This article's factual accuracy may be compromised due to out-of-date information.(March 2022) |
African Union Mission in Somalia | |
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Dates of operation | March 2007 – 31 March 2022 (15 years, 25 days) |
Headquarters | Mogadishu |
Active regions | Central and southern Somalia |
Size | 20,626 (2019) [1] |
Allies |
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Opponents |
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Battles and wars | |
Website | amisom-au |
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was a Multinational force formed by the African Union. The operation deployed to Somalia soon after the Islamic Courts Union was deposed by troops from Ethiopia during a large scale invasion in late 2006. The missions primary objective was to maintain the regime change between the ICU and the newly installed Transitional Federal Government, implement a national security plan and train the TFG security forces. [2] As part of its duties, AMISOM later supported the Federal Government of Somalia in its war against Al-Shabaab. [3] AMISOM was the most deadly peacekeeping operation in the post-war era. [4]
AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. [5] On 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate. [6] Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African Union Peace and Security Council have also been authorized by the United Nations Security Council. [7] [8]
In March 2007, the first AMISOM troops deployed to Somalia, landing in Mogadishu as fighting was raging between Islamist insurgents and Ethiopian/TFG forces. [9] After four years of intense urban fighting against Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, during the Battle of Mogadishu (2010–2011) the Uganda Army and Burundian Army forced the militants to withdraw from the capital. In 2014, the Ethiopia was integrated into AMISOM. [10] In the succeeding years 2012-2015 a number of towns in the hinterland were recaptured, though most of the rural clans remained under Al-Shabaab rule.
The duration of AMISOM's mandate had been extended in each period that it has been up for review, until it was replaced on April 1, 2022, by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. On 21 December 2021, the United Nations Security Council reauthorized AMISOM in Somalia for three months. The new mandate ran until 31 March 2022, ahead of a phased handover of responsibilities to Somalia's security forces in early 2023. [11] AMISOM's mandate ended on 31 March 2022, and was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. [12]
During 2005 the Transitional Federal Government was deeply divided over the issue of a possible deployment of foreign troops in Somalia. Various prominent Somali leaders and groups threatened to forcefully oppose such an intervention. [13] The IGAD planned on deploying in March 2005 despite significant opposition, though the operation was cancelled. [14] As early as 25 March 2005 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rising Islamist group fighting warlords in Mogadishu, warned that any foreigner peacekeepers deployed to Somalia would be unwelcome and face death. [15] Faced with the ascendancy of the ICU after taking over the capital in the Battle of Mogadishu between May and June 2006, UN-watchers were growing concerned with the level of hostility of the ICU towards the proposed foreign deployment. [16] The African Union adopted a plan to deploy troops to Somalia on 14 September 2006. [17] Plans for a foreign deployment continued, though the ICU was clearly opposed, as they saw IGASOM as a US/Western means to curb their growth. [16] Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, [18] but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for foreign troops was issued on 6 December 2006 for six months. [19]
The African Union's involvement in the war came at the insistence of both Ethiopia and the United States for the organization to take over the role of ‘regime changer’. In effect, the newly planned AU military operation in Somalia was an attempt to legitimize the Ethiopian invasion and TFG. According to Cocodia, "AMISOM was more a tool for regime change than it was a peace operation." [20] [21] AMISOM's deployment served as an exit strategy for Ethiopian troops, as their presence was inflaming an insurgency. [22] On 20 February 2007, the United Nations granted authorization for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission by the African Union, known as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The mission's stated primary objective was to provide support for a national reconciliation congress in Somalia. [21]
From 2007 to 2009, AMISOM was predominantly composed of troops from Uganda, Burundi, and a few Kenyans. During 2007, the operation relied heavily on Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), as Uganda played a crucial role in offering support to the initiation of the mission. By the end of the year, Burundian troops also joined the effort. AMISOM's initial mandate did not permit the use of offensive force, resulting in limited involvement in the conflict between Ethiopian forces and the insurgency. This dynamic led to growing tensions between AMISOM and the ENDF, exacerbated by a lack of transparency from Ethiopia regarding its objectives within Somalia. [23] The European Union was reportedly 'exceptionally unhappy' about the heavy US support for the December invasion, and held back funds for the newly created AMISOM mission for several months. [24]
The African Union Peace and Security Council authorized AMISOM in January 2007, explicitly assuming that it would become a UN mission after six months. [25] On 21 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months. [6] On 20 August 2007, the United Nations Security Council extended the African Union's authorisation to continue deploying AMISOM for a further six months and requested the Secretary-General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a United Nations mission to Somalia. [7]
On 31 May 2019, the Security Council unanimously approved United Nations Security Council Resolution 2472, authorising Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2020, with a reduction of the number of troops to 19,626 by 28 February 2020. [26]
The Security Council decided [on 29 May] to reauthorize the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel for nine months, requiring them to support security in the lead-up to elections and to work towards the gradual hand-over of responsibility to Somali forces by 2021. [27]
IGASOM was expected to eventually reach 8,000 troops, with an expected cost of $335 million for the first year. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1725, states bordering Somalia would not be eligible to deploy troops under IGASOM. The remaining (non-bordering) IGAD member nations include Sudan, Eritrea, and Uganda. Because of the objection of the burden falling on these three nations alone (and the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea), the mission was expanded to include other member states of the African Union.
AMISOM has a different composition. As proposed, it comprised an initial three battalions, growing to a total of nine battalions of 850 troops each, which would serve for an initial stabilization period of six months. The mission was to be modelled after the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). [5]
Though IGAD and the ICU met and published a cordial and formal communique [28] committing the ICU to the IGAD plans on 2 December, by the time United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725 was passed on 6 December, [29] the ICU was openly and militantly opposed to peacekeepers entering Somalia, and vowed to treat any peacekeepers as hostile forces. Because of regional divisions, there were also UIC resistance to allowing Ethiopian troops be part of the mission. Ethiopia, for its part, was leery of allowing Eritrean troops to be members of the IGAD peacekeeping force.
In the face of ICU threats, Uganda, the only IGAD members who had openly offered to send forces (a battalion), withdrew in the face of concerns of the present feasibility of the mission. [30] [31] [32] In Uganda's defense, the crisis does not allow for peacekeepers when there are active hostilities conducted with heavy weapons (see Battle of Baidoa).
On 1 January 2007, after the defeat of the ICU in various battles in December 2006, Uganda again renewed its pledge of a battalion of troops. Between Uganda and Nigeria (which is a Member State of the African Union, but not of Intergovernmental Authority on Development), there was a pledge of a total of 8,000 peacekeepers. [33] Ghana, Rwanda and Tanzania were reported to be considering sending forces. [34]
Following the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union in December 2006 – January 2007 the international community began to gather both fiscal commitments as well as military forces for the mission. Nations of the African Union (AU) outside the Intergovernmental Authority on Development community were drawn on to provide support.
On 17 January 2007, the US ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, said the US pledged $40 million to support the deployment of a peacekeeping force for Somalia. [35] By 20 January, the European Union followed with a pledge of 15 million euros. [36] On 19 January 2007 the mission was formally defined and approved by the African Union at the 69th meeting of the Peace and Security Council. [5] On 22 January 2007 Malawi agreed to send a half-battalion to a battalion (ranging widely anywhere between approximately 400 to 1,200 troops) for a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. [37] On 24 January 2007 Nigeria pledged a battalion (a force between 770 and 1,100 troops) to join the Somali peacekeeping mission. [38]
On 1 February 2007 Burundi committed to the peacekeeping mission, pledging up to 1,000 troops. [39] By 27 March, it was confirmed that 1700 Burundian peacekeepers would be sent to Somalia. [40] On 2 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the advent of the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development-led peacekeeping mission. [41] On 5 February 2007 Tanzania offered to train Somali government troops, but not to deploy peacekeepers. [42] On 9 February 2007 a gathering of 800 Somali demonstrators in north Mogadishu, where Islamist support was strongest, burned U.S., Ethiopian, and Ugandan flags in protest of the proposed peacekeeping mission. A masked representative of the resistance group, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations, said Ethiopian troops would be attacked in their hotels; the same group had made a video warning peacekeepers to avoid coming to Somalia. [43] By this date, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi and Burundi had committed to the peacekeeping mission, but the total force was about half of the proposed 8,000-strong force. [44] Uganda had pledged 1,400 troops and some armored vehicles for a mission lasting up to 9 months, and the AU had pledged $11.6 million. [45] On 16 February 2007 Uganda announced it would deploy 1,500 well-seasoned troops as early as Saturday, 17 February 2007 under the command of Major General Levi Karuhanga. Reportedly the troops had been training for two years in preparation for the mission. [46]
Days before AMISOM deployed in Somalia, violence in Mogadishu began rapidly escalating. [47] On 6 March 2007, the first African Union troops landed at Mogadishu airport alongside three military vehicles. [9]
The Burundian troops were technically ready to go in early August 2007, but equipment promised by the United States and France had not yet arrived. [48] On 23 December 2007, an advance force of 100 Burundians was deployed and another 100 soldiers arrived on 2007-12-24. [49] [50] By late 2008, 1,700 Burundian soldiers were deployed to Mogadishu. [51]
On July 28, 2009, the World Health Organization was notified that 21 AMISOM soldiers in Mogadishu had become sick, and three had died, with acute peripheral edema, difficulty in breathing, palpitations, and fever. [52] The WHO, together with the U.S. Center for Disease Control, AMISOM, and the Aga Khan University Hospital in Nairobi began an investigation. From April 26, 2009, to May 1, 2010, 241 AU soldiers had lower limb edema and at least one additional symptom; four patients died. At least 52 soldiers were airlifted to hospitals in Kenya and Uganda. Four of 31 hospitalized patients had right-sided heart failure with pulmonary hypertension. The illness was associated with exclusive consumption of food provided to troops (not eating locally acquired foods). Because the syndrome was clinically compatible with wet beriberi, thiamine was administered to affected soldiers, resulting in rapid and dramatic resolution.
In a closed door meeting in Kampala on 22 July 2010, AU ministers agreed to expand the mission's mandate from a peacekeeping focus to a peace-enforcement focus that would engage al-Shabaab more directly. The decision came soon after deadly bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital. [53] A few days later in response to UN pressure, the AU agreed not to expand the mandate but did allow preemptive strikes against Al-Shabaab and promised more troops from other African countries. [54]
On 23 July 2010, Djibouti and Guinea pledged troops to AMISOM. [55] On 17 September 2010, an AU envoy said in Nairobi that AMISOM's size had grown from 6,300 to 7,200 troops after an additional battalion from Uganda joined the force. [56] In December 2010, the UN backed AMISOM in increasing the mission's authorized size to 12,000 – UN Security Council resolution 1964 of 22 December 2010 – and at the same time reports indicated that Uganda had promised an extra 1,800 personnel, with Burundi an extra 850. [57]
In March 2011 Burundi sent 1,000 extra soldiers to AMISOM, bringing the total number of Burundi troops deployed to 4,400. [58] AFP, reported in Africa Research Bulletin, said Burundian military chief General Godefroid Niyombare said on 14 March 2011 the soldiers had been deployed a week before. [59]
In February 2012, the U.N. Security Council boosted the number of troops deployed from 12,000 to 17,731. The approval comes after a series of recent successes against al-Shabaab fighters who had previous positions throughout the central and southern areas of the country. [60] During the same month, AU Commander Fred Mugisha suggested that Al-Shabaab was "at [its] weakest" and would likely "implode in the not so distant future" owing to successive military defeats that it suffered as well as an exodus toward the Arabian Peninsula of hundreds of the group's fighters. [61]
Due to the successful military operations against the Islamists, the United States has also been stepping up efforts to train and equip the AMISOM troops in a bid to stamp out the Al-Shabaab insurgency and limit its influence. [62]
In October 2011, the Kenya Defence Forces began Operation Linda Nchi, crossing the border into Somalia to attack Al-Shabaab. [63] [64] On 12 November, the Kenyan government agreed to rehat its forces under AMISOM command, [65] and later announced in March 2012 that it would send 5,000 troops to join AMISOM. [65]
The East African reported in March 2012 on reorganisation of AMISOM's headquarters and sector commands. Personnel (J1) would be led by the AU, with Kenya taking responsibility for intelligence (J2) and logistics (J4), Uganda operations (J3) and engineer (J8), Burundi plans (J5) and communications/IS (J6), Sierra Leone training (J7), and Djibouti CIMIC (J9). There would also be four sectors: Uganda responsible for Sector One (the Shabelles and Banadir), Sector Two (the Jubbas) run by Kenya, Sector Three Burundi covering GEdo, Bay, and BAkool, and Sector from which Ethiopia forces were withdrawing from to be directed by Djibouti. [66]
In November 2013, the Ethiopian government announced that it would integrate its troops that are deployed in Somalia into the AMISOM multinational force. Somalia's Foreign Minister Fowzia Haji Yussuf welcomed the decision, stating that the move would galvanize AMISOM's campaign against the insurgent group. She also emphasized the importance of collaboration between Somalia and Ethiopia. [67] The Ethiopian authorities' announcement came a month after a failed October bombing attempt by Al-Shabaab in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, and a week after Ethiopia received a renewed terrorism threat from the insurgent group. [68] According to Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Ambassador Dina Mufti, the Ethiopian military's decision to join AMISOM is intended to render the peacekeeping operation more secure. [69] Analysts also suggested that the move was primarily motivated by financial considerations, with the Ethiopian forces' operational costs now slated to be under AMISOM's allowance budget. It is believed that the Ethiopian military's long experience in Somali territory, its equipment such as helicopters, and the potential for closer coordination will help the allied forces advance their territorial gains. [70] On the other hand, there is a certain amount of unease following Ethiopia's entry into AMISOM given local animosity originating from Ethiopia's heavy handed intervention in 2006. There are also fears that Al Shabaab could use Somali animosity towards Ethiopia as a rallying cry and to recruit more members. [71]
In December 2013, the U.S. government established a military coordination cell in Mogadishu at the request of AMISOM and the Somali government. The unit consists of a small team of fewer than five advisers, including planners and communicators between AMISOM and the Somali authorities. It was intended to provide consultative and planning support to allied forces in order to enhance their capacity. [72]
From June 2021 to March 2022, the EU and its allies reimbursed Kenya nearly Sh2.54 billion, in quarterly disbursements Sh811 million, for its continued military participation in AMISOM. The funding had slowly been decreasing since it began in October 2011, with each soldier taking home only around USD $800 (Sh92,800) in this final installment. [73]
The Head of Mission was the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to Somalia, or SRCC. On 7 October 2015, Francisco Caetano Jose Madeira, of Mozambique, was appointed to this position, replacing Maman Sambo Sidikou of Niger. [74]
No. | Name | Nationality | From | To | Note |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Maj. Gen. Levi Karuhanga [75] [76] | Uganda | 14 February 2007 | 3 March 2008 | |
2 | Maj. Gen. Francis Okello | Uganda | 3 March 2008 | 7 July 2009 | |
3 | Maj. Gen. Nathan Mugisha [77] | Uganda | 7 July 2009 | 15 June 2011 [78] | |
4 | Maj. Gen. Fredrick Mugisha | Uganda | 15 June 2011 [78] [79] | 2 May 2012 [80] | |
5 | Lt. Gen. Andrew Gutti [81] | Uganda | 3 May 2012 | 16 December 2013 [82] | |
6 | Lt. Gen. Silas Ntigurirwa [83] | Burundi | 16 December 2013 | 15 December 2014 | |
7 | Lt. Gen. Jonathon Kipkemoi Rono | Kenya | December 2014 | 23 December 2015 [84] | |
Maj. Gen. Nakibus Lakara | Uganda | December 2015 | Temporarily acting in role | ||
Maj. Gen. Mohamedesha Zeyinu [85] | Ethiopia | March 2016 | Temporarily acting in role | ||
8 | Lt. Gen. Osman Noor Soubagleh [86] | Djibouti | 18 July 2016 | 31 January 2018 | |
9 | Lt. Gen. Jim Beesigye Owoyesigire [87] | Uganda | 31 January 2018 | 31 January 2019 | |
10 | Lt. Gen. Tigabu Yilma Wondimhunegn [88] | Ethiopia | 31 January 2019 | August 2020 | |
11 | Lt. Gen. Diomede Ndegeya [89] | Burundi | August 2020 | December 2021 [90] | |
No. | Name | Nationality | From | To | Note |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Maj. Gen. Juvenal Niyoyunguruza | Burundi | December 2007 | August 2009 | Killed in suicide bomb blast at AMISOM headquarters on 17 September 2009. [91] |
2 | Maj. Gen. Cyprien Hakiza | Burundi | August 2009 | April 2010 | |
3 | Maj. Gen. Maurice Gateretse | Burundi | April 2010 | June 2010 | |
4 | Maj. Gen. Audace Nduwumunsi | Burundi | June 2010 | ||
5a | Maj. Gen. Salvatore Harushimana | Burundi | Deputy Force Commander (Support) | ||
5b | Maj. Gen. Simon N. Karanja [92] | Kenya | 9 April 2012 | December 2013 | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) |
6a | Maj. Gen. Francis Kimeu Nthenge [93] | Kenya | 27 November 2013 | September 2014 | Deputy Force Commander (Support & Logistics) |
6b | Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Baraba Muheesi [94] | Uganda | 27 November 2013 | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) | |
7a | Maj. Gen. Nakibus Lakara [95] | Uganda | April 2015 | 28 October 2016 [96] but then remained until 10 April 2017 [97] | Deputy Force Commander (Logistical Support) |
7b | Maj. Gen. Mohammed Esha Zeyinu [98] | Ethiopia | 30 September 2016 [99] | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) | |
8a | Maj. Gen. Salvator Harushimana | Burundi | 10 April 2017 | Deputy Force Commander (Administration & Logistics) [97] | |
8b | Maj. Gen. Abreha Tesfay [99] | Ethiopia | 1 October 2016 | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) | |
9a | Maj. Gen. Maurice Gateretse | Burundi | incumbent, December 2018 | Deputy Force Commander (Support & Logistics) [100] | |
9b | Maj. Gen. Charles Tai Gituai [101] | Kenya | February 2018 [102] | February 2019 | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) |
10a | Maj. Gen. George Owinow | Kenya | incumbent, September 2020 | Deputy Force Commander (Support & Logistics) [103] | |
10b | Lt. Gen. James Nakibus Lakara | Uganda | February 2019 [104] | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) | |
11a | Maj. Gen. Gerbi Kebede Regassa | Ethiopia | January 2021 | December 2021 [90] | Deputy Force Commander (Support & Logistics) [105] |
11b | Maj. Gen. William Kitsao Shume | Kenya | incumbent, March 2021 [106] | incumbent | Deputy Force Commander (Operations & Plans) |
No. | Name | Nationality | From | To | Note |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Col. Emmanuel Musinguzi [107] | Uganda | 2007 | ? | Initially this position was that of Chief Administration Officer for AMISOM. |
2 | Col. Innocent Oula [108] | Uganda | 2010? | 2011? | |
3 | Col. Simon Ocha | Uganda | |||
4 | Maj. Gen. Osman-Noor Soubagleh | Djibouti | mid-2012 | 2013 | The position was elevated to Force Chief of Staff in mid-2012, following the expansion of AMISOM through the inclusion of KDF forces. |
5 | Brig. Gen. Cyprien Ndikuriyo | Burundi | 2014 | ||
6 | Brig. Gen. Ayub Guantai Matiiri [109] | Kenya | |||
7 | Brig. Gen. Kittila Bulti Tadesse [101] | Ethiopia | |||
8 | Brig. Gen. Kabisa Domitien [110] | Burundi | |||
9 | Brig. Gen. Bob Paciesky Ogik | Uganda | incumbent, May 2021 [111] |
No. | Name | Nationality | From | To |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Capt. Paddy Ankunda [112] | Uganda | March 2007 | February 2008 |
2 | Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku [113] | Uganda | February 2008 | 3 May 2011 |
3 | Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda [114] [115] | Uganda | 3 May 2011 | 8 July 2012 |
4 | Col. Ali Aden Houmed | Djibouti | 8 July 2012 | December 2014 |
5 | Lt. Col. Paul Njuguna | Kenya | 16 March 2015 | April 2016? |
6 | Lt. Col. Joe Kibet [116] | Kenya | April 2016 | April 2017? |
7 | Lt. Col. Wilson Rono | Kenya | April 2017 | April 2018 |
8 | Lt. Col. Richard Omwega | Kenya | April 2018 | incumbent |
On 15 October 2011 Kenyan forces crossed the border into Somalia to attack al-Shebaab. Subsequently UN Security Council resolution 2036 of 22 February 2012 authorized an increase in AMISOM troop numbers to 17,731 to incorporate the Kenyans. [117] This resolution took effect from mid-2012. At this time the initial Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM forces had been successful in largely clearing al-Shebaab militants from Mogadishu and the force was organized into new sectors. [118]
Later, UN Security Council resolution 2124 of 12 November 2013 authorized a troop increase to 22,126 through inclusion of an Ethiopian contingent. [119] This took effect in January 2014, when the Sector organisation was modified to: [120]
In January 2017 Kismayo was mentioned as a separate sector – Sector 6 – under Colonel Paul Njema. [122] On 22 November 2017 AMISOM's twitter feed announced that Colonel Fréderic Ndayisaba of Burundi was replacing Colonel Paul K Njema of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) as Sector 6 Commander and described this command as a multinational sector composed of Burundian, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops based in Kismayo.
a. Commanders
No. | Name | From | To | Note |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Col. Peter Elwelu [123] | March 2007 | February 2008 | With Col. Kyazze |
2 | Col. Godfrey Golooba [124] | February 2008 | ||
3 | Col. Jack Bakusumba [125] | December 2008 | September 2009 | |
4 | Col. Tumusiime Katsigazi [126] | September 2009 | 18 June 2010 | |
5 | Col. Michael Ondoga [127] | 18 June 2010 | 3 May 2011 | |
6 | Brig. Gen. Paul Lokech [77] | 3 May 2011 | November 2012 | |
7 | Brig. Gen. Michael Ondoga [128] | November 2012 | 23 September 2013 | |
Brig. Gen. Deus Sande [129] | 23 September 2013 | 25 September 2013 | Acting in role | |
8 | Brig. Gen. Dick Olum [129] | 25 September 2013 | October 2014 | |
9 | Brig. Gen. Sam Kavuma [130] | October 2014 | 29 November 2015 | |
10 | Brig. Gen. Sam Okiding | 30 November 2015 | 3 January 2017 [131] | |
11 | Brig. Gen. Kayanja Muhanga [132] | 3 January 2017 [131] | 19 December 2017 | |
12 | Brig. Gen. Paul Lokech [133] | 19 December 2017 | 21 December 2018 | |
13 | Brig. Gen. Michael Kabango [134] | 21 December 2018 | ||
14 | Brig. Gen. Richard Otto [135] | |||
15 | Brig. Gen. Don Nabasa [136] | December 2021 | ||
16 | Brig. Gen. Keith Katungi [137] | December 2021 | incumbent | |
b. Battle groups
From the first deployment of Ugandan troops during March 2007—which saw a contingent of two battalions sent to Mogadishu—the UPDF contribution to AMISOM had by 2015 expanded to three battle groups, each of two or three battalions. The following table lists what details are known of the Ugandan battle groups, or 'Ugabag', deployed under AMISOM. The information presented has been collected from Ugandan press reports (largely gleaned from the website 'Allafrica.com') and news reports on the AMISOM website.
Battle Group | Commander | Arr. Somalia | Dep. Somalia | Strength | Composition | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ugabag I | Col. Peter Elwelu [123] | March 2007 | 1,700 | One infantry battalion (Col. Peter Elwelu) and one Armour/ Motorised Infantry battalion (Col. Kyazze) | Lost five personnel? [138] | |
Ugabag II | December 2007 | November 2008 | 97 officers and 1,600 other ranks | Two battalions? | Lost 3 soldiers with 11 wounded during 11-month deployment, although in total nine Ugandans and one Burundian died during the deployment. [139] | |
Ugabag III | Col. Jackson Bakasumba | November/ December 2008 | August/ September 2009 | 1,700 | [139] | |
Ugabag IV | Col. Tumusiime Katsigazi | September 2009 | 1,703 | Two battalions? | [140] | |
Ugabag V | May 2010? | 1,650 | Two battalions? | |||
Ugabag VI | Col. Ondogu although also given as Lt. Col. Francis Chemo | April 2010? | January 2011 | Included 23 Bn (Lt. Col. Patrick Tibihwa, KIA Jun 2011) [141] and possibly also 19 Bn (Lt. Col. Anthony Lukwayo Mbuusi) and 69 Bn (Lt. Col. John Mugarula). | Nine-month deployment. Lost ten personnel with 30 injured [142] Heavily involved in the battle for Mogadishu. [91] | |
Ugabag VII | Lt. Col. Justus Besisira | January 2011 | 1,800 | Two battalions? | [143] | |
Ugabag VIII | Col. Kayanja Muhanga | 7 Bn, 29 Bn and 33 Bn | Participated in Operation Free Shabelle, the May 2012 advance to Afgooye. [144] | |||
Ugabag IX | Col. Stephen Mugerwa, or Lt. Col. Frederick Akiiki Rugadya, or Lt. Col. Eugine Ssebugwawo | April 2012 | May 2013 | 1,500 but also given as 2,369 | Participated in Operation Free Shabelle, the May 2012 advance to Afgooye. Reinforced? by Ugabag IX+ (Col. Stephen Mugerwa) which included 342 Bn (Lt. Col. John Katongole). [144] | |
Ugabag X | Col. Edison Muwaguzi (or Muhanguzi), later charged and demoted | October 2013 | 25 Bn (Maj. Sentamu), 39 Bn (Lt. Col. Wamale), 45 Bn (Maj. Ruziro) | Replaced Ugabag 8. | ||
Ugabag XI | Col. Joseph Balikudembe | January 2013 | February 2014 | 1,700 | Replaced Ugabag 9. Reinforced by 'Ugabag XI+' under Col. Hassan Kimbowa from May 2013? | |
Ugabag XII | Col. Emmy Mulindwa [145] | September/ October 2013 | October/ November 2014 | 2,930 | 37 Bn (Maj. Lugira), 43 Bn (Maj. Ankankunda) and 61 Bn (Maj. Ojuga) | Lost 17 personnel. Participated in Operation Indian Ocean, the August–October 2014 advance to Barawe. [146] |
Ugabag XIII | Col. William Bainomugisha, then Col. Ben Sserwada | February 2014 | June 2015 | |||
Ugabag XIV | Col. Frank Kyambadde | October/ November 2014 | November/ December 2015 | 2,754 | Lost 22 personnel. Based at Barawe. Replaced Ugabag XII. | |
Ugabag XV | Col. Silvio Aguma | April 2016 | 35 Bn (Lt. Col. Paul Muhanguzi) | Based at Arbiska. New battle group, making three in the UPDF contingent. | ||
Ugabag XVI | Col. Bosco Mutambi then Col. Peter Omola Gatilano | June 2015 | July 2016 | 1,400 | Included 13 Bn (Maj. Mwesigye) [147] | Battle group headquartered at Marka. [147] Company base near Janaale was overrun by al-Shabab on 1 September 2015, soon after the battle group's deployment to Somalia. Nineteen Ugandan troops were killed, one captured, [148] and 22 injured. This led to the replacement of the battle group commander and a later Board of Inquiry. [149] |
Ugabag XVII | Col. Bob Ogik | November 2015 | December 2016 | 2,777 [150] | Based at Barawe. Replaced Ugabag XIV. | |
Ugabag XVIII | Col. Ronald Bigirwa | March/ April 2016 | April 2017 [151] | Based at Arbiska. Replaced Ugabag XV. | ||
Ugabag XIX | Col. Anthony Mbuusi Lukwago | July 2016 | July 2017 [152] | Operated in the Marka area. Replaced Ugabag XVI. [153] | ||
Ugabag XX | Col. Bernerd Arinaitwe Tuhaise (Tuhame) [154] | December 2016 | November 2017 [109] | 2,745 | 7 Bn, 69 Bn and one other | Replaced Ugabag XVII. [132] |
Ugabag XXI | Col. Chris Ogwal | April 2017 | April 2018 [155] | Replaced Ugabag XVIII. [156] [151] | ||
Ugabag XXII | July 2017 | 1 Bn and 19 Bn (Lt. Col. Robert Nahamya) [157] | Replaced Ugabag XIX in the Marka area. [158] Later reported to be headquartered at Ceeljaale. [159] [157] | |||
Ugabag XXIII | Col. Eriazile Zake Okolong | November/ December 2017 | December 2018 | 2,400 [160] | [161] | |
Ugabag XXIV | Col. Jackson Kayanja [162] | |||||
Ugabag XXV | Col. Paul Muwanguzi (or Muhanguzi) | July 2018 | July 2019 | 1,406 | Replaced Ugabag XXII [163] [164] [165] | |
Ugabag XXVI | Col. Topher Magino | To replace Ugabag XXIII. [166] | ||||
Ugabag XXVII | Col. Sam Kosiya Kutesa | September 2020 | [167] | |||
Ugabag XXVIII | Col. Wilberforce Sserunkuma | July 2019 | Replacing Ugabag XXV [168] [169] | |||
Ugabag XXIX | Col. Edward Kaddu | December 2019 | April 2021 | [167] | ||
Ugabag XXX | Col. Jimmy Nabiyu Musoke [170] | September 2020 | 1,800 | [171] | ||
Ugabag XXXI | Col. Francis Aragmoi [172] | December 2021? | ||||
Ugabag XXXII | Col. Jonathan Ojok Ochom [173] | April 2021 | Replaced Uganda Battle Group XXIX. | |||
Ugabag XXXIII | August 2021 | 1,848 | To replace Uganda Battle Group XXX. [174] | |||
a. Commanders
No. | Commander | From | To |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Brig. Gen. Juvenal Niyoyunguruza [91] | December 2007 | June 2009 |
2 | Brig. Gen. Prime Niyongabo [83] | June 2009 | June 2010 |
3 | Brig. Gen. Maurice Gateretse [108] | June 2010 | July 2011 |
4 | Col. Oscar Nzohabonimana [175] | July 2011 | June 2012 |
5 | Col. Geard Bigirimana [176] | June 2012 | July 2013 |
6 | Col. Jean Luc Habarugira | July 2013 | |
7 | Col. Reverien Ndayambaje [177] | ||
8 | Col. Venant Bibonimana | June 2016 [178] | |
9 | Brig. Gen. Venuste Nduwayo | July 2016 [179] | |
10 | Brig. Gen. Victor Nduwumukiza | June 2018 [180] | |
11 | Brig. Gen. Leonidas Niyungeko | June 2018 | [180] |
12 | Brig. Gen. Richard Banyakimbona | incumbent, September 2019 [181] | |
13 | Brig. Gen. Telesphore Barandereka [182] | January 2021? | December 2021 [183] |
b. Battalions
Burundi sent its first battalion to Mogadishu to join Ugandan troops in AMISOM in December 2007. It took until October 2008 to build the national contingent up to two battalions, due in part to a lack of equipment. [184] But subsequently the Burundi contingent increased to a six battalion force. [185] The Burundi force commitment is frequently cited as 5432 troops, which would align with a contingent of six battalions (of about 850 personnel each, the UN 'standard') together with headquarters and support elements.
...
...
40, 41 and 42 Battalions were scheduled for deployment in November 2016 but this was delayed. There was speculation this delay was a result of disappointment within Burundi over delays in EU payments in support of AMISOM and the suggestion by the EU that payments could be made directly to the Burundian troops rather than through the Burundi government; or domestic political tensions within Burundi arising from the president running for a third term of office. [194] [195] [196] By January 2017 the Burundi government threatened to withdraw its forces from Somalia altogether, arguing that these were a national contingent and not mere mercenaries, as would be suggested by the troops receiving payment directly from any third party. [197] Subsequently agreement was reached on the question of EU payments and it was announced the Burundi contingents would remain with AMISOM in Somalia. [198]
...
No. | Name | Took command | Left command |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Brig. Gen. Gebremedhin Fikadu Hailu [204] | January 2014 |
Contingent/ Sector 2 Commanders
No. | Name | From | To |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Brig. Gen. Anthony Mukundi Ngere [205] | July 2012 | December 2013 |
2 | Brig. Gen. Walter Koipaton Raria [206] | December 2013 | mid-2015 |
3 | Brig. Gen. Daniel C Bartonjo [207] | mid-2015 | |
4 | Brig. Gen. William Shume [208] | ||
5 | Brig. Gen. Joakim Mwamburi [200] | ||
6 | Brig. Gen. Dickson Ruto | February 2020 [209] | |
7 | Brig. Gen. Paul Njema | February 2020 [209] | |
8 | Brig. Gen. Jeff Nyagah | 24 Feb 2022 [210] | |
9 | Brig. Gen. Jattani Gula | 24 Feb 2022 | incumbent |
a. Sector 4 Commander
No. | Commander | Period | Notes |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Col. Abdourahman Abdi Dhembil [211] | Responsible for Sector 4, headquartered in Belet Weyne and covering Hiiraan and Galgaduud regions. | |
2 | Col. Mohamed Ibrahim Moussa | February 2019 to February 2020 [212] | |
3 | Col. Abdirahman Riyale Hared | Incumbent, January 2021 [213] [214] | |
4 | Col. Hassan Jama Farah | Incumbent, February 2022 [215] | Deputy Commander Col. Yeshiwas Kerbet. |
b. Djibouti Contingent Commander
No. | Commander | Took command | Left command | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Col. Osman Doubad [216] [217] | December 2011 [218] | Col. Osman Doubad is given as Contingent Commander as late as January 2016. [211] | |
2 | Col. Hassan Jama Farah | Incumbent, July 2016 [219] | ||
3 | Col. Abdullahi Muse Omar | Incumbent, February 2022 [215] |
No. | Commander | Arr. Somalia | Dep. Somalia |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Col. Mamadi Mohamed Keita [220] | April 2013 | 4 July 2013, on promotion [221] |
2 | Brig. Gen. Tamba R. Allieu [222] | July 2013? | January 2015? |
Later, during April 2018, a Formed Police Unit of 160 Sierra Leone Police was deployed to AMISOM under the command of Mustafa Solomon Kambeh. [232]
The civilian staff of AMISOM has been operating from Nairobi, Kenya since 2008 due to the security situation in Mogadishu. [233] As of now, they number approximately 81 personnel.
Since the beginning of 2011 AMISOM and TFG has taken control over several strategic places in Mogadishu after several offensives against Al-Shabaab.
With the expanded control over the capital AMISOM on 16 May 2011 moved the civil staff and police officers to Mogadishu. This includes Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia (SRCC) Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra and deputy (SRCC) Honourable Wafula Wamunyinyi. [233]
Much of the key logistical support for the force was provided by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), a field mission of the UN Secretariat Department of Field Support.
The Civilian component was supervised by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia (SRCC) which was represented on the ground by Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif. who oversees the Political, Civil, Humanitarian, Gender and Public Information departments.
Ambassador Epiphanie Kabushemeye-Ntamwana was the civilian Chief of Staff.
The Chief Administrative Officer Timothy Kiguti heads the support component of the mission which includes administration personnel, finance and budgeting, logistics and procurement among other issues.
The Police contingent, which provides capacity building, both institutional and individual in support of the Somali Police Force, was headed by the AMISOM Police Commissioner Anand Pillay.
The United States has provided extensive training for contingents headed for Somalia. In the first half of 2012, Force Recon Marines from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 12 (SPMAGTF-12) trained soldiers from the Uganda People's Defence Force. [234] In the northern spring of 2012 [March–April–May], Marines from SPMAGTF-12 also trained Burundian soldiers. In April and May, members of Task Force Raptor, 3rd Squadron, 124th Cavalry Regiment of the Texas Army National Guard, took part in a separate training mission with the BNDF in Mudubugu, Burundi. SPMAGTF-12 has also sent its trainers to Djibouti, another nation involved in the Somali mission, to work with an army unit there.
At the same time, U.S. troops have assisted in training the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in preparation for their deployment to Somalia later this year[ when? ]. In June 2012, U.S. Army Africa commander Major General David R. Hogg spoke encouragingly of the future of Sierra Leone's forces in conjunction with Kenya. [235] As of June 2012, the RSLAF troops have not yet deployed; the Sierra Leonean defence minister said on 23 June 2012, that the battalion might depart for the Horn 'some time in September [2012].' [236]
In addition, a significant amount of support to AMISOM has been provided by private companies. "Bancroft Global Development, headquartered on Washington's Embassy Row, employs about 40 South African and European trainers who work with [AMISOM's] Ugandan and Burundian troops. [237] Bancroft director Michael Stock told The EastAfrican that these mentors are embedded with AMISOM units in Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia. They coach commanders on ..how to predict and defeat the tactics which foreign fighters bring from outside East Africa and teach to al-Shabaab." Bancroft "does not receive funding directly from the US government but was instead paid by AMISOM, which was then reimbursed by the State Department for these outlays." [238] The Associated Press reports that Bancroft has been paid $12.5 million for its work in Somalia since 2008.
A security analyst in Somalia listed three primary private security companies/private military companies operating in Mogadishu. [239] DynCorp, who provide logistical support in the Somali capital; Bancroft International, who provide training to TFG and AMISOM personnel, as well as assisting with community service delivery; and Pacific Architects & Engineers.
Country | Armed personnel (current) | Casualties | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Troops | Police | Killed | Missing or captured | |
Uganda People's Defence Force | 6,223 | 201 [240] | 110 [241] -2,700+ [242] | |
Burundi National Defence Force | 5,432 [243] | 95+ [241] | 4 missing, [244] 1 captured [245] | |
Ethiopian National Defense Force | 4,395 [246] | 2+ (supposedly) [247] | ||
Kenya Defence Forces | 3,664 [206] | 48 [248] | 36–118 [249] [250] | |
Djibouti Armed Forces | 960 [251] | 8+ [252] [253] [254] | ||
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces | 0 (formerly 850)* [255] | 47 [256] | 1 [255] | |
Nigeria Police Force | 200 [257] | |||
Ghana Police Service | 56 [258] | |||
Total | 20,674 | 550+ | 1,108 [241] -3,000+ [259] | 5 |
According to SIPRI, 1,039 AMISOM soldiers were killed in action between 1 January 2009, and 31 December 2013, with an additional 69 fatalities in 2014 (per AMISOM) bringing the total to 1,108 dead from 2009 through 2014. [241]
AMISOM medical facility records showed 110 Ugandan and 95 Burundian soldiers had died between March 2007 and February 2011 in Somalia. Another 798 AMISOM soldiers were wounded. [241] Some of the deadliest incidents were:
Human Rights Watch investigation uncovers evidence of sexual exploitation of women. Western-backed African Union troops in Somalia gang-raped women and girls as young as 12 and traded food aid for sex, Human Rights Watch has said. An investigation uncovered evidence of sexual exploitation of women seeking medicine for sick babies at what they assumed was the safety of AU military bases. Human Rights Watch documented cases in a 71-page report published on 8 September 2014 with recommendations to the African Union, the United Nations, the Somali government and AMISOM donors UN, EU, UK and US. The African Union dismissed the Human Rights Watch claims as isolated cases. [304] [305] [306]
29 May 2020 The Security Council reauthorized the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 28 February 2021. [368]
The 14 year long AMISOM mission came to an end in March 2022 and it was replaced by a Somali led operation, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). [370]
The Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), previously known as the National Resistance Army, is the armed forces of Uganda. From 2007 to 2011, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the UPDF had a total strength of 40,000–45,000, consisting of land forces and an air wing. Recruitment to the forces is done annually.
The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, also known as the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia or the Ethiopian intervention in the Somali Civil War, was an armed conflict that lasted from late 2006 to early 2009. It began when military forces from Ethiopia, supported by the United States, invaded Somalia to depose the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and install the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The conflict continued after the invasion when an anti-Ethiopian insurgency emerged and rapidly escalated. During 2007 and 2008, the insurgency recaptured the majority of territory lost by the ICU.
Various international and local diplomatic and humanitarian efforts in the Somali Civil War have been in effect since the conflict first began in the early 1990s. The latter include diplomatic initiatives put together by the African Union, the Arab League and the European Union, as well as humanitarian efforts led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) and the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).
The 2009 timeline of events in the Somalia War (2006–2009) during January 2009 is set out below. From the beginning of February the timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present) is set out following the conclusion of the previous phase of the civil war.
The Somali Civil War (2009–present) is the ongoing phase of the Somali Civil War which is concentrated in southern and central Somalia. It began in late January 2009 with the present conflict mainly between the forces of the Federal Government of Somalia assisted by African Union peacekeeping troops and al-Shabaab militants who pledged alliegence to al-Qaeda during 2012.
Two large-scale attacks against AMISOM soldiers carried out by al-Shabaab suicide bombers in Mogadishu, Somalia occurred in 2009. In total 32 people, including 28 AMISOM soldiers, were killed and 55 people were injured.
Bulo Marer is a town in the southwestern Lower Shebelle region of Somalia. It was a base of Al-Shabaab, and was the site of an ill-fated 2013 military operation during which French commandos attempted to free a French hostage that was being held by the insurgent group. The town was taken by Somali government forces assisted by AMISOM troops after a battle on August 30, 2014. It was the site of the 2024 African Union base attack in Bulo Marer.
The Battle of Mogadishu (2010–11) began on 23 August 2010 when al-Shabaab insurgents began attacking government and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) positions in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab began its offensive after its spokesman said the group was declaring a "massive war" on troops sent by AMISOM, describing its 6,000 peacekeepers as "invaders". In December 2010 the number of AMISOM troops was increased to 8,000 and later to 9,000. The battle's name usually includes the years, when referenced, in order to distinguish it amongst the nine major Battles of Mogadishu during the decades long Somali Civil War.
This is a 2011 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
Operation Linda Nchi was the Kenya Defence Forces' invasion of southern Somalia beginning in 2011. The Kenyan government declared the operation completed in March 2012, but its forces then joined AMISOM in Somalia.
This is a 2012 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
The Battle of Kismayo was an offensive led by the Kenya Defence Forces, under the codename Operation Sledge Hammer, to seize the port city of Kismayo, Somalia, from Al-Shabaab from 28 September 2012. Members of the Raskamboni movement militia were part of the amphibious force.
This is a 2014 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
Operation Indian Ocean was a joint military operation between the Somali military, AMISOM and the United States military against the Al-Shabaab militant group aimed at eliminating the remaining insurgent-held areas in southern Somalia. It officially began in August 2014.
This is a 2015 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
This article contains a timeline of events for the Somalimilitant group al-Shabaab.
The Golweyn ambush by al-Shabaab militants against an AMISOM convoy took place on 30 July 2017. Resulting in the death of several Ugandan soldiers, the attack seriously disrupted the control of pro-government forces over the Lower Shebelle region in Somalia, eventually leading to the fall of the strategically significant town of Leego to al-Shabaab.
On August 10, 2021, a patrol of Ugandan soldiers that formed part of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) were ambushed and attacked in a farmland about 2½ kilometers from Golweyn by Al-Shabaab Islamic militants while on a routine patrol to secure the main supply route along the Beldamin-Golweyn Forward Operating Base in the Lower Shabelle.
This attack was followed by an exchange of gunfire between AMISOM forces and Al-Shabaab militants, that lasted several hours. "During the counterattack, 7 terrorists were killed while others sustained injuries and an assortment of weapons was recovered," AMISOM said in a tweet. Also one Ugandan soldier died. But afterwards, reports were received that the 7 deceased were not members of Al-Shabaab but civilians and that they had been killed by AMISOM forces, upon which the tweet was deleted. Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, the Governor of Lower Shabelle confirmed after talking to local residents, that five farmers and two others whose vehicle broke down on the side of the road, were killed by the AMISOM soldiers after the ambush by al-Shabaab. District Commissioner Nur Osman Rage, detailed that after their encounter with Al-Shabaab, AMISOM forces "diverted to a nearby farm, picked an elderly farmer and four of his workers, blindfolded them and paraded them on the tarmac road. They then stopped two trucks on transit in the area, picked the two drivers, blindfolded them and together with the other five, took them to a point where an IED was planted, forced the civilians to sit on the device and detonated it on the seven victims who were blindfolded, instantly killing them.” The incident was allegedly witnessed firsthand by Somali security officers, local elders and many others in the area.
The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is an active African Union transition and drawdown mission from peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Formerly the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), ATMIS's mandate will end in 2024, with full transition of security operations to the Somali National Armed Forces. ATMIS consists of troops from the East African nations of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
The battle of Buulo Mareer took place on 26 May 2023, when Al-Shabaab fighters stormed an African Union military camp manned by Ugandan forces in the town of Bulo Marer, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
AMISOM is, by far, the most deadly peace operation worldwide over the last 80 years
The AU's involvement was an attempt to legitimize the Ethiopian invasion and the TFG. The dominant narrative of the AUs peace operation has masked the intervention for what it truly was. AMISOM was more a tool for regime change than it was a peace operation.
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