Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters | |
---|---|
Court | Constitutional Court of South Africa |
Full case name | Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another |
Decided | 21 May 2002 |
Docket nos. | CCT 28/01 |
Citation(s) | [2002] ZACC 6; 2002 (4) SA 613; 2002 (7) BCLR 663 |
Case history | |
Prior action(s) | High Court of South Africa, Transkei Division – S v Walters and Another 2001 (2) SACR 471; 2001 (10) BCLR 1088 (Tk) |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Chaskalson CJ, Langa DCJ, Ackermann, Kriegler, Madala, Mokgoro, O'Regan, Sachs and Yacoob JJ, Du Plessis and Skweyiya AJJ |
Case opinions | |
Decision by | Kriegler J (unanimous) |
Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another is a 2002 decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa concerning the use of force to arrest criminal suspects. The court invalidated section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, which provided that the killing of certain fugitive suspects constituted justifiable homicide. Writing on behalf of a unanimous court, Justice Johann Kriegler held that the Bill of Rights required that force should be used in arrests only where such force is reasonable and necessary.
The case originated in the murder trial of a father and son, Edward and Marvin Walters. In February 1999, they had shot and lethally wounded a burglar, who at the time was fleeing from the Walters' bakery in Lady Frere. [1] In the murder trial, which was heard as S v Walters in the Umtata High Court, the defence argued that the killing constituted justifiable homicide in terms of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (CPA), which provided for the use of force, including lethal force, in effecting an arrest. In particular, section 49(1) provided that:
If any person authorized under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting another, attempts to arrest such person and such person – resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force; or flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or resists such attempt and flees, the person so authorized may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent the person concerned from fleeing.
Section 49(2) provided that:
Where the person concerned is to be arrested for an offence referred to in Schedule 1 or is to be arrested on the ground that he is reasonably suspected of having committed such an offence, and the person authorized under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting him cannot arrest him or prevent him from fleeing by other means than by killing him, the killing shall be deemed to be justifiable homicide.
In response to the Walters' defence under the CPA, prosecutors disputed the defence's factual foundation, its legal foundation, and, most pertinently, the constitutional validity of the CPA provisions on which it was founded. The High Court accepted the latter argument, holding that section 49 of the CPA was inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that it sanctioned the use of force to prevent the flight of a suspect.
The High Court's order of constitutional invalidity was referred for confirmation to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which heard argument on 15 November 2001. The Minister of Safety and Security and the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service both intervened, contending for the validity of the CPA provisions. The Minister of Justice was named as an interested party but supported the High Court's order and did not formally intervene; indeed, his department had recently sponsored an amendment to section 49. Finally, the non-profit Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation was admitted as amicus curiae; represented by George Bizos and the Legal Resources Centre, it joined the Minister of Justice in arguing against the validity of section 49.
The Constitutional Court handed down judgment on 21 May 2002, with Justice Johann Kriegler writing on behalf of a unanimous court. The High Court's order was partly upheld. Section 49(2) of the CPA was declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution and was therefore invalidated, though only with prospective effect. However, the Constitutional Court overturned the High Court's finding that section 49(1) was unconstitutional as it applied to suspects in flight.
First, in respect of section 49(1), the Constitutional Court held that the provision should be interpreted as generally excluding the use of a firearm to effect an arrest. Instead, the use of a firearm is permitted only when the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm or is reasonably suspected of having committed a serious crime involving or threatening such harm. Thus interpreted, section 49(1) was compliant with the Constitution and need not be struck down. In this approach, Kriegler diverged from the High Court and concurred with the Supreme Court of Appeal, which had interpreted section 49(1) in the same way in the separate matter of Govender v Minister of Safety and Security.
Second, however, the Constitutional Court found that section 49(2) authorised unjustifiable violations of three rights protected by the Bill of Rights: the right to human dignity, in section 10 of the Constitution; the right to life, in section 11; and the right to freedom and security of the person, in section 12. Kriegler held that it was self-evident that section 49 of the CPA authorised limitations of this right, and, conducting the limitations exercise, he found that those limitations were not justifiable or proportionate in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. In this respect, he observed:
What looms large in both the threshold and the limitation phases of the exercise in the present case, is that the right to life, to human dignity and to bodily integrity are individually essential and collectively foundational to the value system prescribed by the Constitution. Compromise them and the society to which we aspire becomes illusory. It therefore follows that any significant limitation of any of these rights, would for its justification demand a very compelling countervailing public interest.
In particular, Kriegler pointed out that there were alternative means of achieving the desired end of apprehending the suspect: "if the fugitive constitutes no threat to the arrester or to someone else or to the public at large and can be picked up later, there is no justification for the use of any significant force, let alone deadly force". There was therefore "a manifest disproportion between the rights infringed and the interests sought to be advanced".
Taking his findings on section 49(1) and section 49(2) together, Kriegler summarised his main findings as follows:
- The purpose of arrest is to bring before court for trial persons suspected of having committed offences.
- Arrest is not the only means of achieving this purpose, nor always the best.
- Arrest may never be used to punish a suspect.
- Where arrest is called for, force may be used only where it is necessary in order to carry out the arrest.
- Where force is necessary, only the least degree of force reasonably necessary to carry out the arrest may be used.
- In deciding what degree of force is both reasonable and necessary, all the circumstances must be taken into account, including the threat of violence the suspect poses to the arrester or others, and the nature and circumstances of the offence the suspect is suspected of having committed; the force being proportional in all these circumstances.
- Shooting a suspect solely in order to carry out an arrest is permitted in very limited circumstances only.
- Ordinarily such shooting is not permitted unless the suspect poses a threat of violence to the arrester or others or is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest, whether at that time or later.
- These limitations in no way detract from the rights of an arrester attempting to carry out an arrest to kill a suspect in self-defence or in defence of any other person.
The CPA was subsequently amended to comply with the judgment. [2] [3] The judgment constituted the first time that the Constitutional Court had regard to the circumstances under which force may be used in self-defence. [4]
In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."
The defence of property is a common method of justification used by defendants who argue that they should not be held liable for any loss and injury that they have caused because they were acting to protect their property.
A citizen's arrest is an arrest made by a private citizen – that is, a person who is not acting as a sworn law-enforcement official. In common law jurisdictions, the practice dates back to medieval England and the English common law, in which sheriffs encouraged ordinary citizens to help apprehend law breakers.
The presumption of innocence is a legal principle that every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty. Under the presumption of innocence, the legal burden of proof is thus on the prosecution, which must present compelling evidence to the trier of fact. If the prosecution does not prove the charges true, then the person is acquitted of the charges. The prosecution must in most cases prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable doubt remains, the accused must be acquitted. The opposite system is a presumption of guilt.
The concept of justifiable homicide in criminal law is a defense to culpable homicide. Generally, there is a burden to produce exculpatory evidence in the legal defense of justification.
False arrest, unlawful arrest or wrongful arrest is a common law tort, where a plaintiff alleges they were held in custody without probable cause, or without an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Although it is possible to sue law enforcement officials for false arrest, the usual defendants in such cases are private security firms.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) is an Act of Parliament which instituted a legislative framework for the powers of police officers in England and Wales to combat crime, and provided codes of practice for the exercise of those powers. Part VI of PACE required the Home Secretary to issue Codes of Practice governing police powers. The aim of PACE is to establish a balance between the powers of the police in England and Wales and the rights and freedoms of the public. Equivalent provision is made for Northern Ireland by the Police and Criminal Evidence Order 1989 (SI 1989/1341). The equivalent in Scots Law is the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
The criminal law of Canada is under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada. The power to enact criminal law is derived from section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Most criminal laws have been codified in the Criminal Code, as well as the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Youth Criminal Justice Act and several other peripheral statutes.
Self-defence is a defence permitting reasonable force to be used to defend one's self or another. This defence arises both from common law and the Criminal Law Act 1967. Self-defence is a justification defence rather than an excuse.
The right to silence in England and Wales is the protection given to a person during criminal proceedings from adverse consequences of remaining silent. It is sometimes referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination. It is used on any occasion when it is considered the person being spoken to is under suspicion of having committed one or more criminal offences and consequently thus potentially being subject to criminal proceedings.
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others is a decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa which struck down the laws prohibiting consensual sexual activities between men. Basing its decision on the Bill of Rights in the Constitution – and in particular its explicit prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation – the court unanimously ruled that the crime of sodomy, as well as various other related provisions of the criminal law, were unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
The Penal Law of the State of New York combines justification and necessity into a single article, Article 35. "Defense of Justification" comprises sections 35.05 through 35.30 of the Penal Law. The general provision relating to necessity, section 35.05, provides:
§ 35.05 Justification; generally.
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
The powers of the police in Scotland, as with much of Scots law, are based on mixed elements of statute law and common law.
The powers of the police in England and Wales are defined largely by statute law, with the main sources of power being the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police Act 1996. This article covers the powers of police officers of territorial police forces only, but a police officer in one of the UK's special police forces can utilise extended jurisdiction powers outside of their normal jurisdiction in certain defined situations as set out in statute. In law, police powers are given to constables. All police officers in England and Wales are "constables" in law whatever their rank. Certain police powers are also available to a limited extent to police community support officers and other non warranted positions such as police civilian investigators or designated detention officers employed by some police forces even though they are not constables.
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others; In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others, an important case in South African law, was heard in the Constitutional Court on March 16, 2000, with judgment handed down on August 25. Chaskalson P, Langa DP, Goldstone J, Kriegler J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, Ngcobo J, O'Regan J, Sachs J, Yacoob J and Cameron AJ were the judges.
South African criminal law is the body of national law relating to crime in South Africa. In the definition of Van der Walt et al., a crime is "conduct which common or statute law prohibits and expressly or impliedly subjects to punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by his own act once he has been convicted." Crime involves the infliction of harm against society. The function or object of criminal law is to provide a social mechanism with which to coerce members of society to abstain from conduct that is harmful to the interests of society.
Criminal procedure in South Africa refers to the adjudication process of that country's criminal law. It forms part of procedural or adjectival law, and describes the means by which its substantive counterpart, South African criminal law, is applied. It has its basis mainly in English law.
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), an important case in South African criminal procedure, a search warrant had been issued in terms of section 29 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act in respect of certain premises. A large quantity of documents, records and data had been seized from those premises.
Use-of-force law in Missouri refers to the law & legal doctrine which determine whether a member of law enforcement in the state of Missouri is justified in the amount of force used to gain control of an unruly situation or person, including situations involving death. In the United States, doctrine about use of force is primarily defined by the individual states, although there have been some Supreme Court decisions of limited scope.
In Australian criminal law, reasonable and probable grounds most prominently regulates police officers as a precondition of the exercise of certain powers in their function as enforcers of the law. Based on Australian common law, it is a prerequisite of most police powers. In Canada, it is defined as the point where probability replaces suspicion based on a reasonable belief; reasonableness is a legitimate expectation in the existence of specific facts, and the belief in individual circumstances can be "reasonable without being probable." Less-clearly defined in Australia, it depends on the circumstances of a case and often involves an assessment of the circumstances of a potential crime.
{{cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of March 2024 (link)