International Shoe Co. v. Washington | |
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Argued November 14, 1945 Decided December 3, 1945 | |
Full case name | International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation & Placement, et al. |
Citations | 326 U.S. 310 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | Special appearance by appellant in Washington state court as defendant in lower court; appellant moved to set aside order on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction; tribunal denied motion; state Superior Court affirmed; state Supreme Court affirmed |
Holding | |
Suit cannot be brought against an individual unless they have minimum contacts with the forum state, and such lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Stone, joined by Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, Burton |
Concurrence | Black |
Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. Amendment XIV; 26 U.S.C. § 1606; Washington Unemployment Compensation Act |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that a party, particularly a corporation, may be subject to the jurisdiction of a state court if it has "minimum contacts" with that state. [1] The ruling has important consequences for corporations involved in interstate commerce, their payments to state unemployment compensation funds, limits on the power of states imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sufficiency of service of process, and, especially, personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiff, the State of Washington, established a tax on employers conducting business therein with the stated legislative purpose of providing a fund to be used for financial assistance to newly unemployed workers in the state. The tax was in effect a mandatory contribution to the state's Unemployment Compensation Fund. The defendant, International Shoe Company, was an American company that was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business ("PPB") in Missouri. The corporation had maintained for some time a staff of 11-13 salesmen in the State of Washington, working on commission. The salesmen were residents of that state and they met with prospective customers in motels and hotels, and occasionally rented space to put up displays. The company thus had no permanent "situs" of business in the State. Each year, the salesmen brought in about $31,000 in compensation. International Shoe's solicitation system allegedly was set up explicitly to avoid establishing the situs of the business in other states insofar as the salesmen did not have offices, did not negotiate prices, and sent all orders back to Missouri; shipments from the plant to customers were sent f.o.b.
International Shoe Co. did not pay the tax at issue in this case, so the state effected service of process on one of their salesmen with a notice of assessment. Washington also sent a letter by registered mail to their place of business in Missouri. International Shoe made a special appearance before the office of unemployment to dispute the state's jurisdiction over it as a corporate "person." However, the trial court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation. This ruling was upheld in the appeal tribunal, the Superior Court, and the Supreme Court of Washington. International Shoe Co. then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The issue involved a determination of the level of connection that must exist between a non-resident corporation and a state in order for that corporation to be sued within that state. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (and in which Justice Robert Jackson did not participate), held that in view of 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (providing that no person shall be relieved from compliance with a state law requiring payments to an unemployment fund on the ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce) the fact that the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce does not relieve it from liability for payments to the state unemployment compensation fund. The activities in behalf of the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of the State to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation fund. The activities in question established sufficient contacts or ties between the State and the corporation to make it reasonable and just, and in conformity to the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against the corporation an obligation arising out of such activities. In such a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment compensation fund, service of process upon one of the corporation's salesmen within the State, and notice sent by registered mail to the corporation at its home office, satisfies the requirements of due process. The tax imposed by the state unemployment compensation statute—construed by the state court, in its application to the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing salesmen within the State—does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching its decision the Court stated that throughout American history, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam has been grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Justice Hugo Black wrote a separate opinion, agreeing with the outcome in this case, but contending that the Court has excessively restricted the power of states to find jurisdiction over companies doing business therein.
A growing body of Supreme Court precedent and incremental statutory and common law doctrines related to personal jurisdiction had been evolving over a period of several decades from the late 19th century through the early 20th century, and the Supreme Court therefore could have upheld jurisdiction over defendant corporation. Initially the courts followed a strict interpretation of territorial jurisdiction, where states only had power over property or defendants who were actually present in the state (excepting corporations or residents). Defendants wishing to avoid claims could abscond to other jurisdictions without fear of suit.
As the doctrine of personal jurisdiction evolved with additional cases directed to related subject matter, the Supreme Court expanded jurisdiction to anyone who tacitly "consented" to jurisdiction (in that case, a defendant consented to jurisdiction by merely driving on a Massachusetts state highway). These doctrines were built upon the expanding legal fiction of "presence" within the forum state or the defendant's commission of an act or failure to act within the forum state. (A "forum state" means the state in whose courts a case is being litigated.)
In International Shoe, the Court's majority chose to create a new doctrine, while still adhering to a "presence" rationale. The basic formulation is: a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, so long as that defendant has "sufficient minimum contacts" with the forum state, from which the complaint arises, such that the exercise of jurisdiction "will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . ." See 326 U.S. 310 (1940).
The court broke down the types of contact that a defendant can have with a state into "casual" contact and "systematic and continuous" contact. In cases with only casual contact, the claim must be related to the contact in order for the state to have jurisdiction. Casual contact is not a basis for bringing unrelated claims. Systematic and continuous contact allows for both claims related to the contact and unrelated claims.
It was and remains a broad doctrine. It eventually allowed states to create "long arm" statutes and responded to the actualities of the national market of the United States. Defendants had often avoided legal responsibilities by "scampering" from the state of occurrence and not being available for service of process. This case changed that to some extent, though the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are drawn from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Aristotle's [ citation needed ] notions of justice. The doctrine of International Shoe is broad, but the Court has recognized that it has limits, nevertheless.
Personal jurisdiction is a court's jurisdiction over the parties, as determined by the facts in evidence, which bind the parties to a lawsuit, as opposed to subject-matter jurisdiction, which is jurisdiction over the law involved in the suit. Without personal jurisdiction over a party, a court's rulings or decrees cannot be enforced upon that party, except by comity; i.e., to the extent that the sovereign which has jurisdiction over the party allows the court to enforce them upon that party. A court that has personal jurisdiction has both the authority to rule on the law and facts of a suit and the power to enforce its decision upon a party to the suit. In some cases, territorial jurisdiction may also constrain a court's reach, such as preventing hearing of a case concerning events occurring on foreign territory between two citizens of the home jurisdiction. A similar principle is that of standing or locus standi, which is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.
In the common law legal systems, capias ad respondendum is or was a writ issued by a court to the sheriff of a particular county to bring the defendant, having failed to appear, to answer a civil action against him.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), is a United States corporate law case in which the Supreme Court of the United States established that a defendant's ownership of stock in a corporation incorporated within a state, without more, is insufficient to allow that state's courts to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. The case set forth a framework for evaluating when a defendant will be deemed to have minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction to be consistent with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Minimum contacts is a term used in the United States law of civil procedure to determine when it is appropriate for a court in one state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant from another state. The United States Supreme Court has decided a number of cases that have established and refined the principle that it is unfair for a court to assert jurisdiction over a party unless that party's contacts with the state in which that court sits are such that the party "could reasonably expect to be haled into court" in that state. This jurisdiction must "not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". A non-resident defendant may have minimum contacts with the forum state if they 1) have direct contact with the state; 2) have a contract with a resident of the state; 3) have placed their product into the stream of commerce such that it reaches the forum state; 4) seek to serve residents of the forum state; 5) have satisfied the Calder effects test; or 6) have a non-passive website viewed within the forum state.
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a court within a state could assert personal jurisdiction over the author and editor of a national magazine which published an allegedly libelous article about a resident of that state, and where the magazine had wide circulation in that state.
Long-arm jurisdiction is the ability of local courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants, whether on a statutory basis or through a court's inherent jurisdiction. This jurisdiction permits a court to hear a case against a defendant and enter a binding judgment against a defendant residing outside the jurisdiction concerned.
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), is a notable case in United States civil procedure that came before the Supreme Court of the United States addressing personal jurisdiction.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case involving strict products liability, personal injury and various procedural issues and considerations. The 1980 opinion, written by Justice Byron White, is included in the first-year civil procedure curriculum at nearly every American law school for its focus on personal jurisdiction.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), decided on February 24, 1987, was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court, in which the court decided whether a foreign corporation, by merely being aware that its products could end up in the forum state and into the American "stream of commerce" which later caused injuries, satisfied the minimum contact necessary to satisfy jurisdictional due process requirements. The court was unanimous in the result, but issued a fractured decision with Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for a plurality of the court.
Personal jurisdiction in Internet cases refers to a growing set of judicial precedents in American courts where personal jurisdiction has been asserted upon defendants based solely on their Internet activities. Personal jurisdiction in American civil procedure law is premised on the notion that a defendant should not be subject to the decisions of a foreign or out of state court, without having "purposely availed" himself of the benefits that the forum state has to offer. Generally, the doctrine is grounded on two main principles: courts should protect defendants from the undue burden of facing litigation in an unlimited number of possibly remote jurisdictions, and courts should prevent states from infringing on the sovereignty of other states by limiting the circumstances under which defendants can be "haled" into court.
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), was a United States Supreme Court case that exemplified the bizarre types of jurisdiction state courts could assert through quasi in rem actions before International Shoe's (1945) "minimum contacts" test replaced Pennoyer's (1878) principles of "power and notice".
Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that an Ohio state court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of that company's "continuous and systematic" contacts with the state of Ohio. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. was a Philippine mining corporation, owned by American John W. Hausermann, that temporarily stopped its mining operations and relocated its president to Ohio during the World War II Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The Court held that the president's use of his office in Ohio to carry on continuous business activities during this period allowed Ohio to properly assert general jurisdiction over his company.
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case addressing whether a state court may, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident of the state who is served with process while temporarily visiting the state. All nine justices unanimously agreed that this basis for personal jurisdiction—known as "transient jurisdiction"—is constitutionally permissible. However, the Court failed to produce a majority opinion, as the members were sharply divided on the reasons for the decision, reflecting two fundamentally different approaches to how due-process issues are to be analyzed. Justice Scalia wrote the lead opinion, joined in whole or part by three other Justices. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion joined by three other Justices. Justices White and Stevens wrote separate opinions.
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, was decided by the Tenth Circuit in January 2008. The Tenth Circuit overturned a dismissal granted by the District Court upon a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP12(b)(2). Dudnikov addresses the issues that arise regarding personal jurisdiction and the internet, applying standards set by the Supreme Court of the United States in a line of cases that progressively defined the doctrine and its scope in light of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Attaway v. Omega, 903 N.E.2d 73, was a decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals in which the Court found personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who bought a car on eBay then rescinded payment but returned the automobile at buyer's expense.
Illinois v. Hemi Group, LLC, 622 F.3d 754, was a personal jurisdiction case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois' ruling finding personal jurisdiction based on Internet transactions. In the initial filing, the state of Illinois sued Hemi Group LLC (Hemi) for selling cigarettes to Illinois residents over the Internet in violation of state law and for failing to report those sales in violation of federal law. Hemi moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the district court found that the Internet transactions provided a basis for Hemi to be sued in Illinois.
Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011 is a diversity jurisdiction case brought by California resident, Paul Boschetto ("Boschetto") against certain private corporations with their principal place of business in Wisconsin. The case involved the determination of the question whether the sale of an item via the internet consumer-to-consumer trading portal, eBay, by the defendants in Wisconsin to the plaintiff in California, was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in the buyer's forum state. At the first instance, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California decided against Boschetto and held that a lone “eBay sale consummated with a California purchaser, was insufficient to establish jurisdiction over any of the defendants.” Boschetto appealed against the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the district court and denied relief to Boschetto. The Court became the first federal appellate court to address whether personal jurisdiction in a forum state could be established when an out-of-state resident makes use of an intermediary website accessible by forum-state citizens.
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023), was a United States Supreme Court case related to personal jurisdiction.