In U.S. constitutional law, when a law infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right, the court may apply the strict scrutiny standard. Strict scrutiny holds the challenged law as presumptively invalid unless the government can demonstrate that the law or regulation is necessary to achieve a "compelling state interest". The government must also demonstrate that the law is "narrowly tailored" to achieve that compelling purpose, and that it uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve that purpose. Failure to meet this standard will result in striking the law as unconstitutional.
The standard is the highest and most stringent standard of judicial review and is part of the levels of judicial scrutiny that courts use to determine whether a constitutional right or principle should give way to the government's interest against observance of the principle. The lesser standards are rational basis review and exacting or intermediate scrutiny. These standards are applied to statutes and government action at all levels of government within the United States.
The notion of "levels of judicial scrutiny", including strict scrutiny, was introduced in Footnote 4 of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), one of a series of decisions testing the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. One of the most notable cases in which the Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny standard and found the government's actions constitutional was Korematsu v. United States (1944), in which the Court upheld the forced relocation of Japanese Americans in internment camps during World War II. Another example is the D.C. Circuit Court's 2007 ruling in Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach that compelling government interest was demonstrated in the restriction of unapproved prescription drugs. [1]
The burden of proof falls on the state in cases that require strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny, but not the rational basis.
U.S. courts apply the strict scrutiny standard in two contexts:
To satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, the law or policy must:
Legal scholars, including judges and professors, often say that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, fatal in fact" since popular perception is that most laws subjected to the standard are struck down. However, an empirical study of strict scrutiny decisions in the federal courts found that laws survive strict scrutiny more than 30% of the time. In one area of law, religious liberty, laws that burden religious liberty survived strict scrutiny review in nearly 60% of cases. However, a discrepancy was found in the type of religious liberty claim, with most claims for exemption from law failing and no allegedly discriminatory laws surviving. [3] See also the cases cited below, however; several appear to permit the exemption from laws based upon religious liberty.
Harvard law professor Richard Fallon Jr. has written that rather than being neatly applied, under strict scrutiny, "interpretation is more varied than is often recognized", [4] a view that has been acknowledged by U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Clarence Thomas (e.g. in his dissent (part III) in Hellerstedt ). [5]
The compelling state interest test is distinguishable from the rational basis test, which involves claims that do not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, but still arise under the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.
Presumption of constitutionality doesn't apply under strict scrutiny; the burden to prove the constitutionality of a law shifts to the government lawyers.
The Supreme Court has established standards for determining whether a statute or policy must satisfy strict scrutiny. One ruling suggested that the affected class of people must have experienced a history of discrimination, must be definable as a group based on "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics", or be a minority or "politically powerless". [6]
The Court has consistently found that classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage require strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court held that all race-based classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny in Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC (89-453), 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which had briefly allowed the use of intermediate scrutiny to analyze the Equal Protection implications of race-based classifications in the narrow category of affirmative-action programs established by the federal government in the broadcasting field.
As applied in Korematsu v. United States , which upheld the race-based exclusion order and internment during World War II of Japanese Americans who had resided on the West Coast of the United States, strict scrutiny was limited to instances of de jure discrimination, where a racial classification is written into the language of a statute.
The Supreme Court's decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. provided further definition to the concept of intent and clarified three particular areas in which intent of a particular administrative or legislative decision becomes apparent, the presence of any of which demands the harsher equal protection test. The Court must use strict scrutiny if one of these tests, among others, is met:
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court upheld the right to have an abortion as established by the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade (1973) and issued as its "key judgment" the restoration of the undue burden standard when evaluating state-imposed restrictions on that right. Both the essential holding of Roe and the key judgment of Casey were overturned by the Supreme Court in 2022, with its landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.
Substantive due process is a principle in United States constitutional law that allows courts to establish and protect substantive laws and certain fundamental rights from government interference, even if they are unenumerated elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution. Courts have asserted that such protections come from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibit the federal and state governments, respectively, from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law". Substantive due process demarks the line between those acts that courts hold to be subject to government regulation or legislation and those that courts place beyond the reach of governmental interference. Whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were intended to serve that function continues to be a matter of scholarly as well as judicial discussion and dissent. In 2022, Justice Clarence Thomas called on the Supreme Court to reconsider all of its rulings that were based on substantive due process.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4, is a 1993 United States federal law that "ensures that interests in religious freedom are protected." The bill was introduced by Congressman Chuck Schumer (D–NY) on March 11, 1993. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Ted Kennedy (D-MA) the same day. A unanimous U.S. House and a nearly unanimous U.S. Senate—three senators voted against passage—passed the bill, and President Bill Clinton signed it into law.
United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), was a case of the United States Supreme Court that upheld the federal government's power to prohibit filled milk from being shipped in interstate commerce. In his majority opinion for the Court, Associate Justice Harlan F. Stone wrote that economic regulations were "presumptively constitutional" under a deferential standard of review known as the "rational basis test".
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that an ordinance passed in Hialeah, Florida, forbidding the "unnecessar[y]" killing of "an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption", was unconstitutional.
The Free Exercise Clause accompanies the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause together read:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), is a United States Supreme Court case that held that the state could deny unemployment benefits to a person fired for violating a state prohibition on the use of peyote even though the use of the drug was part of a religious ritual. Although states have the power to accommodate otherwise illegal acts performed in pursuit of religious beliefs, they are not required to do so.
Fundamental rights are a group of rights that have been recognized by a high degree of protection from encroachment. These rights are specifically identified in a constitution, or have been found under due process of law. The United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 17, established in 2015, underscores the link between promoting human rights and sustaining peace.
In U.S. constitutional law, rational basis review is the normal standard of review that courts apply when considering constitutional questions, including due process or equal protection questions under the Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is "rationally related" to a "legitimate" government interest, whether real or hypothetical. The higher levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny is applied where a suspect or quasi-suspect classification is involved, or a fundamental right is implicated. In U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the nature of the interest at issue determines the level of scrutiny applied by appellate courts. When courts engage in rational basis review, only the most egregious enactments, those not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, are overturned.
In law, the standard of review is the amount of deference given by one court in reviewing a decision of a lower court or tribunal. A low standard of review means that the decision under review will be varied or overturned if the reviewing court considers there is any error at all in the lower court's decision. A high standard of review means that deference is accorded to the decision under review, so that it will not be disturbed just because the reviewing court might have decided the matter differently; it will be varied only if the higher court considers the decision to have obvious error. The standard of review may be set by statute or precedent. In the United States, "standard of review" also has a separate meaning concerning the level of deference the judiciary gives to Congress when ruling on the constitutionality of legislation.
Intermediate scrutiny, in U.S. constitutional law, is the second level of deciding issues using judicial review. The other levels are typically referred to as rational basis review and strict scrutiny.
In United States constitutional law, a suspect classification is a class or group of persons meeting a series of criteria suggesting they are likely the subject of discrimination. These classes receive closer scrutiny by courts when an Equal Protection claim alleging unconstitutional discrimination is asserted against a law, regulation, or other government action, or sometimes private action. When a law or government action affects a group that falls under a "suspect classification," courts apply the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the constitutional validity of a law or action.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the government to demonstrate both a compelling interest and that the law in question was narrowly tailored before it denied unemployment compensation to someone who was fired because her job requirements substantially conflicted with her religion.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision that held that Wisconsin Statutes §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973) violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Section 245.10 required noncustodial parents who were Wisconsin residents attempting to marry inside or outside of Wisconsin to seek a court order prior to receiving a marriage license. In order to receive such a court order, the noncustodial parent could not be in arrears on his or her child support, and the court had to believe that the child(ren) would not become dependent on the State.
The undue burden standard is a constitutional test fashioned by the Supreme Court of the United States. The test, first developed in the late 20th century, is widely used in American constitutional law. In short, the undue burden standard states that a legislature cannot make a particular law that is too burdensome or restrictive of one's fundamental rights.
Williams v. Pryor, 229 F.3d 1331, rehearing denied, 240 F.3d 944 was a federal lawsuit that unsuccessfully challenged an Alabama law criminalizing the sale of sex toys in the state. In 1998, a statute enacted by the legislature of the State of Alabama amended the obscenity provisions of the Alabama Code to make the distribution of certain defined sexual devices a criminal offense. Vendors and users of such devices filed a constitutional challenge to the statute in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against William H. Pryor, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama. The district court declined to hold the statute violated any constitutional right but determined the statute was unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis. The State appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court ruling on October 12, 2000.
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), was a case before the United States Supreme Court. It is the seminal case for the "strong-basis-in-evidence standard" for affirmative action programs.
Eunique v. Powell, 281 F.3d 940, challenging passport denial for child support arrearage under 42 U.S.C. § 652(k) and enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996, is the second cornerstone of the Court's thinking on passport denial/revocation under this law.
Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore guarantees to all persons equality before the law and equal protection of the law. The Article also identifies four forbidden classifications – religion, race, descent and place of birth – upon which Singapore citizens may not be discriminated for specific reasons. For example, discrimination on those classifications is prohibited in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law relating to the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment.
Government or state interest is a concept in law that allows the state to regulate a given matter. The concept may apply differently in different countries, and the limitations of what should and should not be of government interest vary, and have varied over time.
As a historical matter, [close relatives] have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority, or politically powerless.