Examples
If a, b, and c are distinct and {a, b, c} is a set of indiscernibles, then, for example, for each binary formula , we must have
Historically, the identity of indiscernibles was one of the laws of thought of Gottfried Leibniz.
In mathematical logic, indiscernibles are objects that cannot be distinguished by any property or relation defined by a formula. Usually only first-order formulas are considered.
If a, b, and c are distinct and {a, b, c} is a set of indiscernibles, then, for example, for each binary formula , we must have
Historically, the identity of indiscernibles was one of the laws of thought of Gottfried Leibniz.
In some contexts one considers the more general notion of order-indiscernibles, and the term sequence of indiscernibles often refers implicitly to this weaker notion. In our example of binary formulas, to say that the triple (a, b, c) of distinct elements is a sequence of indiscernibles implies
More generally, for a structure with domain and a linear ordering , a set is said to be a set of -indiscernibles for if for any finite subsets and with and and any first-order formula of the language of with free variables, . [1] p. 2
Order-indiscernibles feature prominently in the theory of Ramsey cardinals, Erdős cardinals, and zero sharp.
First-order logic—also called predicate logic, predicate calculus, quantificational logic—is a collection of formal systems used in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science. First-order logic uses quantified variables over non-logical objects, and allows the use of sentences that contain variables. Rather than propositions such as "all men are mortal", in first-order logic one can have expressions in the form "for all x, if x is a man, then x is mortal"; where "for all x" is a quantifier, x is a variable, and "... is a man" and "... is mortal" are predicates. This distinguishes it from propositional logic, which does not use quantifiers or relations; in this sense, propositional logic is the foundation of first-order logic.
In boolean logic, a disjunctive normal form (DNF) is a canonical normal form of a logical formula consisting of a disjunction of conjunctions; it can also be described as an OR of ANDs, a sum of products, or — in philosophical logic — a cluster concept. As a normal form, it is useful in automated theorem proving.
In Boolean logic, a formula is in conjunctive normal form (CNF) or clausal normal form if it is a conjunction of one or more clauses, where a clause is a disjunction of literals; otherwise put, it is a product of sums or an AND of ORs. As a canonical normal form, it is useful in automated theorem proving and circuit theory.
In classical, deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not lead to a logical contradiction. A theory is consistent if there is no formula such that both and its negation are elements of the set of consequences of . Let be a set of closed sentences and the set of closed sentences provable from under some formal deductive system. The set of axioms is consistent when there is no formula such that and . A trivial theory is clearly inconsistent. Conversely, in an explosive formal system every inconsistent theory is trivial. Consistency of a theory is a syntactic notion, whose semantic counterpart is satisfiability. A theory is satisfiable if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all axioms in the theory are true. This is what consistent meant in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisfiable is used instead.
In the mathematical discipline of set theory, forcing is a technique for proving consistency and independence results. Intuitively, forcing can be thought of as a technique to expand the set theoretical universe to a larger universe by introducing a new "generic" object .
In mathematical logic, the compactness theorem states that a set of first-order sentences has a model if and only if every finite subset of it has a model. This theorem is an important tool in model theory, as it provides a useful method for constructing models of any set of sentences that is finitely consistent.
In set theory, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel, is an axiomatic system that was proposed in the early twentieth century in order to formulate a theory of sets free of paradoxes such as Russell's paradox. Today, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, with the historically controversial axiom of choice (AC) included, is the standard form of axiomatic set theory and as such is the most common foundation of mathematics. Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice included is abbreviated ZFC, where C stands for "choice", and ZF refers to the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice excluded.
In the mathematical discipline of set theory, 0# is the set of true formulae about indiscernibles and order-indiscernibles in the Gödel constructible universe. It is often encoded as a subset of the natural numbers, or as a subset of the hereditarily finite sets, or as a real number. Its existence is unprovable in ZFC, the standard form of axiomatic set theory, but follows from a suitable large cardinal axiom. It was first introduced as a set of formulae in Silver's 1966 thesis, later published as Silver (1971), where it was denoted by Σ, and rediscovered by Solovay, who considered it as a subset of the natural numbers and introduced the notation O#.
In mathematics, in set theory, the constructible universe, denoted by , is a particular class of sets that can be described entirely in terms of simpler sets. is the union of the constructible hierarchy. It was introduced by Kurt Gödel in his 1938 paper "The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum-Hypothesis". In this paper, he proved that the constructible universe is an inner model of ZF set theory, and also that the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis are true in the constructible universe. This shows that both propositions are consistent with the basic axioms of set theory, if ZF itself is consistent. Since many other theorems only hold in systems in which one or both of the propositions is true, their consistency is an important result.
Independence-friendly logic is an extension of classical first-order logic (FOL) by means of slashed quantifiers of the form and , where is a finite set of variables. The intended reading of is "there is a which is functionally independent from the variables in ". IF logic allows one to express more general patterns of dependence between variables than those which are implicit in first-order logic. This greater level of generality leads to an actual increase in expressive power; the set of IF sentences can characterize the same classes of structures as existential second-order logic.
In mathematical logic, a ground term of a formal system is a term that does not contain any variables. Similarly, a ground formula is a formula that does not contain any variables.
In set theory, a branch of mathematics, a reflection principle says that it is possible to find sets that, with respect to any given property, resemble the class of all sets. There are several different forms of the reflection principle depending on exactly what is meant by "resemble". Weak forms of the reflection principle are theorems of ZF set theory due to Montague (1961), while stronger forms can be new and very powerful axioms for set theory.
In mathematical logic, a definable set is an n-ary relation on the domain of a structure whose elements satisfy some formula in the first-order language of that structure. A set can be defined with or without parameters, which are elements of the domain that can be referenced in the formula defining the relation.
In logic, more specifically proof theory, a Hilbert system, sometimes called Hilbert calculus, Hilbert-style system, Hilbert-style proof system, Hilbert-style deductive system or Hilbert–Ackermann system, is a type of formal proof system attributed to Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert. These deductive systems are most often studied for first-order logic, but are of interest for other logics as well.
In mathematics, the spin representations are particular projective representations of the orthogonal or special orthogonal groups in arbitrary dimension and signature. More precisely, they are two equivalent representations of the spin groups, which are double covers of the special orthogonal groups. They are usually studied over the real or complex numbers, but they can be defined over other fields.
In set theory and mathematical logic, the Lévy hierarchy, introduced by Azriel Lévy in 1965, is a hierarchy of formulas in the formal language of the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, which is typically called just the language of set theory. This is analogous to the arithmetical hierarchy, which provides a similar classification for sentences of the language of arithmetic.
This is a glossary for the terminology applied in the mathematical theories of Lie groups and Lie algebras. For the topics in the representation theory of Lie groups and Lie algebras, see Glossary of representation theory. Because of the lack of other options, the glossary also includes some generalizations such as quantum group.
In set theory and logic, Buchholz's ID hierarchy is a hierarchy of subsystems of first-order arithmetic. The systems/theories are referred to as "the formal theories of ν-times iterated inductive definitions". IDν extends PA by ν iterated least fixed points of monotone operators.
In mathematics, Rathjen's psi function is an ordinal collapsing function developed by Michael Rathjen. It collapses weakly Mahlo cardinals to generate large countable ordinals. A weakly Mahlo cardinal is a cardinal such that the set of regular cardinals below is closed under . Rathjen uses this to diagonalise over the weakly inaccessible hierarchy.
