Decision
On appeal the decision was reversed. The judge may not impose the insanity defense upon an unwilling defendant if an intelligent defendant voluntarily wishes to forgo the defense. [4] The court said that a defendant may feel hospital is worse than prison, that the term of incarceration may be longer, that the stigma and legal consequences of a criminal or an insanity defenses are different. [3]
Using the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in North Carolina v. Alford and Faretta v. California , the court concluded that
... respect for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of the proceedings. [5]
The court listed several disadvantages to choosing the insanity defense, including: [5]
- an insanity acquittal may increase the period of confinement over a prison sentence
- better treatment may be received in a prison than a mental hospital
- the defendant may want to avoid the stigma associated with a mental disorder
- commitment may result in loss of other rights, such as a driver's license
- the defendant may regard the crime as a political or religious act
The court therefore limited any further competence inquiry to an evaluation of the defendant's specific competency to waive the insanity defense. [5]
Significance
This decision examines the quality of the defendant's decision. If the defendant appears to be intelligently and voluntarily waiving the insanity defense, the trial court should not deny this. However, the trial court should look into whether the defendant has been properly informed of the effects of their decision as well as the alternatives available to them. Thus the nature of such an evaluation would be similar to a competency to stand trial evaluation. [6]
The Frendak rationale, that a judge may not impose an insanity defense over the objections of the defendant, has been used mostly in federal cases. Some states have endorsed less elaborate procedures. For example, if a judge rules that the waiver of the insanity defense is not voluntary and informed, yet nonetheless the defense is imposed over the defendant's objections, then a separate counsel must be appointed to argue issues pertaining to insanity issues, while the defendant's counsel presents the arguments the defendant desires. [2]
However, as of 2002, seventeen jurisdictions permitted an insanity defense to be entered over the objections of the defendant. Thus these jurisdictions are, in effect, saying that a defendant who has been found competent to stand trial is not competent to rationally select his trial plea. Therefore a separate competency to refuse the insanity defense would have to be held that is similar to an evaluation of the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. [7]
Realistically, because of the Supreme Court's holding in Godinez v. Moran , it is most likely that the court would hold that if a defendant is competent to stand trial, then he is also competent to waive the insanity defense, as the two competencies are equivalent. [5]
Godinez v. Moran was modified and refined by the Supreme Court decision in Indiana v. Edwards in 2008.
The insanity defense, also known as the mental disorder defense, is an affirmative defense by excuse in a criminal case, arguing that the defendant is not responsible for their actions due to a psychiatric disease at the time of the criminal act. This is contrasted with an excuse of provocation, in which the defendant is responsible, but the responsibility is lessened due to a temporary mental state. It is also contrasted with the justification of self defense or with the mitigation of imperfect self-defense. The insanity defense is also contrasted with a finding that a defendant cannot stand trial in a criminal case because a mental disease prevents them from effectively assisting counsel, from a civil finding in trusts and estates where a will is nullified because it was made when a mental disorder prevented a testator from recognizing the natural objects of their bounty, and from involuntary civil commitment to a mental institution, when anyone is found to be gravely disabled or to be a danger to themself or to others.
Insanity, madness, lunacy, and craziness are behaviors caused by certain abnormal mental or behavioral patterns. Insanity can manifest as violations of societal norms, including a person or persons becoming a danger to themselves or to other people. Conceptually, mental insanity also is associated with the biological phenomenon of contagion as in the case of copycat suicides. In contemporary usage, the term insanity is an informal, un-scientific term denoting "mental instability"; thus, the term insanity defense is the legal definition of mental instability. In medicine, the general term psychosis is used to include the presence of delusions and/or hallucinations in a patient; and psychiatric illness is "psychopathology", not mental insanity.
Forensic psychiatry is a subspeciality of psychiatry and is related to criminology. It encompasses the interface between law and psychiatry. According to the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, it is defined as "a subspecialty of psychiatry in which scientific and clinical expertise is applied in legal contexts involving civil, criminal, correctional, regulatory, or legislative matters, and in specialized clinical consultations in areas such as risk assessment or employment." A forensic psychiatrist provides services – such as determination of competency to stand trial – to a court of law to facilitate the adjudicative process and provide treatment, such as medications and psychotherapy, to criminals.
In United States and Canadian law, competence concerns the mental capacity of an individual to participate in legal proceedings or transactions, and the mental condition a person must have to be responsible for his or her decisions or acts. Competence is an attribute that is decision-specific. Depending on various factors which typically revolve around mental function integrity, an individual may or may not be competent to make a particular medical decision, a particular contractual agreement, to execute an effective deed to real property, or to execute a will having certain terms.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent themselves in state criminal proceedings.
In the law of England and Wales, fitness to plead is the capacity of a defendant in criminal proceedings to comprehend the course of those proceedings. The concept of fitness to plead also applies in Scots and Irish law. Its United States equivalent is competence to stand trial.
Michael Mark Welner is an American forensic psychiatrist and Chairman of The Forensic Panel. Welner is best known for his work in sensitive and complex litigation. He has acted as lead forensic psychiatric examiner in numerous criminal or court proceedings of national and international prominence, including precedent-setting trials and higher court decisions. Welner is also known for a number of innovations in forensic science, forensic psychiatry and justice, including protocols for prospective peer review in forensic medicine consultation, research to standardize an evidence-based distinction of the worst crimes, The Depravity Standard, and recommendations for upgrading forensic science assessment. He has been featured in network television news coverage of forensic psychiatry issues, has authored publications for professional and public audiences, and has contributed to emerging legislation on mental health reform.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), is a decision in which the United States Supreme Court imposed stringent limits on the right of a lower court to order the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to a criminal defendant who had been determined to be incompetent to stand trial for the sole purpose of making them competent and able to be tried. Specifically, the court held that lower courts could do so only under limited circumstances in which specified criteria had been met. In the case of Charles Sell, since the lower court had failed to determine that all the appropriate criteria for court-ordered forcible treatment had been met, the order to forcibly medicate the defendant was reversed.
In the United States criminal justice system, a competency evaluation is an assessment of the ability of a defendant to understand and rationally participate in a court process.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed a defendant's right to have a competency evaluation before proceeding to trial. The Court outlined the basic standards for determining competency.
United States v. Binion, 132 F. App'x 89, is a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, in upholding the sentencing decision by the trial court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
In criminal law, a mitigating factor, also known as an extenuating circumstance, is any information or evidence presented to the court regarding the defendant or the circumstances of the crime that might result in reduced charges or a lesser sentence. Unlike a legal defense, the presentation of mitigating factors will not result in the acquittal of a defendant. The opposite of a mitigating factor is an aggravating factor.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that determined a U.S. state violated due process by involuntarily committing a criminal defendant for an indefinite period of time solely on the basis of his permanent incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), was a landmark decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if a defendant was competent to stand trial, they were automatically competent to plead guilty, and thereby waive the panoply of trial rights, including the right to counsel.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, per Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the state may not force a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination solely for the purposes of sentencing. Any such examination violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination as well as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and is therefore inadmissible at sentencing.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a Missouri trial court deprived a defendant of due process by failing to order a competency examination after he was hospitalized following an attempted suicide and as a result missed a portion of his trial for a capital offense.
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court reversed an Oklahoma court decision holding that a defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial unless he proves otherwise by the second highest legal standard of proof, that of clear and convincing evidence, ruling that to be unconstitutional. The court said the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated.
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the standard for competency to stand trial was not linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself.
The Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
