ProVerif

Last updated
ProVerif
Developer(s) Bruno Blanchet
Initial releaseJune 1, 2002 (2002-06-01)
Stable release
2.04 / December 1, 2021 (2021-12-01) [1]
Written in OCaml
Available inEnglish
License Mainly, GNU GPL; Windows binaries, BSD licenses
Website prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/

ProVerif is a software tool for automated reasoning about the security properties of cryptographic protocols. The tool has been developed by Bruno Blanchet and others.

Contents

Support is provided for cryptographic primitives including: symmetric & asymmetric cryptography; digital signatures; hash functions; bit-commitment; and signature proofs of knowledge. The tool is capable of evaluating reachability properties, correspondence assertions and observational equivalence. These reasoning capabilities are particularly useful to the computer security domain since they permit the analysis of secrecy and authentication properties. Emerging properties such as privacy, traceability and verifiability can also be considered. Protocol analysis is considered with respect to an unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded message space. The tool is capable of attack reconstruction: when a property cannot be proved, an execution trace which falsifies the desired property is constructed.

Applicability of ProVerif

ProVerif has been used in the following case studies, which include the security analysis of actual network protocols:

Further examples can be found online: .

Alternatives

Alternative analysis tools include: AVISPA (for reachability and correspondence assertions), KISS (for static equivalence), YAPA (for static equivalence). CryptoVerif for verification of security against polynomial time adversaries in the computational model. The Tamarin Prover is a modern alternative to ProVerif, with excellent support for Diffie-Hellman equational reasoning, and verification of observational equivalence properties.

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References

  1. ↑ New release: ProVerif 2.04 - Community - OCaml
  2. ↑ Abadi, Martín; Blanchet, Bruno (2005). "Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email". Science of Computer Programming. 58 (1–2): 3–27. doi: 10.1016/j.scico.2005.02.002 .
  3. ↑ Abadi, Martín; Glew, Neal (2002). "Certified email with a light on-line trusted third party". Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web. WWW '02. New York, NY, USA: ACM. pp. 387–395. doi:10.1145/511446.511497. ISBN   978-1581134490. S2CID   9035150.
  4. ↑ Abadi, Martín; Blanchet, Bruno; Fournet, Cédric (July 2007). "Just Fast Keying in the Pi Calculus". ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. 10 (3): 9–es. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.3.3762 . doi:10.1145/1266977.1266978. ISSN   1094-9224. S2CID   2371806.
  5. ↑ Aiello, William; Bellovin, Steven M.; Blaze, Matt; Canetti, Ran; Ioannidis, John; Keromytis, Angelos D.; Reingold, Omer (May 2004). "Just Fast Keying: Key Agreement in a Hostile Interne". ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. 7 (2): 242–273. doi:10.1145/996943.996946. ISSN   1094-9224. S2CID   14442788.
  6. ↑ Blanchet, B.; Chaudhuri, A. (May 2008). "Automated Formal Analysis of a Protocol for Secure File Sharing on Untrusted Storage". 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Sp 2008). pp. 417–431. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.362.4343 . doi:10.1109/SP.2008.12. ISBN   978-0-7695-3168-7. S2CID   6736116.
  7. ↑ Kallahalla, Mahesh; Riedel, Erik; Swaminathan, Ram; Wang, Qian; Fu, Kevin (2003). "Plutus: Scalable Secure File Sharing on Untrusted Storage". Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies. FAST '03: 29–42.
  8. ↑ Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Fournet, Cédric; Gordon, Andrew D. (2006-09-08). "Verified Reference Implementations of WS-Security Protocols". Web Services and Formal Methods. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 4184. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp. 88–106. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.61.3389 . doi:10.1007/11841197_6. ISBN   9783540388623.
  9. ↑ Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Fournet, Cédric; Gordon, Andrew D.; Swamy, Nikhil (2008). "Verified implementations of the information card federated identity-management protocol". Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security. ASIACCS '08. New York, NY, USA: ACM. pp. 123–135. doi:10.1145/1368310.1368330. ISBN   9781595939791. S2CID   6821014.
  10. ↑ Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Fournet, Cédric; Gordon, Andrew D.; Tse, Stephen (December 2008). "Verified Interoperable Implementations of Security Protocols". ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems. 31 (1): 5:1–5:61. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.187.9727 . doi:10.1145/1452044.1452049. ISSN   0164-0925. S2CID   14018835.
  11. ↑ Chen, Liqun; Ryan, Mark (2009-11-05). "Attack, Solution and Verification for Shared Authorisation Data in TCG TPM". Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 5983. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp. 201–216. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.158.2073 . doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_15. ISBN   9783642124587.
  12. ↑ Delaune, Stéphanie; Kremer, Steve; Ryan, Mark (2009-01-01). "Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols". Journal of Computer Security. 17 (4): 435–487. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.142.1731 . doi:10.3233/jcs-2009-0340. ISSN   0926-227X.
  13. ↑ Kremer, Steve; Ryan, Mark (2005-04-04). "Analysis of an Electronic Voting Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus". Programming Languages and Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 3444. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp. 186–200. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31987-0_14. ISBN   9783540254355.
  14. ↑ Backes, M.; Hritcu, C.; Maffei, M. (June 2008). "Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus". 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. pp. 195–209. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.612.2408 . doi:10.1109/CSF.2008.26. ISBN   978-0-7695-3182-3. S2CID   15189878.
  15. ↑ Delaune, Stéphanie; Ryan, Mark; Smyth, Ben (2008-06-18). "Automatic Verification of Privacy Properties in the Applied pi Calculus". Trust Management II. IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing. Vol. 263. Springer, Boston, MA. pp. 263–278. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-09428-1_17. ISBN   9780387094274.
  16. ↑ Backes, M.; Maffei, M.; Unruh, D. (May 2008). "Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol". 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Sp 2008). pp. 202–215. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.463.489 . doi:10.1109/SP.2008.23. ISBN   978-0-7695-3168-7. S2CID   651680.
  17. ↑ Küsters, R.; Truderung, T. (July 2009). "Using ProVerif to Analyze Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation". 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. pp. 157–171. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.667.7130 . doi:10.1109/CSF.2009.17. ISBN   978-0-7695-3712-2. S2CID   14185888.
  18. ↑ Küsters, Ralf; Truderung, Tomasz (2011-04-01). "Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR-Free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach". Journal of Automated Reasoning. 46 (3–4): 325–352. arXiv: 0808.0634 . doi:10.1007/s10817-010-9188-8. ISSN   0168-7433. S2CID   7597742.
  19. ↑ Kremer, Steve; Ryan, Mark; Smyth, Ben (2010-09-20). "Election Verifiability in Electronic Voting Protocols". Computer Security – ESORICS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 6345. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp. 389–404. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.388.2984 . doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_24. ISBN   9783642154966.
  20. ↑ "Application Layer Transport Security | Documentation". Google Cloud.
  21. ↑ Sardar, Muhammad Usama; Quoc, Do Le; Fetzer, Christof (August 2020). "Towards Formalization of Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based Remote Attestation in Intel SGX". 2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). Kranj, Slovenia: IEEE. pp. 604–607. doi:10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00099. ISBN   978-1-7281-9535-3. S2CID   222297511.
  22. ↑ Sardar, Muhammad Usama; Faqeh, Rasha; Fetzer, Christof (2020). "Formal Foundations for Intel SGX Data Center Attestation Primitives". In Lin, Shang-Wei; Hou, Zhe; Mahony, Brendan (eds.). Formal Methods and Software Engineering. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 12531. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 268–283. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63406-3_16. ISBN   978-3-030-63406-3. S2CID   229344923.
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