James M. Malcomson

Last updated

James Malcomson is a British-Irish economist. He is emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford [1] and emeritus Fellow of All Souls College. [2] He is a specialist in the fields of labour economics and contract theory.

Contents

Education

Following graduation with a BA in economics at the University of Cambridge (Gonville and Caius College) in 1967, Malcomson studied for a doctorate in economics at Harvard University, which he completed in 1973 [3] with a thesis supervised by the Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief.

Career

Malcomson was lecturer, then senior lecturer, at the University of York (1972–85), Professor of Economics at the University of Southampton (1985–1999) and then statutory Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College (1999–2013). He was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 2000 and Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2005. [4] He chaired [5] the Office of Health Economics Commission on Competition in the NHS, 2011–2012 [6] and served as a member of the Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ Remuneration, 2015–2021. [7]

Research

Malcomson's early research analysed vintage effects in investment, especially the implications for obsolescence, replacement and utilisation of capital equipment and the effects of tax policy on these. He derived rigorous theoretical models of optimal investment and replacement that do not rely on stationarity, [8] showed how optimal policies relate to simple rules, and derived analytic results for the effects of changes in tax policy on investment and replacement. [9] He also devised ways to estimate such models empirically without imposing stationarity, an essential step in predicting the short-run effects of tax policy changes. [10] [11] He additionally explored dynamic inconsistency in government policies, [12] the Laffer Curve, [13] and the impact of trade unions. [14]

Malcomson's empirical research on production convinced him of the need for economists to understand better the labour side of the production process and much of his more recent research has been directed towards that. [15] One of his main concerns has been with different ways of motivating employees when important aspects of performance are not easily specified in an employment contract and their implications: high pay coupled with the threat of dismissal for unsatisfactory performance (efficiency wages), [16] [17] competition for promotion, [18] [19] [20] [21] tournaments [22] and repeated interaction over time , [23] which "showed that the optimal long-term contract can be replicated by a sequence of optimal static contracts when the agent's saving decision can be controlled by the principal." [24] With W. Bentley MacLeod, he characterized the full set of outcomes that can be sustained in such repeated principal-agent contexts, described as "the "classic" relational contract model" [25] and "(t)he most complete analysis of relational contracts under symmetric information". [26] Together they also showed that tournaments and competition for promotion can provide effective methods of motivation provided agent-employees are sufficiently heterogeneous in their abilities, a system that “mimics a remarkable number of the features of actual job ladders in internal labor markets”. [27] Performance-related bonuses are effective even when agent-employees are homogeneous but may result in less efficient outcomes than efficiency wages when prospective employees are plentiful relative to jobs. [28] But when employees differ in abilities, competition for promotion may be open to influence activities and so distort allocation of employees to more senior jobs [29] [30] [31] and efficient outcomes in the future prevent full separation of abilities when differences are sufficiently fine in which "Malcomson provides a general analysis of relational contracts with persistent private information. He shows that full revelation of information is inconsistent with continuation payoffs being on the Pareto frontier, and therefore it generalizes the observation that asymmetric information leads to conflict in relational contracts." [32] This approach has been taken up in the subsequent literature. [33] These results have implications for dual economies and cyclical behavior, in which the "interplay between competition and relational contracts also has implications for output over the business cycle". [34] The implications for labour markets are surveyed in and, more completely, in [35] and those for economic organizations in.

Other research with W. Bentley MacLeod has shown that the types of contracts used in many practical situations have properties that theory suggests are appropriate for protecting investments in general and specific assets. [36] [37] Research with other co-authors has shown how time-serving apprenticeships can mitigate incentive issues in training [38] and the role for not-for-profit providers in provision of public sector services. [39] Malcomson also analysed forms of contract appropriate for the provision of health services, [40] [41] and, most notably, the quality of care and, developments surveyed in. [42]

Selected publications

Personal life

Malcomson is married to the social gerontologist Dr Sally Richards. [43] They live in Oxford.

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kenneth Arrow</span> American economist (1921–2017)

Kenneth Joseph Arrow was an American economist, mathematician, writer, and political theorist. Along with John Hicks, he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1972.

In economics, industrial organization is a field that builds on the theory of the firm by examining the structure of firms and markets. Industrial organization adds real-world complications to the perfectly competitive model, complications such as transaction costs, limited information, and barriers to entry of new firms that may be associated with imperfect competition. It analyzes determinants of firm and market organization and behavior on a continuum between competition and monopoly, including from government actions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Oliver E. Williamson</span> American economist (1932–2020)

Oliver Eaton Williamson was an American economist, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and recipient of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which he shared with Elinor Ostrom.

Experimental economics is the application of experimental methods to study economic questions. Data collected in experiments are used to estimate effect size, test the validity of economic theories, and illuminate market mechanisms. Economic experiments usually use cash to motivate subjects, in order to mimic real-world incentives. Experiments are used to help understand how and why markets and other exchange systems function as they do. Experimental economics have also expanded to understand institutions and the law.

International political economy (IPE) is the study of how politics shapes the global economy and how the global economy shapes politics. A key focus in IPE is on the distributive consequences of global economic exchange. It has been described as the study of "the political battle between the winners and losers of global economic exchange."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Bruno Frey</span> Swiss economist

Bruno S. Frey is a Swiss economist and visiting professor for Political Economy at the University of Basel. Frey's research topics include Political economy and Happiness economics, with his published work including concepts derived from Psychology, Sociology, Jurisprudence, History, Arts, and Theology.

Personnel economics has been defined as "the application of economic and mathematical approaches and econometric and statistical methods to traditional questions in human resources management". It is an area of applied micro labor economics, but there are a few key distinctions. One distinction, not always clearcut, is that studies in personnel economics deal with the personnel management within firms, and thus internal labor markets, while those in labor economics deal with labor markets as such, whether external or internal. In addition, personnel economics deals with issues related to both managerial-supervisory and non-supervisory workers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Geoffrey Hodgson</span> British economist

Geoffrey Martin Hodgson is Emeritus Professor in Management at the London campus of Loughborough University, and also the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Institutional Economics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Edward Lazear</span> American economist and academic (1948–2020)

Edward Paul Lazear was an American economist, the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Davies Family Professor of Economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Zoltan J. Acs is an American economist. He is Professor of Management at The London School of Economics (LSE), and a professor at George Mason University, where he teaches in the Schar School of Policy and Government and is the Director of the Center for Entrepreneurship and Public Policy. He is also a visiting professor at Imperial College Business School in London and affiliated with the University of Pecs in Hungary. He is co-editor and founder of Small Business Economics.

Family economics applies economic concepts such as production, division of labor, distribution, and decision making to the family. It is used to explain outcomes unique to family—such as marriage, the decision to have children, fertility, time devoted to domestic production, and dowry payments using economic analysis.

The neoclassical synthesis (NCS), neoclassical–Keynesian synthesis, or just neo-Keynesianism was a neoclassical economics academic movement and paradigm in economics that worked towards reconciling the macroeconomic thought of John Maynard Keynes in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). It was formulated most notably by John Hicks (1937), Franco Modigliani (1944), and Paul Samuelson (1948), who dominated economics in the post-war period and formed the mainstream of macroeconomic thought in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.

David Neumark is an American economist and a Chancellor's Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine, where he also directs the Economic Self-Sufficiency Policy Research Institute.

Demographic economics or population economics is the application of economic analysis to demography, the study of human populations, including size, growth, density, distribution, and vital statistics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Andrew Lo</span> MIT professor (born 1960)

Andrew Wen-Chuan Lo is a Hong Kong-born American economist and academic who is the Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor of Finance at the MIT Sloan School of Management. Lo is the author of many academic articles in finance and financial economics. He founded AlphaSimplex Group in 1999 and served as chairman and chief investment strategist until 2018 when he transitioned to his current role as chairman emeritus and senior advisor.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">History of macroeconomic thought</span>

Macroeconomic theory has its origins in the study of business cycles and monetary theory. In general, early theorists believed monetary factors could not affect real factors such as real output. John Maynard Keynes attacked some of these "classical" theories and produced a general theory that described the whole economy in terms of aggregates rather than individual, microeconomic parts. Attempting to explain unemployment and recessions, he noticed the tendency for people and businesses to hoard cash and avoid investment during a recession. He argued that this invalidated the assumptions of classical economists who thought that markets always clear, leaving no surplus of goods and no willing labor left idle.

Statistical discrimination is a theorized behavior in which group inequality arises when economic agents have imperfect information about individuals they interact with. According to this theory, inequality may exist and persist between demographic groups even when economic agents are rational. This is distinguished from taste-based discrimination which emphasizes the role of prejudice to explain disparities in labour market outcomes between demographic groups.

In economics, non-convexity refers to violations of the convexity assumptions of elementary economics. Basic economics textbooks concentrate on consumers with convex preferences and convex budget sets and on producers with convex production sets; for convex models, the predicted economic behavior is well understood. When convexity assumptions are violated, then many of the good properties of competitive markets need not hold: Thus, non-convexity is associated with market failures, where supply and demand differ or where market equilibria can be inefficient. Non-convex economies are studied with nonsmooth analysis, which is a generalization of convex analysis.

William Bentley MacLeod is a Canadian-American economist. He is Lecturer with Rank of Professor and Research Scholar at Princeton University, and the Sami Mnaymneh Professor of Economics and Professor of International and Public Affairs Emeritus at Columbia University. He is a specialist in the fields of labor economics and health economics, and law and economics.

Duncan K. Foley is an American economist. He is the Leo Model Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research and an External Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. Previously, he was Associate Professor of Economics at MIT and Stanford, and Professor of Economics at Columbia University. He has held visiting professorships at Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, UC Berkeley, and Dartmouth College, as well as the New School for Social Research.

References

  1. "James Malcomson". www.economics.ox.ac.uk. Retrieved 2023-11-24.
  2. "Professor James Malcomson | All Souls College". www.asc.ox.ac.uk. Retrieved 2023-11-24.
  3. Who's Who 2023 (Bloomsbury, 2022). ISBN   978-1-4729-9128-7 https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/whos-who-2023-9781472991287/
  4. Who's Who 2023 (Bloomsbury, 2022). ISBN   978-1-4729-9128-7 https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/whos-who-2023-9781472991287/
  5. "New OHE Commission on Competition in the NHS – OHE". OHE – Leading intellectual authority on global health economics. 2011-02-14. Retrieved 2023-11-21.
  6. Office of Health Economics Commission on Competition in the NHS, Competition in the NHS, Report of the Office of Health Economics Commission, January 2012. https://www.ohe.org/publications/report-office-health-economics-commission-competition-nhs/
  7. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1005003/DDRB_2021_Web_Accessible_v2.pdf p. iii. Retrieved 24 November 2023.
  8. Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Dynamic Optimization (2nd edition, Dover, 2012), p. 361. ISBN   978-0-486-48856-1 https://store.doverpublications.com/048648856x.html
  9. Mark Blaug and Howard Vane (eds.), Who's Who in Economics (4th edition), (Edward Elgar, 2003). ISBN   978-1-84064-992-5 https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/who-s-who-in-economics-fourth-edition-9781840649925.html
  10. E. Bjørn, Taxation, Technology, and the User Cost of Capital (Elsevier, 19892), p. 12. ISBN   978-0-444-87490-0 ISSN   0573-8555 https://www.sciencedirect.com/bookseries/contributions-to-economic-analysis/vol/182/suppl/C
  11. Terry Barker, Paul Ekins and Nick Johnstone (eds.), Global Warming and Energy Demand (Routledge, 1994), p. 124. eBook ISBN   978-0-203-98364-5 doi : 10.4324/9780203983645
  12. Keith Blackburn and Michael Christensen, "Monetary policy and policy credibility: theories and evidence", Journal of Economic Literature, 27(1), 1989, p. 12. Print ISSN   0022-0515 Online ISSN   2328-8175 JSTOR   2726940
  13. John Kay, "Tax policy: a survey", Economic Journal, 100(399), 1990, p. 35. Print ISSN   0013-0133 Online ISSN   1468-0297 doi : 10.2307/2233594
  14. Pierre Cahuc. Stéphane Carcillo and André Zylberberg, Labor Economics (MIT Press, 2014), pp. 755, 780. ISBN   978-0-262-02770-0 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262027700/labor-economics/
  15. Mark Blaug and Howard Vane (eds.), Who's Who in Economics (4th edition), (Edward Elgar, 2003). ISBN   978-1-84064-992-5 https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/who-s-who-in-economics-fourth-edition-9781840649925.html
  16. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 123. Online ISBN   978-1-139-05205-4 doi : 10.1017/CCOL0521340446 https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  17. Lewis A. Kornhauser and W. Bentley MacLeod, "Contracts between legal persons" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 929. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  18. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 122. Online ISBN   978-1-139-05205-4 doi : 10.1017/CCOL0521340446  https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  19. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman, "Careers in organizations: theories and evidence" in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B (Elsevier, 1999), pp. 2401-2402. ISBN   978-0-444-50188-2 https://www.sciencedirect.com/handbook/handbook-of-labor-economics/vol/3/part/PB
  20. Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, "Economic theories of incentives in organizations" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 67. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  21. Michael Waldman, "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 528-529. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  22. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 89. Online ISBN   978-1-139-05205-4 doi : 10.1017/CCOL0521340446  https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  23. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 98. Online ISBN   978-1-139-05205-4 doi : 10.1017/CCOL0521340446  https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  24. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives (Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 332-333. ISBN   978-0-691-09184-6 https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691091846/the-theory-of-incentives
  25. W. Bentley MacLeod, Advanced Microeconomics (MIT Press, 2022), p. 267. ISBN   978-0-262-04687-9 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046879/advanced-microeconomics-for-contract-institutional-and-organizational-economics/
  26. Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory (MIT Press, 2005), p. 462. ISBN   978-0-262-02576-8 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262025768/contract-theory/
  27. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 374. ISBN   978-0-13-224650-7 https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:152523816
  28. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman, "Careers in organizations: theories and evidence" in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B (Elsevier, 1999), p. 2390. ISBN   978-0-444-50188-2 https://www.sciencedirect.com/handbook/handbook-of-labor-economics/vol/3/part/PB
  29. Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory (MIT Press, 2005), p. 316. ISBN   978-0-262-02576-8 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262025768/contract-theory/
  30. Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer, "Personnel Economics" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 483, 495. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  31. Michael Waldman, "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 532. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  32. W. Bentley MacLeod, Advanced Microeconomics (MIT Press, 2022), p. 331. ISBN   978-0-262-04687-9 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046879/advanced-microeconomics-for-contract-institutional-and-organizational-economics/
  33. David Martimort, Aggey Semenov and Lars Stole, "A theory of contracts with limited enforcement", Review of Economic Studies, 84(2), 2017, p. 820. Print ISSN 0034-6527 Online ISSN 1467-937X https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw024
  34. W. Bentley MacLeod, Advanced Microeconomics (MIT Press, 2022), p. 275. ISBN   978-0-262-04687-9 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046879/advanced-microeconomics-for-contract-institutional-and-organizational-economics/
  35. Pierre Cahuc. Stéphane Carcillo and André Zylberberg, Labor Economics (MIT Press, 2014), p. 325. ISBN   978-0-262-02770-0 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262027700/labor-economics/
  36. Ilya Segal and Michael D. Whinston, "Property rights" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 129, 138. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  37. Lewis A. Kornhauser and W. Bentley MacLeod, "Contracts between legal persons" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 937. ISBN   978-0-691-13279-2 https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  38. Jane Humphries, Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 285-288. Online ISBN   978-0-511-78045-5 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511780455
  39. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, The Morality of Markets (ECARES, 2022), p. 36. https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-351283.html
  40. Kurt R. Brekke, Robert Nuscheler and Odd Rune Straume, "Gatekeeping in health care", Journal of Health Economics, 26(1), 2007, p. 152. Print ISSN 0167-6296 Online ISSN 1879-1646 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.04.004
  41. Ching-to Albert Ma and Henry Y. Mak, "Incentives in healthcare payment systems" in Andrew Jones (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Health Economics (Oxford University Press, 2020). Print ISBN   978-0-19-090217-9 e ISBN   978-0-19-090218-6 doi : 10.1093/acref/9780190902179.001.0001 https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780190902179.001.0001/acref-9780190902179-e-61?rskey=AtYUK0&result=39
  42. Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing the Priceless (MIT Press, 2002), pp. 93-98. ISBN   978-0-262-64058-9 https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262640589/pricing-the-priceless/
  43. Who's Who 2023 (Bloomsbury, 2022). ISBN   978-1-4729-9128-7 https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/whos-who-2023-9781472991287/