2022 al-Shabaab invasion of Ethiopia | |||||||
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Part of the Ethiopian–Somali conflict, the Somali Civil War (2009–present), Ethiopian civil conflict (2018–present) and the spillover of the Tigray war | |||||||
Al-Shabaab fighters inside a Liyu Police base on the 21st July 2022 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Units involved | |||||||
| Several units, [8] including the "Ethiopian Front" [3] | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Unclear | |||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
800+ killed, 100 captured (Ethiopian claim) [11] [13] | |||||||
On 20 July 2022, the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab launched an invasion [14] from Somalia into Ethiopia's Somali Region. Taking advantage of the instability created by the Tigray war, the goal of the operation was to establish a presence for the group within southern Ethiopia. [2]
The incursion began with over a thousand Al-Shabaab fighters staging diversionary attacks on four Ethiopia–Somalia border towns in order to allow a force of 500 to 800 fighters to penetrate the Ethiopian security zone and advance into the region. [9] [15] During the initial days of fighting, Al-Shabaab primarily fought against the Somali Region's security forces. [12] Further cross-border attacks continued in the following days, while Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) carried out counter-offensives in response. [1]
Al-Shabaab forces advanced 150 kilometers into the Ogaden. [15] After two weeks of intense clashes and airstrikes, the ENDF and Somali Region security forces began to reassert control. A battalion of around 500 al-Shabaab fighters succeeded in evading the Ethiopian army and reached its main target, the Bale Mountains. [2] Several weeks after the operation was over, clashes continued to break out in border regions. [1]
Al-Shabaab was able to successfully establish a presence in Bale following the incursion and created several training camps. [2] It is the largest attack by al-Shabaab in Ethiopian territory to date. [8]
Historically, the Somali inhabited Ogaden (organized into the Somali Region in 1995), along with the adjacent Ethiopian-Somali border, has been disputed and been the place of several interstate wars and insurgencies (both nationalist and Islamist). In addition, eastern Ethiopia has been affected by a number of ethno-nationalist rebellions, some of which were motivated by separatism in Oromia. [14] During the 1960's, Bale Province, inhabited by the Oromo and Somali people, saw a major revolt against Emperor Haile Selassie lasting nearly a decade. Common Islamic faith provided a basis for cooperation between Oromo and Somalis when the insurgency broke out against the Ethiopian Empire in 1963. [16] In 1991, the Somali government collapsed and Somalia was embroiled in a full-scale civil war. During 1992, the Ethiopian government attacked Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), a rising Islamist political-military group in the Ogaden that was a registered political party; in a bid to crush the movement. This sparked a jihad between the Ethiopians and AIAI. [17] Al-Itihaad began to launch raids into Ethiopia. In doing so, it possibly forged links with local rebels such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). In 1996, Ethiopia responded to these raids by launching its first armed intervention into Somalia. [14]
In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia to depose the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). In the following two years most of the country fell to an Islamist insurgency and Ethiopia withdrew in 2009. [18] The invasion and military occupation led to the rise of Al-Shabaab, a youth militia within the wider military wing of the ICU, which became an independent faction in early 2007 and began governing territory in 2008. [19] [20] In early 2007, an al-Shabaab force led by Aden Ayro launched an incursion into Ethiopia in retaliation for the invasion, but was quickly repelled. [8] Al-Shabaab has also had hostile relations with insurgents fighting for independence in the Somali Region. During December 2007, an al-Shabaab force in the Somali Regions Degahbur Zone fought with the Ogaden National Liberation Front. [21] Instead of eliminating "Jihadist" activity the invasion led to its rise in Somalia. [22] By the time of the ENDF withdrawal in early 2009, Al-Shabaab's forces had grown significantly in numbers, swelling from just six hundred to several thousand fighters strong since the invasion began. [23] Al-Shabaab later pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012. [19] [24] The group has also voiced support for pan-Somali ideas, describing the Ethiopian-Somali border as "artificial". [9]
Overall, al-Shabaab has only been able to organize a few attacks inside Ethiopia. [14] After Ayro's early 2007 incursion, the group's leader Ahmed Godane set up the "Ethiopian Front" to organize terrorist attacks, but this force failed to make an impact. Further attack plans by al-Shabaab's intelligence wing Amniyaat were also foiled. [8] In 2014, Ethiopia was formerly integrated into the African Union Mission in Somalia. [25] Since then, the Ethiopia has maintained an armed presence, deploying both the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) as well as the Liyu police [lower-alpha 1] in Somalia. [14]
Ethiopian officials often arrested suspected Al-Shabaab infiltrators. [14] Researcher James Barnett argued that the Liyu police in particular had organized "effective—if controversial—counterterrorism operations" which had prevented insurgents from establishing a lasting presence in Ethiopia. [2]
In 2020, the Tigray war erupted and greatly weakened the ENDF, resulting in a partial withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia. [14] Despite this, 4,000 Ethiopian troops remained stationed in Somalia as of mid-2022. [9] Meanwhile, al-Shabaab experienced another period of growth, increasing the number of its attacks and capturing more territory in Somalia. [14] In 2021, it seemed as if the Ethiopian government might collapse due to the Tigray war; security analyst Matt Bryden argued that al-Shabaab began to plan an invasion in this period. [11] A similar analysis was provided by Barnett who argued that al-Shabaab hoped to exploit the unrest generated by the war. [2]
Al-Shabaab spent more than a year before the attack considering the operation. [26] It trained thousands of fighters for the operation, recruiting large numbers of ethnic Somalis and Oromo from Ethiopia. [11] Preparations were made for an invasion by trying to set up a small supporter network at El Kari, deep inside Ethiopia. [3]
In May 2022, the insurgents launched a series of attacks to weaken the Ethiopian and Somali pro-government presence at the border, possibly to prepare for the following invasion. [9] In early July, Osman Abu Abdi Rahman, al-Shabaab governor of the Somali gobol Bakool, declared war on the Liyu police. [6] Five days before the invasion, Ethiopian security forces conducted a raid in El Kari, killing a local cleric who was identified as an "al-Shabab commander". [3]
In late July 2022 Al-Shabaab assembled 1,500–2,000 insurgents for the attack. [9] [1] The scale of mobilization for the incursion surprised many observers, with vehicles and supplies mobilized in large numbers by the militants. [26]
The rebel offensive [9] began on 20 July 2022, as al-Shabaab shut down the telephone networks across the South West State of Somalia. [8] One al-Shabaab unit [8] then launched a surprise attack on four settlements on the Somali side of the border, [9] including the towns Aato and Yeed as well as the village of Washaaqo. These settlements were garrisoned by units of the Ethiopian Liyu police. [8] The rebels defeated the garrisons of Aato and Yeed [8] [14] [9] and proceeded to burn down the Ethiopian bases at both towns. [14] Around this time, al-Shabaab top leader Fu'ad Mohamed Khalaf visited Aato and used the opportunity to denounce the Liyu police. [6]
According to Voice of America journalist Harun Maruf, [6] Critical Threats analysts Liam Karr and Emily Estelle, [9] as well as Somali regional and intelligence officials, this first attack was a diversionary operation designed to facilitate an invasion into Ethiopian territory by another al-Shabaab force. [8] Local officials and civilians stated that pro-government forces eventually retook Aato and Yeed. [8] [27] [10] Both sides claimed to had inflicted heavy losses on the other. [14] [10]
On 20 or 21 July 2022, [14] [9] about 500 al-Shabaab fighters [8] crossed the border at Yeed [9] from Somalia's Bakool into Ethiopia's Afder Zone. [14] The invading force reportedly mostly consisted of militants recruited from Ethiopia itself. [8] Al-Shabaab's "Ethiopian Front", led by Ali Diyaar, was known to have taken part in the operation. [3] The rebels advanced 150 kilometres (93 mi) into Ethiopian territory. [6] They captured the town of Hulhul, [14] but were encircled there by Somali Region paramilitary forces [8] on 22 July. [9] In the following, three-days-long battle for Hulhul, [14] the rebel force was destroyed [27] or at least forced to retreat. [14] The Ethiopian government claimed that its troops had killed over 100 al-Shabaab rebels at Hulhul, [14] and destroyed 13 vehicles. [8]
On 24 or 25 July, [8] [9] an al-Shabaab contingent of about 200 fighters [9] made another incursion at Ferfer, clashing with security forces at Lasqurun village. [8] After some fighting, this attack was also repulsed by Somali Region security forces; the latter claimed to had killed 85 rebels during this clash. [6] Meanwhile, the ENDF deployed reinforcements to the Somali Region. [4] At this point, Ethiopian officials argued that all invaders had been eliminated, though security analysts cautioned that some rebels might had slipped through the pro-government defensive lines. [8] The Ethiopian government later admitted that operations against al-Shabaab invaders were continuing. [4] According to Critical Threats, one rebel unit had entered Ethiopia east of El Barde, and was still active between Gode and Kelafo by 27 July. [9] A third invading force, counting several hundred al-Shabaab militants, reportedly also entered Ethiopia around this time. Rebels belonging to this force were subsequently sighted near El Kari, Jaraati, and Imi. According to "credible reports", some al-Shabaab troops were also moving toward Moyale. [11]
Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early August. [28]
The ENDF and Somali Region military began to plan a counter-offensive against the Somali insurgents, [4] and subsequently launched a series of ground and air attacks along the border that inflicted several losses on the rebels. [11] The Somali Region government also announced its plan to create a buffer zone along the border to prevent more rebel incursions. [29] By 29 July, Aato was back under pro-government control, though was again attacked by a large al-Shabaab force. [30] On 31 July, Ethiopia announced that it had killed three rebel commanders at the border, though al-Shabaab denied this. [11] [5] Fu'ad Mohamed Khalaf was initially reportedly among the dead, as was al-Shabaab's chief border commander, Ubeda Nur Isse, and a spokesman. However, none were killed. Al Shabaab released a voice recording of Qalaf, who denied Ethiopian forces killed him on July 29. He further stated that al Shabaab would continue to attack the Somali Regional Liyu police [5] Local civilians organized ad hoc self-defense groups to hunt for rebel stragglers. The clashes in Ethiopia lasted into early August, and one small al-Shabaab contingent (initially suspected to number 50 to 100 fighters, later reported to number up to 500) actually reached its target, the Bale Mountains, probably in the wider El Kari area. [3] [2]
Somali Region officials claimed that the al-Shabaab invaders had planned to advance up to Oromia to coordinate with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). OLA wages an independent insurgency against the Ethiopian government, and had become part of a major, cross-regional rebel alliance in 2021. [14] However, the Long War Journal and other researchers argued that a cooperation between OLA and al-Shabaab is unlikely, as no independent proof of links between the two factions was surfaced so far. [14] [11] In addition, OLA is a secular nationalist group in stark contrast to al-Shabaab's strongly religious alignment. [6] Instead, the official claims appeared to mirror previous statements of the Ethiopian government which has repeatedly alleged links between various local insurgent groups and al-Shabaab in order to frame any local rebels as terrorist organizations. [14] Al-Shabaab has also previously rejected accusations of cooperating with Ethiopian rebels, stating that the latter were "un-Islamic" and "therefore unworthy of its support". [6]
Independent journalists argued that al-Shabaab was probably not trying to coordinate with other insurgents, [11] [6] but instead trying to open a new frontline in Ethiopia. As fighting was still underway, Horn of Africa analyst Matt Bryden argued that the rebels had probably aimed to advance into the Bale Mountains. [6] This was later confirmed by local officials and the movement of one al-Shabaab group. [3] The Long War Journal speculated that al-Shabaab was intending to exploit the local tensions and fighting between various groups at Bale Mountains, including by OLA, to set up their own bases there. [6] Former al-Shabaab official Omar Mohamed Abu Ayan argued that the invasion had been probably conducted for propaganda reasons by the Somali insurgents. [8]
Head of the ENDF claimed that more than 800 Shabaab fighters along with 24 top commanders had been killed. Voice of America reported that these claims could not be verified. [13] Somali Region president Mustafa Mohammed Omar claimed more than 600 Shabaab fighters had been killed. [11]
A number of Somali Region officials informed VOA that the al-Shabaab had inflicted heavy losses on the Ethiopians, and captured several local administrators before their main force was defeated. [13] Al-Shabaab claimed it killed hundreds of Somali region forces. [12] The groups Radio Andalus claimed that it had killed 187 ENDF troops in the attack. [11]
The Ethiopian government framed the invasion as a major victory over the invading force. [14] President Omar of Somali Region stated that he had visited the troops who had retaken Hulhul, and thanked them for their service. [7] Deeply concerned by the invasion, the ENDF increased troop deployments in the buffer zone it maintains between the border and areas where Al-Shabaab is active. [28]
Initially it was reported about 100 Al-Shabaab fighters had reached their target of the Bale Mountains, though Ethiopian officials claimed that they were too few in number to establish a viable presence. [1] On 5 August 2022 it was reported that, "Hundreds of al-Shabab fighters were able to slip into Ethiopia last week alone", with their presence detected in numerous local communities in the Somali Region. [11] According to a 2023 Hudson Institute report, an entire al-Shabaab battalion, about 500 militants, were able to set up a camp in the Bale Mountains due to the invasion. This battalion was reportedly mostly recruited from the Oromo ethnic group. [2] Roland Marchal observed that Al-Shabaab would likely, "... pursue a discreet policy of putting down roots. Their primary objective is not to carry out attacks, but to gain acceptance and to forge links," [26]
Since mid-2022, al-Shabaab forces in Bale have not claimed any attacks in order to maintain their operational security. By late 2023, Barnett pointed out that the al-Shabaab unit in the Bale Mountains had not yet engaged in significant operations. However, he pointed out that the Somali rebel group had made attempts to further reinforce its troops inside Ethiopia. For instance, the Bale Mountains-based battalion had attacked the Liyu police in August 2023 to divert attention from the border in order to enable fresh troops from Somalia to launch another incursion. [31] In December 2023, the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service claimed it had foiled a series of attacks planned by Al-Shabaab in Jigjiga and several other cities in Somali Region. [32] During March 2024, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission released a report asserting al-Shabaab forces were operating in Bale and had killed several police officers. The reported was disputed by Ethiopian authorities in Bale who claimed there were no Shabaab insurgents in the region. [33]
The Ogaden National Liberation Front is a social and political movement, founded in 1984 to campaign for the right to self-determination for Somalis in the Ogaden or Somali Region of Ethiopia. The armed wing of the ONLF waged an insurgency against the Ethiopian government from 1994 to 2018.
The Islamic Courts Union was a legal and political organization founded by Mogadishu-based Sharia courts during the early 2000s to combat the lawlessness stemming from the Somali Civil War. By mid-to-late 2006, the Islamic Courts had expanded their influence to become the de facto government in most of southern and central Somalia, succeeding in creating the first semblance of a state since 1991.
The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, also known as the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia or the Ethiopian intervention in the Somali Civil War, was an armed conflict that lasted from late 2006 to early 2009. It began when military forces from Ethiopia, supported by the United States, invaded Somalia to depose the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and install the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The conflict continued after the invasion when an anti-Ethiopian insurgency emerged and rapidly escalated. During 2007 and 2008, the insurgency recaptured the majority of territory lost by the ICU.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was a Multinational force formed by the African Union. The operation deployed to Somalia soon after the Islamic Courts Union was deposed by troops from Ethiopia during a large scale invasion in late 2006. The missions primary objective was to maintain the regime change between the ICU and the newly installed Transitional Federal Government, implement a national security plan and train the TFG security forces. As part of its duties, AMISOM later supported the Federal Government of Somalia in its war against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM was the most deadly peacekeeping operation in the post-war era.
The Ethiopian–Somali conflict is a territorial and political dispute between Ethiopia, Somalia, and insurgents in the area.
Fuad Mohamed Qalaf, also known as Fuad Shangole, is a Somali-Swedish militant Islamist.
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, commonly known as al-Shabaab, is a transnational Salafi Jihadist military and political organization based in Somalia and active elsewhere in East Africa. It is actively involved in the ongoing Somali Civil War and incorporates elements of Somali nationalism into its Islamist cause. Allegiant to the militant pan-Islamist organization al-Qaeda since 2012, it has also forged ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The Insurgency in Ogaden was an armed conflict that took place from 1992 to 2018. It was waged by nationalist and islamist Somali insurgent groups seeking self determination for the region, primarily the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI). The war in the region began in 1992, when the Ethiopian government attacked AIAI in an attempt to suppress the growth of the organization. In 1994, the ONLF commenced its armed struggle and began publicly calling for an independent 'Ogadenia' state.
The Somali Civil War (2009–present) is the ongoing phase of the Somali Civil War which is concentrated in southern and central Somalia. It began in late January 2009 with the present conflict mainly between the forces of the Federal Government of Somalia assisted by African Union peacekeeping troops and al-Shabaab militants who pledged alliegence to al-Qaeda during 2012.
A series of battles in Hiraan, Shabeellaha Dhexe and Galgudug, between rebels of al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam and Somali government forces and ICU militants loyal to the government, erupted during spring 2009. The fighting led to al-Shabaab capturing major government strongholds and Ethiopian forces re-entering Somalia and setting up bases in Hiraan. There was a halt in fighting during a government offensive in Mogadishu, which started on May 22.
Ahmed Abdi Godane, also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, was a Somali militant leader who was the Emir (leader) of Al-Shabaab, an Islamist militant group based in Somalia. Godane, who received training and fought in Afghanistan, was designated by the United States as a terrorist. The exact date of Godane's rise to al-Shabaab's Emir is debated, although it seems he ascended to this position in December 2007.
This is a 2011 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
Operation Linda Nchi was the Kenya Defence Forces' invasion of southern Somalia beginning in 2011. The Kenyan government declared the operation completed in March 2012, but its forces then joined AMISOM in Somalia.
This is a 2012 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
This is a 2014 timeline of events in the Somali Civil War (2009–present).
This article contains a timeline of events for the Somalimilitant group al-Shabaab.
Since the early 2000s, the United States has provided military support to the Transitional Federal Government and the Federal Government of Somalia in conflicts. U.S. military actions in Somalia date back to the 1990s; however, following the September 11th attacks, military action was justified as counterterrorism. The Obama and Trump administrations conducted drone and fighter aircraft strikes, advisory missions, and training; provided intelligence; and attacked al-Shabaab militants. Two U.S. special operations personnel, two contractors, one US Army soldier, and a CIA paramilitary officer have died during operations in Somalia.
The ongoing Ethiopian civil conflict began with the 2018 dissolution of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERPDF), an ethnic federalist, dominant party political coalition. After the 20-year border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a decade of internal tensions, two years of protests, and a state of emergency, Hailemariam Desalegn resigned on 15 February 2018 as prime minister and EPRDF chairman, and there were hopes of peace under his successor Abiy Ahmed. However, war broke out in the Tigray Region, with resurgent regional and ethnic factional attacks throughout Ethiopia. The civil wars caused substantial human rights violations, war crimes, and extrajudicial killings.
In July 2009, Ethiopia passed Anti-Terrorism Legislation to counter insurgencies and terror acts. The legislation is heavily criticized by opponents who argued the legislation is a cornerstone for government to initiate crackdowns and jailing opposition leaders and dissents. Proponents defended that the law combats terrorist acts in the country in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). The Ethiopian government often used to justify political repressions by limiting freedom of expression wherein many journalists and critics jailed for many years. In addition, the EPRDF regime used to dismantle propaganda against certain political parties such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which was designated as terrorist group until 2018.
In July a force of 500-800 al-Shabab fighters penetrated a security zone maintained by Ethiopia, then crossed 150km into that country with the aim of setting up a base in the Bale mountains.
... relations between ONLF and al-shabaab have reached the worst stage since they first got into conflict in Degahbur Zone in December 2007