Mutual majority criterion

Last updated

The mutual majority criterion is a criterion for evaluating electoral systems. It is also known as the majority criterion for solid coalitions and the generalized majority criterion. This criterion requires that whenever a majority of voters prefer a group of candidates above all others, then the winner must be a candidate from that group. [1] The mutual majority criterion may also be thought of as the single-winner case of Droop-Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.

Contents

Formal definition

Let L be a subset of candidates. A solid coalition in support of L is a group of voters who strictly prefer all members of L to all candidates outside of L. In other words, each member of the solid coalition ranks their least-favorite member of L higher than their favorite member outside L. Note that the members of the solid coalition may rank the members of L differently.

The mutual majority criterion says that if there is a solid coalition of voters in support of L, and this solid coalition consists of more than half of all voters, then the winner of the election must belong to L.

Relationships to other criteria

This is similar to but stricter than the majority criterion, where the requirement applies only to the case that L is only one single candidate. It is also stricter than the majority loser criterion, which only applies when L consists of all candidates except one. [2]

All Smith-efficient Condorcet methods pass the mutual majority criterion. [3]

Methods which pass mutual majority but fail the Condorcet criterion may nullify the voting power of voters outside the mutual majority whenever they fail to elect the Condorcet winner.

By method

Anti-plurality voting, range voting, and the Borda count fail the majority-favorite criterion and hence fail the mutual majority criterion.

The Schulze method, ranked pairs, instant-runoff voting, Nanson's method, and Bucklin voting pass this criterion.

Borda count

Majority criterion#Borda count

The mutual majority criterion implies the majority criterion so the Borda count's failure of the latter is also a failure of the mutual majority criterion. The set solely containing candidate A is a set S as described in the definition.

Minimax

Assume four candidates A, B, C, and D with 100 voters and the following preferences:

19 voters17 voters17 voters16 voters16 voters15 voters
1. C1. D1. B1. D1. A1. D
2. A2. C2. C2. B2. B2. A
3. B3. A3. A3. C3. C3. B
4. D4. B4. D4. A4. D4. C

The results would be tabulated as follows:

Pairwise election results
X
ABCD
YA[X] 33
[Y] 67
[X] 69
[Y] 31
[X] 48
[Y] 52
B[X] 67
[Y] 33
[X] 36
[Y] 64
[X] 48
[Y] 52
C[X] 31
[Y] 69
[X] 64
[Y] 36
[X] 48
[Y] 52
D[X] 52
[Y] 48
[X] 52
[Y] 48
[X] 52
[Y] 48
Pairwise election results (won-tied-lost):2-0-12-0-12-0-10-0-3
worst pairwise defeat (winning votes):69676452
worst pairwise defeat (margins):3834284
worst pairwise opposition:69676452

Result: Candidates A, B and C each are strictly preferred by more than the half of the voters (52%) over D, so {A, B, C} is a set S as described in the definition and D is a Condorcet loser. Nevertheless, Minimax declares D the winner because its biggest defeat is significantly the smallest compared to the defeats A, B and C caused each other.

Plurality

Tennessee map for voting example.svg

Suppose that Tennessee is holding an election on the location of its capital. The population is concentrated around four major cities. All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible. The options are:

The preferences of each region's voters are:

42% of voters
Far-West
26% of voters
Center
15% of voters
Center-East
17% of voters
Far-East
  1. Memphis
  2. Nashville
  3. Chattanooga
  4. Knoxville
  1. Nashville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Knoxville
  4. Memphis
  1. Chattanooga
  2. Knoxville
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis
  1. Knoxville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis

58% of the voters prefer Nashville, Chattanooga and Knoxville to Memphis. Therefore, the three eastern cities build a set S as described in the definition. But, since the supporters of the three cities split their votes, Memphis wins under plurality voting.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Condorcet method</span> Pairwise-comparison electoral system

A Condorcet method is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner or Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW). The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Copeland's method</span> Single-winner ranked vote system

The Copeland or Llull method is a ranked-choice voting system based on counting each candidate's pairwise wins and losses.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Smith set</span> Set preferred to any other by a majority

The Smithset, sometimes called the top-cycle, generalizes the idea of a Condorcet winner to cases where no such winner exists. It does so by allowing cycles of candidates to be treated jointly, as if they were a single Condorcet winner. Voting systems that always elect a candidate from the Smith set pass the Smith criterion. The Smith set and Smith criterion are both named for mathematician John H Smith.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Bucklin voting</span> Class of electoral systems

Bucklin voting is a class of voting methods that can be used for single-member and multi-member districts. As in highest median rules like the majority judgment, the Bucklin winner will be one of the candidates with the highest median ranking or rating. It is named after its original promoter, the Georgist politician James W. Bucklin of Grand Junction, Colorado, and is also known as the Grand Junction system.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ranked pairs</span> Single-winner electoral system

Ranked Pairs (RP) is a tournament-style system of ranked voting first proposed by Nicolaus Tideman in 1987.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Condorcet winner criterion</span> Property of electoral systems

A Condorcet winner is a candidate who would receive the support of more than half of the electorate in a one-on-one race against any one of their opponents. Voting systems where a majority winner will always win are said to satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The Condorcet winner criterion extends the principle of majority rule to elections with multiple candidates.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Majority winner criterion</span> Property of electoral systems

The majority criterion is a winner-takes-all voting system criterion that says that, if only one candidate is ranked first by over 50% of voters, that candidate must win.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Multiple districts paradox</span> Property of electoral systems

A voting system satisfies join-consistency if combining two sets of votes, both electing A over B, always results in a combined electorate that ranks A over B. It is a stronger form of the participation criterion. Systems that fail the consistency criterion are susceptible to the multiple-district paradox, which allows for a particularly egregious kind of gerrymander: it is possible to draw boundaries in such a way that a candidate who wins the overall election fails to carry even a single electoral district.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nanson's method</span> Single-winner electoral system

The Borda count electoral system can be combined with an instant-runoff procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called Nanson method and Baldwin method. Both methods are designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings.

In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Minimax Condorcet method</span> Single-winner ranked-choice voting system

In voting systems, the Minimax Condorcet method is a single-winner ranked-choice voting method that always elects the majority (Condorcet) winner. Minimax compares all candidates against each other in a round-robin tournament, then ranks candidates by their worst election result. The candidate with the largest (maximum) number of votes in their worst (minimum) matchup is declared the winner.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kemeny–Young method</span> Single-winner electoral system

The Kemeny–Young method is an electoral system that uses ranked ballots and pairwise comparison counts to identify the most popular choices in an election. It is a Condorcet method because if there is a Condorcet winner, it will always be ranked as the most popular choice.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Independence of clones criterion</span> Property of electoral systems

In social choice theory, the independence of (irrelevant) clones criterion says that adding a clone, i.e. a new candidate very similar to an already-existing candidate, should not spoil the results. It can be considered a weak form of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion that nevertheless is failed by a number of voting rules. A method that passes the criterion is said to be clone independent.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Borda count</span> Point-based ranked voting system

The Borda method or order of merit is a positional voting rule which gives each candidate a number of points equal to the number of candidates ranked below them: the lowest-ranked candidate gets 0 points, the second-lowest gets 1 point, and so on. Once all votes have been counted, the option or candidate with the most points is the winner.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Instant-runoff voting</span> Single-winner ranked-choice electoral system

Instant-runoff voting (IRV), is a multi-round elimination rule that uses ranked voting to simulate a series of runoff elections. In each round, the last-place finisher according to a plurality vote is eliminated, and further rounds are held until only one candidate is left. RCV falls under the plurality-rule family of voting methods, and is most closely related to two-round rules, including those with partisan or nonpartisan primaries.

The majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters give a candidate no support, i.e. do not list that candidate on their ballot, that candidate must lose.

There are a number of different criteria which can be used for voting systems in an election, including the following

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Comparison of voting rules</span> Comparative politics for electoral systems

A major branch of social choice theory is devoted to the comparison of electoral systems, otherwise known as social choice functions. Viewed from the perspective of political science, electoral systems are rules for conducting elections and determining winners from the ballots cast. From the perspective of economics, mathematics, and philosophy, a social choice function is a mathematical function that determines how a society should make choices, given a collection of individual preferences.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Black's method</span> Single-winner electoral system

Black's method is an election method proposed by Duncan Black in 1958 as a compromise between the Condorcet method and the Borda count. This method selects a Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the candidate with the highest Borda score is selected.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Multiwinner voting</span> Process of electing more than one winner in the same election / district

Multiwinner, at-large, or committeevoting refers to electoral systems that elect several candidates at once. Such methods can be used to elect parliaments or committees.

References

  1. Green-Armytage, James (2004). "Cardinal-weighted pairwise comparison" (PDF). Voting matters . Retrieved 2024-10-19.
  2. Tideman, Nicolaus (2006). Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN   978-0-7546-4717-1. Note that mutual majority consistency implies majority consistency.
  3. Green-Armytage, James (October 2011). "Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections" (PDF). Voting Matters. No. 29. pp. 1–14. S2CID   15220771. Meanwhile, they possess Smith consistency [efficiency], along with properties that are implied by this, such as [...] mutual majority.