Victory Plan for Ukraine

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Victory Plan
Ukrainian: «План перемоги» (Plan peremohy)
NATO Russia Ukraine Locator.svg
   UKRAINE
   Russian Federation
   NATO member states as of 2025
  Territories controlled by Russia or pro-Russian separatists but claimed by Ukraine (Crimea, Donbas) with the support of the UNGA [a]
Type Peace enforcement
Context Russo-Ukrainian war
DraftedOctober 16, 2024 (2024-10-16)
Condition
  • NATO membership invitation to Ukraine
  • Just end to the Russo-Ukrainian war (Point 1)
Amendment3 secret annexes (Points 2—4, partly)
ExpirationNot meant for signing [1]
Languages
  • Ukrainian
  • English
Five-point plan [2]
  • 1. Geopolitical
  • 2. Defense
  • 3. Deterrence
  • 4. Economical
  • 5. Postwar safety
Unveiled at the Verkhovna Rada by Volodymyr Zelensky on 16 October 2024 [3]

In October 2024, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled the Victory plan for Ukraine, [4] which includes the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and description of future national defense guarantees. [5] The official goal of the plan is "to change the circumstances in such a way that Russia will be forced to peace". [6]

Contents

Points

The plan includes five points: one geopolitical, two military, one economical and one related to national defense and safety. [7] The second, third and fourth points of the plan have classified conditions included, that were introduced only to the political leaders of the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy. [8] [9]

  1. Inclusion of Ukraine into NATO and the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war. This implies geopolitical determination in Europe. This will be "a testament to the determination of Ukrainian partners" (mainly key Euro-Atlantic countries) and "will show how the partners see Ukraine in the renewed continental security architecture in the future". [10] [11] [12]
  2. Strengthening of the national defense. Implies the strengthening of Ukrainian positions on the territory of Russia in order to avoid the creation of buffer zones on the Ukrainian territory, lifting restrictions on strikes inside the Russian territory, strengthening Ukraine's air defense to a sufficient level of protection and joint defense operations with neighboring states within the reach of their air shield; access to satellite intelligence data of Ukrainian partners in real time, irreversible strengthening of the positions of the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine and the destruction of Russia's offensive potential on the occupied territory of Ukraine. [10] [11] [12]
  3. Deterrence. Implies the placement of a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic package of deterring Russia's armed aggression and its military capabilities inside the Ukrainian territory. [10] [11] [12]
  4. Strategic economic potential. Envisages the investment of international partners in the production of critically important natural resources, such as uranium, titanium, lithium and graphite. [13]
  5. National safety. This point is designed for the post-war period. Zelenskyy assumed that in case of an agreement, Ukrainian units will be able to replace separate US military contingents stationed in Europe. [14]

Reaction

Comparative assessment

In August 2025, Nik Hynek and Michal Šenk suggested the template for analysis of peace plans in interstate war with assessments of respective suggestions during ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. Two right-most columns are added for the November 2025 two 28-point drafts.

Comparative Table

C[onc]urrent peace plans across ten comparative criteria [b]
CriterionUkraine "Victory" Agenda Russia Maximalist Design U.S. Mediated PartitionEurope–Ukraine Counter‑Initiative [17] China–Brazil "Friends of Peace" Plan Istanbul Draft (2022 revival) U.S.–Russia Draft Plan (2025) European Proposal (2025)
Enforcement mechanismsStrong emphasis on Western guarantees [18] [19] Minimal; relies on Russian dominance [20] International monitors envisaged [21] EU/NATO backing; sanctions leverage [22] [23] Vague; multipolar rhetoric [24] Weak; limited monitoring [25] None specified; relies on bilateral recognition [26] [27] [28] NATO-style guarantees from Western allies [29] [30]
Recovery & reconstructionWestern aid central [31] Russia assumes control of occupied areas [32] Partition with aid to both sides [33] EU-led recovery funds [34] [35] Development aid promised [36] Limited; undefined [37] Rebuild Ukraine using seized Russian funds [38] [39] Western economic aid [40] [41]
Societal alignmentHigh domestic support for sovereignty [42] Russian domestic narrative only [43] Divisive; Ukrainians reject partition [44] Strong Ukrainian civil society backing [45] Low resonance in Ukraine [46] Mixed; contested [47] Mixed signals; neutrality imposed [48] [49] [50] Strong Ukrainian public support [51] [52]
Security guaranteesNATO/EU integration [53] [54] Neutrality enforced by Russia [55] U.S./UN guarantees proposed [56] NATO umbrella [57] [58] Multipolar guarantees (China, Brazil) [59] Neutrality clauses; weak guarantees [60] Ukraine neutral; conditional U.S. guarantees [26] [27] [61] NATO Article 5 mirror; robust guarantees [29] [62]
Territorial concessionsRejects concessions [63] Demands recognition of annexations [64] Partition envisaged [65] Rejects concessions [66] Freeze lines; ambiguous [67] Crimea/Donbas unresolved [68] Recognizes Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk as Russian; freeze Kherson/Zaporizhzhia [38] [69] Crimea remains under Russian control; Ukraine retains claim [29] [70]
Accountability / justiceWar crimes prosecution central [71] Russia absolved of responsibility [72] Deferred accountability [73] Strong emphasis on justice [74] Downplayed [75] Deferred [76] Amnesty, prisoner exchange only [26] [77] [50] War crimes trials, reparations [40] [50]
External mediationWestern allies [78] Russia only [79] U.S. broker [80] EU role [81] [35] China–Brazil mediation [82] Turkey broker [83] U.S.–Russia backchannel [48] [84] [28] European-led diplomacy [29] [30]
Neutrality / alliancesRejects neutrality [85] Demands neutrality [86] Neutral buffer envisaged [87] NATO integration [88] [89] Neutrality promoted [90] Neutrality clause [91] Ukraine constitutionally barred from NATO [26] [61] Ukraine eventually joins NATO and the EU [51] [62]
Economic aid / incentivesWestern aid packages [92] Russian subsidies [93] Aid split between entities [94] EU recovery funds [95] [35] Development aid promised [96] Limited [97] Frozen Russian assets diverted; U.S. profit share [38] [39] Western weapons, aid [29] [41]
Durability / stabilityHigh if backed by West [98] [99] Low; coercive [100] Fragile; partition unstable [101] Stronger with EU/NATO support [102] [89] Weak; lacks enforcement [103] Fragile; draft abandoned [104] Politically fragile; contradiction, vague wording [26] [105] [106] High if Western support sustained [51] [70]
Credit: Originally published by Peacebuilding in November 2025 - columns 1-7. [c] ISSN: 2164-7259 (Print) 2164-7267 (Online) [107] : 11–12 
Sources

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ as of February 2022
  2. ↑ Combining comparative-historical and conflict-resolution analyses, authors developed and conceptualized a ten-criterion template for appraising peace proposals in major interstate wars, exemplified by Russo-Ukrainian war. It featured eight instructive settlements – the Treaty of Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese War (1905), the Moscow Peace Treaty concluding the Winter War (1940), the Korean Armistice Agreement (1953), the Austrian State Treaty (1955), the Camp David Accords (1978), the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan (1988), the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) and the Khasavyurt Accord on Chechnya (1996) – each relevant through either Russia/USSR participation or design choices illuminating Russo-Ukrainian dilemmas.
  3. ↑ Excluding two right-most columns 8-9.

References

  1. ↑ Barker, Kim; Schmitt, Eric; Erlanged, Steven; Troianovski, Anton (29 October 2024). "With Limited Options, Zelensky Seeks a Path Forward for Ukraine". The New York Times. Retrieved 13 November 2025.
  2. ↑ Kullab, Samya; Cook, Lorne (25 September 2024). "Zelenskyy's victory plan sets Ukraine's terms in a desperate war against Russia". Associated Press news. Retrieved 13 November 2025.
  3. ↑ Arhirova, Hanna (17 October 2024). "A glance at Ukraine's plan aimed at nudging Russia into talks to end the war". Associated Press news. Retrieved 13 November 2025.
  4. ↑ "Zelensky presents 'victory plan' to Ukrainian parliament". www.bbc.com. Retrieved 2024-10-20.
  5. ↑ "Зеленський представив План перемоги, який складається з пʼяти пунктів — Forbes.ua". forbes.ua (in Ukrainian). 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  6. ↑ "Зеленський у Раді перерахував пункти плану перемоги України. Перший – запрошення до НАТО" (in Ukrainian). Радіо Свобода. 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  7. ↑ "Here's what's in Zelenskyy's victory plan for beating Putin". POLITICO. 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-20.
  8. ↑ "Зеленський у Раді представив деталі "плану перемоги"". Радіо Свобода (in Ukrainian). 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  9. ↑ "План перемоги Зеленського: які у ньому пункти". BBC News Україна (in Ukrainian). 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  10. 1 2 3 "Зеленський представив план перемоги в Європейській раді" (in Ukrainian). Суспільне | Новини. 2024-10-17. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  11. 1 2 3 "Що передбачає "план перемоги"". Головне з виступу Зеленського у Раді" (in Ukrainian). Texty.org.ua. 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  12. 1 2 3 "План перемоги і завершення війни. Що запропонував Зеленський, щоб досягти миру?" (in Ukrainian). Радіо Свобода. 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-19.
  13. ↑ "Victory Plan Consists of Five Points and Three Secret Annexes". president.gov.ua. 16 October 2024.
  14. ↑ "Zelenskyy outlines his 'victory plan' to Ukraine's lawmakers, including a call to join NATO". AP News. 2024-10-16. Retrieved 2024-10-20.
  15. ↑ "МЗС: Франція підтримує план перемоги України". Радіо Свобода (in Ukrainian). 2024-10-19. Retrieved 2024-10-19.
  16. ↑ "Ukraine cannot join NATO while at war, Scholz says". The Kyiv Independent. 2024-10-24. Retrieved 2024-11-09.
  17. ↑ "Will the EU's 12-point plan for Ukraine work?". BOTA. 2025-11-03. Retrieved 2025-11-22– via Politiko.al.
  18. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 12
  19. ↑ Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 11–12
  20. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 14
  21. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 15
  22. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 16
  23. ↑ Sollfrank & Boeke, p. 15
  24. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 18
  25. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 19
  26. 1 2 3 4 5 "US secretly drafting Ukraine peace plan". Axios. 18 Nov 2025.
  27. 1 2 Mello & Saideman, pp. 31–32
  28. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 3–5
  29. 1 2 3 4 5 "Europe's 28-point counter proposal". Sky News. 23 Nov 2025.
  30. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 4–6
  31. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 21
  32. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 22
  33. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 23
  34. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 24
  35. 1 2 3 Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 16–17
  36. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 25
  37. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 26
  38. 1 2 3 "Trump's 28-point Ukraine plan". Al Jazeera. 21 Nov 2025.
  39. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 7–9
  40. 1 2 "Europe's counter-proposal for peace in Ukraine". The Independent. 24 November 2025.
  41. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 8–9
  42. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 28
  43. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 29
  44. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 30
  45. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 31
  46. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 32
  47. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 33
  48. 1 2 "Witkoff's back-channel push on Ukraine alarms allies". POLITICO. 19 Nov 2025.
  49. ↑ Mello & Saideman, p. 31
  50. 1 2 3 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 9–10
  51. 1 2 3 "Europe's Alternative Plan". Newsweek. 24 Nov 2025.
  52. ↑ Cancian & Snegovaya, p. 10
  53. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 35
  54. ↑ Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 14–15
  55. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 36
  56. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 37
  57. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 38
  58. ↑ Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 15–16
  59. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 39
  60. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 40
  61. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 5–7
  62. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 6–7
  63. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 42
  64. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 43
  65. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 44
  66. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 45
  67. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 46
  68. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 47
  69. ↑ Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 3–4, 10–11
  70. 1 2 Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 10–11
  71. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 49
  72. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 50
  73. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 51
  74. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 52
  75. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 53
  76. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 54
  77. ↑ Mello & Saideman, pp. 31–33
  78. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 56
  79. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 57
  80. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 58
  81. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 59
  82. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 60
  83. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 61
  84. ↑ Mello & Saideman, pp. 33–34
  85. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 63
  86. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 64
  87. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 65
  88. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 66
  89. 1 2 Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 14–16
  90. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 67
  91. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 68
  92. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 70
  93. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 71
  94. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 72
  95. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 73
  96. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 74
  97. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 75
  98. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 77
  99. ↑ Sollfrank & Boeke, pp. 12, 19–20
  100. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 78
  101. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 79
  102. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 80
  103. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 81
  104. ↑ Hynek & Šenk, p. 82
  105. ↑ Mello & Saideman, pp. 32–34
  106. ↑ Cancian & Snegovaya, pp. 3–10
  107. ↑ Hynek, N.; Šenk, M. (16 November 2025). "Ukraine–Russia peace plans: historical lessons, operationalising criteria, and comparative assessment" . Peacebuilding. 2025: 1–22. doi:10.1080/21647259.2025.2585235 . Retrieved 19 November 2025. Using our historically derived criteria, we analyse each plan with attention to future trajectories rather than day-to-day changes – though we do consider recent events, including the aftermath of the Trump–Putin meeting in Anchorage, Alaska in August 2025 – to ensure the paper's continued relevance as circumstances shift.
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