Madhavan Nair & Anor. v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 264 is a case in Malaysian law concerning the freedom of speech, sedition, and Article 10 of the Constitution.
The applicants had applied for and been granted a permit to speak in a public place under the terms of the Police Act, which grants the Royal Malaysian Police the power to issue such licences. The permit prohibited the applicants from speaking about particular issues, including the status of the Malay language as the national language, and policies related to education. These issues were considered "sensitive" [1] — they had been entrenched in the Constitution after the May 13 Incident of racial rioting in the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur in 1969. [2]
The applicants argued that these restrictions issued by the police were unconstitutional, contravening Article 10, which provides for freedom of speech (subject to any legislation that Parliament may pass restricting this freedom). In their view, a person ought to be able to speak on any issue he likes — if in doing so, he runs the risk of violating the law (questioning the "sensitive" provisions of the Constitution constitutes a crime under the Sedition Act), so be it. They argued that the police did not have the right to impose prior restraint in the issuing of permits, and this was thus ultra vires (beyond the power granted by) Article 10. [1]
Justice Chang Min Tat rejected the arguments of the applicants. In his judgement, Chang stated that clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 10 allowed Parliament to restrict the freedoms of Article 10, and thus there was no unconstitutional infringement of the applicants' rights. Chang also cited the judgement in the British case of R. v. Comptroller of Patents-ex parte Bayer Products Ltd. (1941), stating:
...if a regulation is expressed to have been made because it appeared to the authorities to be necessary to secure, inter alia , the public safety, the defence of the realm and the maintenance of public order then the court had no jurisdiction to investigate the reasons which impelled the authorities in question to the conclusion that it was necessary or expedient to effect any of the specified purposes. [1]
The judgement has been criticised by legal scholars as "simplistic" in its reasoning, and for the judge's refusal to follow the "spirit of the constitution in assessing a reasonable balance between the right of a citizen to speak and the dictates of security or public order". It has been suggested that the court could have chosen to assess the "intent on the part of the applicant to create a seditious tendency in order to establish his state of mind". [3] However, the Sedition Act expressly states that the intent of the person charged with sedition is irrelevant, so this may have been a route not open to the court. [4]
Freedom of religion is enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution. First, Article 11 provides that every person has the right to profess and to practice his or her religion and to propagate it. Second, the Constitution also provides that Islam is the religion of the country but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony.
Sedition is overt conduct, such as speech and organization, that tends toward rebellion against the established order. Sedition often includes subversion of a constitution and incitement of discontent toward, or insurrection against, established authority. Sedition may include any commotion, though not aimed at direct and open violence against the laws. Seditious words in writing are seditious libel. A seditionist is one who engages in or promotes the interest of sedition.
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, which came into force in 1957, is the supreme law of Malaysia. The Federation was initially called the Federation of Malaya and it adopted its present name, Malaysia, when the States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore became part of the Federation. The Constitution establishes the Federation as a constitutional monarchy having the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as the Head of State whose roles are largely ceremonial. It provides for the establishment and the organisation of three main branches of the government: the bicameral legislative branch called the Parliament, which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate ; the executive branch led by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet Ministers; and the judicial branch headed by the Federal Court.
In the United States, freedom of speech and expression is strongly protected from government restrictions by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, many state constitutions, and state and federal laws. Freedom of speech, also called free speech, means the free and public expression of opinions without censorship, interference and restraint by the government. The term "freedom of speech" embedded in the First Amendment encompasses the decision what to say as well as what not to say. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized several categories of speech that are given lesser or no protection by the First Amendment and has recognized that governments may enact reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech. The First Amendment's constitutional right of free speech, which is applicable to state and local governments under the incorporation doctrine, prevents only government restrictions on speech, not restrictions imposed by private individuals or businesses unless they are acting on behalf of the government. However, laws may restrict the ability of private businesses and individuals from restricting the speech of others, such as employment laws that restrict employers' ability to prevent employees from disclosing their salary with coworkers or attempting to organize a labor union.
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The protection of basic human rights is enshrined in Constitution of Malaysia. These include liberty of the person and prohibition of slavery and forced labour. At the national level, legislative measures that exist to prevent human rights violations and abuses can be found in acts and laws on issues that either have a human rights component or relate to certain groups of society whose rights may be at risk of being violated. Human rights groups are generally critical of the Malaysian government and the Royal Malaysian Police. Preventive detention laws such as the Internal Security Act and the Emergency Ordinance 1969 allow for detention without trial or charge and as such are a source of concern for human rights organizations like Suara Rakyat Malaysia.
The Sedition Act 1948 in Malaysia is a law prohibiting discourse deemed as seditious. The act was originally enacted by the colonial authorities of British Malaya in 1948. The act criminalises speech with "seditious tendency", including that which would "bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against" the government or engender "feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races". The meaning of "seditious tendency" is defined in section 3 of the Sedition Act 1948 and in substance it is similar to the English common law definition of sedition, with modifications to suit local circumstances. The Malaysian definition includes the questioning of certain portions of the Constitution of Malaysia, namely those pertaining to the Malaysian social contract, such as Article 153, which deals with special rights for the bumiputra.
Article 10 of the Constitution of Malaysia guarantees Malaysian citizens the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Unlike comparable provisions in constitutional law such as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 10 entitles citizens to such freedoms as are not restricted by the government, instead of absolutely guaranteeing those freedoms.
The Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 is a Malaysian statute governing the usage of printing presses and the printing, importation, production, reproduction, publishing and distribution of publications in Malaysia. It replaced the Printing Presses Act 1948 and the Control of Imported Publications Act 1958. A controversial amendment was made after Operation Lalang, where all printing presses were required to renew their licence annually through the Ministry of Home Affairs, seen as a move to curtail press freedom.The Act was subsequently amended in 2012 to remove the requirement for annual licence application and the government's 'absolute discretion' over permits, and reinstated judicial overview.
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