Majority rule

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Majority rule is the principle that a group which has more than half of all voters should be allowed to make the decisions for a group. Majority rule is the binary decision rule most often used in decision-making bodies, including many legislatures of democratic nations. Where no one party wins a majority of the seats in a legislature, the majority of legislators that wields power is partly composed of members of other parties in support.

Contents

Where only two candidates are competing for a single seat, one or the other will receive a simple majority of valid votes, unless they tie. But in situations where more than two are competing for a single seat, simple plurality is sometimes considered as close as possible to majority in which case having plurality is enough to be elected, while in some systems such as instant-runoff voting special efforts are made to ensure that the winner is in fact the majority choice even where three or more are competing for the same office. However, that does not always happen. [1]

Where multiple members are elected in a district as may happen under proportional representation or plurality block voting, no candidate may receive a majority of votes cast. Under block voting, the winners, usually of just one party, often have received only a minority of the votes cast.

Alternatives

Plurality

Pie charts plurality (left) and majority (right) Plurality versus Majority.png
Pie charts plurality (left) and majority (right)

One alternative to majority rule is plurality (First-past-the-post voting or FPTP). This is often used in elections with more than two candidates. In this case, the winner is the one with the most votes, whether or not that constitutes a majority. [2]

Supermajority

Parliamentary rules may prescribe the use of a supermajoritarian rule under certain circumstances, such as the 60% filibuster rule to close debate in the US Senate. [3] However such requirement means that 41 percent of the members or more could prevent debate from being closed, an example where the majority will would be blocked by a minority. Switzerland is an example of consensus democracy where generally supermajority rule is applied. A national unity government is a government with a supermajority.

Use

Majority rule is common in liberal democracies. It is used in legislatures and other bodies. [2] It is one of the basic rules of parliamentary procedure such as Robert's Rules of Order . [4] Mandatory referendums where the question is yes or no are also decided by majority rule, while optional referendums and popular initiatives correspond to consensus rule (e.g. Switzerland). [5]

Properties

May's Theorem

According to Kenneth May, majority rule is the only "fair" decision rule. Majority rule does not let some votes count more than others or privilege an alternative by requiring fewer votes to pass. Formally, majority rule is the only binary decision rule that has the following properties: [6] [7]

Majority rule meets these criteria only if the number of voters is odd or infinite. If the number of voters is even, ties are possible, violating neutrality. Some assemblies permit the chair to vote only to break ties. This substitutes a loss of anonymity for the loss of neutrality.

Other properties

Voting paradox

In group decision-making voting paradoxes can form. It is possible that alternatives a, b, and c exist such that a majority prefers a to b, another majority prefers b to c, and yet another majority prefers c to a. (For each proposition to have majority, the measure must involve more than just voter's first preference.) Because majority rule requires an alternative to have majority support to pass, majority rule is vulnerable to rejecting the majority's decision. (The minimum number of alternatives that can form such a cycle (voting paradox) is 3 if the number of voters is different from 4, because the Nakamura number of the majority rule is 3. For supermajority rules the minimum number is often greater, because the Nakamura number is often greater.)

Limitations

Arguments for limitations

Minority rights

A super-majority rule actually empowers the minority, making it stronger (at least through its veto) than the majority. McGann argued that when only one of multiple minorities is protected by the super-majority rule (same as seen in simple plurality elections systems), so the protection is for the status quo, rather than for the faction that supports it.

Another possible way to prevent tyranny is to elevate certain rights as inalienable. [8] Thereafter, any decision that targets such a right might be majoritarian, but it would not be legitimate, because it would violate the requirement for equal rights.

Constitutional rights cannot by themselves offer protection. Under some circumstances, the legal rights of one person cannot be guaranteed without unjustly imposing on someone else. McGann wrote, "one man's right to property in the antebellum South was another man's slavery." Amartya Sen noted the liberal paradox, stating that a proliferation of rights may make everyone worse off. [9]

Erroneous priorities

The erroneous priorities effect (EPE) states that groups that act upon what they initially consider important almost always misplace their effort. Such groups have not yet determined which factors are most influential. Only after identifying those factors can they take effective action. EPE was articulated by K.M. Dye at the Food and Drug Administration. [10] [11] This discovery led to the recognition that even with good intentions, effective action requires a different paradigm for language and voting. [12] EPE is a negative consequence of phenomena such as spreadthink and groupthink. Effective priorities are dependent on recognizing the influence patterns of global interdependencies and are defeated by EPE when priorities simply aggregate individual stakeholder's subjective voting that does not consider those interdependencies. Dye's work resulted in the discovery of the 6th law of the science of structured dialogic design, namely that "Learning occurs in a dialogue as the observers search for influence relationships among the members of a set of observations." [11]

Other arguments for limitations

Seeds For Change argued that majority rule can lead to poor deliberative practice or even to "an aggressive culture and conflict." [13] Along these lines, majority rule may fail to measure the preferences intensity. The authors of An Anarchist Critique of Democracy argue that "two voters who are casually interested in doing something" can defeat one voter who has "dire opposition" to the proposal of the two. [14] Strict observance of majority rule would allow two voters (a majority) to pass legislation that hurts one voter (the minority).

Voting theorists claimed that cycling leads to debilitating instability. [2] Buchanan and Tullock argue that unanimity is the only decision rule that guarantees economic efficiency. [2]

US jury decisions require the support of at least 10 of 12 jurors, or even unanimous support. This supermajoritarian concept follows directly from the presumption of innocence on which the US legal system is based. Rousseau advocated supermajority voting on important decisions when he said, "The more the deliberations are important and serious, the more the opinion that carries should approach unanimity." [15]

Arguments against limitations

Minority rights

McGann argued that majority rule helps to protect minority rights, at least in deliberative settings. The argument is that cycling ensures that parties that lose to a majority have an interest to remain part of the group's process, because any decision can easily be overturned by another majority. Furthermore, suppose a minority wishes to overturn a decision. In that case, under majority rule it just needs to form a coalition that has more than half of the officials involved and that will give it power. Under supermajority rules, a minority needs its own supermajority to overturn a decision. [2]

To support the view that majority rule protects minority rights better than supermajority rules, McGann pointed to the cloture rule in the US Senate, which was used to prevent the extension of civil liberties to racial minorities. [2] Saunders, while agreeing that majority rule may offer better protection than supermajority rules, argued that majority rule may nonetheless be of little help to the least minorities. [16]

Other arguments

Saunders argued that deliberative democracy flourishes under majority rule and that under majority rule, participants always have to convince more than half the group, while under supermajoritarian rules participants might only need to persuade a minority (to prevent a change). [16]

Where large changes in seats held by a party may arise from only relatively slight change in votes cast (such as under FPTP), and a simple majority is all that is required to wield power (most legislatures in democratic countries), governments may repeatedly fall into and out of power. This may cause polarization and policy lurch, or it may encourage compromise, depending on other aspects of political culture. McGann argued that such cycling encourages participants to compromise, rather than pass resolutions that have the bare minimum required to "win" because of the likelihood that they would soon be reversed. [9]

Within this atmosphere of compromise, a minority faction may accept proposals that it dislikes in order to build a coalition for a proposal that it deems of greater moment. In that way, majority rule differentiates weak and strong preferences. McGann argued that such situations encourage minorities to participate, because majority rule does not typically create permanent losers, encouraging systemic stability. He pointed to governments that use largely unchecked majority rule, such as is seen under proportional representation in the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden, as empirical evidence of majority rule's stability. [2]

See also

Related Research Articles

Plurality voting refers to electoral systems in which the candidate in an electoral district who poll more than any other are elected.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Voting</span> Method to make collective decisions

Voting is a method by which a group, such as a meeting or an electorate, convenes together for the purpose of making a collective decision or expressing an opinion usually following discussions, debates or election campaigns. Democracies elect holders of high office by voting. Residents of a jurisdiction represented by an elected official are called "constituents", and the constituents who choose to cast a ballot for their chosen candidate are called "voters." There are different systems for collecting votes, but while many of the systems used in decision-making can also be used as electoral systems, any which cater to proportional representation can only be used in elections.

Cumulative voting is a multiple-winner method intended to promote more proportional representation than winner-take-all elections such as block voting or first past the post. Cumulative voting is used frequently in corporate governance, where it is mandated by some (7) U.S. states.

Block voting, also known as bloc voting, refers to certain electoral systems where multiple candidates are elected simultaneously. They do not guarantee minority representation and allow a group of voters to ensure that only their preferred candidates are elected. In these systems, a voter can select as many candidates as there are open seats. That is, the voter has as many votes to cast as the number of seats to fill. The block voting systems are among various election systems available for use in multi-member districts where the voting system allows for the selection of multiple winners at once.

A majority is more than half of a total. It is a subset of a set consisting of more than half of the set's elements. For example, if a group consists of 31 individuals, a majority would be 16 or more individuals, while having 15 or fewer individuals would not constitute a majority.

The tyranny of the majority is an inherent weakness to majority rule in which the majority of an electorate pursues exclusively its own objectives at the expense of those of the minority factions. This results in oppression of minority groups comparable to that of a tyrant or despot, argued John Stuart Mill in his 1859 book On Liberty.

Parallel voting is a type of mixed electoral system in which representatives are voted into a single chamber using two or more different systems, most often first-past-the-post voting (FPTP) with party-list proportional representation (PR). It is the most common form of mixed member majoritarian representation (MMM), which is why these terms are often used synonymously with each other. In some countries, parallel voting is known as the supplementary member (SM) system, while in academic literature it is sometimes called the superposition method within mixed systems.

Majoritarianism is a political philosophy or ideology with an agenda asserting that a majority, whether based on a religion, language, social class, or other category of the population, is entitled to a certain degree of primacy in society, and has the right to make decisions that affect the society. This traditional view has come under growing criticism, and liberal democracies have increasingly included constraints on what the parliamentary majority can do, in order to protect citizens' fundamental rights. Majoritarianism should not be confused with electoral systems that give seats to candidates with only a plurality of votes. Although such systems are sometimes called majoritarian systems, they use plurality, not majority, to set winners. Some electoral systems, such as instant-runoff voting, are most often majoritarian – winners are most often determined by having majority of the votes that are being counted – but not always. A parliament that gives lawmaking power to any group that holds a majority of seats may be called a majoritarian parliament. Such is the case in the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Parliament of Saudi Arabia and many other chambers of power.

Bucklin voting is a class of voting methods that can be used for single-member and multi-member districts. As in highest median rules like the majority judgment, the Bucklin winner will be one of the candidates with the highest median ranking or rating. It is named after its original promoter, the Georgist politician James W. Bucklin of Grand Junction, Colorado, and is also known as the Grand Junction system.

A supermajority is a requirement for a proposal to gain a specified level of support which is greater than the threshold of more than one-half used for a simple majority. Supermajority rules in a democracy can help to prevent a majority from eroding fundamental rights of a minority, but they can also hamper efforts to respond to problems and encourage corrupt compromises at times when action is taken. Changes to constitutions, especially those with entrenched clauses, commonly require supermajority support in a legislature. Parliamentary procedure requires that any action of a deliberative assembly that may alter the rights of a minority have a supermajority requirement, such as a two-thirds vote. In consensus democracy the supermajority rule is applied in most cases.

In social choice theory, May's theorem, also called the general possibility theorem, says that majority vote is the unique ranked social choice function that satisfies the following criteria:

In political science, minoritarianism is a neologism for a political structure or process in which a minority group of a population has a certain degree of primacy in that population's decision making, with legislative power or judicial power being held or controlled by a minority group rather than a majority that is representative of the population.

The majority favorite or absolute majority criterion is a voting system criterion. The criterion states that "if only one candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters, then that candidate must win." It is sometimes referred to simply as the majority criterion, but this term is more often used to refer to Condorcet's majority-rule principle.

Majoritarian democracy is a form of democracy based upon majority rule of a polity's citizens. Majoritarian democracy contrasts with consensus democracy, rule by as many people as possible.

The multiple non-transferable vote (MNTV) is a group of voting system, in which voters elect several representatives at once, with each voter having more than one vote. MNTV uses multi-member electoral districts or only one district, which contains all voters, which is used to provide at-large representation.

Instant-runoff voting (IRV), also known as plurality with elimination or alternative vote (AV) in certain countries, is an ordinal voting system that modifies plurality voting to repeatedly eliminate the last-place finisher and reassigning their votes until only one candidate is left. In the United States, IRV is often mistakenly conflated with ranked-choice voting (RCV); however, there are many other ranked-choice methods and social choice theorists tend to prefer more exact terms.

A majoritarian electoral system is an electoral system where the candidates or parties with the most votes takes all seats using the winner-takes-all principle and in this way provides majoritarian representation. However, there are many electoral systems considered majoritarian based on different definitions, including types of at-large majoritarian representation such as block voting or party block voting, but district-based majoritarian systems such as first-past-the-post voting (FPTP/SMP). Where two candidates are in the running, the one with the most votes will have a majority, but where there are three or more candidates, it often happens that no candidate takes a majority of the votes.

A major branch of social choice theory is devoted to the comparison of electoral systems, otherwise known as social choice functions. Viewed from the perspective of political science, electoral systems are rules for conducting elections and determining winners from the ballots cast. From the perspective of economics, mathematics, and philosophy, a social choice function is a mathematical function that determines how a society should make choices, given a collection of individual preferences.

Melissa Schwartzberg is an American political scientist. She is the Silver Professor of Politics at New York University, and is affiliated with its Department of Classics and School of Law. She studies democratic theory, constitutionalism, and both ancient and recent political institutions and political thought. She has written books on the conflict between democratic theory and entrenched laws, and on the tradeoff between supermajoritarian and majoritarian rulesets.

Mixed member majoritarian representation (MMM) is type of a mixed electoral system combining majoritarian and proportional methods, where the disproportional results of district contests using a plurality voting system or other, usually first-past-the-post voting, are completely separate from the proportional component. Mixed member majoritarian systems are therefore described as semi-proportional representation, and are usually contrasted with mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) which aims to provide proportional representation via additional compensation ("top-up") seats.

References

  1. Bristow-Johnson, R. (2023). "The failure of Instant Runoff to accomplish the purpose for which it was adopted: a case study from Burlington Vermont" (PDF). Const Polit Econ. 34 (3): 378–389. doi:10.1007/s10602-023-09393-1 . Retrieved 2024-01-09.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anthony J. McGann (2002). "The Tyranny of the Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities" (PDF). Center for the Study of Democracy. Retrieved 2008-06-09.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. Robert 2011 , p. 401
  4. Robert, Henry M.; et al. (2011). Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised (11th ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press. p. 4. ISBN   978-0-306-82020-5. The basic principle of decision in a deliberative assembly is that, to become the act or choice of the body, a proposition must be adopted by a majority vote. . .
  5. Vatter, Adrian (2000). "Consensus and direct democracy:Conceptual and empirical linkages". European Journal of Political Research. 38 (2): 171–192. doi:10.1023/A:1007137026336.
  6. May, Kenneth O. (1952). "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision". Econometrica. 20 (4): 680–684. doi:10.2307/1907651. JSTOR   1907651.
  7. Mark Fey, "May's Theorem with an Infinite Population", Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, Vol. 23, issue 2, pages 275–293.
  8. Przeworski, Adam; Maravall, José María (2003-07-21). Democracy and the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 223. ISBN   9780521532662.
  9. 1 2 McGann, Anthony J. (2006). The Logic of Democracy: Reconciling Equality, Deliberation, and Minority Protection. University of Michigan Press. ISBN   0472069497.
  10. Dye, K.M. and Conaway, D.S. (1999) 'Lessons learned from five years of application of the cogniscope', Approach to the Food and Drug Administration, CWA Report, Interactive Management Consultants, Paoli.
  11. 1 2 Dye, K. (1999). "Dye's law of requisite evolution of observations". In Christakis, A.N.; Bausch, K. (eds.). How People Harness their Collective Wisdom and Power. Information Age Pub. pp. 166–169. ISBN   9781593114824.
  12. Flanagan, T.R., and Christakis, A.N. (2010) The Talking Point: Creating an Environment for ExploringComplex Meaning, Information Age Publishing, Greenwich, CT.
  13. "What's wrong with majority voting?". Consensus Decision Making. Seeds for Change. 2005. Retrieved 2006-01-17.
  14. "An Anarchist Critique of Democracy". 2005. Archived from the original on 2008-04-29. Retrieved 2008-06-09.
  15. Rousseau. The Social Contract. bk. 4, ch. 2.
  16. 1 2 Ben Saunders (2008). "Democracy-as-Fairness: Justice, Equal Chances, and Lotteries" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on September 10, 2008. Retrieved September 8, 2013.

Further reading