Smith v. United States (1993)

Last updated
Smith v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 23, 1993
Decided June 1, 1993
Full case nameJohn Angus Smith, Petitioner v. United States
Citations508 U.S. 223 ( more )
113 S. Ct. 2050; 124 L. Ed. 2d 138; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 3740; 61 U.S.L.W. 4503; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3929; 93 Daily Journal DAR 6966; 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 326
Case history
PriorOn writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Holding
The exchange of a gun for drugs constitutes "use" of the firearm for purposes of a federal statute imposing penalties for "use" of a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Case opinions
MajorityO'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Kennedy, Thomas
ConcurrenceBlackmun
DissentScalia, joined by Stevens, Souter

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a United States Supreme Court case that held that the exchange of a gun for drugs constituted "use" of the firearm for purposes of a federal statute imposing penalties for "use" of a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime.

Contents

In Watson v. United States , 128 S.Ct. 697 (2007) the court later decided that a transaction in the opposite direction does not violate the same statute (i.e., Smith holds that one "uses" a gun by giving it in exchange for drugs, but Watson holds that one does not "use" a gun by receiving it in exchange for drugs).

Statutory Context and Sentencing

The defendant exchanged a firearm for cocaine and was convicted of drug trafficking. The prosecution claimed this triggered enhanced sentencing because of the "use" of the gun in the commission of a crime. [1] The defendant stated using a firearm for barter was not covered by the statutory meaning of "use". [2] The Supreme Court had found that in a subsection of the statute, firearms could be 'used' as objects of commerce rather than as weapons, implying that a similar understanding and interpretation of 'used' should apply to the disputed sentence. [3]

See also

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References

  1. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938-39 (2017)
  2. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
  3. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938-39 (2017)