1988 Summer Olympics boycott

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1988 Summer Olympics boycott
Part of the Olympic Games boycotts
1988 Summer Olympics (Seoul) boycotting countries (blue).png
The seven countries which boycotted the 1988 Games are shaded blue
DateSeptember 17 – October 2, 1988 (1988-09-17 1988-10-02)
(37 years ago)
Location
Caused by
Methods
Parties
Lead figures
Number
Boycotting athletes: 320+

The boycott of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul followed four years after the Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. The boycott involved seven socialist countries: North Korea and four of its allies, Cuba, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Madagascar, all of whom withdrew specifically in protest against North Korea's failure to secure a role as co-host of the Games; and two other socialist countries, Seychelles and Albania, who did not offer reasons for their absence.

Contents

Coming at a time during the waning years of the Cold War, the boycott represented a fracturing of the Eastern Bloc, with a preponderance of Bloc countries choosing to attend the Olympics rather than supporting North Korea. [2]

Leadup to boycott

'Co-hosting' request and negotiations

Cognizant of the enmity existing between the two Koreas and wishing to prevent any actions that might undermine the Games' organization, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) began in 1985 coordinating a series of joint meetings in order to help facilitate North Korea's participation in the Games. The idea of co-hosting the Olympics did not originate with the IOC; rather, the idea first came from Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, who suggested to South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Won Kyong on June 27, 1984, that one way of assuring a "smooth running of the Games" in Seoul was for South Korea to consider ceding a particular number of sporting events and locations to the North, who would act as co-host for those segments. That idea was similarly suggested by Cuban President Fidel Castro, who, on December 1, 1985, had sent a letter to the president of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, where Castro attacked the IOC's choice of Seoul for the Summer Games and demanded that the Games be split between North and South Korea. [3]

The South Koreans and the IOC were categorically opposed to the idea of having a 'co-host' for the Games but were prepared to allow the North to serve as a site for a minimal number of athletic segments from the Games. The precedent for carrying out an Olympic Games' athletic events in two separate countries had been previously set at the 1956 Summer Olympic Games, when Australia hosted the majority of events in Melbourne while equestrian events were held in Stockholm. [4] In order to explore how this arrangement might work, the IOC proposed meeting with the North and South Korean NOCs at the IOC's headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland.

First joint meeting

The first joint meetings between the IOC and the North and South Korean NOCs began on October 8, 1985, in Lausanne. [5] Kim Yu-sun, President of the Olympic Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OCDPRK), put forward a proposal for the following items: [6]

Kim Chung-ha, President of the South Korean National Olympic Committee (then known as the Korean Amateur Sport Association or KASA), responded by describing the legal contracts which the IOC had entered into with the South Korean NOC and the Republic of Korea, and that this "established fact" would preclude them from agreeing to many of the items on the North's list, [7] save for two modified elements: That the two Korean teams enter the stadium during the Opening Ceremonies together in one instance, and that a location within North Korea serve as a partial site for an athletic competition, perhaps one of the cycling events. After two days of meetings, the first round was adjourned until the second round, scheduled for January 1986.

Meeting of the socialist ministers of sport in Hanoi

In the time between the first two joint sessions, Samaranch traveled to Hanoi on November 1416, 1985, to attend the 34th Annual meeting of the Eastern Bloc Ministers of Sport in order to gauge the level of any support North Korea might receive from the ideologically socialist-oriented countries. Upon his arrival, Samaranch was disappointed to learn that North Korea's Minister of Sport was using his time in Hanoi to lobby other countries' participants into adopting a categorical resolution against the Games occurring only in Seoul. However, only Cuba appeared to be so-strongly supportive of North Korea's proposals that it was considering a boycott. The Cuban Minister, Conrado Martinez, used his speech time to effectively deliver what Samaranch called "a diatribe" against the IOC and the 1988 Games. [8]

The other nations present offered only cautious support when discussing the matter, seemingly avoiding any commitments to a boycott. Antonín Himl of Czechoslovakia supported the idea of organizing some events in North Korea, while Lia Manoliu of Romania merely reaffirmed her support of the Olympic Movement and the IOC. Gunther Heinz of East Germany spoke highly of the IOC's first joint session with the two Korean NOCs, stating that it demonstrated the possibility for positive results. Trendafil Martinski of Bulgaria mentioned his country's wish to avoid the boycotts that affected 1980 and 1984, while Marat Gramov of the Soviet Union was not particularly insistent upon any course of action. Marian Renke of Poland spoke of his belief that nothing about Seoul's being chosen could be changed, no matter what North Korea was hoping for. The Mongolian representative expressed only mild support for North Korea. [9]

Second and third joint meetings

The second joint meeting between the IOC and North and South Korea occurred on January 89, 1986, in Lausanne. By the time of this second meeting, the North Korean position and demands had changed to a degree. The request to have the name of the Games changed was dropped, and the North had reduced the number of athletic events they were requesting to host to eight. This, however, was still far more than the South and the IOC were prepared to accept. [10] By the third round in June 1986, North Korea had agreed in principle to host table tennis, archery, preliminary-round soccer, and a 100-km cycle race from Pyongyang to Seoul. However, in February 1987, North Korean demands for athletic competitions to host had increased once again to 8 events. [11] Samaranch stated that "I think the offer we made to the North Koreans was both historic and very generous. There could be minor changes, but we cannot go beyond that". [12]

It was around this time that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung met with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who told Kim that "the Olympics is a huge channel for cooperation, for influencing in the needed direction". When the discussion turned to the possibility of a boycott by the Eastern Bloc in support of North Korea achieving its aims, Gorbachev said, "if we took this road [the road of boycott], we would do injury to ourselves, and to our policy". [2]

Civil unrest and fourth joint meeting

The death of a Korean activist, Park Chong-chul, in January 1987, while undergoing interrogation at the hands of South Korean police, led to mass protests being held across the country in April, 1987. [13] The further death of a university student in July, and concerns over South Korea's Presidential election system, exacerbated the protests against the government, leading commentators around the world to question South Korea's ability to successfully orchestrate the coming Summer Games. A speech given by Roh Tae-woo, the candidate for President of South Korea at the next election, was viewed positively as resolving the protests. [14] [15]

Meanwhile, the fourth round of joint meetings began on July 14, 1987. [16] Despite Samaranch's previous claim that the proposals offered in February 1987 were likely the last, best offer to the North, the offer being discussed in July was an "improved proposal":

Additional considerations, including allowing those events to be conducted entirely in North Korea, and scheduling for a fifth series of meetings where they would discuss the formation of a new Organizing Committee in the North to coordinate only those activities being held there, as well as ensuring television coverage, were also to be granted. [17] As long as the North agreed to withdraw their request to "co-host" the Games, comply with the Olympic Charter, attend the Opening and Closing Ceremonies (which would only be held in Seoul), participate in the Games, and allow guaranteed unrestricted travel across their border. [18] The offer on its face was historic in nature, in that the concessions the IOC was proposing went against the principles laid down by the Olympic Charter. [19] Samaranch described the proposals as "exceptional and unprecedented" and urged the North to make a timely reply. Inexplicably, the North, showing much prevarication, failed to accept the newer proposals.

Failure of the joint meetings

IOC Vice President Richard W. Pound described the different positions of the North and South and the inability to meet in the middle as "the very heart of the political problem". The peculiar manner in which the two Koreas communicated with each other also complicated their search for middle ground. Samaranch referred to this as the Olendorf Method , which involves "responding to any statement or question with something entirely offpoint and completely unrelated to the topic at hand", the resulting chaos being "often a feature of the[ir] negotiations". [20] The only silver lining, as Pound saw it, was how the more radicalized positions of the North eventually worked against the North realizing its own goals, while working for the South and the IOC in realizing theirs:

"In the end, the likelihood of inter-Korean cooperation on the scale necessary to coordinate the logistical aspects of the Olympic Games was, at best, illusory. The South wanted it to be clear that it was the host nation and that anything it might give to the North should be seen as just that — an accommodation made by the official host of the Games. The North, on the other hand, was desperately afraid of being maneuvered into a position that would be manifestly subservient to the South. Placed in the middle, the IOC wanted to keep pressure on the North and to continue to give them more opportunities to isolate themselves. The more it could appear that the IOC was doing everything to be reasonable in the face of unreasonable conduct, the more likely it was that the [other] NOC's would be sympathetic to its [the IOC's] efforts. The more irrational and unreasonable the DPRK could appear to be, the better it would be for this process. North Korea resolutely took advantage of every such opportunity to lose the backing of those who might otherwise have been inclined to support its position." [21]

Richard W. Pound, IOC Vice President

With a breakdown in negotiations, the destruction of Korean Air Flight 858 in November 1987and North Korea's apparent culpability in the bombing [22] left it even more isolated, with "such support as they might have garnered, even among the socialist countries, evaporating significantly thereafter". [23] [24] [25]

Boycott announcements

North Korea

With the North Koreans refusing to accept the IOC's 'historic' proposals, and no more joint meetings on schedule that might have offered North Korea additional room to maneuver, on January 12, 1988, the North announced it was boycotting the Games. The Korean Central News Agency reported on the announcement made by the North Korean NOC, saying "we will not participate in the Olympic Games to be singly hosted by South Korea". [26]

Cuba

On February 4, 1986, the Cuban Communist Party Third Congress began in Havana, with Cuban President Fidel Castro hosting the majority of Cuban government officialdom as well as a variety of foreign Communist and socialist dignitaries, among them, North Korean Vice President Pak Song-chol and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. On February 6, Vice President Pak made a speech where he urged other countries to "wage a dynamic struggle" for North Korea to get a share of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games. In response, Castro guaranteed that Cuba would boycott the 1988 Games unless North and South co-hosted the event. [27] Castro's stance was due in part to Cuba's loss to Ecuador as host of the 1987 Pan American Games, with "Castro's support for Kim Il Sung in the dispute over the Seoul Olympics thus complementing his own set of grievances about the state of the international Olympic movement". [28]

On January 15, 1988, Cuba reiterated that it would boycott the Games in Seoul owing to "North Korea not being invited to co-host the event with South Korea". The official Cuban news agency Prensa Latina , reporting on an announcement made in Havana by Cuban Olympic Committee President Manuel González Guerra, said Cuba "will not register for, nor will it commit itself to participating in the Olympic Games", adding that Cuba "would be prepared to reconsider its decision if there were co-sponsorship of the Games". [29]

Nicaragua

On February 7, 1986, during the final day of the Cuban Communist Party Third Congress, North Korean Vice President Pak met privately with Nicaraguan President Ortega, where Pak repeated his exhortations for Nicaraguan support of their co-hosting the Olympics. As Castro had done earlier, Ortega pledged Nicaragua's support, saying that his country would not participate in the Seoul Games if North Korea's proposal to co-host did not come about. [27]

On September 15, 1986, while visiting North Korea, Ortega repeated this pledge at a banquet hosted by Kim Il Sung, with Ortega affirming that "Nicaragua will not participate in the Games if the co-hosting proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not realized". [30]

On May 20, 1987, Nicaraguan Olympic Committee (NOC) President Moisés Hassan restated his country's plan of action that "if the 1988 Olympics are not carried out in Pyongyang and Seoul, the two Korean capitals, Nicaragua will not attend this event". [31]

Despite these three prior pronouncements on Nicaragua's boycott intentions, on January 16, 1988, in a telex sent by Nicaraguan OC President Hassan to IOC President Samaranch, there was no mention made of North Korea. [32] Instead, Hassan claimed a 'lack of concentration on sport' due to hostilities in Nicaragua, non-qualification of their best athletes through the Pan American Games, and a 'bad economic situation' [33] as causing Nicaragua's nonattendance. Samaranch dismissed these reasons as false, calling Hassan's telex "a feeble rationalization of a political decision not to participate", [32] and reminded Hassan in a reply telex that the Nicaraguan OC would not share in any of the Olympic Solidarity funds for the period of 19881992 if it failed to participate in the Seoul Games, "seeing as they will not have contributed towards raising the funds which we subsequently distribute". [34] [b]

Ethiopia

On December 18, 1985, in an address given before the African continental association of National Olympic Committees, President of the Ethiopian Olympic Committee and commissioner for sports and physical culture, Tsegaw Ayele, warned of an Olympic boycott in 1988 if the Games were not co-hosted by North Korea. [36] According to Samaranch, Ayele's address signaled that the internal decision for Ethiopia to boycott was likely already made by the Ethiopian Communist Party's Central Committee two years before being announced. Unfortunately for Ethiopia and its athletes, Samaranch stated, their decision failed to take into account the directional changes made by the other socialist members of the Eastern Bloc, which by a later point, were moving away from boycotts and towards participation in the Seoul Games. [37]

Nevertheless, on January 20, 1988, Ethiopia publicly announced that it would boycott the 1988 Summer Olympics in solidarity with North Korea, saying "At a time when the Korean people, who are divided against their will, are struggling for peaceful negotiations, Ethiopia strongly objects to the Olympic Games being conducted in South Korea, which further strengthens disunity", adding that Ethiopia would participate "if the decision to keep the Games in South Korea were reversed". [38]

Madagascar

Between June 2326, 1988, Samaranch tasked a UNESCO official, Charles Randriamanantenasoa, with paying a visit to Madagascar during celebrations for the twenty-eighth anniversary of Malagasy Independence. During this visit, Randriamanantenasoa met with various government officials as well as Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka, to whom Randriamanantenasoa had delivered a plea for allowing "the young people and the athletes" of Madagascar to attend the Seoul Games. Ratsiraka replied that the position adopted by the Malagasy Joint Ministers/Supreme Councillors of the Revolution Committee was that they would only participate if North Korea were allowed a co-hosting role. Randriamanantenasoa reported back to Samaranch that "although certain Malagasy officials were not in favor of the decision, none dared to make any other suggestion to the President, who alone appeared to have the final word". [39]

Despite Ratsiraka's apparent intransigence, Madagascar had mistakenly responded positively to the initial invitation to attend, but later corrected itself, withdrawing from the Games in support of North Korea, as it had earlier said it would. This reason was noted by the SLOOC in their official report on the Games released in 1989. [40]

Albania

Albania did not publicly offer a reason for their boycott, [34] but the country was generally believed to have subscribed to a policy of isolationism at the time. The 1988 Summer Olympic Games represented the fourth Summer Games in a row which Albania had boycotted.

Seychelles

The Seychelles did not publicly offer a reason for their boycott. [34]

Non-boycotting socialist countries

The following members of the Eastern Bloc and other related socialist countries did not join the boycott and participated in the 1988 Summer Olympic Games:

Notes

  1. While Madagascar, Nicaragua, and the Seychelles were—and still are—official members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Albania was never formally part of that group. [1]
  2. Samaranch also told Hassan that he found it strange that Nicaragua would have participated in the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the Central American and Caribbean Games, and the Pan American Games the year before "if the country was in the same circumstances as the present". [35]

References

  1. "Albanian Communist Leader Questions Nonaligned Status". The New York Times. Vol. 133, no. 45820. AP. October 3, 1983. Archived from the original on October 3, 2022.
  2. 1 2 Radchenko (2011), p. 9.
  3. Pound (1994), p. 67.
  4. "North Korea's Failure to Acquire More Events Risks Eastern Bloc Boycott". UPI. February 26, 1987.
  5. Mousset, Violette & Épron (2023), p. 389.
  6. Radchenko (2011), p. 66.
  7. Pound (1994), pp. 108–109.
  8. Pound (1994), p. 122.
  9. Pound (1994), pp. 123–124.
  10. Pound (1994), pp. 120, 157.
  11. Myers, Morley (February 12, 1987). "North Korean Officials Request an Increase in Hosted Events". UPI.
  12. Myers, Morley (February 13, 1987). "North Korea's Demand for a Bigger Share of 1988 Seoul Olympics Produces Swift Riposte from IOC". UPI.
  13. Lee, C.Y. (April 23, 1987). "Memorial Service Erupts Into Violence". UPI.
  14. Radchenko (2011), pp. 8–10.
  15. Kim, James (June 29, 1987). "Sports Official Says Reform Proposals Shows Hope for Olympic Success". UPI.
  16. Radchenko (2011), p. 138.
  17. Radchenko (2011 , p. 148) "The IOC had reconsidered the proposal put forward at the close of the third round of talks and was prepared to put forward an improved proposal as follows: men’s and women’s archery competitions, men’s and women’s table tennis competitions, one group of the football tournament, the cycle road race and the women’s volleyball competitions would be organized in the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Should the NOC accept this proposal, the IOC would call a fifth meeting in order to discuss other issues such as free circulation, formation of an Organizing Committee in Pyongyang, television coverage and so forth."
  18. Pound (1994), pp. 254–257.
  19. Radchenko (2011), p. 148.
  20. Pound (1994), p. 290.
  21. Pound (1994), pp. 112, 161–162.
  22. Reed, Jack (December 1, 1987). "Man and Woman Suspected of Planting Bomb Are Believed to Be North Korean Agents". UPI.
  23. Pound (1994), p. 265.
  24. "China and Poland Tell North Korea They Will Not Join Possible Boycott". UPI. December 10, 1987.
  25. Sneider, Daniel (August 29, 1988). "North-South Korea Talks Leave Question Mark Over Olympics". Christian Science Monitor.
  26. "North Korea Announces It Will Boycott the 1988 Summer Olympic Games". UPI. January 12, 1988.
  27. 1 2 Pound (1994), p. 121.
  28. Radchenko (2011), p. 2.
  29. "Cuba Will Not Attend the 1988 Seoul Olympics". UPI. January 15, 1988.
  30. "President Daniel Ortega Says Nicaragua to Boycott 1988 Seoul Olympics Unless North Korea Given Co-Hosting Role". UPI. September 15, 1986.
  31. Bonilla, Oswaldo (May 20, 1987). "Nicaragua Conditions Its Attendance at Olympic Games". UPI. Moises Hassan, Nicaragua Olympic Committee president, told the El Nuevo Diario newspaper the problem was a 'political question' and that Nicaragua 'fully' backed North Korean demands. ... 'If the 1988 Olympics are not carried out in Pyongyang and Seoul, the two Korean capitals, Nicaragua will not attend this event,' Hassan told the newspaper.
  32. 1 2 Pound (1994), pp. 271–272.
  33. Janofsky, Michael (January 16, 1988). "Nicaragua Says No". The New York Times. Archived from the original on October 27, 2022. Moisés Hassan said that the decision was based on athletic and financial considerations, and that it was not politically motivated. He said that solidarity with North Korea, which is boycotting the Games, was not a factor.
  34. 1 2 3 Myers, Morley (February 1, 1988). "IOC to Discuss Steps to Punish Nations Who Boycott for Political Reasons". UPI.
  35. Pound (1994), p. 272.
  36. Pound (1994), p. 371.
  37. Pound (1994), p. 278.
  38. "Ethiopia Says It Will Boycott Seoul Olympics". UPI. January 20, 1988.
  39. Pound (1994), pp. 298–300.
  40. Official Report of the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad Seoul 1988 (PDF) (Report). Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee. September 17, 1989. p.  246. Madagascar pulled out of the Games at the last minute in support of the co-hosting demands of North Korea.
  41. 1 2 "143 Countries Accept Olympic Invitations". UPI. January 7, 1988.
  42. 1 2 "145 Countries Sign Up for Summer Games". UPI. January 8, 1988.
  43. "China Will Attend the Seoul Olympics". UPI. January 14, 1988.
  44. "East Germany Will Attend Summer Olympics in Seoul". UPI. December 21, 1987.
  45. "Hungary Becomes First East-bloc Nation to Accept 1988 Olympics Invitation". UPI. December 21, 1987.
  46. "Poland and the Soviet Union Will Participate in the 1988 Seoul Games". UPI. January 5, 1988.
  47. Nadler, Gerald (January 11, 1988). "Soviet Union, Despite a Boycott by Ally North Korea, Will Participate in the Seoul Summer Olympics". UPI.

Works cited