In financial economics, a liquidity crisis is an acute shortage of liquidity. [1] Liquidity may refer to market liquidity (the ease with which an asset can be converted into a liquid medium, e.g. cash), funding liquidity (the ease with which borrowers can obtain external funding), or accounting liquidity (the health of an institution's balance sheet measured in terms of its cash-like assets). Additionally, some economists define a market to be liquid if it can absorb "liquidity trades" (sale of securities by investors to meet sudden needs for cash) without large changes in price. This shortage of liquidity could reflect a fall in asset prices below their long run fundamental price, deterioration in external financing conditions, reduction in the number of market participants, or simply difficulty in trading assets. [2]
The above-mentioned forces mutually reinforce each other during a liquidity crisis. Market participants in need of cash find it hard to locate potential trading partners to sell their assets. This may result either due to limited market participation or because of a decrease in cash held by financial market participants. Thus asset holders may be forced to sell their assets at a price below the long term fundamental price. Borrowers typically face higher loan costs and collateral requirements, compared to periods of ample liquidity, and unsecured debt is nearly impossible to obtain. Typically, during a liquidity crisis, the interbank lending market does not function smoothly either.
Several mechanisms operating through the mutual reinforcement of asset market liquidity and funding liquidity can amplify the effects of a small negative shock to the economy and result in a lack of liquidity and eventually a full-blown financial crisis. [2]
One of the earliest and most influential models of liquidity crisis and bank runs was given by Diamond and Dybvig in 1983. The Diamond–Dybvig model demonstrates how financial intermediation by banks, performed by accepting assets that are inherently illiquid and offering liabilities which are much more liquid (offer a smoother pattern of returns), can make banks vulnerable to a bank run. Emphasizing the role played by demand deposit contracts in providing liquidity and better risk sharing among people, they argue that such a demand deposit contract has a potential undesirable equilibrium where all depositors panic and withdraw their deposits immediately. This gives rise to self-fulfilling panics among depositors, as we observe withdrawals by even those depositors who would have actually preferred to leave their deposits in, if they were not concerned about the bank failing. This can lead to failure of even 'healthy' banks and eventually an economy-wide contraction of liquidity, resulting in a full blown financial crisis. [3]
Diamond and Dybvig demonstrate that when banks provide pure demand deposit contracts, we can actually have multiple equilibria. If confidence is maintained, such contracts can actually improve on the competitive market outcome and provide better risk sharing. In such an equilibrium, a depositor will only withdraw when it is appropriate for him to do so under optimal risk-sharing. However, if agents panic, their incentives are distorted and in such an equilibrium, all depositors withdraw their deposits. Since liquidated assets are sold at a loss, therefore in this scenario, a bank will liquidate all its assets, even if not all depositors withdraw.
Note that the underlying reason for withdrawals by depositors in the Diamond–Dybvig model is a shift in expectations. Alternatively, a bank run may occur because bank's assets, which are liquid but risky, no longer cover the nominally fixed liability (demand deposits), and depositors therefore withdraw quickly to minimize their potential losses. [4]
The model also provides a suitable framework for analysis of devices that can be used to contain and even prevent a liquidity crisis (elaborated below).
One of the mechanisms, that can work to amplify the effects of a small negative shock to the economy, is the balance sheet mechanism. Under this mechanism, a negative shock in the financial market lowers asset prices and erodes the financial institution's capital, thus worsening its balance sheet. Consequently, two liquidity spirals come into effect, which amplify the impact of the initial negative shock. In an attempt to maintain its leverage ratio, the financial institution must sell its assets, precisely at a time when their price is low. Thus, assuming that asset prices depend on the health of investors' balance sheet, erosion of investors' net worth further reduces asset prices, which feeds back into their balance sheet and so on. This is what Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) term as the "loss spiral". At the same time, lending standards and margins tighten, leading to the "margin spiral". Both these effects cause the borrowers to engage in a fire sale, lowering prices and deteriorating external financing conditions. [2] [5]
Apart from the "balance sheet mechanism" described above, the lending channel can also dry up for reasons exogenous to the borrower's credit worthiness. For instance, banks may become concerned about their future access to capital markets in the event of a negative shock and may engage in precautionary hoarding of funds. This would result in reduction of funds available in the economy and a slowdown in economic activity. Additionally, the fact that most financial institutions are simultaneously engaged in lending and borrowing can give rise to a network effect. In a setting that involves multiple parties, a gridlock can occur when concerns about counterparty credit risk result in failure to cancel out offsetting positions. Each party then has to hold additional funds to protect itself against the risks that are not netted out, reducing liquidity in the market. These mechanisms may explain the 'gridlock' observed in the interbank lending market during the recent subprime crisis, when banks were unwilling to lend to each other and instead hoarded their reserves. [5]
Besides, a liquidity crisis may even result due to uncertainty associated with market activities. Typically, market participants jump on the financial innovation bandwagon, often before they can fully apprehend the risks associated with new financial assets. Unexpected behaviour of such new financial assets can lead to market participants disengaging from risks they don't understand and investing in more liquid or familiar assets. This can be described as the information amplification mechanism. In the subprime mortgage crisis, rapid endorsement and later abandonment of complicated structured finance products such as collateralized debt obligations, mortgage-backed securities, etc. played a pivotal role in amplifying the effects of a drop in property prices. [2] [6]
Many asset prices drop significantly during liquidity crises. Hence, asset prices are subject to liquidity risk and risk-averse investors naturally require higher expected return as compensation for this risk. The liquidity-adjusted CAPM pricing model therefore states that, the higher an asset's market-liquidity risk, the higher its required return. [7]
Liquidity crises such as the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the LTCM crisis of 1998 also result in deviations from the Law of one price, meaning that almost identical securities trade at different prices. This happens when investors are financially constrained and liquidity spirals affect more securities that are difficult to borrow against. Hence, a security's margin requirement can affect its value. [8] [9]
A phenomenon frequently observed during liquidity crises is flight to liquidity as investors exit illiquid investments and turn to secondary markets in pursuit of cash–like or easily saleable assets. Empirical evidence points towards widening price differentials, during periods of liquidity shortage, among assets that are otherwise alike, but differ in terms of their asset market liquidity. For instance, there are often large liquidity premia (in some cases as much as 10–15%) in Treasury bond prices. An example of a flight to liquidity occurred during the 1998 Russian financial crisis, when the price of Treasury bonds sharply rose relative to less liquid debt instruments. This resulted in widening of credit spreads and major losses at Long-Term Capital Management and many other hedge funds. [6] [10]
There exists scope for government policy to alleviate a liquidity crunch, by absorbing less liquid assets and in turn providing the private sector with more liquid government – backed assets, through the following channels:
Pre-emptive or ex-ante policy: Imposition of minimum equity-to-capital requirements or ceilings on debt-to-equity ratio on financial institutions other than commercial banks would lead to more resilient balance sheets. In the context of the Diamond–Dybvig model, an example of a demand deposit contract that mitigates banks' vulnerability to bank runs, while allowing them to be providers of liquidity and optimal risk sharing, is one that entails suspension of convertibility when there are too many withdrawals. For instance, consider a contract which is identical to the pure demand deposit contract, except that it states that a depositor will not receive anything on a given date if he attempts to prematurely withdraw, after a certain fraction of the bank's total deposits have been withdrawn. Such a contract has a unique Nash equilibrium which is stable and achieves optimal risk sharing.
Expost policy intervention: Some experts suggest that the central bank should provide downside insurance in the event of a liquidity crisis. This could take the form of direct provision of insurance to asset-holders against losses or a commitment to purchasing assets in the event that the asset price falls below a threshold. Such 'asset purchases' will help drive up the demand and consequently the price of the asset in question, thereby easing the liquidity shortage faced by borrowers. Alternatively, the government could provide 'deposit insurance', where it guarantees that a promised return will be paid to all those who withdraw. In the framework of the Diamond–Dybvig model, demand deposit contracts with government deposit insurance help achieve the optimal equilibrium if the government imposes an optimal tax to finance the deposit insurance. Alternative mechanisms through which the central bank could intervene are direct injection of equity into the system in the event of a liquidity crunch or engaging in a debt for equity swap. It could also lend through the discount window or other lending facilities, providing credit to distressed financial institutions on easier terms. Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010) argue that controlling the credit supply through such lending facilities with low margin requirements is an important second monetary tool (in addition to the interest rate tool), which can raise asset prices, lower bond yields, and ease the funding problems in the financial system during crises. [11] While there are such benefits of intervention, there is also costs. It is argued by many economists that if the central bank declares itself as a lender of last resort (LLR), this might result in a moral hazard problem, with the private sector becoming lax and this may even exacerbate the problem. Many economists therefore assert that the LLR must only be employed in extreme cases and must be a discretion of the government rather than a rule. [2] [12]
Some economists argue that financial liberalization and increased inflows of foreign capital, especially if short term, can aggravate illiquidity of banks and increase their vulnerability. In this context, 'International Illiquidity' refers to a situation in which a country's short-term financial obligations denominated in foreign/hard currency exceed the amount of foreign/hard currency that it can obtain on a short notice. Empirical evidence reveals that weak fundamentals alone cannot account for all foreign capital outflows, especially from emerging markets. Open economy extensions of the Diamond–Dybvig Model, where runs on domestic deposits interact with foreign creditor panics (depending on the maturity of the foreign debt and the possibility of international default), offer a plausible explanation for the financial crises that were observed in Mexico, East Asia, Russia etc. These models assert that international factors can play a particularly important role in increasing domestic financial vulnerability and likelihood of a liquidity crisis. [13]
The onset of capital outflows can have particularly destabilising consequences for emerging markets. Unlike the banks of advanced economies, which typically have a number of potential investors in the world capital markets, informational frictions imply that investors in emerging markets are 'fair weather friends'. Thus self – fulfilling panics akin to those observed during a bank run, are much more likely for these economies. Moreover, policy distortions in these countries work to magnify the effects of adverse shocks. Given the limited access of emerging markets to world capital markets, illiquidity resulting from contemporaneous loss of domestic and foreign investor confidence is nearly sufficient to cause a financial and currency crises, the 1997 Asian financial crisis being one example. [13] [14] [15]
A financial market is a market in which people trade financial securities and derivatives at low transaction costs. Some of the securities include stocks and bonds, raw materials and precious metals, which are known in the financial markets as commodities.
In business, economics or investment, market liquidity is a market's feature whereby an individual or firm can quickly purchase or sell an asset without causing a drastic change in the asset's price. Liquidity involves the trade-off between the price at which an asset can be sold, and how quickly it can be sold. In a liquid market, the trade-off is mild: one can sell quickly without having to accept a significantly lower price. In a relatively illiquid market, an asset must be discounted in order to sell quickly. A liquid asset is an asset which can be converted into cash within a relatively short period of time, or cash itself, which can be considered the most liquid asset because it can be exchanged for goods and services instantly at face value.
The money market is a component of the economy that provides short-term funds. The money market deals in short-term loans, generally for a period of a year or less.
Fractional-reserve banking is the system of banking in all countries worldwide, under which banks that take deposits from the public keep only part of their deposit liabilities in liquid assets as a reserve, typically lending the remainder to borrowers. Bank reserves are held as cash in the bank or as balances in the bank's account at the central bank. Fractional-reserve banking differs from the hypothetical alternative model, full-reserve banking, in which banks would keep all depositor funds on hand as reserves.
Full-reserve banking is a system of banking where banks do not lend demand deposits and instead only lend from time deposits. It differs from fractional-reserve banking, in which banks may lend funds on deposit, while fully reserved banks would be required to keep the full amount of each customer's demand deposits in cash, available for immediate withdrawal.
A bank run or run on the bank occurs when many clients withdraw their money from a bank, because they believe the bank may fail in the near future. In other words, it is when, in a fractional-reserve banking system, numerous customers withdraw cash from deposit accounts with a financial institution at the same time because they believe that the financial institution is, or might become, insolvent. When they transfer funds to another institution, it may be characterized as a capital flight. As a bank run progresses, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy: as more people withdraw cash, the likelihood of default increases, triggering further withdrawals. This can destabilize the bank to the point where it runs out of cash and thus faces sudden bankruptcy. To combat a bank run, a bank may acquire more cash from other banks or from the central bank, or limit the amount of cash customers may withdraw, either by imposing a hard limit or by scheduling quick deliveries of cash, encouraging high-return term deposits to reduce on-demand withdrawals or suspending withdrawals altogether.
In public finance, a lender of last resort (LOLR) is the institution in a financial system that acts as the provider of liquidity to a financial institution which finds itself unable to obtain sufficient liquidity in the interbank lending market when other facilities or such sources have been exhausted. It is, in effect, a government guarantee to provide liquidity to financial institutions. Since the beginning of the 20th century, most central banks have been providers of lender of last resort facilities, and their functions usually also include ensuring liquidity in the financial market in general.
Liquidity risk is a financial risk that for a certain period of time a given financial asset, security or commodity cannot be traded quickly enough in the market without impacting the market price.
A financial crisis is any of a broad variety of situations in which some financial assets suddenly lose a large part of their nominal value. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, many financial crises were associated with banking panics, and many recessions coincided with these panics. Other situations that are often called financial crises include stock market crashes and the bursting of other financial bubbles, currency crises, and sovereign defaults. Financial crises directly result in a loss of paper wealth but do not necessarily result in significant changes in the real economy.
A structured investment vehicle (SIV) is a non-bank financial institution established to earn a credit spread between the longer-term assets held in its portfolio and the shorter-term liabilities it issues. They are simple credit spread lenders, frequently "lending" by investing in securitizations, but also by investing in corporate bonds and funding by issuing commercial paper and medium term notes, which were usually rated AAA until the onset of the financial crisis. They did not expose themselves to either interest rate or currency risk and typically held asset to maturity. SIVs differ from asset-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations in that they are permanently capitalized and have an active management team.
In finance, an asset–liability mismatch occurs when the financial terms of an institution's assets and liabilities do not correspond. Several types of mismatches are possible. An asset-liability mismatch presents a material risk at institutions with significant debt exposure, such as banks or sovereign governments. A significant mismatch may lead to insolvency or illiquidity, which can cause financial failure. Such risks were among the principal causes of economic crises such as the 1980s Latin American Debt Crisis, the 2007 Subprime Mortgage Crisis, the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis, and the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in 2023.
At the micro-economic level, deleveraging refers to the reduction of the leverage ratio, or the percentage of debt in the balance sheet of a single economic entity, such as a household or a firm. It is the opposite of leveraging, which is the practice of borrowing money to acquire assets and multiply gains and losses.
A flight-to-quality, or flight-to-safety, is a financial market phenomenon occurring when investors sell what they perceive to be higher-risk investments and purchase safer investments, such as gold and other precious metals. This is considered a sign of fear in the marketplace, as investors seek less risk in exchange for lower profits.
The financial accelerator in macroeconomics is the process by which adverse shocks to the economy may be amplified by worsening financial market conditions. More broadly, adverse conditions in the real economy and in financial markets propagate the financial and macroeconomic downturn.
The Diamond–Dybvig model is an influential model of bank runs and related financial crises. The model shows how banks' mix of illiquid assets and liquid liabilities may give rise to self-fulfilling panics among depositors. Diamond and Dybvig, along with Ben Bernanke, were the recipients of the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics for their work on the Diamond-Dybvig model.
The interbank lending market is a market in which banks lend funds to one another for a specified term. Most interbank loans are for maturities of one week or less, the majority being overnight. Such loans are made at the interbank rate. A sharp decline in transaction volume in this market was a major contributing factor to the collapse of several financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of the asset value to the cash needed to purchase it. The leverage cycle can be defined as the procyclical expansion and contraction of leverage over the course of the business cycle. The existence of procyclical leverage amplifies the effect on asset prices over the business cycle.
Financial fragility is the vulnerability of a financial system to a financial crisis. Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale define financial fragility as the degree to which "...small shocks have disproportionately large effects." Roger Lagunoff and Stacey Schreft write, "In macroeconomics, the term "financial fragility" is used...to refer to a financial system's susceptibility to large-scale financial crises caused by small, routine economic shocks."
Lasse Heje Pedersen is a Danish financial economist known for his research on liquidity risk and asset pricing. He is Professor of Finance at the Copenhagen Business School. Before that, he held the position of a Professor of Finance and Alternative Investments at the New York University Stern School of Business. He has also served in the monetary policy panel and liquidity working group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and is a principal at AQR Capital Management.
Liquidity regulations are financial regulations designed to ensure that financial institutions have the necessary assets on hand in order to prevent liquidity disruptions due to changing market conditions. This is often related to reserve requirement and capital requirement but focuses on the specific liquidity risk of assets that are held.