Holbrook v. Flynn

Last updated
Holbrook v. Flynn
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 14, 1986
Decided March 26, 1986
Full case nameTerrance HOLBROOK, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk, Massachusetts, et al. v. Charles FLYNN
Citations475 U.S. 560 ( more )
106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525
Argument Oral argument
Holding
The visible presence of armed, uniformed, security officers in a courtroom is not inherently prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair trial
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr.  · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityMarshall, joined by unanimous
ConcurrenceBurger
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. VI

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court regarding the Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial jury.

Contents

Background

In January 1976, Charles Flynn and five codefendants were indicted for a $4 million heist of the Providence, Rhode Island Bonded Vault Co. that happened on August 14, 1975. When the defendants were brought to trial in April 1976, their counsel objected to the presence of four uniformed state troopers sitting in the first row of the spectators' section. The attorneys argued that the presence of armed, uniformed police officers, would lead jurors to perceive the defendants as "[being] of 'bad character'." [1]

The Superior Court Associate Justice, Anthony A. Giannini responded that Providence's "Committing Squad" was overextended, but accepted a request to determine if the troopers can wear plainclothes for future appearances. A week later, Giannini denied the request as it was considered impractical. He further emphasized that he did not request the troopers, and that there was little risk of prejudice as they were seated behind the spectator bar. Nonetheless, jury selection would begin by examining whether prospective jurors would draw inferences from the presence of the troopers.

During jury selection, the defendant's lawyers filed an interlocutory appeal in the Supreme Court of Justice. After initially denying the petition, the lower court eventually ruled that the trial judge must make a final decision regarding the presence of the State Police as the presence of armed and uniformed guards is a departure from usual Rhode Island court procedures.

Judge Giannini then conducted a hearing at the request of the prosecution where a Providence Police Department captain and the State Police's Executive Officer testified that the Committing Squad was overextended and that there was a contractual obligation with the Fraternal Order of Police to specifically provide uniformed officers in the commission of court security duties.

With the respondent's motion struck down, Judge Giannini further declared that all 54 prospective jurors were either not influenced against the defendant despite the troopers' presence, or they vaguely stated a need for security.

After a two-month trial, half of the codefendants were acquitted while Flynn and the rest were convicted. The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the conviction by stating that the circumstances did not prejudice the defendants. [2]

The District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the state supreme court's dismissal under the reasoning that the alternatives were rejected under a rational basis. [3] However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the District Court by concluding that the unusual nature of the troopers' presence, as well as Judge Giannini's failure to consider the defendants' behavior, made the court proceedings entirely unacceptable. [4]

Decision

In an opinion delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court unanimously ruled that while there are cases where a courtroom full of armed and uniformed officers can create prejudice, [5] the presence of four uniformed troopers sitting quietly while overlooking six defendants is not inherently prejudicial. There is also a legitimate need to provide security against outside threats. Flynn therefore failed to satisfy the burden of proof showing actual prejudice.

Concurring opinion

Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred with the opinion, but objected to Marshall's statement that the Court might express a preference that federal officers providing security should not be easily identifiable as guards. Furthermore, Burger highlighted a study that tentatively concluded that defendants wearing prison garb, or surrounded by guards are more likely to be convicted. In discussing the Court's opinion that a policy requiring defendants to wear prison garb is arbitrarily discriminating against those without bail, Burger noted favored treatment given to defendants that both wore prison clothes, and had visible supervision. [6]

Related Research Articles

<i>Miranda</i> warning Notification given by U.S. police to criminal suspects on their rights while in custody

In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "the father of Miranda."

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court decision that dealt with the effective assistance of counsel during a criminal trial.

In United States law, ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) is a claim raised by a convicted criminal defendant asserting that the defendant's legal counsel performed so ineffectively that it deprived the defendant of the constitutional right guaranteed by the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ineffectiveness claims may only be brought where the defendant had the right to counsel, ordinarily during the critical stages of a prosecution.

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case involving the standard for when a federal court can grant habeas corpus relief to overturn a criminal conviction based on the state court's misapplication of established federal law. At issue was whether a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when relatives of the alleged victim were permitted to sit in the courtroom as spectators during the trial, wearing buttons that displayed the victim's image.

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), was a landmark Supreme Court of the United States decision in which the Court held unconstitutional prior restraints on media coverage during criminal trials.

Racial discrimination in jury selection is specifically prohibited by law in many jurisdictions throughout the world. In the United States, it has been defined through a series of judicial decisions. However, juries composed solely of one racial group are legal in the United States and other countries. While the racial composition of juries is not dictated by law, racial discrimination in the selection of jurors is specifically prohibited. Depending on context, the phrases "all-white jury" or "all-black jury" can raise the expectation that deliberations may be unfair.

Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), was a legal case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state could allow the broadcast and still photography coverage of criminal trials. While refraining from formally overruling Estes v. Texas, which in 1965 held that media coverage was "infringing the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," it effectively did so.

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court regarding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in a police interrogation. In a decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that once an accused individual has claimed a right to counsel at a plea hearing or other court proceeding, a waiver of that right during later police questioning would be invalid unless the accused individual initiated the communication.

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case about racial issues in jury selection in death penalty cases. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the 7–2 majority, ruled that the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to remove African American jurors violated the Court's earlier holding in Batson v. Kentucky. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach during a pre-indictment identification.

North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that a non-lawyer jurist can constitutionally sit in a jail-carrying criminal case provided that the defendant has an opportunity through an appeal to obtain a second trial before a judge who is a lawyer.

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the constitutionality of shackling a prisoner during the sentencing phase of a trial. In a 7–2 opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the court held that it is against due process, a right prescribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to shackle a defendant in the sentencing portion of a trial unless the shackling relates to a specific defendant and certain state interests.

The Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution's Sixth Amendment barred the admission, in a joint trial, of a non-testifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant, even if the defendant's own confession was admitted against him.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on two issues of constitutional criminal procedure. Glasser was the first Supreme Court decision to hold that the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment required the reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction if his lawyer's representation of him was limited by a conflict of interest.

Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court decision concerning examinations of prospective jurors during voir dire. The Court held that the trial court's failure to "have the jurors interrogated on the issue of racial bias" violated the petitioner's due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment. This right does not extend to any question of bias, but it does not preclude questions of relevant biases.

Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case involving issues of privacy in correspondence with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the freedom of the press, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After a murder case ended in three mistrials, the judge closed the fourth trial to the public and the press. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled the closing to be in violation of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment asserting that the First Amendment implicitly guarantees the press access to public trials.

Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019), was a civil rights case in which the Supreme Court of the United States decided that probable cause should generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim brought under the First Amendment, unless officers under the circumstances would typically exercise their discretion not to make an arrest.

Lakeside vs. Oregon was a decision in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that trial judges may instruct a jury to not find a defendant guilty in any way based on his refusal to testify against himself, even if the defendant objects to the instruction.

Carter v. Kentucky was a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that trial judges in criminal proceedings must, upon proper request of the defendant, inform the jury of his right against self-incrimination, and that its execution may not be used against him.

References

  1. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) Justia
  2. State v. Byrnes 433 A.2d 658 (1981) Justia
  3. Flynn v. Holbrook, 581 F. Supp. 990 (D.R.I. 1984) Justia
  4. Charles Flynn, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Terrance Holbrook, et al., Respondents, Appellees, 749 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1984) Justia
  5. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.1(c) (2d ed.1980).
  6. Fontaine & Kiger, The Effects of Defendant Dress and Supervision on Judgments of Simulated Jurors: An Exploratory Study, 2 Law and Human Behavior 63, 69-70 (1978)