United front in Taiwan

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The united front in Taiwan is an aspect of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Government of China's larger united front strategy, applied to Taiwan, to achieve unification. [1] [2] It relies on the presence of pro-Beijing sympathizers in Taiwan combined with a carrot-and-stick approach of threatening war with Taiwan while offering opportunities for business and cultural exchanges. [3] [4] [5] According to officials of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, the CCP has long relied on organized crime as part of its united front tactics in Taiwan. [6] Critics who are negative of Chinese unification have linked the term "united front" to Chinese imperialism and expansionism. [7]

Contents

History

In 2011, Xi Jinping instructed cadres to "make full use" of Mazu for promotion of Chinese unification. [8] Temples in Taiwan, especially in rural areas, have been the most prominent targets for influence operations as they are meeting grounds for prominent local figures and financial donations to temples remain unregulated. [9] [10] [11]

Starting in 2017, the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots took on a more prominent role in the CCP's united front efforts directed at Taiwan. [12]

According to Sinologist Gerry Groot, the CCP's abrogation of one country, two systems in Hong Kong following the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests "was noted in Taiwan, where it made the work of the tiny minority of pro-unification activists even harder and reinforced the skepticism of others regarding the value of CCP promises." [13] Others have also perceived its failure to persuade Taiwanese. [14]

In 2022, Taiwan's National Security Bureau chief stated that the CCP had provided training to local internet celebrities in "cognitive warfare" campaigns to spread propaganda. [15]

In 2023, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated in a report that the CCP's united front efforts in Taiwan through "cognitive warfare" were increasing. [16]

During the run-up to the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots coordinated editorial attacks against Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, framing him as "pro-war"; Lai later won the election. [17] In November 2023, Taiwanese prosecutors investigated individuals accused of recruiting Taiwanese tourists on trips to mainland China paid for by the Taiwan Affairs Office, in which they met with representatives of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and were urged to vote for pan-Blue candidates. [18] [19] According to a Taiwan security official, more than 1,000 Taiwanese local officials had visited China on junkets in 2023. [20] A Liberty Times investigation showed that almost 30% of the 456 borough chiefs in Taipei had taken trips in 2023 to mainland China subsidized by the Chinese government. [21]

In 2025, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated that Douyin and Xiaohongshu are vectors for pro-unification propaganda. [22]

Organizations

Two bureaus of the Ministry of State Security, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, share intelligence collection and analysis on Taiwan. [23]

The UFWD sponsors paid trips and summer camps to mainland China for Taiwanese youth. The trips are reported to promote pro-Chinese unification sentiment. [24]

Responses

In February 2025, Taiwan's Ministry of Education barred two schools affiliated with the UFWD, Huaqiao University and Jinan University, from conducting exchanges in Taiwan. [25] The ministry also stated it would no longer recognize qualifications from schools associated with the UFWD. [26] The same month, the same ministry banned exchanges with the Seven Sons of National Defence. [27] In March 2025, Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te gave a policy speech in which he promised greater efforts to crack down on PRC espionage and infiltration in Taiwan. [28]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Cole, J. Michael (27 December 2019). "Taiwan and CCP political warfare: A blueprint". Sinopsis. Archived from the original on 30 December 2019. Retrieved 16 January 2022.
  2. ↑ Hong, Brendon (28 October 2020). "China's Real Invasion of Taiwan Has Already Started". The Daily Beast . Archived from the original on 28 October 2020. Retrieved 29 October 2020.
  3. ↑ McCarthy, Simone (1 August 2022). "'Win hearts and minds' in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Xi urges Communist Party". CNN . Archived from the original on 1 August 2022. Retrieved 1 August 2022.
  4. ↑ Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang; Tien, Hung-mao (1999). Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China. Macmillan. ISBN   978-0-333-73783-5. Archived from the original on 27 August 2023. Retrieved 4 November 2016.
  5. ↑ Yu-fu, Chen; Chin, Jonathan (5 September 2021). "Beijing boosts influence drive: report". Taipei Times . Archived from the original on 6 September 2021. Retrieved 5 September 2021.
  6. ↑ Cooper, Sam. "Beijing uses organized crime to interfere in Taiwan's elections, and likely does in Canada: Taiwanese official". www.thebureau.news. Archived from the original on 13 October 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2023.
  7. ↑ "Notes from Central Taiwan: Imaginings of another Taiwan". Taipei Times . 8 May 2023. Archived from the original on 28 June 2023. Retrieved 30 April 2024. Today we know terms like "united front" in the context of Chinese imperialism and expansionism, but in the 1930s the term had another meaning: it encapsulated the desire of Asians struggling to form a "united front" against external imperialism.
  8. ↑ "China's atheist Communist Party encourages folk religion" . The Economist . 19 September 2019. ISSN   0013-0613. Archived from the original on 16 June 2023. Retrieved 16 June 2023. In 2011 Mr Xi urged officials to "make full use" of Mazu to woo Taiwanese, most of whom have ancestral ties with the mainland.
  9. ↑ Pomfret, James; Lee, Yimou (21 December 2023). "China wields Mazu 'peace goddess' religion as weapon in Taiwan election". Reuters . Retrieved 21 December 2023.
  10. ↑ Wong, Tessa; Chang, Joy (29 December 2023). "The worshippers caught between China and Taiwan". BBC News . Archived from the original on 30 December 2023. Retrieved 30 December 2023.
  11. ↑ "China targets Taiwan's temples, Matsu worshippers in influence ops". Radio Free Asia . 10 January 2024. Archived from the original on 11 January 2024. Retrieved 11 January 2024.
  12. ↑ "Civilian group from mainland China to take more prominent role in cross-strait affairs". South China Morning Post . 7 May 2017. Archived from the original on 15 May 2023. Retrieved 27 August 2023.
  13. ↑ Groot, Gerry (19 October 2022). "The Life and Death of United Front Promises From Revolution to (Re)-Unification Past, Present and Future". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 19 October 2022. Retrieved 19 October 2022.
  14. ↑ Purbrick, Martin (12 April 2023). "United Front Work and Beyond: How the Chinese Communist Party Penetrates the United States and Western Societies". Jamestown Foundation . Archived from the original on 15 April 2023. Retrieved 15 April 2023.
  15. ↑ "Some Taiwanese Youtubers on CCP payroll: intelligence chief". Central News Agency (Taiwan) . Archived from the original on 17 May 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2022.
  16. ↑ "China to increase 'united front' efforts: MAC report". Taipei Times . 16 May 2023. Archived from the original on 5 June 2023. Retrieved 19 May 2023.
  17. ↑ "China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 27, 2023". Critical Threats. American Enterprise Institute. Archived from the original on 29 July 2023. Retrieved 27 August 2023.
  18. ↑ Shan, Shelley (29 November 2023). "Suspects running China-funded tours". Taipei Times . Archived from the original on 3 December 2023. Retrieved 2 December 2023.
  19. ↑ "First charge laid over China voter tours". Taipei Times . 27 December 2023. Archived from the original on 14 January 2024. Retrieved 28 December 2023.
  20. ↑ Lee, Yimou (30 November 2023). "Exclusive: China lures hundreds of Taiwan politicians with cheap trips before election". Reuters . Retrieved 23 April 2025.
  21. ↑ Hsin-hui, Yang (4 December 2023). "Borough heads questioned over tours". Taipei Times . Retrieved 23 April 2025.
  22. ↑ "Douyin, RedNote seen as China's propaganda tools: MAC". Focus Taiwan . 29 May 2025. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  23. ↑ Hsiao, Russell (23 August 2023). "Personnel Changes at the PRC's Organs for Taiwan Intelligence Analysis". Global Taiwan Institute. Archived from the original on 3 November 2023. Retrieved 4 September 2023.
  24. ↑ "Songs, pandas and praise for Xi: how China courts young Taiwanese" . The Economist . 11 July 2024. ISSN   0013-0613. Archived from the original on 11 July 2024. Retrieved 12 July 2024.
  25. ↑ "Taiwan blacklists two Chinese schools". Taipei Times . 20 February 2025. Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  26. ↑ "Taiwan to no longer recognize qualifications from United Front schools (update)". Focus Taiwan . 20 February 2025. Retrieved 22 February 2025.
  27. ↑ "Seven Chinese universities sanctioned". Taipei Times . 1 March 2025. Retrieved 2 March 2025.
  28. ↑ Dotson, John (2 April 2025). "The Lai Administration Vows Renewed Efforts to Combat PRC Espionage and Subversion". Global Taiwan Institute. Retrieved 5 April 2025.
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