Simmons v. South Carolina

Last updated
Simmons v. South Carolina
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 18, 1994
Decided June 17, 1994
Full case nameSimmons v. South Carolina
Citations512 U.S. 154 ( more )
114 S. Ct. 2187; 129 L. Ed. 2d 133
Case history
Prior310 S.C. 439, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993); cert. granted, 510 U.S. 811(1993).
Holding
Where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury of his future parole ineligibility.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Harry Blackmun  · John P. Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · David Souter
Clarence Thomas  · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Case opinions
PluralityBlackmun, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg
ConcurrenceSouter, joined by Stevens
ConcurrenceGinsburg
ConcurrenceO'Connor (in judgment), joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy
DissentScalia, joined by Thomas

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that, where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only alternative sentence available is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencing jury must be informed that the defendant is ineligible for parole. [1]

Contents

After being found guilty of murder, Jonathan Dale Simmons faced either execution or life in prison without parole. [2] The State asked the jury to sentence Mr. Simmons to death, in part because he posed a future danger to society. [3] Although Mr. Simmons repeatedly requested permission to instruct the jury that he would never be released from prison, these requests were denied by the trial court. [4] Denying Mr. Simmons his requested instruction violated his due process rights, the Supreme Court held, and presented to the jury a "false choice between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration." [5]

Although Simmons was a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its holding. [6] [7] [8]

Facts and procedural history

Jonathan Dale Simmons was found guilty of brutally murdering 79 year-old Josie Lamb. [9] Because of Mr. Simmons' criminal history, he was ineligible for parole, and he faced either life in prison or execution for the murder. [2] Defense counsel was prohibited from asking potential jury members about their understanding of parole in voir dire. [10] Following a three-day long trial, Mr. Simmons was convicted. [11] During the penalty phase, the State sought the death penalty and, despite Mr. Simmons' parole ineligibility, repeatedly told the jury that Mr. Simmons posed a danger to society. [3] At one point, the State told the jury that a death sentence would be "an act of self-defense" and a "response of society to someone who is a threat." [11]

Defense counsel repeatedly requested permission to instruct the jury that, because of Mr. Simmons' parole ineligibility, he could never be released from prison. [4] The court denied each of these requests. [4] During deliberations, the sentencing jury asked the judge whether a "life sentence" included the possibility of parole. [12] In response, the judge instructed the jury to "not consider parole eligibility." [12] After receiving this response, the jury sentenced Mr. Simmons to death. [12] The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the sentence, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. [13]

Decision of the Court

Plurality opinion

Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion began by grounding the Court's holding in the Due Process Clause, which requires that no person be executed "'on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.'" [14] The opinion then detailed the trial court proceedings, and the "grievous misperception" created by the emphasis on Mr. Simmons' future dangerousness and the absence of an instruction regarding his parole ineligibility. [15] In particular, the plurality noted the defense's repeated requests – and the court's refusals – to instruct the jury on Mr. Simmons' parole status. [15] The result, the plurality concluded, was that the jury was presented a "false choice between sentencing [him] to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration." [5]

The plurality pointed to several studies [16] [17] [18] [19] which indicated that jurors commonly misunderstood the meaning of the term "life imprisonment" to permit early release. [20] In Mr. Simmons' case, this misunderstanding was exacerbated by the State's repeated emphasis on the danger that Mr. Simmons would pose to society. [5] Of course, the plurality noted, the State was permitted to emphasize future dangerousness as a valid factor for the jury to consider in sentencing. [15] Indeed, several factors in addition to future dangerousness – such as the defendant's age, mental capacity, and prior criminal history – can be appropriate for jury consideration during the sentencing phase and yet inappropriate during the guilt phase of trial. [15] But if the defendant's future dangerousness is considered by the jury, then the jury must be informed that the defendant is ineligible for parole. [21]

Concurring opinions

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote separately to state that he would base the Court's judgment in the Eighth Amendment, which guarantees capital defendants the right to clarify legal terms for the jury. [22] In addition to the due process clause, Justice Souter wrote, the Eighth Amendment imposed "a straightforward duty on the court" to instruct juries on the meaning of a capital defendants' parole eligibility. [23] The concurrence also noted that the court (as opposed to the defense counsel) should have provided the parole ineligibility information, so as to ensure that the jury understood it to be a binding statement of law. [23]

Justice Ginsburg

Concurring in the opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote to place the capital defendant's right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility within his "right to be heard" which is a "core requirement of due process." [24] Contrary to Justice Souter's concurrence, Justice Ginsburg believed that the defendant's right to the parole ineligibility instruction would be satisfied regardless of whether it was provided by the defense counsel or the judge. [24]

Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy

Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, wrote to concur in the judgment. [25] The concurring opinion reiterated the State's right to argue future dangerousness to the public, noted the State's right to emphasize the defendant's future dangerousness to the prison population, and acknowledged that the judgment was in contrast to the "general deference to state decisions regarding what the jury should be told about sentencing." [26]

Dissent

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. In dissent, the Justices described the Court's ruling as a vast departure from the Constitution and an overreach into state power. [27] The plurality opinion, the dissent criticized, was based neither in state practice nor the Court's precedent. [27] The plurality was not based on state practice, Justice Scalia wrote, because most states did not allow capital sentencing juries to receive information regarding parole. [28] And the plurality was not based on the Court's precedent, the dissent argued, because those cases involved an emphasis on future dangerousness that was absent from the Simmons record. [29] Though the Court's opinion might have been "reasonable as a matter of policy," the dissent concluded, the Constitution did not require that it be "followed coast to coast." [30]

Implications

Since Simmons, a jury instruction regarding a capital defendant's parole ineligibility is commonly referred to as a "Simmons instruction." [31] [7] Several studies reveal that providing juries with Simmons instructions can have significant consequences because jurors commonly misunderstand a "life sentence" to include parole, and that this misunderstanding can increase the likelihood of a death sentence. [32] [33] Despite the significance of a Simmons instruction, in 1997 the Court declared that Simmons could not be applied retroactively to overturn death sentences that were final when Simmons was decided. [34]

Subsequent state practice

Evading Simmons

Though some commentators predicted Simmons would significantly impact state criminal law, [35] it has been narrowly interpreted by state courts. [36]

Arizona was denying defendants Simmons instructions based on their opportunity to receive clemency. [37] But in 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the potential for defendants to receive clemency did not obviate the need for a Simmons instruction. [38]

In April 2018, Arizona sought certiorari from the Supreme Court concerning the applicability of Simmons, [39] and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. [40]

After Simmons, South Carolina amended its sentencing scheme [41] and, based on those amendments, claimed that Simmons no longer applied. [42] Pursuant to the amended scheme, jurors first decided whether an aggravating factor was present. [41] If the jury answered no, then the defendant faced life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum of 30 years. [41] If the jury answered yes, then the defendant faced life without parole or execution. [41] In 2001, the Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of South Carolina, and ruled that the amendments to South Carolina's sentencing scheme did not render Simmons instructions unnecessary. [6] [43]

Legal commentators have characterized the Supreme Court as "chid[ing]" and "rebuk[ing]" state attempts to evade Simmons. [44] [43]

Implementing Simmons

Many states have added Simmons instructions into their routine capital sentencing practices. As the Simmons plurality opinion noted, most states were already providing similar instructions for capital defendants facing life without parole or execution. [45] Meanwhile, only 8 states – Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming – did not provide parole ineligibility instructions under the relevant circumstances. [46] Since Simmons, several of those states – including Florida, [47] North Carolina, [48] South Carolina, [49] South Dakota, [50] [51] Texas, [52] and Virginia [53] – have added Simmons-like instructions to their capital sentencing proceedings.

Selected Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals cases

Selected scholarship

Selected treatises and manuals

See also

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References

  1. ↑ "Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994)". Justia Law. Retrieved 2019-02-28.
  2. 1 2 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156.
  3. 1 2 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156-59.
  4. 1 2 3 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 158-160.
  5. 1 2 3 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161.
  6. 1 2 "Shafer v. South Carolina", Wikipedia, 2018-09-04, retrieved 2019-02-28
  7. 1 2 Lynch v. Arizona , 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).
  8. ↑ Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165-66 (2000).
  9. ↑ "State v. Simmons, 310 S.C. 439, 440-41 | Casetext". casetext.com. Retrieved 2019-02-28.
  10. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156-57.
  11. 1 2 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157.
  12. 1 2 3 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160.
  13. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160-61.
  14. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
  15. 1 2 3 4 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161-62.
  16. ↑ Paduano & Smith, Deadly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Human Rights L.Rev. 211, 222-225 (1987).
  17. ↑ Note, The Meaning of “Life” for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va.L.Rev. 1605, 1624 (1989).
  18. ↑ Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 1 (1993).
  19. ↑ Bowers, Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 Law & Society 157, 169-170 (1993).
  20. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 170 n.9.
  21. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163-64.
  22. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172.
  23. 1 2 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 173.
  24. 1 2 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 174.
  25. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 175.
  26. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 177.
  27. 1 2 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 178-79.
  28. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 179.
  29. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 180-81.
  30. ↑ SImmons, 512 U.S. at 185.
  31. ↑ Dietz, Laura (February 2019). "Defendant's Ineligibility for Parole". American Jurisprudence. Second Edition: § 536 – via WestLaw.
  32. ↑ Cooper, Benjamin (Fall 1996). "TRUTH IN SENTENCING: THE PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA". University of Chicago Law Review. 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1573.
  33. ↑ Eisenberg, Theodore; Wells, Martin (November 1993). "DEADLY CONFUSION: JUROR INSTRUCTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES". Cornell Law Review. 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1 – via WestLaw.
  34. ↑ O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167-68 (1997).
  35. ↑ Zaug, Mary (1995). "SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA: SAFEGUARDING A CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FAIR SENTENCING". Loyola University Chicago Law Journal– via WestLaw.
  36. ↑ 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1573 at 1575.
  37. ↑ Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1819.
  38. ↑ Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1820
  39. ↑ Arizona v. Rushing, Petition for Certiorari (April 2018).
  40. ↑ Supreme Court Orders (October 1, 2018).
  41. 1 2 3 4 CRIMES—SENTENCING, PROBATION AND PAROLE—GENERAL AMENDMENTS, 1995 South Carolina Laws Act 83 (H.B. 3096)
  42. ↑ Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
  43. 1 2 Greenhouse, Linda (2002-01-10). "Justices Chide South Carolina in a Death Sentence, Again". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 2019-03-07.
  44. ↑ Greenhouse, Linda (2001-03-21). "Justices Rule S. Carolina Must Clarify Jury Orders". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 2019-03-13.
  45. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167 n.7.
  46. ↑ Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167-68 nn.7-8.
  47. ↑ Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases § 7.11(a).
  48. ↑ N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-2002.
  49. ↑ S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A).
  50. ↑ Moeller v. Weber, 689 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (S.D. 2004)
  51. ↑ Rhines v. Weber, 608 N.W.2d 303, 311 (S.D. 2000)   
  52. ↑ Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 37.071.
  53. ↑ Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4.
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