Algiers Accords (2015)

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Algiers Accords (2015)
Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali
SignedMay 15 and June 20, 2015
Location Bamako, Mali and Algiers, Algeria
SignatoriesFlag of Mali.svg Mali
CMADrapeau.JPG Coordination of Azawad Movements

The Algiers Accords, officially referred to as the Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, is a 2015 agreement to end the Mali War. The agreement was signed on May 15 and June 20, 2015, in Bamako, following negotiations in Algiers between the Republic of Mali and Coordination of Azawad Movements.

Contents

Background

In 2013, the Ouagadougou Accords were signed between the Malian government and secessionist Tuareg rebels. Shortly afterward, fighting broke out in Kidal between May 17 and 21, 2014. The Malian army was defeated, and subsequently lost control of Ménaka, Andéramboukane, Anefif, and Kidal. [1] [2] Negotiations restarted in Kidal at the behest of the Malian government on May 22, and were mediated by Mauritanian and AU president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The negotiations ended with a return to the stipulations of the Ouagadougou Accords. However, Tuareg separatists remained in control of Kidal and Menaka. [3] [4]

Accords

On February 19, 2015, representatives from the Malian government and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) agreed upon a new document, including the cessation of hostilities, as negotiations to end the broader war continued in Algiers. [5] On March 1, a mediation agreement was proposed by Algeria, which was accepted by Mali and pro-government militias. The CMA asked for some time to consider the agreement, as there were no propositions for autonomy or federalism for northern Mali, which angered a large portion of Tuareg rebels. [6] [7] The CMA announced their refusal to sign the agreement on April 10. [8]

On April 27, the pro-government GATIA and Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) captured Menaka, initiating new clashes between Tuareg rebels and the pro-government militias. [9] On May 10, the CMA initialized the agreement, but did not sign the text. [10] The peace agreement was signed on May 15 in Bamako by the Malian government, representatives of pro-government militias, and representatives from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, the African Union, the United Nations, ECOWAS, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, and France. [11] No CMA representatives were present for the signing on May 15. [12] [13] That same day, fighting broke out near Menaka. [14]

Under pressure from international organizations, the CMA finally signed the agreement in Bamako on June 20. The CMA's representative was Sidi Brahim Ould Sidati, a leader of the MAA. [15]

Implementation

The Carter Center, who was appointed as the independent observer of the agreement's implementations in 2017, stated that 22% of the accords' provisions were put into effect by 2017, and by 2020, that number had only increased to 23%. [16] While the Malian Army was dispatched to Kidal as per the terms of the agreement, the troops never actually patrolled the city. Similarly, CMA fighters were sent to Gao under similar provisions. [16]

Part of the reason for the lack of implementation was the need for more willingness by the signatories to honor it. A March 2020 survey showed slightly over eighty percent of Malian civilians had little to no knowledge of the peace agreement. [16] The CMA continued to exercise de facto control over the Kidal region, which the Malian government tolerated as Malian government control of the region would force the government to enact constitutional reforms upending the status quo. [16]

Nullification

Tensions arose between the Malian government and the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD), a coalition of the CMA and pro-government militias, in August 2023 following the Malian government and allied Wagner Group's atrocities against civilians. [17] The conflict culminated on August 11, 2023, when CSP-PSD fighters clashed with Mali and Wagner over control of the former MINUSMA base in Ber, which MINUSMA hadn't even finished evacuating. [17] This conflict spiraled into a war between the CSP-PSD and the Malian government, and the nullification of the Algiers Agreement. [18]

The Malian government announced its withdrawal from the agreement on January 25, blaming hostility from Algeria. [19]

See also

Algiers Accords (2006)

Related Research Articles

The May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change is a Malian Tuareg rebel group, formed in 2006 by ex-combatants from the 1990s Tuareg insurgency in Mali. In 2007, splinters of the organisation returned to combat in northern Mali, launching the Malian element of the 2007 Tuareg insurgency. Led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, this ADC faction continued to operate under that name, despite most elements remaining under ceasefire. In July 2008, most of these elements, along with much of the splinter following Ag Bahanga reached another accord with the Malian government in Algiers. Ag Bahanga and a faction of that group rejected the accord and fled to Libya. At the end of 2008, this faction returned to fighting, operating under the name Alliance Touaregue Nord Mali Pour Le Changement (ATNMC). The government of Mali has contended since 2007 that the Ag Bahanga faction of the ADC is a "band of marginals" who were "isolated from the heart of the Tuareg community", primarily motivated by lucrative Trans-Saharan smuggling operations operating from Ag Bahanga's home town of Tin-Zaouatene. Ag Bahanga and the other leaders of his faction contend that the government of Mali oppresses the Tuareg population of the north, and has repeatedly failed to live up to its agreements with the ADC and other groups. Outside observers have also speculated that internal rivalries between Tuareg from the Kel Adagh and the Ouilliminden confederations have frustrated peace attempts.

The Ouagadagou Declaration is the final declaration signed by the six political and military movements of Azawad, following a meeting that took place in Burkina Faso at the end of August 2014. The purpose of the declaration was to put an end to hostilities in northern Mali and to establish a political and legal status for Azawad. It was signed on August 28, 2014 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. During this meeting, the groups were gathered together for the first time since the Ouagadougou Agreements of June 2013. The meeting took place following the first round of the Algiers peace negotiations in July 2014 and before these negotiations resumed in Algiers on September 1, 2014.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Coordination of Azawad Movements</span> Mali resistance coalition

The Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) (Tamasheq: ⵜⴰⵙⵈ ⵏ ⵜⵏⴰⴾⵔⵢⵓⵏ ⵜⵢⵏ ⴰⵣⴰⵓⴰⴷ; Arabic: تنسيقية الحركات الأزوادية; French: Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad) is a large coalition of Tuareg independentist and Arab nationalist groups which formed in Mali during the Northern Mali conflict in 2014.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies</span> Pro-government armed group in Mali

The Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies is an armed group in Azawad, Mali. Most of its 500 to 1,000 fighters are Imghad Tuaregs, and the group supports the Malian government.

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The Tamanrasset Accords of 1991 were signed on January 6, 1991, between Malian chief of staff Colonel Ousmane Coulibaly, the chief of staff of the Malian Army, and Iyad Ag Ghaly, representing Tuareg militants. The accords aimed to put an end to the Tuareg rebellion of 1990, and led to the demilitarization of northern Mali, including the cities of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. The accords were signed in Tamanrasset, Algeria, under Algerian mediation.

Hassan Ag Fagaga, born around 1959 or 1966, in Kidal, Mali is a former Malian soldier and a Tuareg rebel.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Coalition of the People of Azawad</span> Political and military party in Mali

The Coalition of the People of Azawad, also translated as the Coalition for the People of Azawad (CPA) is a Tuareg political and military movement formed in 2014 during the Mali War.

El Hadj Ag Gamou, born December 31, 1964, in Tidermène, Mali, is an Imghad Tuareg Malian division general. Gamou is currently the governor of Kidal Region since November 22, 2023, and has also been the head of his faction of Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies since the group's foundation. Prior to his governorship, Gamou served in the Malian army, commanding Malian troops against Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in the early stages of the Mali War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">High Council for the Unity of Azawad</span>

The High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) (French: Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad) is a Tuareg political movement formed on May 2, 2013, during the Mali War. The movement was initially called the High Council of Azawad (HCA) (French: Haut conseil de l'Azawad) before changing its name on May 19, 2013.

On July 26, 2017, clashes broke out between the pro-government GATIA Imghad Tuareg militia and anti-government Idnane Tuareg rebels from the Coordination of Azawad Movements.

On 10 August 2016, clashes broke out between pro-government GATIA militiamen against Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) aligned groups near Adjlal, Kidal Region, Mali.

The battle of Kidal took place between July 21 and 22, 2016 between GATIA, a pro-government militia consisting of Imghad Tuaregs, against the Coordination of Azawad Movements, consisting of Ifoghas Tuaregs.

The Algiers Accords for the Restoration of Peace, Security, and Development in Kidal Region were the peace agreements that laid out a roadmap to development of northern Mali and the end of the Tuareg rebellion of 2006. The accords allowed for a normalization of relations between Kidal Region, Ménaka Cercle, and the Malian government. The agreement was signed on July 4, 2006, and was signed between Malian government representatives and representatives of the May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change, under Algerian mediation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Alghabass Ag Intalla</span>

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References

  1. AFP. "Au Mali, Kidal et Ménaka sous contrôle des rebelles". Libération (in French). Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  2. "Chassé de Kidal, le gouvernement malien décrète un cessez-le-feu". RFI (in French). 2014-05-22. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  3. "Mali: trois groupes armés à Kidal acceptent un accord de cessez-le-feu". RFI (in French). 2014-05-23. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  4. "Mali: les groupes armés à Kidal acceptent un cessez-le-feu avec Bamako". L'Obs (in French). 2014-05-23. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  5. "Mali: une déclaration signée à Alger lors des négociations de paix". RFI (in French). 2015-02-20. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  6. "Mali : un "accord de paix et de réconciliation" signé à Alger". Le Point (in French). 2015-03-01. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  7. "Mali: les discussions continuent dans le Nord autour de l'accord d'Alger". RFI (in French). 2015-03-13. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  8. "Nord du Mali: la CMA ne paraphera pas le projet d'accord de paix". RFI (in French). 2015-04-11. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  9. "Nord du Mali: les groupes armés ont paraphé l'accord de paix d'Alger". RFI (in French). 2015-05-14. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  10. "Mali : un accord de paix très fragile pour le Nord". Le Figaro (in French). 2015-05-14. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  11. "Mali: signature de l'accord de paix, sans les principaux groupes rebelles". RFI (in French). 2015-05-15. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  12. "Le Mali signe la paix, mais sans les Touareg". Le Point (in French). 2015-05-15. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  13. "la CMA informe qu'aucun de ses membres n'est présent à la cérémonie de signature à Bamako". mnlamov.net. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  14. Touzet, Jean-Louis Le. "«La situation au Mali a empiré»". Libération (in French). Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  15. "Accord de paix au Mali: scènes de fraternisation entre anciens ennemis". RFI (in French). 2015-06-21. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  16. 1 2 3 4 "Mali's Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 2020-06-24. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  17. 1 2 "Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 2023-10-13. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  18. "Mali peace deal under threat following increase in attacks by armed Tuareg groups". RFI. 2023-09-13. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  19. "Mali ends peace deal with separatist groups – DW – 01/25/2024". dw.com. Retrieved 2024-01-25.

Further reading