Profit sharing

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Profit sharing refers to various incentive plans introduced by businesses which provide direct or indirect payments to employees, often depending on the company's profitability, employees' regular salaries, and bonuses. [1] [2] [3] In publicly traded companies, these plans typically amount to allocation of shares to employees.

Contents

The profit sharing plans are based on predetermined economic sharing rules that define the split of gains between the company as a principal and the employee as an agent. [4] For example, suppose the profits are , which might be a random variable. [4] Before knowing the profits, the principal and agent might agree on a sharing rule . [4] Here, the agent will receive and the principal will receive the residual gain . [4]

Profit-sharing tends to lead to less conflict and more cooperation between labor and their employers. [5] [6]

History

American politician Albert Gallatin had profit-sharing institutions on his glass works in the 1790s. Another of early pioneers of profit sharing was English politician Theodore Taylor, who is known to have introduced the practice in his woollen mills during the late 1800s. [7] In the United Kingdom, profit-sharing became prominent in the 1860s. [8] [9]

Economists debated profit-sharing in major economic journals in the 1880s. [10] [11] William Cooper Procter established a profit-sharing plan in Procter & Gamble in 1887. [12]

Profit-sharing has historically been a prevalent practice in the Hollywood motion picture industry. [13] Profit-sharing partnerships are also prevalent in industries such as law, accounting, medicine, investment banking, architecture, advertising, and consulting. [14]

The Harvard economist Martin L. Weitzman was a prominent proponent of profit-sharing in the 1980s, influencing governments to incentivize the practice. [15] Weitzman argued that profit-sharing could be a way to reduce unemployment without increasing inflation. [15] Economists have debated the effects of profit-sharing on different outcomes. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]

Europe

Management's share of profits

The share of profits paid to the management or to the board of directors is sometimes called the tantième.[ citation needed ] This French term is generally applied in describing the business and finance practices of certain European countries, including Germany, France, Belgium, and Sweden. It is usually paid in addition to the manager's (or director's) fixed salary and bonuses (bonuses usually depend on profits as well, and often bonuses and tantieme are treated as the same thing); laws vary from country to country.

United States

In the United States, a profit sharing plan can be set up where all or some of the employee's profit sharing amount can be contributed to a retirement plan. These are often used in conjunction with 401(k) plans.

Gainsharing

Gainsharing is a program that returns cost savings to the employees, usually as a lump-sum bonus. It is a productivity measure, as opposed to profit-sharing which is a profitability measure. There are three major types of gainsharing:

See also

Further reading

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References

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