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Electoral systems |
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The sequential elimination methods are a class of voting systems that repeatedly eliminate the last-place finisher of another voting method until a single candidate remains. [1] The method used to determine the loser is called the base method. Common are the two-round system, instant-runoff voting, and systems where parties nominate candidates in partisan primaries.
Instant-runoff voting is a sequential loser method based on plurality voting, while Baldwin's method is a sequential loser method based on the Borda count. [2]
Proofs of criterion compliance for loser-elimination methods often use mathematical induction, and so can be easier than proving such compliance for other method types. For instance, if the base method passes the majority criterion, a sequential loser-elimination method based on it will pass mutual majority. Loser-elimination methods are also not much harder to explain than their base methods. [2]
However, loser-elimination methods often fail monotonicity due to chaotic effects (sensitivity to initial conditions): the order in which candidates are eliminated can create erratic behavior. [1]
If the base method passes independence from the weakest alternative, the loser-elimination method is equivalent to the base method. [1] In other words, methods that are immune to weak spoilers are already "their own" elimination methods, because eliminating the weakest candidate does not affect the winner.
If the base method satisfies a criterion for a single candidate (e.g. the majority criterion or the Condorcet criterion), then a sequential loser method satisfies the corresponding set criterion (e.g. the mutual majority criterion or the Smith criterion), so long as eliminating a candidate can't remove another candidate from the set in question. This is because when all but one of the candidates of the set have been eliminated, the single-candidate criterion applies to the remaining candidate. [1]
Score voting, sometimes called range voting, is an electoral system for single-seat elections. Voters give each candidate a numerical score, and the candidate with the highest average score is elected. Score voting includes the well-known approval voting, but also lets voters give partial (in-between) approval ratings to candidates.
The two-round system (TRS), also known as runoff voting, second ballot, or ballotage, is a voting method used to elect a single candidate. The first round is held using simple plurality to choose the top-two candidates, and then in the second round the winner is chosen by majority vote. The two-round system is widely used in the election of legislative bodies and directly elected presidents.
A Condorcet method is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner. The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.
Coombs' method or the Coombs rule is a ranked voting system, created by Clyde Coombs, which uses a ballot counting method for ranked voting. Coombs' method can be thought of as a cross between instant-runoff voting and anti-plurality voting.
The monotonicity criterion, also called positive response or positive vote weight, is a principle of social choice theory that says that increasing a candidate's ranking or rating should not cause them to lose. Positive response rules out cases where a candidate loses an election as a result of receiving too much support from voters.
Ranked pairs, sometimes called the Tideman method, is a tournament-style system of ranked-choice voting first proposed by Nicolaus Tideman in 1987.
In an election, a candidate is called a Condorcet, beats-all, or majority-rule winner if a majority of voters would support them in a race against any other candidate. Such a candidate is also called an undefeated or tournament champion. Voting systems where a majority-rule winner will always win the election are said to satisfy the majority-rule principle, also known as the Condorcet criterion. Condorcet voting methods extend majority rule to elections with more than one candidate.
The participation criterion, also called vote or population monotonicity, is a voting system criterion that says that a candidate should never lose an election because they have "too much support." It says that adding voters who support A over B should not cause A to lose the election to B.
In political science and social choice theory, the median voter theorem states that if voters and candidates are distributed along a one-dimensional spectrum and voters have single peaked preferences, any voting method satisfying the Condorcet criterion will elect the candidate preferred by the median voter.
The majority favorite or absolute majority criterion is a voting system criterion. The criterion states that "if only one candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters, then that candidate must win." It is sometimes referred to simply as the majority criterion, but this term is more often used to refer to Condorcet's majority-rule principle.
The mutual majority criterion is a criterion for evaluating electoral system. It requires that whenever a majority of voters prefer a group of candidates above all others, someone from that group must win.
The Borda count electoral system can be combined with an instant-runoff procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called Nanson method and Baldwin method. Both methods are designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings.
In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion.
Reversal symmetry is a voting system criterion which requires that if candidate A is the unique winner, and each voter's individual preferences are inverted, then A must not be elected. Methods that satisfy reversal symmetry include Borda count, ranked pairs, Kemeny–Young method, and Schulze method. Methods that fail include Bucklin voting, instant-runoff voting and Condorcet methods that fail the Condorcet loser criterion such as Minimax.
Later-no-harm is a property of some ranked-choice voting systems, first described by Douglas Woodall. In later-no-harm systems, increasing the rating or rank of a candidate ranked below the winner of an election cannot cause this higher-ranked candidate to lose.
Instant-runoff voting (IRV), also known as plurality with elimination or plurality loser, is a ranked-choice voting system that modifies plurality by repeatedly eliminating the last-place finisher until only one candidate is left. In the United Kingdom, it is generally called the alternative vote (AV). In the United States, IRV is often conflated with ranked-choice voting (RCV); however, this conflation is not completely standard, and social choice theorists tend to prefer more explicit terms.
The majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters prefers every other candidate over a given candidate, then that candidate must not win.
The term ranked voting, also known as preferential voting or ranked-choice voting, pertains to any voting system where voters indicate a rank to order candidates or options—in a sequence from first, second, third, and onwards—on their ballots. Ranked voting systems vary based on the ballot marking process, how preferences are tabulated and counted, the number of seats available for election, and whether voters are allowed to rank candidates equally.
A major branch of social choice theory is devoted to the comparison of electoral systems, otherwise known as social choice functions. Viewed from the perspective of political science, electoral systems are rules for conducting elections and determining winners from the ballots cast. From the perspective of economics, mathematics, and philosophy, a social choice function is a mathematical function that determines how a society should make choices, given a collection of individual preferences.
STAR voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections. The name stands for "Score then Automatic Runoff", referring to the fact that this system is a combination of score voting, to pick two finalists with the highest total scores, followed by an "automatic runoff" in which the finalist who is preferred on more ballots wins. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system.