In re Kansas Indians | |
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Argued April 2, 1867 Decided May 6, 1867 | |
Full case name | The Kansas Indians |
Citations | 72 U.S. 737 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | Blue-Jacket v. Johnson County Com'rs, 3 Kan. 299 (1865); Miami County Com'rs v. Wan-zop-pe-che, 3 Kan. 364 (1865) |
Holding | |
The state of Kansas was not authorized to levy taxes on, and seize for forfeiture, lands which are set aside for Indian tribes by the United States government, under treaty or otherwise. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Davis, joined by unanimous |
Superseded by | |
Statute, as stated in Ariz. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) |
In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the state of Kansas was not authorized to levy taxes on, and seize for forfeiture, lands which are set aside for Indian tribes by the United States government, under treaty or otherwise.
The Kansas Indians case developed from three separate cases. Both Kansas and New York tried to tax the land of individual Indians. [1] The Shawnee tribe moved to Kansas from Ohio and Missouri from 1825 to 1831, and were not to be considered part of the land of any state. [2] In 1854, the tribe partitioned the land among its members, with the restriction that the land could not be sold without the permission of the United States. [3] The Wea tribe was in a similar position, as was the Miami tribe. [4]
In all three cases, the local counties levied property taxes on land belonging to members of the tribe, and the tribes objected. The Kansas Supreme Court heard two of the cases, and ruled that the taxes were proper as the Indians held fee simple title to the land. [5]
Justice David Davis delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that a state could not levy taxes on the property of a tribe while the tribe was recognized by the United States. [6]
Tribal sovereignty in the United States is the concept of the inherent authority of Indigenous tribes to govern themselves within the borders of the United States.
The Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) or Oneida Nation is a federally recognized tribe of Oneida people in the United States. The tribe is headquartered in Verona, New York, where the tribe originated and held territory prior to European colonialism, and continues to hold territory today. They are Iroquoian-speaking people, and one of the Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, or Haudenosaunee. The Oneida are known as "America's first allies" as they were the first, and one of the few, Iroquois nations to support the American cause. Three other federally recognized Oneida tribes operate in locations where they migrated or were removed to during and after the American Revolutionary War: one in Wisconsin in the United States, and two in Ontario, Canada.
The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1870), is a United States court case with implications relating to tribal sovereignty in the United States.
The Omaha Reservation of the federally recognized Omaha tribe is located mostly in Thurston County, Nebraska, with sections in neighboring Cuming and Burt counties, in addition to Monona County in Iowa. As of the 2020 federal census, the reservation population was 4,526. The tribal seat of government is in Macy. The villages of Rosalie, Pender and Walthill are located within reservation boundaries, as is the northernmost part of Bancroft. Due to land sales in the area since the reservation was established, Pender has disputed tribal jurisdiction over it, to which the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2016 that "the disputed land is within the reservation’s boundaries."
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), is a case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Menominee Indian Tribe kept their historical hunting and fishing rights even after the federal government ceased to recognize the tribe. It was a landmark decision in Native American case law.
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), was a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court held that repurchase of traditional tribal lands 200 years later did not restore tribal sovereignty to that land. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion.
Okla. Tax Commission v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the tribe was not subject to state sales taxes on sales made to tribal members, but that they were liable for taxes on sales to non-tribal members.
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Indian land that Congress has exempted from direct taxation by a state is also exempt from state estate taxes.
The United States was the first jurisdiction to acknowledge the common law doctrine of aboriginal title. Native American tribes and nations establish aboriginal title by actual, continuous, and exclusive use and occupancy for a "long time." Individuals may also establish aboriginal title, if their ancestors held title as individuals. Unlike other jurisdictions, the content of aboriginal title is not limited to historical or traditional land uses. Aboriginal title may not be alienated, except to the federal government or with the approval of Congress. Aboriginal title is distinct from the lands Native Americans own in fee simple and occupy under federal trust.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state could tax tribal, off-reservation business activities but could not impose a tax on tribal land, which was exempt from all forms of property taxes.
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case concerning aboriginal title in the United States. The case, sometimes referred to as Oneida II, was "the first Indian land claim case won on the basis of the Nonintercourse Act."
The Marshall Court (1801–1835) issued some of the earliest and most influential opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States on the status of aboriginal title in the United States, several of them written by Chief Justice John Marshall himself. However, without exception, the remarks of the Court on aboriginal title during this period are dicta. Only one indigenous litigant ever appeared before the Marshall Court, and there, Marshall dismissed the case for lack of original jurisdiction.
Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 366 (1857), is a United States Supreme Court decision involving Native American law. John Blacksmith, a Tonawanda Seneca, sued agents of the Ogden Land Company for common law claims of trespass, assault, and battery after he was forcibly evicted from his sawmill by the Company's agents. The Court affirmed a judgement in Blacksmith's favor, notwithstanding the fact that the Seneca had executed an Indian removal treaty and the Company held the exclusive right to purchase to the land by virtue of an interstate compact ratified by Congress.
New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. 366 (1858), was a companion case to the more well-known Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857). At the time Fellows was decided, this case had reached the U.S. Supreme Court but had not yet been argued.
Aboriginal land title in New Mexico is unique among aboriginal title in the United States. Congressional legislation was passed to define such title after the United States acquired this territory following war with Mexico (1846–1848). But the Supreme Court of the New Mexico Territory and the United States Supreme Court held that the Nonintercourse Act did not restrict the alienability of Pueblo lands.
The Supreme Court of the United States, under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney (1836–1864), issued several important decisions on the status of aboriginal title in the United States, building on the opinions of aboriginal title in the Marshall Court.
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that absent explicit congressional direction to the contrary, it must be presumed that a State does not have jurisdiction to tax tribal members who live and work in Indian country, whether the particular territory consists of a formal or informal reservation, allotted lands, or dependent Indian communities.
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the United States, not the state of Idaho, held title to lands submerged under Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River, and that the land was held in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe as part of its reservation, and in recognition of the importance of traditional tribal uses of these areas for basic food and other needs.
Article I, § 10, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the Import-Export Clause, prevents the states, without the consent of Congress, from imposing tariffs on imports and exports above what is necessary for their inspection laws and secures for the federal government the revenues from all tariffs on imports and exports. Several nineteenth century Supreme Court cases applied this clause to duties and imposts on interstate imports and exports. In 1869, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Import-Export Clause only applied to imports and exports with foreign nations and did not apply to imports and exports with other states, although this interpretation has been questioned by modern legal scholars.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827), was a significant United States Supreme Court case which interpreted the Import-Export and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution to prohibit discriminatory taxation by states against imported items after importation, rather than only at the time of importation. The state of Maryland passed a law requiring importers of foreign goods to obtain a license for selling their products. Brown was charged under this law and appealed. It was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court construed the Import-Export Clause. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the court, ruling that Maryland's statute violated the Import-Export and Commerce Clauses and the federal law was supreme. He alleged that the power of a state to tax goods did not apply if they remained in their "original package". A license tax on the importer was essentially the same as a tax on an import itself. Despite arguing the case for Maryland, future chief justice Roger Taney admitted that the case was correctly decided.
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