Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg

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Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 9, 1989
Decided June 23, 1989
Full case nameGranfinanciera, S.A., et al., Petitioners v. Paul C. Nordberg, Creditor Trustee for the Estate of Chase & Sanborn Corporation, etc.
Citations492 U.S. 33 ( more )
109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorIn re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988).
Holding
Provided that Congress has not permissibly assigned resolution of the claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a jury as factfinder, the Seventh Amendment entitles a person who has not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate to a jury trial when sued by the bankruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
MajorityBrennan, joined by Rehnquist, Marshall, Stevens, Kennedy; Scalia (Parts I, II, III, and V)
ConcurrenceScalia (in part and in judgment)
DissentWhite
DissentBlackmun, joined by O'Connor

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33(1989), is a 1989 United States Supreme Court case concerning the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. In a majority opinion by William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed individuals the right to a jury trial if they are sued by a bankruptcy trustee seeking the recovery of an allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer, provided that those individuals had not previously submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The decision emphasized that a legal action seeking the recovery of money from someone who allegedly defrauded them would have been litigated at law, rather than in a court of equity, in 18th-century England; it therefore concluded that such an action was a "sui[t] at common law" for which the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial. However, the majority also emphasized that this holding only applied if "Congress has not permissibly assigned resolution of the claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a jury as factfinder". [1]

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References

  1. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)