Key to the far-right worldview is the notion of societal purity, often invoking ideas of a homogeneous "national" or "ethnic" community. This view generally promotes organicism, which perceives society as a unified, natural entity under threat from diversity or modern pluralism. Far-right movements frequently target perceived threats to their idealized community, whether ethnic, religious, or cultural, leading to anti-immigrant sentiments, welfare chauvinism, and, in extreme cases, political violence or oppression.[2] According to political theorists, the far-right appeals to those who believe in maintaining strict cultural and ethnic divisions and a return to traditional social hierarchies and values.[3]
In practice, far-right movements differ widely by region and historical context. In Western Europe, they have often focused on anti-immigration and anti-globalism, while in Eastern Europe, strong anti-communist rhetoric is more common. The United States has seen a unique evolution of far-right movements that emphasize nativism and radical opposition to central government.
According to scholars Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, the core of the far right's worldview is organicism, the idea that society functions as a complete, organized and homogeneous living being. Adapted to the community they wish to constitute or reconstitute (whether based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or race), the concept leads them to reject every form of universalism in favor of autophilia and alterophobia, or in other words the idealization of a "we" excluding a "they".[5] The far right tends to absolutize differences between nations, races, individuals or cultures since they disrupt their efforts towards the utopian dream of the "closed" and naturally organized society, perceived as the condition to ensure the rebirth of a community finally reconnected to its quasi-eternal nature and re-established on firm metaphysical foundations.[6][7]
As they view their community in a state of decay facilitated by the ruling elites, far-right members portray themselves as a natural, sane and alternative elite, with the redemptive mission of saving society from its promised doom. They reject both their national political system and the global geopolitical order (including their institutions and values, e.g. political liberalism and egalitarianhumanism) which are presented as needing to be abandoned or purged of their impurities, so that the "redemptive community" can eventually leave the current phase of liminal crisis to usher in the new era.[5][7] The community itself is idealized through great archetypal figures (the Golden Age, the savior, decadence and global conspiracy theories) as they glorify non-rationalistic and non-materialistic values such as the youth or the cult of the dead.[5]
The Encyclopedia of Politics: The Left and the Right states that far-right politics include "persons or groups who hold extreme nationalist, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, religious fundamentalist, or other reactionary views." While the term far right is typically applied to fascists and neo-Nazis, it has also been used to refer to those to the right of mainstream right-wing politics.[11]
According to political scientist Lubomír Kopeček, "[t]he best working definition of the contemporary far right may be the four-element combination of nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, and welfare chauvinism proposed for the Western European environment by Cas Mudde."[12] Relying on those concepts, far-right politics includes yet is not limited to aspects of authoritarianism, anti-communism[12] and nativism.[13] Claims that superior people should have greater rights than inferior people are often associated with the far right, as they have historically favored a social Darwinistic or elitist hierarchy based on the belief in the legitimacy of the rule of a supposed superior minority over the inferior masses.[14] Regarding the socio-cultural dimension of nationality, culture and migration, one far-right position is the view that certain ethnic, racial or religious groups should stay separate, based on the belief that the interests of one's own group should be prioritized.[15]
In comparing the Western European and post-Communist Central European far-right, Kopeček writes that "[t]he Central European far right was also typified by a strong anti-Communism, much more markedly than in Western Europe", allowing for "a basic ideological classification within a unified party family, despite the heterogeneity of the far right parties." Kopeček concludes that a comparison of Central European far-right parties with those of Western Europe shows that "these four elements are present in Central Europe as well, though in a somewhat modified form, despite differing political, economic, and social influences."[12] In the American and more general Anglo-Saxon environment, the most common term is "radical right", which has a broader meaning than the European radical right.[17][12] Mudde defines the American radical right as an "old school of nativism, populism, and hostility to central government [which] was said to have developed into the post-World War II combination of ultranationalism and anti-communism, Christian fundamentalism, militaristic orientation, and anti-alien sentiment."[17]
Jodi Dean argues that "the rise of far-right anti-communism in many parts of the world" should be interpreted "as a politics of fear, which utilizes the disaffection and anger generated by capitalism. [...] Partisans of far right-wing organizations, in turn, use anti-communism to challenge every political current which is not embedded in a clearly exposed nationalist and racist agenda. For them, both the USSR and the European Union, leftist liberals, ecologists, and supranational corporations–all of these may be called 'communist' for the sake of their expediency."[18]
In Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right, Cynthia Miller-Idriss examines the far-right as a global movement and representing a cluster of overlapping "antidemocratic, antiegalitarian, white supremacist" beliefs that are "embedded in solutions like authoritarianism, ethnic cleansing or ethnic migration, and the establishment of separate ethno-states or enclaves along racial and ethnic lines".[19]
Modern debates
Terminology
According to Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, the modern ambiguities in the definition of far-right politics lie in the fact that the concept is generally used by political adversaries to "disqualify and stigmatize all forms of partisan nationalism by reducing them to the historical experiments of Italian Fascism [and] German National Socialism."[20] Mudde agrees and notes that "the term is not only used for scientific purposes but also for political purposes. Several authors define right-wing extremism as a sort of anti-thesis against their own beliefs."[21] While the existence of such a political position is widely accepted among scholars, figures associated with the far-right rarely accept this denomination, preferring terms like "national movement" or "national right".[20] There is also debate about how appropriate the labels neo-fascist or neo-Nazi are. In the words of Mudde, "the labels Neo-Nazi and to a lesser extent neo-Fascism are now used exclusively for parties and groups that explicitly state a desire to restore the Third Reich or quote historical National Socialism as their ideological influence."[22]
One issue is whether parties should be labelled radical or extreme, a distinction that is made by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany when determining whether or not a party should be banned.[nb 1] Within the broader family of the far right, the extreme right is revolutionary, opposing popular sovereignty and majority rule, and sometimes supporting violence, whereas the radical right is reformist, accepting free elections, but opposing fundamental elements of liberal democracy such as minority rights, rule of law, or separation of powers.[23]
After a survey of the academic literature, Mudde concluded in 2002 that the terms "right-wing extremism", "right-wing populism", "national populism", or "neo-populism" were often used as synonyms by scholars (or, nonetheless, terms with "striking similarities"), except notably among a few authors studying the extremist-theoretical tradition.[nb 2]
Relation to right-wing politics
Italian philosopher and political scientist Norberto Bobbio argues that attitudes towards equality are primarily what distinguish left-wing politics from right-wing politics on the political spectrum:[24] "the left considers the key inequalities between people to be artificial and negative, which should be overcome by an active state, whereas the right believes that inequalities between people are natural and positive, and should be either defended or left alone by the state."[25]
Aspects of far-right ideology can be identified in the agenda of some contemporary right-wing parties: in particular, the idea that superior persons should dominate society while undesirable elements should be purged, which in extreme cases has resulted in genocides.[26] Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform in London, distinguishes between fascism and right-wing nationalist parties which are often described as far right such as the National Front in France.[27] Mudde notes that the most successful European far-right parties in 2019 were "former mainstream right-wing parties that have turned into populist radical right ones."[28] According to historian Mark Sedgwick, "[t]here is no general agreement as to where the mainstream ends and the extreme starts, and if there ever had been agreement on this, the recent shift in the mainstream would challenge it."[29]
Proponents of the horseshoe theory interpretation of the left–right political spectrum identify the far left and the far right as having more in common with each other as extremists than each of them has with centrists or moderates.[30] This theory has received criticism,[31][32][33] including the argument that it has been centrists who have supported far-right and fascist regimes over socialist ones.[34]
Nature of support
Jens Rydgren describes a number of theories as to why individuals support far-right political parties and the academic literature on this topic distinguishes between demand-side theories that have changed the "interests, emotions, attitudes and preferences of voters" and supply-side theories which focus on the programmes of parties, their organization and the opportunity structures within individual political systems.[35] The most common demand-side theories are the social breakdown thesis, the relative deprivation thesis, the modernization losers thesis and the ethnic competition thesis.[36]
The rise of far-right parties has also been viewed as a rejection of post-materialist values on the part of some voters. This theory which is known as the reverse post-material thesis blames both left-wing and progressive parties for embracing a post-material agenda (including feminism and environmentalism) that alienates traditional working class voters.[37][38] Another study argues that individuals who join far-right parties determine whether those parties develop into major political players or whether they remain marginalized.[39]
Early academic studies adopted psychoanalytical explanations for the far right's support. The 1933 publication The Mass Psychology of Fascism by Wilhelm Reich argued the theory that fascists came to power in Germany as a result of sexual repression. For some far-right parties in Western Europe, the issue of immigration has become the dominant issue among them, so much so that some scholars refer to these parties as "anti-immigrant" parties.[40]
Intellectual history
Background
The French Revolution in 1789 created a major shift in political thought by challenging the established ideas supporting hierarchy with new ones about universal equality and freedom.[41] The modern left–right political spectrum also emerged during this period. Democrats and proponents of universal suffrage were located on the left side of the elected French Assembly, while monarchists seated farthest to the right.[20]
The strongest opponents of liberalism and democracy during the 19th century, such as Joseph de Maistre and Friedrich Nietzsche, were highly critical of the French Revolution.[42] Those who advocated a return to the absolute monarchy during the 19th century called themselves "ultra-monarchists" and embraced a "mystic" and "providentialist" vision of the world where royal dynasties were seen as the "repositories of divine will". The opposition to liberal modernity was based on the belief that hierarchy and rootedness are more important than equality and liberty, with the latter two being dehumanizing.[43]
As the concept of "the masses" was introduced into the political debate through industrialization and the universal suffrage, a new right-wing founded on national and social ideas began to emerge, what Zeev Sternhell has called the "revolutionary right" and a foreshadowing of fascism. The rift between the left and nationalists was furthermore accentuated by the emergence of anti-militarist and anti-patriotic movements like anarchism or syndicalism, which shared even fewer similarities with the far right.[50] The latter began to develop a "nationalist mysticism" entirely different from that on the left, and antisemitism turned into a credo of the far right, marking a break from the traditional economic "anti-Judaism" defended by parts of the far left, in favour of a racial and pseudo-scientific notion of alterity. Various nationalist leagues began to form across Europe like the Pan-German League or the Ligue des Patriotes, with the common goal of a uniting the masses beyond social divisions.[51][52]
The Völkisch movement emerged in the late 19th century, drawing inspiration from German Romanticism and its fascination for a medieval Reich supposedly organized into a harmonious hierarchical order. Erected on the idea of "blood and soil", it was a racialist, populist, agrarian, romantic nationalist and an antisemitic movement from the 1900s onward as a consequence of a growing exclusive and racial connotation.[53] They idealized the myth of an "original nation", that still could be found at their times in the rural regions of Germany, a form of "primitive democracy freely subjected to their natural elites."[48] Thinkers led by Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Alexis Carrel and Georges Vacher de Lapouge distorted Darwin's theory of evolution to advocate a "race struggle" and an hygienist vision of the world. The purity of the bio-mystical and primordial nation theorized by the Völkischen then began to be seen as corrupted by foreign elements, Jewish in particular.[53]
Translated in Maurice Barrès' concept of "the earth and the dead", these ideas influenced the pre-fascist "revolutionary right" across Europe. The latter had its origin in the fin de siècle intellectual crisis and it was, in the words of Fritz Stern, the deep "cultural despair" of thinkers feeling uprooted within the rationalism and scientism of the modern world.[54] It was characterized by a rejection of the established social order, with revolutionary tendencies and anti-capitalist stances, a populist and plebiscitary dimension, the advocacy of violence as a means of action and a call for individual and collective palingenesis ("regeneration, rebirth").[55]
In a 1961 book deemed influential in the European far-right at large, French neo-fascist writer Maurice Bardèche introduced the idea that fascism could survive the 20th century under a new metapolitical guise adapted to the changes of the times. Rather than trying to revive doomed regimes with their single party, secret police or public display of Caesarism, Bardèche argued that its theorists should promote the core philosophical idea of fascism regardless of its framework,[7] i.e. the concept that only a minority, "the physically saner, the morally purer, the most conscious of national interest", can represent best the community and serve the less gifted in what Bardèche calls a new "feudal contract".[57]
The far-right Spanish party Vox initially introduced the Madrid Charter project, a planned group to denounce left-wing groups in Ibero-America, to the government of United States president Donald Trump while visiting the United States in February 2019, with Santiago Abascal and Rafael Bardají using their good relations with the administration to build support within the Republican Party and establishing strong ties with American contacts.[64][65][66] In March 2019, Abascal tweeted an image of himself wearing a morion similar to a conquistador, with ABC writing in an article detailing the document that this event provided a narrative that "symbolizes in part the expansionist mood of Vox and its ideology far from Spain".[67] The charter subsequently grew to include signers that had little to no relation to Latin America and Spanish-speaking areas.[68] Vox has advised Javier Milei in Argentina, the Bolsonaro family in Brazil, José Antonio Kast in Chile and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.[69]
Nationalists from Europe and the United States met at a Holiday Inn in St. Petersburg on March 22, 2015, for first convention of the International Russian Conservative Forum organized by pro-Putin Rodina-party. The event was attended by fringe right-wing extremists like Nordic Resistance Movement from Scandinavia but also by more mainstream MEPs from Golden Dawn and National Democratic Party of Germany. In addition to Rodina, Russian neo-Nazis from Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich Group were also in attendance. The event was attended by several notable American white supremacists including Jared Taylor and Brandon Russell.[76]
A number of far-right extremist and paramilitary groups carried out the Rwandan genocide under the racial supremacist ideology of Hutu Power, developed by journalist and Hutu supremacist Hassan Ngeze.[78] On 5 July 1975, exactly two years after the 1973 Rwandan coup d'état, the far right National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) was founded under president Juvénal Habyarimana. Between 1975 and 1991, the MRND was the only legal political party in the country. It was dominated by Hutus, particularly from Habyarimana's home region of Northern Rwanda. An elite group of MRND party members who were known to have influence on the President and his wife Agathe Habyarimana are known as the akazu, an informal organization of Hutu extremists whose members planned and lead the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[79][80] Prominent Hutu businessman and member of the akazu, Félicien Kabuga was one of the genocides main financiers, providing thousands of machetes which were used to commit the genocide.[81] Kabuga also founded Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, used to broadcast propaganda and direct the génocidaires. Kabuga was arrested in France on 16 May 2020, and charged with crimes against humanity.[82]
The Interahamwe was formed around 1990 as the youth wing of the MRND and enjoyed the backing of the Hutu Power government. The Interahamwe were driven out of Rwanda after Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front victory in the Rwandan Civil War in July 1994 and are considered a terrorist organisation by many African and Western governments. The Interahamwe and splinter groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda continue to wage an insurgency against Rwanda from neighboring countries, where they are also involved in local conflicts and terrorism. The Interahamwe were the main perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, during which an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsi, Twa and moderate Hutus were killed from April to July 1994 and the term Interahamwe was widened to mean any civilian bands killing Tutsi.[83][84]
Other far-right groups and paramilitaries involved included the anti-democraticsegregationist Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), which called for complete segregation of Hutus from Tutsis. The CDR had a paramilitary wing known as the Impuzamugambi. Together with the Interahamwe militia, the Impuzamugambi played a central role in the Rwandan genocide.[85][78]
The far right in South Africa emerged as the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in 1969, formed by Albert Hertzog as breakaway from the predominant right-wing South African National Party, an Afrikanerethno-nationalist party that implemented the racist, segregationist program of apartheid, the legal system of political, economic and social separation of the races intended to maintain and extend political and economic control of South Africa by the White minority.[86][87][88] The HNP was formed after the South African National Party re-established diplomatic relations with Malawi and legislated to allow Māori players and spectators to enter the country during the 1970 New Zealand rugby union team tour in South Africa.[89] The HNP advocated for a Calvinist, racially segregated and Afrikaans-speaking nation.[90]
In 1973, Eugène Terre'Blanche, a former police officer founded the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), a South African neo-Nazi paramilitary organisation, often described as a white supremacist group.[91][92][93] Since its founding in 1973 by Eugène Terre'Blanche and six other far-right Afrikaners, it has been dedicated to secessionist Afrikaner nationalism and the creation of an independent Boer-Afrikaner republic in part of South Africa. During negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s, the organization terrorized and killed black South Africans.[94]
Togo has been ruled by members of the Gnassingbé family and the far-right military dictatorship formerly known as the Rally of the Togolese People since 1969. Despite the legalisation of political parties in 1991 and the ratification of a democratic constitution in 1992, the regime continues to be regarded as oppressive. In 1993, the European Union cut off aid in reaction to the regime's human-rights offenses. After's Eyadema's death in 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbe took over, then stood down and was re-elected in elections that were widely described as fraudulent and occasioned violence that resulted in as many as 600 deaths and the flight from Togo of 40,000 refugees.[95] In 2012, Faure Gnassingbe dissolved the RTP and created the Union for the Republic.[96][97][98]
Throughout the reign of the Gnassingbé family, Togo has been extremely oppressive. According to a United States Department of State report based on conditions in 2010, human rights abuses are common and include "security force use of excessive force, including torture, which resulted in deaths and injuries; official impunity; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; executive influence over the judiciary; infringement of citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedoms of press, assembly, and movement; official corruption; discrimination and violence against women; child abuse, including female genital mutilation (FGM), and sexual exploitation of children; regional and ethnic discrimination; trafficking in persons, especially women and children; societal discrimination against persons with disabilities; official and societal discrimination against homosexual persons; societal discrimination against persons with HIV; and forced labor, including by children."[99]
During the 1920s and 1930s, a local brand of religious fascism appeared known as Brazilian Integralism, coalescing around the party known as Brazilian Integralist Action. It adopted many characteristics of European fascist movements, including a green-shirted paramilitary organization with uniformed ranks, highly regimented street demonstrations and rhetoric against Marxism and liberalism.[100]
Prior to World War II, the Nazi Party had been making and distributing propaganda among ethnic Germans in Brazil. The Nazi regime built close ties with Brazil through the estimated 100 thousand native Germans and 1 million German descendants living in Brazil at the time.[101] In 1928, the Brazilian section of the Nazi Party was founded in Timbó, Santa Catarina. This section reached 2,822 members and was the largest section of the Nazi Party outside Germany.[102][103] About 100 thousand born Germans and about one million descendants lived in Brazil at that time.[104]
After Germany's defeat in World War II, many Nazi war criminals fled to Brazil and hid among the German-Brazilian communities. The most notable example of this was Josef Mengele, a Nazi SS officer and physician known as the "Angel of Death" for his deadly experiments on prisoners at the Auschwitz II (Birkenau) concentration camp, who fled first to Argentina, then Paraguay, before finally settling in Brazil in 1960. Mengele eventually drowned in 1979 in Bertioga, on the coast of São Paulo state, without ever having been recognized in his 19 years in Brazil.[105]
Mano Blanca, otherwise known as the Movement of Organized Nationalist Action, was set up in 1966 as a front for the MLN to carry out its more violent activities,[115][116] along with many other similar groups, including the New Anticommunist Organization and the Anticommunist Council of Guatemala.[113][117] Mano Blanca was active during the governments of colonel Carlos Arana Osorio and general Kjell Laugerud García and was dissolved by general Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia in 1978.[118]
Armed with the support and coordination of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, Mano Blanca began a campaign described by the United States Department of State as one of "kidnappings, torture, and summary execution."[116] One of the main targets of Mano Blanca was the Revolutionary Party, an anti-communist group that was the only major reform oriented party allowed to operate under the military-dominated regime. Other targets included the banned leftist parties.[116] Human rights activist Blase Bonpane described the activities of Mano Blanca as being an integral part of the policy of the Guatemalan government and by extension the policy of the United States government and the Central Intelligence Agency.[114][119] Overall, Mano Blanca was responsible for thousands of murders and kidnappings, leading travel writer Paul Theroux to refer to them as "Guatemala's version of a volunteer Gestapo unit".[120]
Following the end of Pinochet's government, the National Party would split to become the more centrist National Renewal (RN), while individuals who supported Pinochet organized Independent Democratic Union (UDI). UDI is a far-right political party that was formed by former Pinochet officials.[129][130][131][132] In 2019, the far-right Republican Party was founded by José Antonio Kast, a UDI politician who believed his former party criticized Pinochet too often.[133][134][135][136] According to Cox and Blanco, the Republican Party appeared in Chilean politics in a similar manner to Spain's Vox party, with both parties splitting off from an existing right wing party to collect disillusioned voters.[137]
A billboard serving as a reminder of one of many massacres in El Salvador that occurred during the civil war
During the Salvadoran Civil War, far-right death squads known in Spanish by the name of Escuadrón de la Muerte, literally "Squadron of Death, achieved notoriety when a sniper assassinated Archbishop Óscar Romero while he was saying mass in March 1980. In December 1980, three American nuns and a lay worker were gangraped and murdered by a military unit later found to have been acting on specific orders. Death squads were instrumental in killing thousands of peasants and activists. Funding for the squads came primarily from right-wing Salvadoran businessmen and landowners.[138]
Honduras also had far-right death squads active through the 1980s, the most notorious of which was Battalion 3–16. Hundreds of people, teachers, politicians and union bosses were assassinated by government-backed forces. Battalion 316 received substantial support and training from the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency.[141] At least nineteen members were School of the Americas graduates.[142][143] As of mid-2006, seven members, including Billy Joya, later played important roles in the administration of President Manuel Zelaya.[144]
Following the 2009 Honduran constitutional crisis, former Battalion 3–16 member Nelson Willy Mejía Mejía became Director-General of Immigration[145][146] and Billy Joya was de facto President Roberto Micheletti's security advisor.[147]Napoleón Nassar Herrera, another former Battalion 3–16 member,[144][148] was high Commissioner of Police for the north-west region under Zelaya and under Micheletti, even becoming a Secretary of Security spokesperson "for dialogue" under Micheletti.[149][150] Zelaya claimed that Joya had reactivated the death squad, with dozens of government opponents having been murdered since the ascent of the Michiletti and Lobo governments.[147]
The largest far-right party in Mexico is the National Synarchist Union. It was historically a movement of the Roman Catholic extreme right, in some ways akin to clerical fascism and Falangism, strongly opposed to the left-wing and secularist policies of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and its predecessors that governed Mexico from 1929 to 2000 and 2012 to 2018.[151][152]
During the Cold War and the Red Scares, the far right "saw spies and communists influencing government and entertainment. Thus, despite bipartisan anticommunism in the United States, it was the right that mainly fought the great ideological battle against the communists."[190] The John Birch Society, founded in 1958, is a prominent example of a far-right organization mainly concerned with anti-communism and the perceived threat of communism. Neo-Nazi militant Robert Jay Matthews of the White supremacist group The Order came to support the John Birch Society, especially when conservative icon Barry Goldwater from Arizona ran for the presidency on the Republican Party ticket. Far-right conservatives consider John Birch to be the first casualty of the Cold War.[191] In the 1990s, many conservatives turned against then-President George H. W. Bush, who pleasured neither the Republican Party's more moderate and far-right wings. As a result, Bush was primared by Pat Buchanan. In the 2000s, critics of President George W. Bush's conservative unilateralism argued it can be traced to both Vice President Dick Cheney who embraced the policy since the early 1990s and to far-right Congressmen who won their seats during the conservative revolution of 1994.[12]
Although small voluntary militias had existed in the United States throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the groups became more popular during the early 1990s, after a series of standoffs between armed citizens and federal government agents, such as the 1992 Ruby Ridge siege and 1993 Waco Siege. These groups expressed concern for what they perceived as government tyranny within the United States and generally held constitutionalist, libertarian, and right-libertarian political views, with a strong focus on the Second Amendment gun rights and tax protest. They also embraced many of the same conspiracy theories as predecessor groups on the radical right, particularly the New World Order conspiracy theory. Examples of such groups are the patriot and militia movements Oath Keepers and the Three Percenters. A minority of militia groups, such as the Aryan Nations and the Posse Comitatus, were White nationalists and saw militia and patriot movements as a form of White resistance against what they perceived to be a liberal and multiculturalist government. Militia and patriot organizations were involved in the 2014 Bundy standoff[192][193] and the 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge.[194][195]
Chetan Bhatt, in White Extinction: Metaphysical Elements of Contemporary Western Fascism, says that "The 'fear of white extinction', and related ideas of population eugenics, have travelled far and represent a wider political anxiety about 'white displacement' in the US, UK, and Europe that has fuelled the right-wing phenomena referred to by that sanitizing word 'populism', a term that neatly evades attention to the racism and white majoritarianism that energizes it."[198]
In 1996, the National Police Agency estimated that there were over 1,000 extremist right-wing groups in Japan, with about 100,000 members in total. These groups are known in Japanese as Uyoku dantai. While there are political differences among the groups, they generally carry a philosophy of anti-leftism, hostility towards China, North Korea and South Korea, and justification of Japan's role and war crimes in World War II. Uyoku dantai groups are well known for their highly visible propaganda vehicles fitted with loudspeakers and prominently marked with the name of the group and propaganda slogans. The vehicles play patriotic or wartime-era Japanese songs. Activists affiliated with such groups have used Molotov cocktails and time bombs to intimidate moderate Japanese politicians and public figures, including former Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka and Fuji Xerox Chairman Yotaro Kobayashi. An ex-member of a right-wing group set fire to Liberal Democratic Party politician Koichi Kato's house. Koichi Kato and Yotaro Kobayashi had spoken out against Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine.[225] Openly revisionist, Nippon Kaigi is considered "the biggest right-wing organization in Japan."[226][227]
Individuals and groups in Croatia that employ far-right politics are most often associated with the historical Ustaše movement, hence they have connections to neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. That World War II political movement was an extremist organization at the time supported by the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists. The association with the Ustaše has been called neo-Ustashism by Slavko Goldstein.[243] Most active far-right political parties in Croatia openly state their continuity with the Ustaše.[244] These include the Croatian Party of Rights and Authentic Croatian Party of Rights.[244] Croatia's far-right often advocates the false theory that the Jasenovac concentration camp was a "labour camp" where mass murder did not take place.[245]
Estonia's most significant far-right movement was the Vaps movement. Its ideological predecessor Valve Liit was founded by Admiral Johan Pitka and later banned for maligning the government. The organization became politicized quickly Vaps soon turned into a mass fascist movement.[248] In 1933, Estonians voted on Vaps' proposed changes to the constitution and the party later won a large proportion of the vote. However, the State Elder Konstantin Päts declared state of emergency and imprisoned the leadership of the Vaps. In 1935, all political parties were banned. In 1935, a Vaps coup attempt was discovered, which led to the banning of the Finnish Patriotic People's Movement's youth wing that had been secretly aiding and arming them.[249][250]
In Finland, support for the far right was most widespread between 1920 and 1940 when the Academic Karelia Society, Lapua Movement, Patriotic People's Movement and Vientirauha operated in the country and had hundreds of thousands of members.[259] Far-right groups exercised considerable political power during this period, pressuring the government to outlaw communist parties and newspapers and expel Freemasons from the armed forces.[260][261] During the Cold War, all parties deemed fascist were banned according to the Paris Peace Treaties and all former fascist activists had to find new political homes.[262] Despite Finlandization, many continued in public life. Three former members of the Waffen SS served as ministers of defense; Sulo Suorttanen and Pekka Malinen as well as Mikko Laaksonen.[263][264]
The skinhead culture gained momentum during the late 1980s and peaked during the late 1990s. Numerous hate crimes were committed against refugees, including a number of racially motivated murders.[265][266]
Today, the most prominent neo-Nazi group is the Nordic Resistance Movement, which is tied to multiple murders, attempted murders and assaults of political enemies was found in 2006 and proscribed in 2019. Prominent far-right parties include the Blue-and-Black Movement and Power Belongs to the People.[267] The second biggest Finnish party, the Finns Party, has been described as far right.[268][269][270][271] The former leader of the Finns party and current speaker of the Parliament Jussi Halla-aho, has been convicted of hate speech due to his comments stating that, "Prophet Muhammad was a pedophile and Islam justifies pedophilia and Pedophilia was Allah's will." Finns Party members have frequently supported far-right and neo-Nazi movements such as the Finnish Defense League, Soldiers of Odin, Nordic Resistance Movement, Rajat Kiinni (Close the Borders), and Suomi Ensin (Finland First). "[272] In the 1990s and 2000s, before the breakthrough of the Finns Party, a few neo-Nazi candidates enjoyed success, like Janne Kujala of Finland - Fatherland (founded as Aryan Germanic Brotherhood) and Jouni Lanamäki who was previously associated with the Nordic Reich Party.[273][274] Pekka Siitoin of the National Democracy Party was the fifth most popular candidate in Naantali city council elections.[275]
The NRM and Finns party and other far-right groups organize an annual torch march demonstration in Helsinki in memory of the Finnish SS-battalion on the Finnish independence day which ends at the Hietaniemi cemetery where members visit the tomb of Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim and the monument to the Finnish SS Battalion.[276][277] The event is protested by antifascists, leading to counterdemonstrators being violently assaulted by NRM members who act as security. The demonstration attracts close to 3,000 participants according to the estimates of the police and hundreds of officers patrol Helsinki to prevent violent clashes.[278][279][280][281]
The largest far-right party in Europe is the French anti-immigration party National Rally, formally known as the National Front.[282][283] The party was founded in 1972, uniting a variety of French far-right groups under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen.[284] Since 1984, it has been the major force of French nationalism.[285] Jean-Marie Le Pen's daughter Marine Le Pen was elected to succeed him as party leader in 2012. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership, the party sparked outrage for hate speech, including Holocaust denial and Islamophobia.[286][287]
Right-wing populists protesting against Islam in Germany, 2008
In 1945, the Allied powers took control of Germany and banned the swastika, Nazi Party and the publication of Mein Kampf. Explicitly Nazi and neo-Nazi organizations are banned in Germany.[288] In 1960, the West German parliament voted unanimously to "make it illegal to incite hatred, to provoke violence, or to insult, ridicule or defame 'parts of the population' in a manner apt to breach the peace." German law outlaws anything that "approves of, glorifies or justifies the violent and despotic rule of the National Socialists."[288] Section 86a of the Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) outlaws any "use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations" outside the contexts of "art or science, research or teaching". The law primarily outlaws the use of Nazi symbols, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting.[289] In the 21st century, the German far right consists of various small parties and two larger groups, namely Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Pegida.[288][290][291][292] In March 2021, the Germany domestic intelligence agency Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution placed the AfD under surveillance, the first time in the post-war period that a main opposition party had been subjected to such scrutiny.[293]
The far right in Greece first came to power under the ideology of Metaxism, a proto-fascist ideology developed by dictator Ioannis Metaxas.[294] Metaxism called for the regeneration of the Greek nation and the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous state.[295] Metaxism disparaged liberalism, and held individual interests to be subordinate to those of the nation, seeking to mobilize the Greek people as a disciplined mass in service to the creation of a "new Greece".[295]
The Metaxis regime came to an end after the Axis powers invaded Greece. The Axis occupation of Greece began in April 1941.[297] The occupation ruined the Greek economy and brought about terrible hardships for the Greek civilian population.[298] The Jewish population of Greece was nearly eradicated. Of its pre-war population of 75–77,000, only around 11–12,000 survived, either by joining the resistance or being hidden.[299] Following the short-lived interim government of Georgios Papandreou, the military seized power in Greece during the 1967 Greek coup d'état, replacing the interim government with the right-wing United States-backed Greek junta. The Junta was a series of military juntas that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. The dictatorship was characterised by right-wing cultural policies, restrictions on civil liberties and the imprisonment, torture and exile of political opponents. The junta's rule ended on 24 July 1974 under the pressure of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, leading to the Metapolitefsi ("regime change") to democracy and the establishment of the Third Hellenic Republic.[300][301]
Founded by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, Golden Dawn had its origins in the movement that worked towards a return to right-wing military dictatorship in Greece. Following an investigation into the 2013 murder of Pavlos Fyssas, an anti-fascist rapper, by a supporter of the party,[322] Michaloliakos and several other Golden Dawn parliamentarians and members were arrested and held in pre-trial detention on suspicion of forming a criminal organization.[323] The trial began on 20 April 2015[324] and eventually led to the conviction of 7 of its leaders for heading a criminal organisation and 61 other defendants for participating in a criminal organisation.[325] Guilty verdicts on charges of murder, attempted murder, and violent attacks on immigrants and left-wing political opponents were also delivered and prison sentences of a combined total of over 500 years were handed out.
The far right has maintained a continuous political presence in Italy since the fall of Mussolini. The neo-fascist party Italian Social Movement (1946–1995), influenced by the previous Italian Social Republic (1943–1945), became one of the chief reference points for the European far-right from the end of World War II until the late 1980s.[332]
Despite being neutral, the Netherlands was invaded by Nazi Germany on 10 May 1940 as part of Fall Gelb.[338] About 70% of the country's Jewish population were killed during the occupation, a much higher percentage than comparable countries such as Belgium and France.[339] Most of the south of the country was liberated in the second half of 1944. The rest, especially the west and north of the country still under occupation, suffered from a famine at the end of 1944 known as the Hunger Winter. On 5 May 1945, the whole country was finally liberated by the total surrender of all German forces. Since the end of World War II, the Netherlands has had a number of small far-right groups and parties, the largest and most successful being the Party for Freedom led by Geert Wilders.[340] Other far-right Dutch groups include the neo-Nazi Dutch People's Union (1973–present),[341] the Centre Party (1982–1986), the Centre Party '86 (1986–1998), the Dutch Block (1992–2000), New National Party (1998–2005) and the ultranationalist National Alliance (2003–2007).[342][343]
In 2019, the Confederation Liberty and Independence had the best performance of any far-right coalition to date, earning 1,256,953 votes which was 6.81% of the total vote in an election that saw a historically high turnout. Members of far-right groups make up a significant portion of those taking part in the annual Independence March in central Warsaw which started in 2009 to mark Independence Day. About 60,000 were in the 2017 march marking the 99th anniversary of independence, with placards such as "Clean Blood" seen on the march.[347]
The preeminent far-right party in Romania is the Greater Romania Party, founded in 1991 by Tudor, who was formerly known as a "court poet" of Communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu[348] and his literary mentor, the writer Eugen Barbu, one year after Tudor launched the România Mare weekly magazine, which remains the most important propaganda tool of the PRM. Tudor subsequently launched a companion daily newspaper called Tricolorul. The historical expression Greater Romania refers to the idea of recreating the former Kingdom of Romania which existed during the interwar period. Having been the largest entity to bear the name of Romania, the frontiers were marked with the intent of uniting most territories inhabited by ethnic Romanians into a single country and it is now a rallying cry for Romanian nationalists. Due to internal conditions under Communist Romania after World War II, the expression's use was forbidden in publications until after the Romanian Revolution in 1989. The party's initial success was partly attributed to the deep rootedness of Ceaușescu's national communism in Romania.[349]
Both the ideology and the main political focus of the Greater Romania Party are reflected in frequently strongly nationalistic articles written by Tudor. The party has called for the outlawing of the ethnic Hungarian party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, for allegedly plotting the secession of Transylvania.[350]
The period of development of Russian fascism in the 1930s–1940s was characterized by sympathy for Italian fascism and German Nazism and pronounced anti-communism and antisemitism.
The Russian Fascist Party in the first half of the 20th century. The slogan "Let's get our homeland!" is also used by the modern far-right in Russia.
Russian fascism has its roots in the movements known in history as the Black Hundreds and the White movement. It was distributed among white émigré circles living in Germany, Manchukuo, and the United States. In Germany and the United States (unlike Manchukuo), they practically did not conduct political activity, limiting themselves to the publication of newspapers and brochures.
Some ideologues of the white movement, such as Ivan Ilyin and Vasily Shulgin, welcomed the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany, offering their comrades-in-arms the fascist "method" as a way to fight socialism, communism, and godlessness. At the same time, they did not deny fascist political repression and antisemitism and even justified them.[351]
With the outbreak of World War II, Russian fascists in Germany supported Nazi Germany and joined the ranks of Russian collaborators.
Some Russian neo-Nazi organizations are part of the international World Union of National Socialists (WUNS, founded in 1962). As of 2012, six Russian organizations are among the officially registered members of the union: National Resistance, National Socialist Movement – Russian Division, All-Russian Public Patriotic Movement "Russian National Unity", National Socialist Movement "Slavic Union" (prohibited by a court decision in June 2010), and others. The following organizations are not included in WUNS: the National Socialist Society (banned by a court decision in 2010), the Russian All-National Union (banned in September 2011), and others, such as skinheads: "Legion" Werewolf "" (liquidated in 1996), "Schultz-88" (liquidated in 2006), "White Wolves" (liquidated in 2008–2010), "New Order" (ceased to exist), " Russian goal "(ceased to exist), and others. Some of the more radical neo-Nazi organizations, using terrorist methods, belonged to skinhead groups such as the Werewolf Legion (liquidated in 1996), Schultz-88 (liquidated in 2006), White Wolves (liquidated in 2008— 2010), New Order (ceased to exist), "Russian Goal" (ceased to exist), and others.[352]
Until the end of the 1990s, one of the largest parties of Russian national extremists was the neo-Nazi socio-political movement "Russian National Unity" (RNE), founded by Alexander Barkashov in 1990. At the end of 1999, the RNE made an unsuccessful attempt to take part in the elections to the State Duma. Barkashov considered "true Orthodoxy" as a fusion of Christianity with paganism and advocated the "Russian God" and the "Aryan swastika" allegedly associated with it. He wrote about the Atlanteans, the Etruscans, and the "Aryan" civilization as the direct predecessors of the Russian nation, in a centuries-old struggle with the "Semites", the "world Jewish conspiracy", and the "dominance of the Jews in Russia". The symbol of the movement was a modified swastika. Barkashov was a parishioner of the "True Orthodox ("Catacomb") Church", and the first cells of the RNE were formed as brotherhoods and communities of the RTOC.[353]
The ideology of Russian neo-Nazism is closely connected with the ideology of Slavic neo-paganism (rodnovery). In a number of cases, there are also organizational ties between neo-Nazis and neo-pagans. One of the founders of Russian neo-paganism, the former dissident Alexey Dobrovolsky (pagan name – Dobroslav) shared the ideas of Nazism and transferred them to his neo-pagan teaching.[353][354] Modern Russian neo-paganism took shape in the second half[355] of the 1970s and is associated with the activities of Dobrovolsky and Moscow Arabist Valery Yemelyanov (neo-pagan name – Velemir),[356][354] both supporters of antisemitism. Rodnoverie is a popular religion among Russian skinheads.[357][358] These skinheads, however, do not usually practice their religion.[359]
Historian Dmitry Shlapentokh wrote that, as in Europe, neo-paganism in Russia pushes some of its adherents to antisemitism. This antisemitism is closely related to negative attitudes towards Asians, and this emphasis on racial factors can lead neo-pagans to neo-Nazism. The tendency of neo-pagans to antisemitism is a logical development of the ideas of neo-paganism and imitation of the Nazis, and is also a consequence of a number of specific conditions of modern Russian politics. Unlike previous regimes, the modern Russian political regime, as well as the ideology of the middle class, combines support for Orthodoxy with philosemitism and a positive attitude towards Muslims. These features of the regime contributed to the formation of specific views of neo-Nazi neo-pagans, which are represented to a large extent among the socially unprotected and marginalized Russian youth. In their opinion, power in Russia was usurped by a cabal of conspirators, including hierarchs of the Orthodox Church, Jews, and Muslims. Contrary to external differences, it is believed that these forces have united in their desire to maintain power over the Russian "Aryans".[360]
There are multiple groups and organisations within Slovenia which are or have been engaged in far-right political activity, and right-wing extremism. Their political activity has traditionally opposed and targeted socially progressive policies, and minorities (in particular; the LGBT community, and ethnic minorities like the Roma and immigrants (particularly those from the Southern Balkans),[381][382][383][384] and espoused traditional ultraconservative and reactionary views and values.[381][383] More recently, a rise in new, incipient alt-right groups has been noted, particularly as a reaction to the European migrant crisis.[citation needed] While far-right actors have been responsible for multiple acts of violent extremism in Slovenia[382][383][385] it is a relatively minor issue in the country.[386][failed verification]
The history of the far-right in Spain dates back to at least the 1800s and refers to any manifestation of far-right politics in Spain. Individuals and organizations associated with the far-right in Spain often employ reactionarytraditionalism, religious fundamentalism, corporate Catholicism, and fascism in their ideological practice. In the case of Spain, according to historian Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, the predominance of Catholicism played an essential role in the suppression of external political innovations such as Social Darwinism, positivism, and vitalism in Spanish far-right politics.[387]
With the decline of the British Empire becoming inevitable, British far-right parties turned their attention to internal matters. The 1950s had seen an increase in immigration to the UK from its former colonies, particularly India, Pakistan, the Caribbean and Uganda. Led by John Bean and Andrew Fountaine, the BNP opposed the admittance of these people to the UK. A number of its rallies such as one in 1962 in Trafalgar Square ended in race riots. After a few early successes, the party got into difficulties and was destroyed by internal arguments. In 1967 it joined forces with John Tyndall and the remnants of Chesterton's League of Empire Loyalists to form Britain's largest far-right organisation, the National Front (NF).[391] The BNP and the NF supported extreme loyalism in Northern Ireland, and attracted Conservative Party members who had become disillusioned after Harold Macmillan had recognised the right to independence of the African colonies and had criticised Apartheid in South Africa.[392]
Some Northern Irish loyalist paramilitaries have links with far-right and neo-Nazi groups in Britain, including Combat 18,[393][394] the British National Socialist Movement[395] and the NF.[396] In 2004, The Guardian reported that loyalist paramilitaries had been responsible for numerous racist attacks in loyalist areas.[397] During the 1970s, the NF's rallies became a regular feature of British politics. Election results remained strong in a few working-class urban areas, with a number of local council seats won, but the party never came anywhere near winning representation in parliament.
Since the 1970s, the NF's support has been in decline whilst Nick Griffin and the current British National Party (BNP) grew in popularity. Around the turn of the 21st century, the BNP won a number of council seats. At its peak in the late 2000s, the party had 54 local council seats, one seat in the London Assembly, two seats in the European Parliament, and were the official opposition in the Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council. The party received almost a million votes in the 2009 European Parliament elections, and contested the majority of UK parliamentary seats in the 2010 general election. The party's membership was 12,632 and its financial resources were an estimated £1,983,947.[46] By the early 2010s the BNP saw its support and membership quickly collapse due to internal divisions caused by a disappointing performance in the 2010 elections. Griffin was ousted as leader in 2014 after losing his European Parliament seat, and since then the party has been in terminal decline under the leadership of Adam Walker.
A number of breakaway groups have been established by former members of the BNP, such as Britain First by ex-councillor Paul Golding, the British Democrats by ex-MEP and leadership candidateAndrew Brons, as well as Patriotic Alternative by Mark Collett. UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage claimed that his party absorbed much of the BNP's former voters during their electoral peak in the early 2010s.[398] The party was accused of shifting towards far-right, anti-Islam politics under the leadership of Paul Nuttall and Gerard Batten during its decline in the late 2010s. Anti-Islam activist and former UKIP leadership candidateAnne Marie Waters established the far-right For Britain Movement, which gained a small number of ex-BNP councillors. It was deregistered in 2022, and subsequently a large portion of prominent far-right activists began coalescing around the British Democrats, which (following UKIP's loss of its few councillors on 4 May 2023, leaving it with only a few parish and town councillors) quickly established itself as the UK's only far-right party with any electoral representation.
A small number of far-right organisations have existed in New Zealand since World War II, including the Conservative Front, the New Zealand National Front and the National Democrats Party.[406][407] Far-right parties in New Zealand lack significant support, with their protests often dwarfed by counter protest.[408] After the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019, the National Front "publicly shut up shop"[409] and largely went underground like other far-right groups.[410]
The Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party was a far-right political party which advocated Fijian ethnic nationalism.[411] In 2009, party leader Iliesa Duvuloco was arrested for breaching the military regime's emergency laws by distributing pamphlets calling for an uprising against the military regime.[412] In January 2013, the military regime introduced regulations that essentially de-registered the party.[413][414]
The development of an pan-European identity among far-right members of the European parliament has been claimed.[415]
Islamic extremism
Some Islamic extremists view Islam superior to all other ideologies and non-Muslims as inferior.[416] Some Islamic extremism can be seen as far-right,[208] and can have some social acceptance in some countries.[228]Dhimmi refers to the inferior status of non-Muslims in some historic Islamic states.[417]
Online
A number of far-right internet pages and forums are focused on and frequented by the far right. These include Stormfront and Iron March.
Far-right internet movements gained popularity and notoriety online in 2012, and this has not stopped.[418] In the United States, they gained many followers during the 2016 presidential election, the time after the election during Obama's last months in office in 2016, and in 2017.[418]
Stormfront is the oldest and most prominent neo-Nazi website,[419] described by the Southern Poverty Law Center and other media organizations as the "murder capital of the internet".[420] In August 2017, Stormfront was taken offline for just over a month when its registrar seized its domain name due to complaints that it promoted hatred and that some of its members were linked to murder. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law claimed credit for the action after advocating for Stormfront's web host, Network Solutions, to enforce its Terms of Service agreement which prohibits users from using its services to incite violence.[421]
Iron March was a fascist web forum founded in 2011 by Russian nationalist Alexander "Slavros" Mukhitdinov. An unknown individual uploaded a database of Iron March users to the Internet Archive in November 2019 and multiple neo-Nazi users were identified, including an ICE detention center captain and several active members of the United States Armed Forces.[422][423] As of mid 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center linked Iron March to nearly 100 murders.[424][422] Mukhitdinov remained a murky figure at the time of the leaks.[425]
The Terrorgram community on Telegram is a network of Telegram channels and accounts that subscribe to and promote militant accelerationism. Terrorgram channels are neofascist in ideology, and regularly share instructions and manuals on how to carry out acts of racially-motivated violence and anti-government, anti-authority terrorism.[426] In 2021, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), an international think-tank, exposed more than two hundred neo-Nazi pro-terrorism telegram channels that make up the Terrorgram network, many of which contained instructions to build weapons and bombs.[427][428][429]
Right-wing terrorism is terrorism motivated by a variety of far right ideologies and beliefs, including anti-communism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, racism, xenophobia and opposition to immigration. This type of terrorism has been sporadic, with little or no international cooperation.[430] Modern right-wing terrorism first appeared in western Europe in the 1980s and it first appeared in Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[431]
Right-wing terrorists aim to overthrow governments and replace them with nationalist or fascist-oriented governments.[430] The core of this movement includes neo-fascist skinheads, far-right hooligans, youth sympathisers and intellectual guides who believe that the state must rid itself of foreign elements in order to protect rightful citizens.[431] However, they usually lack a rigid ideology.[431]
According to Cas Mudde, far-right terrorism and violence in the West have been generally perpetrated in recent times by individuals or groups of individuals "who have at best a peripheral association" with politically relevant organizations of the far right. Nevertheless, Mudde follows, "in recent years far-right violence has become more planned, regular, and lethal, as terrorists attacks in Christchurch (2019), Pittsburgh (2018), and Norway (2011) show."[28]
Fascism is a far-right, authoritarian, and ultranationalist political ideology and movement, characterized by a dictatorial leader, centralized autocracy, militarism, forcible suppression of opposition, belief in a natural social hierarchy, subordination of individual interests for the perceived good of the nation or race, and strong regimentation of society and the economy. Opposed to anarchism, democracy, pluralism, egalitarianism, liberalism, socialism, and Marxism, fascism is at the far right of the traditional left–right spectrum.
Neo-fascism is a post-World War II far-right ideology that includes significant elements of fascism. Neo-fascism usually includes ultranationalism, ultraconservatism, racial supremacy, right-wing populism, authoritarianism, nativism, xenophobia, and anti-immigration sentiment, sometimes with economic liberal issues, as well as opposition to social democracy, parliamentarianism, Marxism, capitalism, communism, and socialism. As with classical fascism, it occasionally proposes a Third Position as an alternative to market capitalism.
Neo-Nazism comprises the post-World War II militant, social, and political movements that seek to revive and reinstate Nazi ideology. Neo-Nazis employ their ideology to promote hatred and racial supremacy, to attack racial and ethnic minorities, and in some cases to create a fascist state.
Right-wing politics is the range of political ideologies that view certain social orders and hierarchies as inevitable, natural, normal, or desirable, typically supporting this position based on natural law, economics, authority, property, religion, or tradition. Hierarchy and inequality may be seen as natural results of traditional social differences or competition in market economies.
Strasserism is an ideological strand of Nazism which adheres to revolutionary nationalism and to economic antisemitism, which conditions are to be achieved with radical, mass-action and worker-based politics that are more aggressive than the politics of the Hitlerite leaders of the Nazi Party. Named after brothers Gregor and Otto Strasser, the ideology of Strasserism is a type of Third Position, right-wing politics in opposition to Communism and to Hitlerite Nazism.
The Third Position is a set of neo-fascist political ideologies that were first described in Western Europe following the Second World War. Developed in the context of the Cold War, it developed its name through the claim that it represented a third position between the capitalism of the Western Bloc and the communism of the Eastern Bloc.
Ecofascism is a term used to describe individuals and groups which combine environmentalism with fascism.
The Centre Party was a Dutch nationalist, right-wing extremist political party espousing an anti-immigrant program. The party was founded by Henry Brookman in 1980, and was represented by Hans Janmaat in the Dutch House of Representatives from 1982, until he was expelled from the party in 1984 and joined the more moderate Centre Democrats. The CP, as well as the CD, was subject to a cordon sanitaire by the other parties in the House of Representatives. After much infighting and finally legal proceedings against the party, it was declared bankrupt in 1986. The party was soon after succeeded by the Centre Party '86, which would become increasingly radical, until it was banned in 1998.
The far right in Switzerland was established in the course of the rise of fascism in Europe in the interwar period. It was a mostly marginal phenomenon in the Cold War period, excepting a surge of radical right-wing populism during the early 1970s, and it has again experienced growth alongside the right-wing Swiss People's Party since the 1990s.
Fascist movements gained popularity in many countries in Asia during the 1920s.
The Italian Social Movement was a neo-fascist political party in Italy. A far-right party, it presented itself until the 1990s as the defender of Italian fascism's legacy, and later moved towards national conservatism. In 1972, the Italian Democratic Party of Monarchist Unity was merged into the MSI and the party's official name was changed to Italian Social Movement – National Right.
The Identitarian movement or Identitarianism is a pan-European nationalist, ethno-nationalist, far-right political ideology asserting the right of the European ethnic groups and white peoples to Western culture and territories exclusively. Originating in France as Les Identitaires, with its youth wing Generation Identity (GI), the movement expanded to other European countries during the early 21st century. Its ideology was formulated from the 1960s onward by essayists such as Alain de Benoist, Dominique Venner, Guillaume Faye and Renaud Camus, who are considered the main ideological sources of the movement.
Anti-fascism is a political movement in opposition to fascist ideologies, groups and individuals. Beginning in European countries in the 1920s, it was at its most significant shortly before and during World War II, where the Axis powers were opposed by many countries forming the Allies of World War II and dozens of resistance movements worldwide. Anti-fascism has been an element of movements across the political spectrum and holding many different political positions such as anarchism, communism, pacifism, republicanism, social democracy, socialism and syndicalism as well as centrist, conservative, liberal and nationalist viewpoints.
In political science, the terms radical right, reactionary right and populist right have been used to refer to the range of nationalist, right-wing and far-right political parties that have grown in support in Europe since the late 1970s. Populist right groups have shared a number of causes, which typically include opposition to globalisation and immigration, criticism of multiculturalism, and opposition to the European Union, with some opposing liberal democracy or rejecting democracy altogether in favor of "Illiberal democracy" or outright authoritarian dictatorship.
Far-right subcultures refers to the symbolism, ideology and traits that hold relevance to various politically extreme right-wing groups and organisations. There are three kinds of subcultures within far-right movements to distinguish: subcultural parasitism, subcultural creation around ideology and subcultures that are networking with far-right movements.
Post–World War II anti-fascism, including antifa groups, anti-fascist movements and anti-fascist action networks, saw the development of political movements describing themselves as anti-fascist and in opposition to fascism. Those movements have been active in several countries in the aftermath of World War II during the second half of the 20th and early 21st century.
Populism has been a significant driver behind European politics for centuries, with a number of radical movements across the political spectrum relying on widespread working-class support for power.
Far-right politics in Australia describes authoritarian ideologies, including fascism and White supremacy as they manifest in Australia.
1 2 3 4 5 Kopeček, Lubomír (2007). "The Far Right in Europe". Středoevropské politické studie. IX (4). International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University in Brno: 280–293. Archived from the original on 7 February 2021. Retrieved 21 December 2020– via Central and Eastern European Online Library.
↑ Widfeldt, Anders, "A fourth phase of the extreme right? Nordic immigration-critical parties in a comparative context". In: NORDEUROPAforum (2010:1/2), 7–31, Edoc.huArchived 24 February 2021 at the Wayback Machine
↑ Kuligowski, Piotr; Moll, Łukasz; Szadkowski, Krystian (2019). "Anti-Communisms: Discourses of Exclusion". Praktyka Teoretyczna. 1 (31). Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań: 7–13. Archived from the original on 25 January 2021. Retrieved 21 December 2020– via Central and Eastern European Online Library.
↑ Mudde 2019, p.12: "The extreme right rejects the essence of democracy, that is, popular sovereignty and majority rule. The most infamous example of the extreme right is fascism, which brought to power German Führer Adolf Hitler and Italian Duce Benito Mussolini, and was responsible for the most destructive war in world history. The radical right accepts the essence of democracy, but opposes fundamental elements of liberal democracy, most notably minority rights, rule of law, and separation of powers. Both subgroups oppose the postwar liberal democratic consensus, but in fundamentally different ways. While the extreme right is revolutionary, the radical right is more reformist. In essence, the radical right trusts the power of the people, the extreme right does not."
↑ Filipović, Miroslava; Đorić, Marija (2010). "The Left or the Right: Old Paradigms and New Governments". Serbian Political Thought. 2 (1–2): 121–144. doi:10.22182/spt.2122011.8.
↑ Pavlopoulos, Vassilis (20 March 2014). Politics, economics, and the far right in Europe: a social psychological perspective. The Challenge of the Extreme Right in Europe: Past, Present, Future. Birkbeck: University of London.
↑ Bornschier, Simon (2010). Cleavage politics and the populist right the new cultural conflict in Western Europe. Temple University Press. OCLC748925475.
↑ Merkel, P. and Weinberg, L. (2004) Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century, Frank Cass Publishers: London, pp. 52–53
↑ Beiner 2018, p.8: "It’s not an accident that the most virulent enemies of modern liberalism and modern democracy—such as Joseph de Maistre in the early nineteenth century and Nietzsche in the late nineteenth century—directed their most intense polemical energies against the French Revolution."
↑ "Trotsky...maintained during the period of Hitler's rise to power so persistent and, for the most part, so prescient a commentary on the course of events in Germany as to deserve record".Carr, Edward Hallett (1986). The twilight of Comintern 1930–1935. Macmillan. p.433. ISBN978-0-333-40455-3.
↑ Ticktin, Hillel (1992). Trotsky's political economy of capitalism. Brotherstone, Terence; Dukes, Paul,(eds). Edinburgh University Press. p.227. ISBN978-0-7486-0317-6.
1 2 Bar-On, Tamir (7 December 2011), Backes, Uwe; Moreau, Patrick (eds.), "Intellectual Right – Wing Extremism – Alain de Benoist's Mazeway Resynthesis since 2000", The Extreme Right in Europe, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp.333–358, doi:10.13109/9783666369223.333, ISBN978-3-525-36922-7
↑ Dupeux, Louis (1994). "La nouvelle droite " révolutionnaire-conservatrice " et son influence sous la république de Weimar". Revue d'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine. 41 (3): 474–475. doi:10.3406/rhmc.1994.1732.
↑ Moreno-Almeida, Cristina; Gerbaudo, Paolo (2021). "Memes and the Moroccan Far-Right". The International Journal of Press/Politics. 26 (4): 882–906. doi:10.1177/1940161221995083. ISSN1940-1612.
1 2 Saha, Santosh C, ed. (2008). Ethnicity and sociopolitical change in Africa and other developing countries: a constructive discourse in state building (firsted.). Lexington Books. p.92. ISBN978-0-7391-2332-4.
↑ Aspegren, Lennart (2006). "Never again?: Rwanda and the World". Human Rights Law: From Dissemination to Application – Essays in Honour of Göran Melander. The Raoul Wallenberg Institute human rights library. Vol.26. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p.173. ISBN9004151818.
↑ "MICT-13-38". United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. 11 November 2013. Archived from the original on 26 November 2020. Retrieved 4 June 2020.
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↑ "The End of Apartheid". Archive: Information released online prior to January 20, 2009. United States Department of State. 2009. Archived from the original on 5 February 2009. Retrieved 5 February 2009.
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↑ Clark, Nancy; Worger, William (2013). South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Routledge. p.xx. ISBN978-1-317-86165-2. Terre'Blanche, Eugene (1941–2010): Began career in the South African police. In 1973 founded the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging as a Nazi-inspired militant right-wing movement upholding white supremacy.
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1 2 Forsythe, David P (2009). Encyclopedia of Human Rights, Volume 1. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. p.344. ISBN978-0-19-533402-9. Retrieved 17 June 2020. The far-right National Liberation Movement (MLN), led by Mario Sandoval Alarcon, became an important political player; after 1969 it was responsible for the first death-squad killings of activists and regime opponents.
1 2 Bartrop, Paul R.; Leonard Jacobs, Steven (2014). Modern Genocide: The Definitive Resource and Document Collection. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. p.970. ISBN978-1-61069-364-6.
1 2 Levenson-Estrada, Deborah (Winter 2003). "The Life That Makes Us Die/The Death That Makes Us Live: Facing Terrorism in Guatemala City". Radical History Review. 2003 (85): 94–104. doi:10.1215/01636545-2003-85-94. S2CID143353418.
↑ Leal, Rene (2020). "The Rise of Fascist Formations in Chile and in the World". Social Sciences. 9 (12): 230. doi:10.3390/socsci9120230. the 'West' and the 'Rest', considering the hegemony of neoliberalism in current global capitalism and the relevance of its ideology in the emergence of the far right. Among the 'Rest' who live in Latin America, and in particular in Chile, fascism is no stranger: Chile was a battlefield falling to the dictatorship of the far-right Pinochet regime
↑ Hunter, Wendy (1997). "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru". Political Science Quarterly. 112 (3). Academy of Political Science: 458. doi:10.2307/2657566. JSTOR2657566. Rather than moving toward the center, they were motivated by the imperatives of Chile's binomial electoral system, which induces parties to form coalitions, to ally with the far right Union Democratica Independiente (UDI)
↑ Bresnahan, Rosalind (November 2003). "The Media and the Neoliberal Transition in Chile: Democratic Promise Unfulfilled". Latin American Perspectives. 30 (6). SAGE Publishing: 45. doi:10.1177/0095399703256257. S2CID145784920. the far right party the Unión Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic UDI)
↑ Blofield, Merike H.; Haas, Liesl (2005). "Defining a Democracy: Reforming the Laws on Women's Rights in Chile, 1990–2002". Latin American Politics and Society. 47 (3). Cambridge University Press: 42. The far-right Independent Democratic Union (UDI) forms an ... electoral alliance with ... National Renovation (RN)
↑ "El Partido Republicano: el proyecto populista de la derecha radical chilena". Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política. 30 (1): 105–134. June 2021. In their ideological core, the radical populist rights are composed of the combination of three traits: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. ... This recap allows to identify dimensions of analysis applicable to the Republican Party.
↑ Dávila, Mireya (January 2020). "La reemergencia del pinochetismo". Barómetro de política y equidad. 16: 49–69. Archived from the original on 25 November 2021. Retrieved 16 December 2021.
↑ Bonner, Raymond, Weakness and Deceit:: U.S. Policy and El Salvador, New York Times Books, 1984, p. 330
↑ Arnson, Cynthia J. "Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death Squads in El Salvador" in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability, Campbell and Brenner, eds, 88
↑ Rospigliosi, Fernando (1996). Las Fuerzas Armadas y el 5 de abril: la percepción de la amenaza subversiva como una motivación golpista. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. pp.46–47.
↑ Burt, Jo-Marie (September–October 1998). "Unsettled accounts: militarization and memory in postwar Peru". NACLA Report on the Americas. 32 (2). Taylor & Francis: 35–41. doi:10.1080/10714839.1998.11725657. the military's growing frustration over the limitations placed upon its counterinsurgency operations by democratic institutions, coupled with the growing inability of civilian politicians to deal with the spiraling economic crisis and the expansion of the Shining Path, prompted a group of military officers to devise a coup plan in the late 1980s. The plan called for the dissolution of Peru's civilian government, military control over the state, and total elimination of armed opposition groups. The plan, developed in a series of documents known as the "Plan Verde," outlined a strategy for carrying out a military coup in which the armed forces would govern for 15 to 20 years and radically restructure state-society relations along neoliberal lines.
↑ Rospigliosi, Fernando (1996). Las Fuerzas Armadas y el 5 de abril: la percepción de la amenaza subversiva como una motivación golpista. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. pp.28–40.
↑ Rendón, Silvio (2013). La intervención de los Estados Unidos en el Perú. Editorial Sur. pp.145–150. ISBN978-6124574139.
1 2 Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt (2006). "Chapter 5: Elites, Cocaine, and Power in Colombia and Peru". The politics of organized crime and the organized crime of politics: a study in criminal power. Lexington Books. pp.114–118. ISBN978-0-7391-1358-5. important members of the officer corps, particularly within the army, had been contemplating a military coup and the establishment of an authoritarian regime, or a so-called directed democracy. The project was known as 'Plan Verde', the Green Plan. ... Fujimori essentially adopted the 'Plan Verde,' and the military became a partner in the regime. ... The autogolpe, or self-coup, of April 5, 1992, dissolved the Congress and the country's constitution and allowed for the implementation of the most important components of the 'Plan Verde.'
↑ Martínez, José Honorio (15 June 2009). "Neoliberalismo y genocidio en el régimen fujimorista". Historia Actual Online. 9.
↑ Villalba, Fernando Velásquez (2022). "A Totalidade Neoliberal-Fujimorista: Estigmatização e Colonialidade No Peru Contemporâneo". Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. 37 (109): e3710906. doi:10.1590/3710906/2022. S2CID251877338. Fujimorism has hegemonic characteristics in Peru. This means that, although it has not governed since November 2000, its political practice is still in force, to the extent that the structures that Alberto Fujimori created have been partially updated or have not been updated in the last two decades. This context, let's call it structural, creates scenarios in which the democratization process faces institutional challenges
↑ Tegel, Simeon (27 March 2023). "Peru's First Female President Has Blood on Her Hands". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 6 June 2023. Retrieved 6 June 2023. social conservatism, which has been one of the few areas of common ground between Free Peru's presidential administrations and the hard-right congressional majority
1 2 •Zaitchik, Alexander (19 October 2006). "The National Socialist Movement Implodes". SPLCenter.org. Montgomery, Alabama: Southern Poverty Law Center. Archived from the original on 19 September 2015. Retrieved 28 December 2020. The party's problems began last June, when Citizens Against Hate discovered that NSM's Tulsa post office box was shared by The Joy of Satan Ministry, in which the wife of NSM chairman emeritus Clifford Herrington is High Priestess. [...] Within NSM ranks, meanwhile, a bitter debate was sparked over the propriety of Herrington's Joy of Satan connections. [...] Schoep moved ahead with damage-control operations by nudging chairman emeritus Herrington from his position under the cover of "attending to personal matters." But it was too late to stop NSM Minister of Radio and Information Michael Blevins, aka Vonbluvens, from following White out of the party, citing disgust with Herrington's Joy of Satan ties. "Satanism," declared Blevins in his resignation letter, "affects the whole prime directive guiding the [NSM] – SURVIVAL OF THE WHITE RACE." [...] NSM was now a Noticeably Smaller Movement, one trailed in extremist circles by a strong whiff of Satanism and related charges of sexual impropriety associated with Joy of Satan initiation rites and curiously strong teen recruitment efforts. •"National Socialist Movement". SPLCenter.org. Montgomery, Alabama: Southern Poverty Law Center. 2020. Archived from the original on 8 September 2015. Retrieved 28 December 2020. The NSM has had its share of movement scandal. In July 2006, it was rocked by revelations that co-founder and chairman emeritus Cliff Herrington's wife was the "High Priestess" of the Joy of Satan Ministry, and that her satanic church shared an address with the Tulsa, Okla., NSM chapter. The exposure of Herrington's wife's Satanist connections caused quite a stir, particularly among those NSM members who adhered to a racist (and heretical) variant of Christianity, Christian Identity. Before the dust settled, both Herringtons were forced out of NSM. Bill White, the neo-Nazi group's energetic spokesman, also quit, taking several NSM officials with him to create a new group, the American National Socialist Workers Party.
↑ Azani, Eitan; Koblenz-Stenzler, Liram; Atiyas-Lvovsky, Lorena; Ganor, Dan; Ben-Am, Arie; Meshulam, Delilah (2020). "The Development and Characterization of Far-Right Ideologies". The Far Right — Ideology, Modus Operandi and Development Trends. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. pp.13–36.
↑ David L Shambaugh (2 April 2008). China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. University of California Press. p.177. Some intellectuals flirt with so-called neoconservatism (xinbaoshouzhuyi), which embodies fascistic-like characteristics, but it has not gained wide appeal.
↑ Vajpeyi, Ananya (2020). "Minorities and Populism in Modi's India: The Mirror Effect". Minorities and Populism – Critical Perspectives from South Asia and Europe. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations. Vol.10. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp.17–28. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-34098-8_2. ISBN978-3-030-34097-1.
↑ "God's Law: an Interview with Rabbi Meir Kahane". Archived from the original on 19 February 2009. Retrieved 18 December 2012.: "Any non-Jew, including the Arabs, can have the status of a foreign resident in Israel if he accepts the law of the Halacha. I don’t differentiate between Arabs and non-Arabs. The only difference I make is between Jews and non-Jews. If a non-Jew wants to live here, he must agree to be a foreign resident, be he Arab or not. He does not have and cannot have national rights in Israel. He can have civil rights, social rights, but he cannot be a citizen; he won’t have the right to vote. Again, whether he’s Arab or not."
↑ "Terrorist Organization Profile: Kach". National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. University of Maryland. 23 June 2015. Archived from the original on 24 June 2015. Retrieved 24 June 2015.
↑ The Economist of Britain on 5 January 2013. Cited in: William L. Brooks (2013), Will history again trip up Prime Minister Shinzo Abe? The Asahi Shimbun, 7 May 2013
1 2 3 蕭嘉弘 (21 September 2018). "台灣急統派不是民主極右勢力！"[Taiwan's 'radical pro-unification factions' is not a 'democratic far-right'.]. 民報 Taiwan People News. Archived from the original on 18 June 2023. 標榜大中國民族主義，屬於極右的愛國同心會和統促黨則完全不同，...[The far-right Patriot Alliance Association and Chinese Unification Promotion Party, which advocates Chinese ultra-nationalism, is completely different, ...]
↑ "風評：婊子洪秀柱，真的想當急統聖戰士嗎？". www.storm.mg (in Chinese (Taiwan)). The Storm Media. 7 October 2015. Archived from the original on 4 April 2016. Retrieved 13 August 2022. 無涉統獨之外，還包括中華復興會、白色正義社會聯盟、中華統一促進黨…，幾乎是極右急統政團大會串
↑ "新黨公布"一國兩制台灣方案" (全文)"[New Party Announces "One Country, Two Systems Taiwan Proposal" (Full Text)]. CRNTT.com. 18 August 2019. Retrieved 7 December 2023.
↑ Samson Ellis and Adrian Kennedy (4 July 2022). "Xi's suppression of Hong Kong democracy pushes Taiwan further from China". The Japan Times. Retrieved 18 October 2023. For Taiwan though, the proposal has never been an option. Even the Kuomintang — a vestige of the losing side in China's civil war and the main force backing eventual unification with the mainland, has rejected the model
↑ Micah McCartney (15 August 2022). "Taiwan's KMT: Between a Rock and a Hard Place". The Diplomat. Retrieved 18 October 2023. On August 10, a white paper published by China's Taiwan Affairs Office, the first such document released on Xi Jinping's watch, confirmed that "One Country, Two Systems" is fundamental to Beijing's vision of unification with Taiwan. This is makes a rapprochement with a KMT, or indeed any Taiwanese administration, more difficult to achieve given how "One Country, Two Systems" played out in Hong Kong. Even pro-China former President Ma has declared the framework "dead".
↑ "陳柏惟被罷免…意味著什麼？". 火花 (in Chinese (Taiwan)). 26 October 2021. Archived from the original on 24 October 2022. Retrieved 30 August 2022. 如今，只要看看台灣基進網站的「關於我們」頁面，「左」這個字也不存在了，取而代之的是五花八門的「抗中」口號。這當然是一種誠實的表現：他們從一開始就從來不是什麼「左派」，而是用各種冠冕堂皇的詞彙重新包裝極端福佬沙文主義的極右翼。
↑ 孫偉倫 (20 June 2018). "第三勢力小黨組策略聯盟 只是形式大於實質？". CredereMedia (in Chinese (Taiwan)). 而基進黨在光譜上常被時為極右派政黨[...]
↑ 高忠義 (22 June 2018). "民進黨小弟連線". 風傳媒 (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Archived from the original on 13 April 2019. Retrieved 26 December 2018.
↑ Vares, Vesa & Uola, Mikko & Majander, Mikko: Kansanvalta koetuksella. Sarjassa Suomen eduskunta 100 vuotta, Osa 3. Helsinki: Edita, 2006. ISBN9513745430 pp. 248, 253
↑ Iltalehti Teema Historia: Lapuan liike, Alma Media, 2015, pp. 34–35.
↑ L. J. Niinistö; "Paavo Susitaival 1896–1993. Aktivismi elämänasenteena", 1998.
↑ Jorma O. Tiainen; etal., eds. (1987). Vuosisatamme Kronikka. Jyväskylä: Gummerus. p.668. ISBN951202893X.
↑ Lars Westerlund, ed. (2008). Sotavangit ja internoidut[Prisoners of war and internees] (in Finnish, English, and Swedish). Helsinki: Kansallisarkisto [National Archives]. ISBN978-9515331397. Archived from the original on 27 October 2018. Retrieved 6 December 2020.
↑ Ravndal, Jacob Aasland (3 September 2018). "Right-wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Case Study". Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (5): 772–792. doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1445888. hdl:10852/64981. One particularly severe episode happened in 1997, when a group of about 50 skinheads attacked Somali youths playing football in the Helsinki suburb Kontula. The violence did not stop before the police started shooting warning shots, and 22 skinheads were sentenced for the attack. Pekonen et al. also mention a number of other violent events from the 1990s, including ten particularly severe events from 1995 (not included in the RTV dataset because sufficient event details are lacking): a racist murder, an immigrant stabbed by a skinhead, four attacks on immigrants using explosives, and another four immigrants beaten severely.Free version available via the University of Oslo (Archived 26 March 2021).
↑ "Finnish centre-left parties agree to form government". FRANCE 24. 31 May 2019. Archived from the original on 4 April 2022. Retrieved 29 October 2020. Rinne led his party to a razor-thin victory in last month's general election, holding off the far-right Finns Party which surged into second place on an anti-immigration agenda.
↑ "Finland's Social Democrats win razor-thin victory against far-right party". euronews. 15 April 2019. Archived from the original on 30 September 2020. Retrieved 29 October 2020. Finland's leftist Social Democrats won first place in Sunday's general election with 17.7% of the votes, avoiding a near defeat by the far-right Finns Party, which rose in the ranks with an anti-immigration agenda.
↑ "A look at euroskeptic and populist forces in the European Union". The Japan Times. 21 May 2019. Archived from the original on 26 September 2019. Retrieved 29 October 2020. Finland's far-right, anti-immigration Finns Party more than doubled its seats in April national elections, closely tailing the leftist Social Democrats who won only narrowly.
↑ "On Europe's Streets:Annual Marches Glorifying Nazism"(PDF). B'nai B'rith, Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Federal Foreign Office. 25 March 2023. Archived(PDF) from the original on 26 March 2023. Retrieved 26 March 2023. the main organizers and guests of the event have been drawn from either non-party-affiliated far-right-activists or members of the right-wing populist Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), its youth organization Finns Party Youth (Perussuomalaiset Nuoret)...the 612-march is a torchlight procession from central Helsinki to the Hietaniemi war cemetery, where members visit the tomb of World War II-era President Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim and the monument to the Finnish SS-Battalion. There are speeches at both the assembly point and at the cemetery, eulogizing the Battle for Helsinki, depicted by speakers as the occasion "when Germans and Finns marched side by side and liberated the city from the communists."
↑ Virchow, Fabian (2016), "PEGIDA: Understanding the Emergence and Essence of Nativist Protest in Dresden", Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37 (6): 541–555, doi:10.1080/07256868.2016.1235026, S2CID151752919
↑ Mazower, Mark Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001 pages 22 & 145.
↑ Martin Seckendorf; Günter Keber; u.a.; Bundesarchiv (Hrsg.): Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus in Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Albanien, Italien und Ungarn (1941–1945) Hüthig, Berlin 1992; Decker/ Müller, Heidelberg 2000. Reihe: Europa unterm Hakenkreuz Band 6, ISBN3822618926
↑ Munoz, Antonio J. (2018). The German Secret Field Police in Greece, 1941–1944. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland & Company. p.95. ISBN978-1-4766-6784-3.
↑ Kassimeris, Christos (2006). "Causes of the 1967 Greek Coup". Democracy and Security. 2(1), 61–72.
↑ Wodak, Ruth (2015), The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, Sage, However, Golden Dawn's neo-Nazi profile is clearly visible in the party's symbolism, with its flag resembling a swastika, Nazi salutes and chant of 'Blood and Honour' encapsulating its xenophobic and racist ideology.
↑ Vasilopoulou; Halikiopoulou (2015), The Golden Dawn's 'Nationalist Solution', p.32, The extremist character of the Golden Dawn, its neo-Nazi principles, racism and ultranationalism, as well as its violence, render the party a least likely case of success [...].
↑ Miliopoulos, Lazaros (2011), "Extremismus in Griechenland", Extremismus in den EU-Staaten (in German), VS Verlag, p.154, doi:10.1007/978-3-531-92746-6_9, ISBN978-3-531-17065-7, ...mit der seit 1993 als Partei anerkannten offen neonationalsozialistischen Gruppierung Goldene Mörgenröte (Chryssi Avgí, Χρυσή Αυγή) kooperierte... [...cooperated with the openly neo-National Socialist group Golden Dawn (Chryssi Avgí, Χρυσή Αυγή), which has been recognized as a party since 1993...]
↑ Davies, Peter; Jackson, Paul (2008), The Far Right in Europe: An Encyclopedia, Greenwood World Press, p.173
↑ Altsech, Moses (August 2004), "Anti-Semitism in Greece: Embedded in Society", Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism (23): 12, On 12 March 2004, Chrysi Avghi (Golden Dawn), the new weekly newspaper of the Neo-Nazi organization with that name, cited another survey which indicated that the percentage of Greeks who view immigrants unfavorably is 89 percent.
↑ Xenakis, Sappho (2012), "A New Dawn? Change and Continuity in Political Violence in Greece", Terrorism and Political Violence, 24 (3): 437–464, doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.633133, S2CID145624655, ...Nikolaos Michaloliakos, who established the fascistic far-right party Chrysi Avgi ("Golden Dawn") in the early 1980s.
↑ Kravva, Vasiliki (2003), "The Construction of Otherness in Modern Greece", The Ethics of Anthropology: Debates and dilemmas, Routledge, p.169, For example, during the summer of 2000 members of Chryssi Avgi, the most widespread fascist organization in Greece, destroyed part of the third cemetery in Athens...
↑ Gemenis, Kostas; Nezi, Roula (January 2012), The 2011 Political Parties Expert Survey in Greece(PDF), University of Twente, p.4, archived(PDF) from the original on 15 June 2013, retrieved 5 June 2020, Interestingly, the placement of the extreme right Chrysi Avyi does not seem to be influenced by this bias, although this has more do with the lack of variance in the data (32 out of 33 experts placed the party on 10)
↑ Grumke, Thomas (2003), "The transatlantic dimension of right-wing extremism", Human Rights Review, 4 (4): 56–72, doi:10.1007/s12142-003-1021-x, S2CID145203309, On October 24, 1998 the Greek right-wing extremist organization Chrisi Avgi ("Golden Dawn") was the host for the "5th European Youth Congress" in Thessaloniki.
↑ Liang, Christina Schori, ed. (2007). Europe for the Europeans: the foreign and security policy of neo-populist parties. Aldershot: Ashgate. pp.265f. ISBN978-0-7546-4851-2.
↑ Verbeeck, Georgi; Hausleitner, Mariana (2011). "Cultural Memory and Legal Responses: Holocaust Denial in Belgium and Romania". Facing the Catastrophe: Jews and Non-Jews in Europe During World War II. Berg. p.238. ISBN978-1-84520-825-7.
↑ Shafir, Michael (2004). "Memories, Memorials and Membership: Romanian Utilitarian Anti-Semitism and Marshal Antonescu". Romania Since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society. Lexington Books. p.71. ISBN978-0-7391-0592-4.
↑ Shizhensky, Roman (2020). "Современное "родноверие": реперные точки" (in Russian). Доклад на круглом столе: «Славянское язычество XXI века: проблемы генезиса и развития», прошедшем 15 февраля 2020 года в Нижегородском государственном педагогическом университете имени Козьмы Минина. Archived from the original on 6 January 2022.
↑ Shizhensky, Roman (2021). "Neopaganism and the middle class". Lecture hall "Krapivensky 4". 03/02/2021. Archived from the original on 6 January 2022. Retrieved 19 February 2023.
1 2 3 Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN978-0-253-34656-8.
↑ Byford, Jovan (2011). "Willing Bystanders: Dimitrije Ljotić, "Shield Collaboration" and the Destruction of Serbia's Jews". In Haynes, Rebecca; Rady, Martyn (eds.). In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN978-1-84511-697-2.
↑ Đokić, Dejan (2011). "'Leader' or 'Devil'? Milan Stojadinović, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, and his Ideology". In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe. London: I.B. Tauris. p.155. ISBN978-1-84511-697-2.
↑ Maliković, Dragi; Rastović, Aleksandar; Šuvaković, Uroš (2007). Parlamentarne stranke u Kraljevini SHS-Jugoslaviji, knjiga 1, Nastanak razvoj i partijski sistemi. Kosovska Mitrovica: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini. ISBN978-8684029142.
↑ Hoare, Marko Attila (2013). Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-231-70394-9.
↑ Rossi, Michael (October 2009). Resurrecting The Past: Democracy, National Identity and Historical Memory in Modern Serbia (PhD thesis). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University. p.12.
↑ Byford, Jovan (2008). Denial and Repression of Antisemitism. Budapest: Central European University Press. p.17. ISBN978-9639776159.
↑ Buchenau, Klaus (2005). "From Hot War to Cold Integration? Serbian Orthodox Voices on Globalization and the European Union". Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. p.64. ISBN978-0-7591-0536-2.
↑ "Another poll, another possible coup". Sydney Morning Herald. Fairfax. 6 May 2006. Retrieved 21 July 2020. When Viliame Savu, leader of the far-right Nationalist Tako Lavo Party, said the country would not tolerate a "foreigner", meaning Chaudhry, as prime minister, Bainimarama threatened him with arrest. Qarase said this week that if Chaudhry returned to power he believed another coup was likely. Bainimarama's response was to threaten Qarase with arrest for inciting violence, along with his party director, Jale Baba.
↑ Hafez, Farid (20 October 2014). "Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building pan-European right-wing unity". Patterns of Prejudice. 48 (5): 479–499. doi:10.1080/0031322X.2014.965877. ISSN0031-322X.
↑ Cook, David (2015). Understanding Jihad. University of California Press. p.103. ISBN9780520287327.
↑ Juan Eduardo Campo, ed. (210). "dhimmi". Encyclopedia of Islam. Infobase Publishing. pp.194–195. ISBN978-1-4381-2696-8. Dhimmis are non-Muslims who live within Islamdom and have a regulated and protected status. ... In the modern period, this term has generally has occasionally been resuscitated, but it is generally obsolete.
1 2 Beran, Dale (30 July 2019). It Came from Something Awful: How a Toxic Troll Army Accidentally Memed Donald Trump into Office (1sted.). New York: All Points Books. p.18. ISBN978-1-250-21947-3.
↑ Sources which consider Stormfront a Neo-Nazi website include:
(Kaplan & Lööw 2002, p.224). "Also, Web Pages such as ...'Stormfront'... in addition to racist, anti-Semitic, and neo-Nazi messages and illustrations, provide links..."
(Gorenfeld 2008, p.68). "She has even written in to neo-Nazi Web site Stormfront, geeking out together on Peter Jackson's film adaptation;..."
(Friedman 2002, p.163). "Stormfront provides its viewers with... a general store stocked with Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and neo-Nazi literature and music..."
(Katel 2010, p.79). "...a March 13 Web post by Poplawski to the neo-Nazi Web site Stormfront."
(Moulitsas 2010, p.56). "Poplawski was active on white supremacist and neo-Nazi Stormfront internet forums."
(Martin & Petro 2006, p.174). "...9/11 Internet chat-room discussions, including radical hate-group sites like the neo-Nazi Stormfront.org."
Bar-On, Tamir (2016). Where Have All The Fascists Gone?. Routledge. ISBN978-1-351-87313-0.
Beiner, Ronald Verfasser (2018). Dangerous Minds: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Return of the Far Right. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN978-0-8122-9541-2. OCLC1148094406.
Hilliard, Robert L.; Keith, Michael C. (1999). Waves of Rancor: Tuning in the Radical Right. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
Ignazi, Piero (2003). Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-829325-5.
Kaplan, Jeffrey; Lööw, Heléne, eds. (2002). The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization. Rowman Altamira. ISBN978-0-7591-0204-0.
Katel, Peter (2010). "Hate Groups: Is Extremism on the Rise in the United States?". Issues in Terrorism and Homeland Security: selections from CQ Researcher (2nded.). SAGE Publications. ISBN978-1-4129-9201-5.
Lipset, Seymour Martin; Raab, Earl (1973). The politics of unreason right-wing extremism in America, 1790–1970. New York: Harper & Row. ISBN978-0-06-131744-6.
Martin, Andrew; Petro, Patrice, eds. (2006). Rethinking Global Security: Media, Popular Culture, and the "War on terror". Rutgers University Press. ISBN978-0-8135-3830-3.
↑ Mudde 2002, p.12: "Simply stated, the difference between radicalism and extremism is that the former is verfassungswidrig (opposed to the constitution), whereas the latter is verfassungsfeindlich (hostile towards the constitution). This difference is of the utmost practical importance for the political parties involved, as extremist parties are extensively watched by the (federal and state) Verfassungsschutz and can even be banned, whereas radical parties are free from this control."
↑ Mudde 2002, p.13: "All in all, most definitions of (whatever) populism do not differ that much in content from the definitions of right-wing extremism. [...] When the whole range of different terms and definitions used in the field is surveyed, there are striking similarities, with the various terms often being used synonymously and without any clear intention. Only a few authors, most notably those working within the extremist-theoretical tradition, clearly distinguish between the various terms."
Further reading
Akkerman, Tjitske, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn, eds. Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe (2016)
Lazaridis, Gabriella, Giovanna Campani, and Annie Benveniste (eds.) The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and 'Othering' (2016)
Macklin, Graham. "Transnational networking on the far right: The case of Britain and Germany." West European Politics 36.1 (2013): 176–198.
Merkl, Peter H.; Weinberg, Leonard (2003). Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN978-0-7146-5182-8.
Mieriņa, Inta, and Ilze Koroļeva. "Support for far right ideology and anti‐migrant attitudes among youth in Europe: A comparative analysis." Sociological Review 63 (2015): 183–205. online
Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (2007)
Parsons, Craig; Smeedling, Timothy M. (2006). Immigration and the transformation of Europe. Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-1-139-45880-1.
Rydgren, Jens, ed. (2018). The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-064418-5.
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