Logan v. United States | |
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Argued October 30, 2007 Decided December 4, 2007 | |
Full case name | Logan v. United States |
Docket no. | 06-6911 |
Citations | 552 U.S. 23 ( more ) 128 S. Ct. 475; 169 L. Ed. 2d 432 |
Case history | |
Prior | United States v. Logan, 453 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006) |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Ginsburg, joined by unanimous |
Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007), was a case before the United States Supreme Court.
Defendant pleaded that his sentence (for being a felon in possession of a firearm) was improperly enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.S. § 921(a)(20), because it was based on prior convictions which did not result in the loss of civil rights. Since that law did not include prior convictions for sentencing purposes if civil rights were restored, defendant argued that it also operated to preclude his prior state battery convictions from consideration at sentencing because the offenses occasioned no loss of civil rights.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence. [1]
Is a conviction that does not result in a loss of civil rights excluded from the "three convictions rule" that are required to activate the Armed Career Criminal Act's sentence enhancement? [2]
The Court unanimously held that the "civil rights restored" exemption of convictions for sentence-enhancement purposes did not extend to a defendant who retained his civil rights at all times, and whose postconviction legal status remained in all respects unaltered by any state dispensation. Justice Ruth Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court. [2] Restoration of rights means that the rights were previously taken away, and rights retained were not functionally equivalent to rights revoked but later restored. Further, the other statutory basis for disregarding convictions involved convictions which were expunged or set aside, or for which the offender was pardoned, all of which were postconviction events which relieved consequences of the convictions, and there was no showing of any congressional intent to broaden the "civil rights restored" exemption to cover convictions attended by no loss of civil rights.
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that, in a criminal proceeding in federal court, a defendant who does not alert the district court to a possible violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must show on appeal that the violation affirmatively affected his rights in order to obtain reversal of his conviction by guilty plea. Rule 11, which pertains to criminal prosecutions in United States federal courts only, governs the offering of plea bargains to criminal defendants and the procedures district courts must employ to ensure that the defendant knows of and properly waives his trial-related constitutional rights.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision with regard to aggravating factors in crimes. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory maxima based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision has been a cornerstone in the modern resurgence in jury trial rights. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, the jury-trial right "has never been efficient; but it has always been free."
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court written by Justice Stephen Breyer which confirmed that a sentencing enhancement for a prior felony conviction was not subject to the Sixth Amendment requirement for a jury to determine the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision that filled in an important gap in the federal criminal law of sentencing. The federal criminal code does not contain a definition of many crimes, including burglary, the crime at issue in this case. Yet sentencing enhancements applicable to federal crimes allow for the enhancement of a defendant's sentence if he has been convicted of prior felonies. The Court addressed in this case how "burglary" should be defined for purposes of such sentencing enhancements when the federal criminal code contained no definition of "burglary." The approach the Court adopted in this case has guided the lower federal courts in interpreting other provisions of the criminal code that also refer to generic crimes not otherwise defined in federal law.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, per Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the state may not force a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination solely for the purposes of sentencing. Any such examination violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination as well as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and is therefore inadmissible at sentencing.
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the 6–3 majority, ruled that although the elements of a crime may not be considered "serious," sentence enhancements related to a defendant's prior record will bear on how the determination is made.
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether racial discrimination in the provision of public accommodations by a privately owned restaurant violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, due to a supervening change in the state law, the Court vacated the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals and remanded the case to allow that court to determine whether the convictions for criminal trespass of twelve African American students should be dismissed.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a life sentence with the possibility of parole under Texas' three strikes law for a felony fraud crime, where the offense and the defendant's two prior offenses involved approximately $230 of fraudulent activity.
Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court decided that criminal defense attorneys must advise noncitizen clients about the deportation risks of a guilty plea. The case extended the Supreme Court's prior decisions on criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel to immigration consequences.
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that failing to report for incarceration does not qualify as a "violent felony" for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Daniels v. United States, 531 U.S. 374 (2001), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court ruled, in a 5–4 decision, that a defendant sentenced under that Act could not challenge previous convictions on appeal that were used to increase his new sentence.
Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case. The case concerned a federal prisoner who sought to challenge his current sentence by arguing it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction. A divided Court held that such challenges could not be brought. The decision was based on a reading of the statute in question, not a Sixth Amendment constitutional analysis.
McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States holding that, regarding whether an offense under State law is a serious drug offense for purposes of federal sentencing, courts must consult the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense at the time of conviction.
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine whether prosecutors in his 1982 death penalty trial violated his right to due process by withholding exculpatory evidence. The defendant, Gary Cone, filed a petition for postconviction relief from a 1982 death sentence in which he argued that prosecutors violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by withholding police reports and witness statements that potentially could have shown that his drug addiction affected his behavior. In an opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that Cone was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated Cone's right to due process; the Court noted that "the quantity and the quality of the suppressed evidence lends support to Cone’s position at trial that he habitually used excessive amounts of drugs, that his addiction affected his behavior during his crime spree". In 2016, Gary Cone died from natural causes while still sitting on Tennessee's death row.
Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that state robbery offenses that involve overcoming victim resistance count as "violent felonies" under the definition of that term under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, even when only 'slight force' is required. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, defendants with three or more violent felonies can face higher sentences when subsequently convicted of a federal firearms-related offense. This case upheld a ruling by the 11th Circuit.
Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), is an opinion of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, the definition of “serious drug offense” only requires that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute. Unlike other provisions of the ACCA, it does not require that state courts develop “generic” version of a crime, which describe the elements of the offense as they are commonly understood, and then compare the crime being charged to that generic version to determine whether the crime qualifies under the ACCA for purposes of penalty enhancement. The decision states that offenses defined under the ACCA are "unlikely names for generic offenses," and are therefore unambiguous. This renders the rule of lenity inapplicable.
Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the classification of prior convictions for "violent felony" in application of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); the ACCA provides for enhanced sentencing for convicted criminals with three or more such felonies in their history. In a 5–4 decision in June 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that crimes resulting from reckless conduct should not be considered as a "violent felony" for the purposes of the ACCA.
Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. ___ (2022), was a Supreme Court of the United States case dealing with the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In a unanimous decision, the court ruled that multiple criminal offenses that a person commits during a single criminal episode do not count as separate convictions when considering the number of prior convictions a criminal has under the ACCA.
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that capital defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel in state collateral postconviction proceedings.
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