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Mandoli v. Acheson | |
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Argued October 17, 1952 Decided November 24, 1952 | |
Full case name | Joseph Mandoli v. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State |
Citations | 344 U.S. 133 ( more ) 73 S. Ct. 135; 97 L. Ed. 146 |
Prior history | Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; 193 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1952) |
Holding | |
A U.S. citizen by birth, who by foreign law derives from his parents citizenship of a foreign nation, does not lose his U.S. citizenship by foreign residence, even if said foreign residence continued long after his attaining majority. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Jackson, joined by Black, Frankfurter, Burton, Minton |
Dissent | Douglas, joined by Vinson, Reed, Clark |
Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a person born in the United States, with both U.S. citizenship and a foreign citizenship obtained via an alien parent or parents, does not need to live in or return to the United States as an adult in order to retain U.S. citizenship.
The holding is a court's determination of a matter of law based on the issue presented in the particular case. In other words: under this law, with these facts, this result. It is the same as a 'decision' made by the judge; however "decision" can also refer to the judge's entire opinion, containing, for example, a discussion of facts, issues, and law as well as the holding. The holding is the "legal principle to be drawn from the opinion (decision) of the court."
The citizenship status of Joseph Mandoli, [1] a man born in the U.S. to Italian parents who took him as a baby to live with them in Italy, was challenged on several grounds, including primarily the fact that he had remained in Italy as an adult and had not returned to live in the United States upon reaching adulthood. Lower courts had rejected Mandoli's claim to U.S. citizenship on the basis of a 1939 Supreme Court case, Perkins v. Elg , which had suggested that a person born in the U.S. with both U.S. and foreign citizenship needed to affirmatively choose U.S. citizenship (by returning to and establishing residence in the U.S.) as an adult, but the Court rejected this interpretation in the Mandoli case. [2]
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a child born in the United States to naturalized parents on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen and that the child's natural born citizenship is not lost if the child is taken to and raised in the country of the parents' origin, provided that upon attaining the age of majority, the child elects to retain U.S. citizenship "and to return to the United States to assume its duties."
Mandoli's claim to U.S. citizenship was originally also challenged because he had served in the Italian armed forces and sworn an oath of allegiance to the Italian king while living in Italy. However, the government dropped these reasons on appeal, apparently because it was considered likely that Mandoli had not performed these actions voluntarily, as the conscription laws under the Benito Mussolini government in Italy would have made it effectively impossible for Mandoli to avoid military service.
Conscription, sometimes called the draft, is the compulsory enlistment of people in a national service, most often a military service. Conscription dates back to antiquity and continues in some countries to the present day under various names. The modern system of near-universal national conscription for young men dates to the French Revolution in the 1790s, where it became the basis of a very large and powerful military. Most European nations later copied the system in peacetime, so that men at a certain age would serve 1–8 years on active duty and then transfer to the reserve force.
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In the early twentieth century, the Department of State attempted to curtail dual nationality by requiring U.S. citizens born with dual nationality to choose one nationality upon reaching the age of majority. However, in 1952, the Supreme Court in Mandoli v. Acheson ... ruled that this election requirement was unwarranted by statute.... Today, there is no requirement that a person born with dual nationality choose one nationality or the other when he becomes an adult.
The United States Reports are the official record of the rulings, orders, case tables, in alphabetical order both by the name of the petitioner and by the name of the respondent, and other proceedings of the Supreme Court of the United States. United States Reports, once printed and bound, are the final version of court opinions and cannot be changed. Opinions of the court in each case are prepended with a headnote prepared by the Reporter of Decisions, and any concurring or dissenting opinions are published sequentially. The Court's Publication Office oversees the binding and publication of the volumes of United States Reports, although the actual printing, binding, and publication are performed by private firms under contract with the United States Government Publishing Office.
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