Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | |
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Argued January 9, 2024 Decided April 12, 2024 | |
Full case name | George Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California |
Docket no. | 22-1074 |
Argument | Oral argument |
Case history | |
Prior | 84 Cal.App.5th 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) |
Questions presented | |
Is a monetary exaction imposed by a local government as a condition for a building permit exempt from the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements established in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, simply because the exaction is authorized by local legislation? | |
Holding | |
The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Barrett, joined by unanimous |
Concurrence | Sotomayor, joined by Jackson |
Concurrence | Gorsuch |
Concurrence | Kavanaugh, joined by Kagan, Jackson |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V |
Sheetz v. County of El Dorado (Docket No. 22-1074) is a United States Supreme Court case regarding permit exactions under the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court held, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, that fees for land-use permits must be closely related and roughly proportional to the effects of the land use – the test established by Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard – even if the fees were established by legislation rather than through an individualized assessment.
In 2016, George Sheetz, a property owner in Placerville, California, applied for a permit from El Dorado county to construct a manufactured single-family home on a lot. [1] The county conditioned approval of the permit on a "traffic mitigation fee" of $23,420. [2] The fee was authorized by legislation and would be utilized to "fund transportation improvements needed to accommodate growth anticipated by the county's general plan". [3] The fee was dependent on the location of the property and the type of construction. [4] [5]
After paying the fee and obtaining the permit, Sheetz challenged the fee in a trial court, arguing that it violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, barring governments from taking private property for public use without just compensation. He argued that the fee failed to adhere to the higher standards of scrutiny set by the Nollan/Dolan test for exactions. Under Nollan/Dolan, if the government intends to condition land-use permits on owners giving up property, it must show that the conditions are closely related and roughly proportional to the effects of the proposed land use. [6] [7] [8]
The California Court of Appeal reaffirmed the trial court's holding and rejected application of the Nollan/Dolan test, ruling that the standard would only apply to adjudicative exactions, not legislatively enacted exactions imposed upon "a broad class of property owners." [9] The California Supreme Court then denied review.
Sheetz appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court and was granted certiorari on September 29, 2023. [9]
Paul Beard II argued the case before the Supreme Court on January 9, 2024, and the Court ruled in favor of Sheetz on April 12, 2024. Justice Amy Coney Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous court, holding that permit exactions generally authorized by legislation were not exempt from the higher standards of scrutiny applicable to ad hoc exactions set by administrators. Justice Barrett wrote that "there is no basis for affording property rights less protection in the hands of legislators than administrators. The Takings Clause applies equally to both". [10] The case was remanded back to state courts for consideration. The court did not address whether the fee itself was a taking. [11] [12] [2]
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor emphasized that the court did not address whether the fee imposed by El Dorado County was indeed a taking if imposed "outside the permitting process", and thus necessarily subject to scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan. [13]
In a concurring opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch argued that application of the Takings Clause and Nollan/Dolan should not vary depending on the "class of property" impacted by a relevant regulation. [11]
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh emphasized that the majority opinion did not rule on the question presented by Gorsuch in his concurrence. [11]
Permit exactions have often been used by municipalities to offset costs related to new developments. For developers and homeowners, the reduction in impact fees will lead to a decrease in the overall cost of housing. [8] In California in particular, municipalities have often relied on them in lieu of raising property taxes. [2] The National League of Cities advised municipalities that imposition of such fees would now require demonstrating the relationship and relative impact of affected property developments on the community. [14]
In United States constitutional law, a regulatory taking occurs when governmental regulations limit the use of private property to such a degree that the landowner is effectively deprived of all economically reasonable use or value of their property. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution governments are required to pay just compensation for such takings. The amendment is incorporated to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. 106–274 (text)(PDF), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., is a United States federal law that protects individuals, houses of worship, and other religious institutions from discrimination in zoning and landmarking laws. RLUIPA was enacted by the United States Congress in 2000 to correct the problems of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. The act was passed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate by unanimous consent in voice votes, meaning that no objection was raised to its passage, so no written vote was taken. The S. 2869 legislation was enacted into law by the 42nd President of the United States Bill Clinton on September 22, 2000.
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An impact fee is a fee that is imposed by a local government within the United States on a new or proposed development project to pay for all or a portion of the costs of providing public services to the new development. Impact fees are considered to be a charge on new development to help fund and pay for the construction or needed expansion of offsite capital improvements. These fees are usually implemented to help reduce the economic burden on local jurisdictions that are trying to deal with population growth within the area.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), more commonly Dolan v. Tigard, is a United States Supreme Court case. It is a landmark case regarding the practice of zoning and property rights, and has served to establish limits on the ability of cities and other government agencies to use zoning and land-use regulations to compel property owners to make unrelated public improvements as a condition to getting zoning approval, citing the violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
An exaction is a concept in US real property law where a condition for development is imposed on a parcel of land that requires the developer to mitigate anticipated negative impacts of the development. The rationale for imposing the exaction is to offset the costs, defined broadly in economic terms, of the development to the municipality. Exactions are similar to impact fees, which are direct payments to local governments instead of conditions on development.
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) is an American nonprofit public interest law firm established for the purpose of defending and promoting individual freedom. PLF attorneys provide pro bono legal representation, file amicus curiae briefs, and hold administrative proceedings with the stated goal of supporting property rights, equality and opportunity, and the separation of powers. The organization is the first and oldest libertarian public interest law firm, having been founded in 1973.
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), is a U.S. Supreme Court case that limited access to federal court for plaintiffs alleging uncompensated takings of private property under the Fifth Amendment. In June 2019, this case was overruled in part by the Court's decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a California Coastal Commission regulation which required private homeowners to dedicate a public easement along valuable beachfront property as a condition of approval for a construction permit to renovate their beach bungalow was unconstitutional. The Coastal Commission had asserted that the public-easement condition was a legitimate state interest of diminishing the "blockage of the view of the ocean" caused by the home renovation, even though the easement would not have created any additional public view of the ocean. The Court held that in evaluating such claims, there must be an "essential nexus" between a legitimate state interest and the actual conditions of the permit being issued.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), was a landmark case in United States regulatory takings law whereby the Court expressly overruled precedent created in Agins v. City of Tiburon. Agins held that a government regulation of private property effects a taking if such regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor found the test untenable for a number of reasons, but declined to grant Chevron relief because Chevron’s motion before the court was limited to a discussion of the “substantially advances” theory which had just been struck down. The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit for a determination of whether the statute exacted a taking according to the formula of Penn Central.
Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did not effect an unconstitutional taking of littoral property owners' rights to future accretions and to contact the water by upholding Florida's beach renourishment program.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that land-use agencies imposing conditions on the issuance of development permits must comply with the "nexus" and "rough proportionality" standards of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, even if the condition consists of a requirement to pay money, and even if the permit is denied for failure to agree to the condition. It was the first case in which monetary exactions were found to be unconstitutional conditions.
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513 (2013) ; 576 U.S. 351 (2015), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions regarding the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case arose out of a dispute involving the National Raisin Reserve, when a farmer challenged a rule that required farmers to keep a portion of their crops off the market. In Horne I the Court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue for violation of the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause. In Horne II the Court held that the National Raisin Reserve was an unconstitutional violation of the Takings Clause.
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Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18–302, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), is a Supreme Court of the United States case related to the registration of trademarks under the Lanham Act. It decided 6–3 that the provisions of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of trademarks of "immoral" or "scandalous" matter is unconstitutional by permitting the United States Patent & Trademark Office to engage in viewpoint discrimination, which violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. ___ (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case involving eminent domain and labor relations. In its decision, the Court held that a regulation made pursuant to the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act that required agricultural employers to allow labor organizers to regularly access their property for the purposes of union recruitment constituted a per se taking under the Fifth Amendment. Consequently, the regulation may not be enforced unless “just compensation” is provided to the employers.
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