This article needs additional citations for verification .(June 2025) |
Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | |
---|---|
![]() | |
Full case name | Damon Landor, Petitioner v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, et al. |
Docket no. | 23-1197 |
Case history | |
Prior |
|
Questions presented | |
Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA. |
Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections (No. 23-1197) is a pending United States Supreme Court case regarding the availability of individual-capacity damages suits under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. [1]
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith . Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In response, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). RFRA provided that laws burdening religious free exercise must comport with strict scrutiny (i.e., the law must be the "least restrictive means" of achieving a "compelling interest"). In passing RFRA, Congress legislated using its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1997, the Supreme Court decided City of Boerne v. Flores . Boerne held that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers in passing RFRA as against state and local governments. In response, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). RLUIPA preserved RFRA's strict scrutiny test, but tailored its application to land use regulations and the rights of institutionalized persons. RLUIPA relied on Congress's powers under the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause, applying only where federal funds are involved, or where there is a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.
In 2020, the Supreme Court decided Tanzin v. Tanvir . In Tanzin, the Court unanimously held that RFRA's provision allowing for “appropriate relief against the government” includes suits for monetary damages against officials acting under color of law. [2]
Damon Landor is a devout Rastafarian. As a part of his religion, he refrained from cutting his hair. In 2020, Landor was incarcerated at two Louisiana correctional facilities that honored his religious vow and allowed him to keep his long hair. With three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to a third facility, the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. At his intake, Landor explained his religious practice of wearing his hair long, going so far as to produce a copy of a Fifth Circuit decision [3] which held unlawful Louisiana's practice of cutting Rastafarians' hair under RLUIPA. Nevertheless, Landor was carried into another room by two prison guards, handcuffed to a chair, restrained, and had his head shaved bald.
Upon his release, Landor brought suit in the Middle District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Department of Corrections and others under RLUIPA and §1983, alleging violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, along with other state-law torts. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that RLUIPA did not authorize damages suits against officials in their individual capacities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. While it condemned Landor's treatment at the hands of prison officials, it found that it was bound by prior circuit precedent foreclosing individual-capacity damages under RLUIPA. The panel also held that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Tanzin did not abrogate that prior circuit precedent. The divided Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc. [4]
On May 3, 2024, Landor filed a petition for writ of certiorari. Several amicus curiae groups filed briefs in support of granting the petition. On June 23, 2025, the petition was granted. The case will be argued during the Supreme Court's October 2025 term, with a decision expected by June 2026. [5]