In Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the Disarming of Iraq | |
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Directed by | Scott Ritter |
Written by | Alex Cohn Scott Ritter Scott Rosann |
Produced by | Alex Cohn |
Starring | Tariq Aziz Rolf Ekeus Scott Ritter |
Cinematography | Dan Lehrecke John Millieghta Mark Niuewenhof |
Edited by | Jed Factor |
Music by | Eben Levy |
Distributed by | Five Rivers M&L Banks |
Release date |
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Running time | 92 minutes |
Country | United States |
Language | English |
In Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the Disarming of Iraq is a 2001 documentary by Scott Ritter that discusses the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq. Ritter was a chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. These inspections were in search of "weapons of mass destruction" during the later years of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
The film was completed and distributed for theatrical release prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
When Ritter resigned from UNSCOM in 1998, he claimed that the United Nations Security Council was caving to Iraq's demands that certain sensitive sites not be inspected and contended that Iraq remained a danger. In In Shifting Sands, Ritter reserves his position. [1] The film is a follow-up to Ritter's 1999 book Endgame, which supported Hussein's claims that the United States used UNSCOM as a cover to spy on Iraq for the United States and Israel almost from the time weapons inspections began in 1991. [2] [3]
The film traces the history of UNSCOM, created by the United Nations Security Council in 1991 after the Gulf War to oversee the destruction of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons. Ritter repeats the charge that the U.S. used UNSCOM to spy on Iraq and alleged that weapons inspectors had been given a deadline to give the United States a pretext to conduct a weeks-long bombing campaign in March 1998. [2]
The film also provides a detailed look into the inner workings of weapons inspectors. [2] In one part of the film, the archive of Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons program is found stashed at a pig farm, which Ritter contends prove his contention that UNSCOM found everything worth finding. [1]
The film cost $530,000 to make, $400,000 of which provided by Iraqi American businessman Shakir al Khafaji. [3] [1] [2] Ritter stated that he had checked out al-Khafaji via a reporter with sources in the CIA and was confident that he was not getting any quid pro quo from the Iraqi government. [1]
Chief UN inspector Richard Butler, Ritter's boss, called Ritter's allegations "completely false" and described the movie as a "propaganda film." [3] [2] Dave Kehr in The New York Times called In Shifting Sands a "surprisingly dry and dispassionate account of UNSCOM." Kehr writes that Ritter's trustfulness that the film's financing was not in return for a quid pro quo was "out of place" for a UN weapons inspector. [1] The U.S. Mission to the United Nations refused to comment on the film. [3]
The film argued that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction because of the UN weapons inspection programme. Ritter's documentary was partially financed by Iraqi American businessman Shakir al Khafaji. Ritter denied any quid pro quo with Al-Khafaji, according to Laurie Mylroie, writing for the Financial Times . When Ritter was asked "how he would characterize anyone suggesting that Mr. Khafaji was offering allocations in [his] name", Mr. Ritter replied: "I'd say that person's a fucking liar ... and tell him to come over here so I can kick his ass." [4] Al-Khafaji pled guilty to multiple felony charges in 2004 for his involvement with the U.N. Oil-for-Food scandal. [5]
The Iraq disarmament crisis was claimed as one of primary issues that led to the multinational invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003.
The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created through the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999 and its mission lasted until June 2007.
Hans Martin Blix is a Swedish diplomat and politician for the Liberal People's Party. He was Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (1978–1979) and later became the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As such, Blix was the first Western representative to inspect the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union on-site and led the agency's response to them. Blix was also the head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission from March 2000 to June 2003, when he was succeeded by Dimitris Perrikos. In 2002, the commission began searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction, ultimately finding none. On 17 March 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an address from the White House announcing that within 48 hours, the United States would invade Iraq unless Saddam Hussein would leave. Bush then ordered all of the weapons inspectors, including Blix's team, to leave Iraq so that America and its allies could invade Iraq on 20 March. In February 2010, Blix became head of the United Arab Emirates' advisory board for its nuclear power program. He is the former president of the World Federation of United Nations Associations.
Iraq actively researched and later employed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from 1962 to 1991, when it destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile and halted its biological and nuclear weapon programs as required by the United Nations Security Council. The fifth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was internationally condemned for his use of chemical weapons against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s. Saddam pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was built. After the Gulf War, the United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons and related equipment and materials; Iraq ceased its chemical, biological and nuclear programs.
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was an inspection regime created by the United Nations to ensure Iraq's compliance with policies concerning Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction after the Gulf War. Between 1991 and 1997 its director was Rolf Ekéus; from 1997 to 1999 its director was Richard Butler.
Operation Rockingham was the codeword for UK involvement in inspections in Iraq following the war over Kuwait in 1990–91. Early in 1991 the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established to oversee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Use of the codeword was referred to in the annual British defence policy white paper "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991" where at page 28 it states "The United Kingdom is playing a full part in the work of the Special Commission; our involvement is known as Operation ROCKINGHAM." The activities carried out by the UK as part of Rockingham were detailed in the following white paper.
William Scott Ritter Jr. is an American author, former United States Marine Corps intelligence officer, former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspector and convicted sex offender.
Colonel General Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid was the son-in-law and first cousin once removed of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. He defected to Jordan and assisted United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams assigned to look for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He was killed the following year for betraying Saddam.
Richard William Butler, is a retired Australian public servant, United Nations weapons inspector, and a former Governor of Tasmania.
The following lists events in the year 2003 in Iraq.
United Nations Security Council resolution 1284, adopted on 17 December 1999, after recalling previous relevant resolutions on Iraq, including resolutions 661 (1990), 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 986 (1995), 1051 (1996), 1153 (1998), 1175 (1998), 1242 (1999) and 1266 (1999), the council established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). It was the final resolution adopted in 1999.
There are various rationales for the Iraq War, both the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent hostilities. The George W. Bush administration began actively pressing for military intervention in Iraq in late 2001. The primary rationalization for the Iraq War was articulated by a joint resolution of the United States Congress known as the Iraq Resolution. The US claimed the intent was to "disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people".
A dispute exists over the legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The debate centers around the question whether the invasion was an unprovoked assault on an independent country that may have breached international law, or if the United Nations Security Council authorized the invasion. Those arguing for its legitimacy often point to Congressional Joint Resolution 114 and UN Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1441 and Resolution 678. Those arguing against its legitimacy also cite some of the same sources, stating they do not actually permit war but instead lay out conditions that must be met before war can be declared. Furthermore, the Security Council may only authorise the use of force against an "aggressor" in the interests of preserving peace, whereas the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not provoked by any aggressive military action.
The Bush–Blair 2003 Iraq memo or Manning memo is a secret memo of a two-hour meeting between American President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair that took place on 31 January 2003 at the White House. The memo purportedly shows at that point, the administrations of Bush and Blair had already decided that the invasion of Iraq would take place two months later. The memo was written by Blair's chief foreign policy adviser, David Manning, who participated in the meeting.
Operation Mass Appeal was an operation alleged to have been set up by the British Secret Intelligence Service in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In December, 2003, former UN arms inspector Scott Ritter said it was a campaign aimed at planting disinformation in the media about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction.
Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) began an extensive biological weapons (BW) program in Iraq in the early 1980s, despite having signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. Details of the BW program and a chemical weapons program surfaced after the Gulf War (1990–91) during the disarmament of Iraq under the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). By the end of the war, program scientists had investigated the BW potential of five bacterial strains, one fungal strain, five types of virus, and four toxins. Of these, three—anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin—had proceeded to weaponization for deployment. Because of the UN disarmament program that followed the war, more is known today about the once-secret bioweapons program in Iraq than that of any other nation.
United Nations Security Council resolution 1134, adopted on 23 October 1997, after recalling resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1060 (1996) and 1115 (1997) on the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, the Council demanded that Iraq co-operate with weapons inspection teams from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and expressed its intention to impose travel bans on Iraqi officials in the event of non-compliance.
Rihab Rashid Taha al-Azawi is an Iraqi microbiologist, dubbed Dr Germ by United Nations weapons inspectors, who worked in Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program. A 1999 report commissioned by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) named her as one of the world's most dangerous women. Dr Taha admitted producing germ warfare agents but said they had been destroyed.