Japanese naval codes

Last updated

The vulnerability of Japanese naval codes and ciphers was crucial to the conduct of World War II, and had an important influence on foreign relations between Japan and the west in the years leading up to the war as well. Every Japanese code was eventually broken, and the intelligence gathered made possible such operations as the victorious American ambush of the Japanese Navy at Midway in 1942 (JN-25b) and the shooting down of Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto a year later in Operation Vengeance.

Contents

The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) used many codes and ciphers. All of these cryptosystems were known differently by different organizations; the names listed below are those given by Western cryptanalytic operations.

Red code

The Red Book code was an IJN code book system used in World War I and after. It was called "Red Book" because the American photographs made of it were bound in red covers. [1] It should not be confused with the RED cipher used by the diplomatic corps.

This code consisted of two books. The first contained the code itself; the second contained an additive cipher which was applied to the codes before transmission, with the starting point for the latter being embedded in the transmitted message. A copy of the code book was obtained in a "black bag" operation on the luggage of a Japanese naval attache in 1923; after three years of work Agnes Driscoll was able to break the additive portion of the code. [2] [3] [4]

Knowledge of the Red Book code helped crack the similarly-constructed Blue Book code. [1]

Coral

A cipher machine developed for Japanese naval attaché ciphers, similar to JADE. It was not used extensively, [5] [6] but Vice Admiral Abe, a Japanese representative to an Axis military council, passed considerable information about German deployments in CORAL, intelligence "essential for Allied military decision making in the European Theater." [7]

Jade

A cipher machine used by the Imperial Japanese Navy from late 1942 to 1944 and similar to CORAL; see JADE (cypher machine).

Dockyard codes

A succession of codes used to communicate between Japanese naval installations. These were comparatively easily broken by British codebreakers in Singapore and are believed to have been the source of early indications of imminent naval war preparations. [8]

JN-11

The Fleet Auxiliary System, derived from the JN-40 merchant-shipping code. Important for information on troop convoys and orders of battle.

JN-20

An inter-island cipher that provided valuable intelligence, especially when periodic changes to JN-25 temporarily blacked out U.S. decryption. JN-20 exploitation produced the "AF is short of water" message that established the main target of the Japanese Fleet, leading to a decisive U.S. victory at the Battle of Midway in 1942. [9] :p.155

JN-25

JN-25 is the name given by codebreakers to the main, and most secure, command and control communications scheme used by the IJN during World War II. Named as the 25th Japanese Navy system identified, it was initially given the designation AN-1 as a "research project" rather than a "current decryption" job. The project required reconstructing the meaning of thirty thousand code groups and piecing together thirty thousand random additives. [10]

Introduced from 1 June 1939 to replace Blue (and the most recent descendant of the Red code), [11] it was an enciphered code, producing five-numeral groups for transmission. New code books and super-enciphering books were introduced from time to time, each new version requiring a more or less fresh cryptanalytic attack. John Tiltman with some help from Alan Turing (at GCSB) had "solved" JN25 by 1941, i.e. they knew that it was a five-digit code with a codebook to translate words into five digits and there was a second "additive" book that the sender used to add to the original numbers "But knowing all this didn’t help them read a single message".

By April 1942 JN25 was about 20 percent readable, so codebreakers could read "about one in five words" and traffic analysis was far more useful. [12] Tiltman had devised a (slow; neither easy nor quick) method of breaking it and had noted that all the numbers in the codebook were divisable by three. [13] "Breaking" rather than "solving" a code involves learning enough code words and indicators so that any given message can be read. [14]

In particular, JN-25 was significantly changed on 1 December 1940 (JN25a); [15] and again on 4 December 1941 (JN25b), [16] just before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

British, Australian, Dutch and American cryptanalysts co-operated on breaking JN-25 well before the Pearl Harbor attack, but because the Japanese Navy was not engaged in significant battle operations before then, there was little traffic available to use as raw material. Before then, IJN discussions and orders could generally travel by routes more secure than broadcast, such as courier or direct delivery by an IJN vessel. Publicly available accounts differ, but the most credible agree that the JN-25 version in use before December 1941 was not more than perhaps 10% broken at the time of the attack [17] , and that primarily in stripping away its super-encipherment. JN-25 traffic increased immensely with the outbreak of naval warfare at the end of 1941 and provided the cryptographic "depth" needed to succeed in substantially breaking the existing and subsequent versions of JN-25.

The American effort was directed from Washington, D.C. by the U.S. Navy's signals intelligence command, OP-20-G; at Pearl Harbor it was centered at the Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit (Station HYPO, also known as COM 14), [18] led by Commander Joseph Rochefort. However in 1942 not every cryptogram was decoded, as Japanese traffic was too heavy for the undermanned Combat Intelligence Unit. [19] With the assistance of Station CAST (also known as COM 16, jointly commanded by Lts Rudolph Fabian and John Lietwiler) [20] in the Philippines, and the British Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore, and using a punched card tabulating machine manufactured by International Business Machines, a successful attack was mounted against the 4 December 1941 edition (JN25b). Together they made considerable progress by early 1942. "Cribs" exploited common formalities in Japanese messages, such as "I have the honor to inform your excellency" (see known plaintext attack).

Later versions of JN-25 were introduced: JN-25c from 28 May 1942, deferred from 1 April then 1 May; providing details of the attacks on Midway and Port Moresby. JN-25d was introduced from 1 April 1943, and while the additive had been changed, large portions had been recovered two weeks later, which provided details of Yamamoto's plans that were used in Operation Vengeance, the shooting-down of his plane. [21]

JN-39

This was a naval code used by merchant ships (commonly known as the "maru code"), [22] broken in May 1940. 28 May 1941, when the whale factory ship Nisshin Maru No. 2 (1937) visited San Francisco, U.S. Customs Service Agent George Muller and Commander R. P. McCullough of the U.S. Navy's 12th Naval District (responsible for the area) boarded her and seized her codebooks, without informing Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Copies were made, clumsily, and the originals returned. [23] The Japanese quickly realized JN-39 was compromised, and replaced it with JN-40. [24]

JN-40

JN-39 was replaced by JN-40, which was originally believed to be a code super-enciphered with a numerical additive in the same way as JN-25. However, in September 1942, an error by the Japanese gave clues to John MacInnes and Brian Townend, codebreakers at the British FECB, Kilindini. It was a fractionating transposition cipher based on a substitution table of 100 groups of two figures each followed by a columnar transposition. By November 1942, they were able to read all previous traffic and break each message as they received it. Enemy shipping, including troop convoys, was thus trackable, exposing it to Allied attack. Over the next two weeks they broke two more systems, the "previously impenetrable" JN167 and JN152. [25] [24]

JN-147

The "minor operations code" often contained useful information on minor troop movements. [26]

JN-152

A simple transposition and substitution cipher used for broadcasting navigation warnings. In 1942 after breaking JN-40 the FECB at Kilindini broke JN-152 and the previously impenetrable JN-167, another merchant shipping cypher. [27]

JN-167

A merchant-shipping cipher (see JN-152).

Chicago Tribune incident

In June 1942 the Chicago Tribune , run by isolationist Col. Robert R. McCormick, published an article implying that the United States had broken the Japanese codes, saying the U.S. Navy knew in advance about the Japanese attack on Midway Island, and published dispositions of the Japanese invasion fleet. The executive officer of Lexington, Commander Morton T. Seligman (who was transferred to shore duties), had shown Nimitz's executive order to reporter Stanley Johnston.

The government at first wanted to prosecute the Tribune under the Espionage Act of 1917. For various reasons, including the desire not to bring more attention to the article and because the Esponiage Act did not cover enemy secrets, the charges were dropped. A grand jury investigation did not result in prosecution but generated further publicity and, according to Walter Winchell, "tossed security out of the window". Britain's worst fears about American security were realized. [28]

In early August, a RAN intercept unit in Melbourne heard Japanese messages, using a superseded lower-grade code. Changes were made to codebooks and the call-sign system, starting with the new JN-25 codebook (issued two months before). However the changes indicated the Japanese believed the Allies had worked out the fleet details from traffic analysis or had obtained a codebook and additive tables, being reluctant to believe that anyone could have broken their codes (least of all a Westerner). [29]

Related Research Articles

Laurance Safford American cryptographer

Captain, U.S.N. Laurance Frye Safford was a U.S. Navy cryptologist. He established the Naval cryptologic organization after World War I, and headed the effort more or less constantly until shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His identification with the Naval effort was so close that he was the Friedman of the Navy.

Joseph Rochefort American cryptographer

Joseph John Rochefort was an American naval officer and cryptanalyst. He was a major figure in the United States Navy's cryptographic and intelligence operations from 1925 to 1946, particularly in the Battle of Midway. His contributions and those of his team were pivotal to victory in the Pacific War.

Agnes Meyer Driscoll American cryptographer

Agnes Meyer Driscoll, known as "Miss Aggie" or "Madame X'", was an American cryptanalyst during both World War I and World War II.

Magic was an Allied cryptanalysis project during World War II. It involved the United States Army's Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) and the United States Navy's Communication Special Unit.

Room 40 cryptanalysis department

Room 40, also known as 40 O.B. was the cryptanalysis section of the British Admiralty during the First World War.

Code (cryptography)

In cryptology, a code is a method used to encrypt a message that operates at the level of meaning; that is, words or phrases are converted into something else. A code might transform "change" into "CVGDK" or "cocktail lounge". The U.S. National Security Agency defined a code as "A substitution cryptosystem in which the plaintext elements are primarily words, phrases, or sentences, and the code equivalents typically consist of letters or digits in otherwise meaningless combinations of identical length." A codebook is needed to encrypt, and decrypt the phrases or words.

Cryptanalysis of the Enigma ciphering system enabled the western Allies in World War II to read substantial amounts of Morse-coded radio communications of the Axis powers that had been enciphered using Enigma machines. This yielded military intelligence which, along with that from other decrypted Axis radio and teleprinter transmissions, was given the codename Ultra. This was considered by western Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower to have been "decisive" to the Allied victory.

Cryptography as used extensively during World War II, with a plethora of code and cipher systems fielded by the nations involved. In addition, the theoretical and practical aspects of cryptanalysis, or codebreaking, were much advanced.

Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory conspiracy theory involving government foreknowledge of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor

The Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is the argument that U.S. Government officials had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught off guard, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans for an attack. In September 1944, John T. Flynn, a co-founder of the non-interventionist America First Committee, launched a Pearl Harbor counter-narrative when he published a forty-six page booklet entitled The Truth about Pearl Harbor.

Hut 8 section in the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park

Hut 8 was a section in the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park tasked with solving German naval (Kriegsmarine) Enigma messages. The section was led initially by Alan Turing. He was succeeded in November 1942 by his deputy, Hugh Alexander. Patrick Mahon succeeded Alexander in September 1944.

Station HYPO, also known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific was the United States Navy signals monitoring and cryptographic intelligence unit in Hawaii during World War II. It was one of two major Allied signals intelligence units, called Fleet Radio Units in the Pacific theaters, along with FRUMEL in Melbourne, Australia. The station took its initial name from the phonetic code at the time for "H" for Heʻeia, Hawaii radio tower. The precise importance and role of HYPO in penetrating the Japanese naval codes has been the subject of considerable controversy, reflecting internal tensions amongst US Navy cryptographic stations.

Station CAST was the United States Navy signals monitoring and cryptographic intelligence fleet radio unit at Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippines, until Cavite was captured by the Japanese forces in 1942, during World War II. It was an important part of the Allied intelligence effort, addressing Japanese communications as the War expanded from China into the rest of the Pacific theaters. As Japanese advances in the Philippines threatened CAST, its staff and services were progressively transferred to Corregidor in Manila Bay, and eventually to a newly formed US-Australian station, FRUMEL in Melbourne, Australia.

Central Bureau

The Central Bureau was one of two Allied Signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisations in the South West Pacific area (SWPA) during World War II. Central Bureau was attached to the Headquarters of the Allied Commander of the South West Pacific area, Douglas MacArthur. Central Bureau's role was to research and decrypt intercepted Imperial Japanese Army traffic and work in close co-operation with other SIGINT centres in the USA, United Kingdom and India. Air activities included both army and navy air forces, as there was no independent Japanese Air Force.

SIGINT is a contraction of SIGnals INTelligence. Before the development of radar and other electronics techniques, signals intelligence and communications intelligence (COMINT) were essentially synonymous. Sir Francis Walsingham ran a postal interception bureau with some cryptanalytic capability during the reign of Elizabeth I, but the technology was only slightly less advanced than men with shotguns, during World War I, who jammed pigeon post communications and intercepted the messages carried.

Hut 7 was a wartime section of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park tasked with the solution of Japanese naval codes such as JN4, JN11, JN40, and JN-25. The hut was headed by Hugh Foss who reported to Frank Birch, the head of Bletchley's Naval section.

Type A Cipher Machine cipher machine

In the history of cryptography, 91-shiki ohbun-injiki (九一式欧文印字機) or Angōki Taipu-A, codenamed Red by the United States, was a diplomatic cryptographic machine used by the Japanese Foreign Office before and during World War II. A relatively simple device, it was quickly broken by western cryptographers. The Red cipher was succeeded by the Type B "Purple" machine which used some of the same principles. Parallel usage of the two systems assisted in the breaking of the Purple system.

Captain Eric Nave was an Australian cryptographer and intelligence officer in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Navy, noted for his work with joint Allied intelligence units during World War II. He served in the navy from 1916 to 1949, then served as an officer in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation until 1959.

Far East Combined Bureau

The Far East Combined Bureau, an outstation of the British Government Code and Cypher School, was set up in Hong Kong in March 1935, to monitor Japanese, and also Chinese and Russian (Soviet) intelligence and radio traffic. Later it moved to Singapore, Colombo (Ceylon), Kilindini (Kenya), then returned to Colombo.

The Short Weather Cipher, also known as the weather short signal book, was a cipher, presented as a codebook, that was used by the radio telegraphists aboard U-boats of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) during World War II. It was used to condense weather reports into a short 7-letter message, which was enciphered by using the naval Enigma and transmitted by radiomen to intercept stations on shore, where it was deciphered by Enigma and the 7-letter weather report was reconstructed.

Japanese army and diplomatic codes. This article is on Japanese army and diplomatic ciphers and codes used up to and during World War II, to supplement the article on Japanese naval codes. The diplomatic codes were significant militarily, particularly those from diplomats in Germany.

References

  1. 1 2 Greg Goebel. "US Codebreakers In The Shadow Of War". 2018.
  2. Sterling, Christopher H. (2007). Military Communications: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century. ABC-CLIO. pp. 126–127. ISBN   978-1-85109-732-6 . Retrieved 1 May 2009.
  3. "Red Code" . Retrieved 1 May 2009.
  4. Budiansky 2000.
  5. "Bletchley Park Jewels Japanese Cryptographic Machines". mkheritage.co.uk.
  6. Smith, p.125
  7. https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/center-cryptologic-history/pearl-harbor-review/early-japanese/ Early Japanese Systems NSA Center for Cryptologic History
  8. Smith, p.93
  9. Mundy, Liza (2017). Code Girls. Hachette Books. ISBN   978-0-316-35253-6.
  10. Budiansky, Stephen (2000). Battle of Wits: The complete story of Codebreaking in World War II. New York: Free Press. pp.  7–12. ISBN   0-684-85932-7.
  11. Wilford, Timothy. "Decoding Pearl Harbor: USN Cryptanalysis and the Challenge of JN-25B in 1941", in The Northern Mariner XII, No.1 (January 2002), p.18.
  12. Dufty 2017, p. 122,123.
  13. Dufty 2017, p. 14,64.
  14. Dufty 2017, p. 96.
  15. Wilford, p.18.
  16. Wilford, p.20: citing Kahn, The Codebreakers.
  17. Twomey, Steve (2016). Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the Attack. New York, NY 10020: Simon & Schuster. p. 152. ISBN   978-1-4767-7646-0.CS1 maint: location (link)
  18. Wilford, p.19.
  19. Kahn 1967, p. 566.
  20. Wilford, pp.19 and 29.
  21. Kahn 1967, pp. 99,564,567.
  22. Blair, Silent Victory, passim
  23. Farago, Ladislas. The Broken Seal (New York: Bantam, 1968), pp.393–395.
  24. 1 2 "Obituary: Brian Townend". The Times . London. 2 March 2005. Retrieved 1 May 2009.
  25. Smith 2000, p. 150.
  26. Smith 2000, pp. 191.
  27. Smith (2000) page 153 & (2001) pp140-143
  28. Gabriel Schoenfeld (March 2006). "Has the 'New York Times' Violated the Espionage Act?". Commentary Magazine. Archived from the original on 18 January 2012. Retrieved 4 October 2017.
  29. Smith 2000, pp. 142,143.

Sources