Criticism has been a key part of democracy, its functions, and its development throughout history. Some critics call upon the constitutional regime to be true to its own highest principles; others reject the values promoted by constitutional democracy.[1]
Plato famously opposed democracy, arguing for a 'government of the best qualified'. James Madison extensively studied the historic attempts at and arguments on democracy in his preparation for the Constitutional Convention, and Winston Churchill remarked that "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."[2]
Critics of democracy have often tried to highlight democracy's inconsistencies, paradoxes, and limits by contrasting it with other forms of government, such as epistocracy or lottocracy. They have characterized most modern democracies as democratic polyarchies[3] and democratic aristocracies.[4] They have identified fascist moments in modern democracies. They have termed the societies produced by modern democracies as neo-feudal[5] and have contrasted democracy with fascism, anarcho-capitalism, theocracy, and absolute monarchy.
Historical Criticisms
Classical philosophy
Plato is considered one of the most important opponents of democratic rule in Ancient Greece.
As Robert Dahl writes, "Although the practices of modern democracy bear only a weak resemblance to the political institutions of classical Greece... Greek democratic ideas have been more influential... [and] what we know of their ideas comes less from the writings and speeches of democratic advocates, of which only fragments survive, than from their critics".[6]
Aristotle was a mild critic who "disliked the power that he thought the expansion of democracy necessarily gave to the poor."[6]Plato's political philosophy was skeptical of democracy and advocated for "government by the best qualified".[6] Modern liberal democracy incorporated some of these critiques.[7] For example, James Madison "trained rigorously in... ancient learning" as a young man, and the ideas of ancient authors explain a "facet of Madison's recorded attitude on the nature of man".[8] The influence of the ancient critiques of democracy is seen in how Madison spent the months before the Constitutional Convention "studying many centuries of political philosophy and histories of past attempts at republican forms of government".[9]
According to Dahl, Aristotle and Plato would agree with most advocates of modern democracy that an aim of the society is "to produce good citizens" and "Virtue, justice, and happiness are companions... [in] developing citizens who seek the common good".[6]
Thucydides, the famous ancient Greek historian of the Peloponnesian War, witnessed the fall of Athenian democracy and applied scientific history in his critique of the democratic government.[10] At the heart of his critique were how democracy failed "in the search for truth" and how leaders and citizens attempted "to impose their own speech-dependent meanings on reality".[10] Thucydides blamed "public orators" and demagogues for a failure of epistemic knowledge, allowing most Athenians to "believe silly things about their past and the institutions of their opponents".[10]
Post-classical era criticisms
From 500 to 1500AD, philosophers and political leaders around the world often advocated for traditional systems of governing society, which were critical of democracy.[citation needed]
Italian philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas advocated for "a mixed government combining elements of democracy, aristocracy and kingship... [which] is reminiscent of Aristotle's preference for mixed government over either democracy or oligarchy."[11] Scholars also consider "the substantial medieval literature in support of the Inquisitions" as opposed to modern ideas of democracy.[12]
Democracy existed in a few "city-states of medieval Italy... [which] were ultimately submerged in imperial or oligarchic rule."[6] The idea of "representation was not invented by democrats but developed instead as a medieval institution of monarchical and aristocratic government," and had its beginnings in "assemblies summoned by the monarch, or sometimes the nobles themselves, to deal with important matters of state."[6] The "state of military technology and organization" in medieval Europe was "highly unfavorable in its effects" on democracy.[6]
Medieval Jewish political philosophy was influenced by Plato, Muslim thought, and Halakhic concepts and was "monarchist, and inherently anti-democratic."[13]
As Amartya Sen wrote about traditional Asian societies, "It is not hard, of course, to find authoritarian writings within the Asian traditions. But neither is it hard to find them in Western classics: One has only to reflect on the writings of Plato or Aquinas to see that devotion to discipline is not a special Asian taste."[12]
Since the post-classical period, Islam has been an important pillar of society for much of the world, and some critics have defended this tradition from "the secular assumptions of the Enlightenment" and an "uncritical universalism," which "erodes historical continuity and the sense of community that sustains traditional societies."[14] In many societies today, people of faith challenge the idea of "secularism as the only 'rational' way to deal with the challenges of life."[14]
Early modern criticisms
Thomas Hobbes, one of the first philosophers of the Enlightenment, published Leviathan in 1651 in defense of "absolute sovereignty" and supporting the royalists in the English Civil War.[15] Hobbes was a critic of democracy because "the sovereign in a democracy (i.e. the people) can only exercise its power when it is actually assembled together... Only in a monarchy is the capacity to govern always exercised."[16] Hobbes also thought democracy would lead to instability, conflict, glory seeking, mistrust, and undermining the social contract.[16] Later Enlightenment thinkers, such as Madison, who shared Hobbesian concerns about "the strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses" of human nature, would use some of these critiques to improve modern democracy.[17][8]
Lippincott proposed that their three leading doctrines were "the common man's inferiority, the title of the few to rule, and authority". The main sources of these ideas were Puritanism, middle-class ideas of power, and the classical education that they received in their youth. The three doctrines were "most perfectly represented in Plato's Republic," while classical history seemed to provide examples of "the common man's inferiority" as in the cases of Athens and Rome, "which showed the populace turning to disorder". The three doctrines were developed during the Reformation and the Enlightenment by writers like John Calvin, Edmund Burke and David Hume.[19]
Plato believed the ability of common men to vote was not proper for a democracy. The vote of an expert has equal value to the vote of 'an incompetent'.[20]Jason Brennan believes that the low information voters is a major problem in America and is the main objection to democracies in general because the system does not incentivize being informed.[21] Brennan cites a study where less than 30% of Americans can name two or more of the rights listed in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.[21] He believes an informed voter should have extensive knowledge of the candidate's current and previous political beliefs/tendencies. He proposes an epistocracy, which would only give a vote to those with an elite political understanding.[21]
Charles Maurras, a supporter of the Vichy regime and member of the far-right FRS of the Action Française movement believed in biological inequality and natural hierarchies, and claimed that the individual is naturally subordinated to social collectivities such as the family, the society, and the state, which he claims are doomed to fail if based upon the "myth of equality" or "abstract liberty". Maurras criticized democracy as being a "government by numbers" in which quantity matters more over quality and prefers the worst over the best. Maurras denounced the principles of liberalism as described in The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as based upon the false assumption of liberty and the false assumption of equality. He claimed that the parliamentary system subordinates the national interest, or common good, to private interests of a parliament's representatives where only short-sighted interests of individuals prevail.[citation needed] Attempts to replace Democratic meritocracy with Authoritarian meritocracy face challenges since power can override merit.[22]
Bernard Manin draws from James Harrington, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to suggest that the dominant form of government, representative as opposed to direct, is effectively aristocratic.[4] He says that modern representative governments exercise political power through aristocratic elections which, in turn, contradicts "rule of the people". As far as Montesquieu is concerned, elections favor the "best" citizens who Manin notes tend to be wealthy and upper-class. As far as Rousseau is concerned, elections favor the incumbent government officials or the citizens with the strongest personalities, which results in hereditary aristocracy. Manin further evinces the aristocratic nature of representative governments by contrasting them with the ancient style of selection by lot. Manin notes that Montesquieu believed that lotteries prevent jealousy and distribute offices equally (among citizens from different ranks), while Rousseau believed that lotteries choose indifferently, preventing self-interest and partiality from polluting the citizen's choice (and thus prevent hereditary aristocracy).
Additionally, Manin is interested in explaining the discrepancy between 18th-century American and French revolutionaries' declaration of the "equality of all citizens" and their enactment of (aristocratic) elections in their respective democratic experiments.[4] Manin suggests that the discrepancy is explained by the revolutionaries' contemporary preoccupation with one form of equality over another. The revolutionaries prioritized gaining the equal right to consent to their choice of government (even a potentially aristocratic democracy), at the expense of seeking the equal right to be the face of that democracy. And it is elections, not lots, that provide citizens with more opportunities to consent. In elections, citizens consent both to the procedure of elections and the product of the elections (even if they produce the election of elites). In lotteries, citizens consent only to the procedure of lots, but not to the product of the lots (even if they produce the election of the average person). That is, if the revolutionaries prioritized consent to be governed over equal opportunity to serve as the government, then their choice of elections over lotteries makes sense.
The 20th-century Italian thinkers Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (independently) argued that democracy was illusory, and served only to mask the reality of elite rule. Indeed, they argued that elite oligarchy is the unbendable law of human nature, due largely to the apathy and division of the masses (as opposed to the drive, initiative and unity of the elites), and that democratic institutions would do no more than shift the exercise of power from oppression to manipulation.[31]
German-Italian political scientist Robert Michels developed the iron law of oligarchy in 1911.[32] Michels argued that oligarchy is inevitable as an "iron law" within any organization as part of the "tactical and technical necessities" of organization and on the topic of democracy, Michels stated: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy" and went on to state "Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy".[32] Michels stated that the official goal of democracy of eliminating elite rule was impossible, that democracy is a façade legitimizing the rule of a particular elite, and that elite rule, which he refers to as oligarchy, is inevitable.[32]
A 2014 study led by Princeton professor Martin Gilens of 1,779 U.S. government decisions concluded that "elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence."[33]
Socialist perspective
French revolutionary syndicalistHubert Lagardelle claimed that French revolutionary syndicalism came to being as the result of "the reaction of the proletariat against idiotic democracy," which he claimed was "the popular form of bourgeois dominance". Lagardelle opposed democracy for its universalism, and believed in the necessity of class separation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, as democracy did not recognize the social differences between them.
Political representatives may vote against their constituency and for special interest groups with increasing lobbying money.[34] Some aspects of lobbying have been criticized by some for contributing to a democratic deficit.[35]
Democracies aren't immune to corruption. [36] Whilst countries that have high levels of democracy tend to have low levels of different forms of corruption, it is also clear that countries with moderate levels of democracy have high corruption, as well as countries with no democracy having very little corruption.[37] Varying types of democratic policies reduce corruption, but only high levels of, and multiple kinds of democratic institutions, such as open and free elections combined with judicial and legislative constraints, will effectively reduce corruption.
According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "democracy is being so emptied of content that it can be instrumentally defended by those who use it in order to destroy it," saying that individuals calling for increased democratization and protection from fascism are labeled as leftists.[38]
Various reasons can be found for eliminating or suppressing political opponents. Methods such as false flags, counterterrorism-laws,[39] planting or creating compromising material and perpetuation of public fear may be used to suppress dissent. After a failed coup d'état over 110,000 people have been purged and nearly 40,000 have been imprisoned in Turkey, which is or was considered to be a democratic nation, during the 2016 Turkish purges.[40][41] Fake parties, phantom political rivals, and "scarecrow" opponents may be used to undermine the opposition.[42]
The electoral process in democracies can be corrupted, through the giving and receiving of bribes, the threat or use of violence, treatment, and impersonation. [43]
Social bots and other forms of online propaganda as well as search engine result algorithms may be used to alter the perception and opinion of voters.[44][45] In 2016 Andrés Sepúlveda disclosed that he manipulated public opinion to rig elections in Latin America. According to him, with a budget of $600,000, he led a team of hackers that stole campaign strategies, manipulated social media to create false waves of enthusiasm and derision, and installed spyware in opposition offices to help Enrique Peña Nieto, a right-of-center candidate, win the election.[46][47] Televised debates[48] and, according to George Bishop, inaccurate opinion polls[49] can in some cases shift election outcomes.
Dan Slater and Lucan Ahmad Way argue that misinformation − such as fake news − has become common to elections around the world.[50] They criticized the FBI for announcing that the agency would examine potentially incriminating evidence against Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server just 11 days before the US election.[50]
Inefficiency and instability
Majoritarian democracy has been criticized [by whom?] for not offering enough political stability.[citation needed] As governments are frequently elected on and off there tends to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally.[citation needed] Reason Wafawarova argued in 2008 that rigid approaches to democracy may undermine that ability for a developing country to achieve long-term stability and democracy.[51][needs update]
Democracy tends to improve conflict resolution.[52] However, spatially concentrated costs and diffuse benefits together with regulatory transaction costs can result in ineffective conflict resolution such as NIMBY.[53]
The Coase theorem states that non-zero transaction costs will generally lead to inefficient conflict resolution. Daron Acemoglu argues that the Coase theorem extends to politics, where the "rules of the game" in politics need to be enforced to achieve low transaction costs. Groups with political power can prefer inefficient policies and inefficient institutions and oppose further democratization.[54] Anthony Downs argued that the political markets works much the same way as the economic market and that there could potentially be an equilibrium in the system because of the democratic process.[55] However, he argued that imperfect knowledge in politicians and voters prevented the full realization of that equilibrium.[55]
Income inequality and limited socioeconomic mobility can lead to social unrest and revolutions.[56] The extension of the democratic franchise can be seen as a commitment by the political elite in favor of economic redistribution and political redistribution to prevent social unrest, explaining the Kuznets curve.[57] In what situations democracy reduces economic inequality is debated.[58]
James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner argue that the nontransparent nature of tax system causes a fiscal illusion which results in greater government spending than democratically expected.[64]
Theocracies view deities as supreme ruling authorities, not the people.[67]Theodemocracy combines authority by both deity and the people.[68]
The practice of orthodox Islam in the form of Salafism can clash with a democratic system. The core precept of Islam, that of "tawheed" (the "oneness of God"), can be interpreted by fundamentalist Salafis to mean, among other things, that democracy as a political system is incompatible with the purported notion that laws not handed down by God should not be recognized.[69]
Asian perspectives
Political leaders in Singapore and China, such as Lee Kuan Yew, have said Confucianism provides a more "coherent ideological basis for a well-ordered Asian society than Western notions of individual liberty".[70]
In his criticism of Western liberal democracy, academic Zhang Weiwei contends that liberal democracy is insufficiently meritocratic and fails to choose trustworthy leaders.[71]:211
Chinese policymakers argue that policy under democratic systems is largely restricted to ad hoc interventions which leaves social development vulnerable to market forces.[72]:144 According to this view, policy-making in democratic systems is limited to ad hoc policy interventions.[72]:144–145 Chinese planners argue that such interventions are incapable of coping with fundamental challenges such as environmental degradation, dysfunction in capital markets, and demographic change.[72]:145
The Chinese Communist Party political concept of whole-process people's democracy criticizes liberal democracy for excessively relying on procedural formalities or rule of law without, in the party's view, genuinely reflecting the interests of the people.[73]:60–64 According to Wang Zhongyuan of Fudan University, this critique arises as part of a post-1990s trend in which various countries have sought to redefine "democracy" in ways that differ from Western multi-party democratic systems.[73]:61 Under the framing of whole-process people's democracy, the most important criteria for democracy is whether it can "solve the people's real problems," while a system in which "the people are awakened only for voting" is deemed not truly democratic.[73]:60–64 The concept is thus both a way of criticizing liberal democracy and deflecting criticism of the Chinese system.[73]:64
Responses to criticism
Defenses of democracy
David Van Reybrouck, the author of Against Elections: The Case for Democracy, argues that allocating power through sortition, such as in citizens' assemblies, fixes many of the shortcomings of representative democracy. "Democracy is not government by the best in our society, because such a thing is called an aristocracy, elected or not...Democracy, by contrast, flourishes precisely by allowing a diversity of voices to be heard. It's all about having an equal say, an equal right to determine what political action is taken."[74]
Some concerned by the sway of the public opinion argue for limiting the ability of money to play a role in democracy.[77][78]
Empirical evidence
Contemporary empirical evidence on the success of democracy is equivocal. On one hand, democracy is sometimes credited for bringing peace, individual freedoms and economic prosperity. [79] On the other hand, certain studies, such as The Economist Democracy Index indicate that democracies are in decline globally. [80]
↑ Kilcullen, John; Robinson, Jonathan (2019), "Medieval Political Philosophy", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved February 19, 2022
↑ Duncan, Stewart (2021), "Thomas Hobbes", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved February 20, 2022
↑ "liberalism In general, the belief that it is the aim of politics to preserve individual rights and to maximize freedom of choice." Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, Third edition 2009, ISBN978-0-19-920516-5.
1 2 3 James L. Hyland. Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations. Manchester, England, UK; New York, New York, USA: Manchester University Press ND, 1995. Pp. 247.
↑ "Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens," M. Gilens and B. I. Page (2014), Perspectives on politics12, 564–581,
↑ Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois (May 31, 2024). "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention". The Economic Journal. 134 (662): 2290–2320. doi:10.1093/ej/ueae020. hdl:10419/193239. ISSN0013-0133.
↑ Wilson, Andrew (2005). Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world (1sted.). New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Pr. ISBN9780300095456.
↑ Ward, Norman (February 1949). "Electoral Corruption and Controverted Elections". The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 15 (1): 74–86. doi:10.2307/137956. JSTOR137956.
↑ Mosler, Martin; Schaltegger, Christoph (June 27, 2024). "The Swiss Debt Brake Is Democratic, Strict, Transparent, and Binding. A Model to Follow?". The Economists' Voice. 21 (1): 213–218. doi:10.1515/ev-2024-0021. ISSN1553-3832.
↑ Salafism in the Netherlands: Diversity and dynamics(PDF). General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). 2015. p.12. Archived from the original(PDF) on January 5, 2019. Retrieved January 5, 2019.
↑ Gorton, William A. (January 2, 2016). "Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns' Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy". New Political Science. 38: 61–80. doi:10.1080/07393148.2015.1125119. S2CID147145163.
Femia, Joseph V. (2001). Against the masses: varieties of anti-democratic thought since the French Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-828063-7. OCLC46641885.
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