![]() Cover of the first edition | |
Author | Robert Wright |
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Language | English |
Subjects | Social evolution, Evolutionary psychology, Morality, Ethics |
Publisher | Vintage Books |
Publication date | 1994 |
Publication place | United States |
Media type | Print (Hardcover and Paperback) |
Pages | 466 pages (paperback) |
ISBN | 0-679-76399-6 (1st edition, hardcover) |
OCLC | 33496013 |
The Moral Animal is a 1994 book by journalist Robert Wright, in which the author explores many aspects of everyday life through evolutionary biology.
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Wright explores many aspects of everyday life through evolutionary biology. He provides Darwinian explanations for human behavior and psychology, social dynamics and structures, as well as people's relationships with lovers, friends, and family.
Wright borrows extensively from Charles Darwin's better-known publications, including On the Origin of Species (1859), but also from his chronicles and personal writings, illustrating behavioral principles with Darwin's own biographical examples.
Explores how evolutionary biology—especially evolutionary psychology—can explain many features of human behavior, morality, and social life. Wright argues that many of our psychological traits (emotions, moral intuitions, social instincts) are shaped by evolutionary pressures from our ancestral past, and by understanding these pressures, we can better understand why people behave the way they do. [1]
He draws on Darwin’s own life and writings as illustrative material, using Darwin as a case study to show how evolutionary principles might play out in concrete human behavior and interpersonal relations. [2]
The Moral Animal was a national bestseller and has been published in 12 languages; The New York Times Book Review chose it as one of its eleven Best Books of 1994. [3] The linguist Steven Pinker praised The Moral Animal as a "fiercely intelligent, beautifully written and engrossingly original book" but "found his [Wright's] larger ethical arguments problematic." [4] Neurologist Amy Wax wrote: "One measure of his [Wright's] success is that most of the incoherences in the book can be traced to weaknesses in the body of work he seeks to present, and not in Wright's exposition." [5] The paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould wrote that The Moral Animal presents "pure guesswork" as science, and that the book owes its impact to "good writing and egregiously simplistic argument." [6]
Here are several of the most important ideas Wright examines:
Wright suggests that moral sentiments—feelings like guilt, pride, shame, altruism—evolved not because they are “good” in some abstract sense, but because they had adaptive value in human evolutionary history. They helped humans live in social groups, cooperate, avoid conflict, reproduce, protect kin, etc. [1]
Some altruistic behaviors make sense when the actors share genes (kin), or when helping others will later generate reciprocal benefits. These are standard evolutionary mechanisms for explaining cooperative behavior, even when it seems to go against immediate self-interest. [2]
Wright discusses how men and women have generally faced different reproductive pressures, which can help explain differences in mating behavior, jealousy, preferences for partner qualities (e.g. fertility indicators, resource capacity), etc. For example, women may be more concerned than men about long-term commitment and resource stability, men more about cues of fertility, etc. [1]
Human social life is structured by competition for status, influence, mates, etc. But it's not purely physical force: deception, alliances, signaling, and self-deception all play a role. Wright emphasizes that social strategy was crucial in evolutionary environments much like it is now. [2]
Wright argues that part of human psychology is designed to fool ourselves (self-deception), or at least to maintain illusions, in ways that help with social standing or mating. And much of morality is embedded in how others perceive us. Being seen as moral or virtuous can itself have an evolutionary benefit. [2]
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