Waiver of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States is a federal relief available to certain removable aliens. [1] [2] Waiver of inadmissibility is used for those who are applying for US immigrant visas or adjustment of status. One cannot file a stand-alone waiver: an underlying application for adjustment of status or immigrant visas must be pending. Not all grounds of inadmissibility can be waived. For example, the INA does not provide a waiver for those who are convicted of crimes related to controlled substances, with the exception of possession of 30g of marijuana or less. Importantly, a person who would like to file for a waiver must have qualifying relatives who are US citizens or permanent residents, otherwise, a person cannot file for the waiver. [3] It statutorily links cancellation of removal, which is another form of relief under the INA that operates parallel to waiver of inadmissibility. As such, an alien in removal proceedings needs only satisfy the requirements of one of them to be effectively saved from removal from the United States. [4]
Every refugee that is seeking admission to the United States or one who has been lawfully admitted as an "immigrant" under the INA is eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility, [5] [6] [7] even if he or she has been convicted of an aggravated felony or a particularly serious crime. [2] [8] [9] But such criminal aliens previously admitted to the United States under Form I-130 cannot apply for such relief. [2]
Any person inadmissible to the United States may request a waiver of inadmissibility by filing Form I-601 ("Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility"). [10] Similar to applying for a U.S. visa, there are no numerical or geographical limitations. Others may request waiver of inadmissibility at any time during their removal proceedings, [11] [12] even from outside the United States after their removal. [13] [14] Any decision regarding this federal relief may be reviewed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) or any U.S. court of appeals. [15]
According to the INA, "[t]he term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." [16] [17] Those referred to as "inadmissible aliens" and "deportable aliens" form a single group, [1] which encompasses the INA violators among the 75 million foreign nationals who are admitted each year as visitors or guests, [18] [19] the 12 million or so illegal aliens, [20] and the INA violators among the hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals who reside in the United States under the temporary protected status (TPS). [21] [22] [7]
"Only 'aliens' are subject to removal under the INA." [23] A lawful permanent resident (LPR) can either be an "alien" or a "national of the United States" (American), [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] which requires a case-by-case analysis and depends mainly on the number of continuous years he or she has spent in the United States as a green card holder (legal immigrant). [6] [4]
Legal immigrants in the United States enjoy the same statutory and constitutional protections as citizens by birth, [34] especially those that were lawfully admitted as stateless refugees. [6] [2] [8] [5] [9] The reason for this is that they had escaped from totalitarianism, genocide, torture and/or persecution, and have absolutely no safe country of permanent residence other than the United States. [35] [36] Removing such protected people from the United States violates the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) and other laws, [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [34] especially if they qualify as Americans or have physically and continuously resided in the United States for at least 10 years without committing (in those years) any offense that triggers removability under the INA. [43]
Before the 1996 enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), [44] U.S. President Bill Clinton had issued a presidential directive in which he expressly warned the Attorney General and others by stating the following:
Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens . Therefore, I direct the Attorney General... and other relevant Administration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment.... [34]
An alien may be inadmissible to the United States for a variety of reasons, which are all detailed under section 1182(a)(1)—(10). [45] In 1980, Congress and the Carter administration enacted the Refugee Act, which authorized up to 50,000 international refugees to be firmly resettled in the United States each year. [5] [46] Sections 1157(c)(3) and 1159(c) provide a special waiver of inadmissibility to refugees only, [5] even if they have been convicted of aggravated felonies or particularly serious crimes. [8] [2] [47] [4] Such immigrants are exempt from concurrently filing an adjustment of status application under , which is plainly for nonimmigrants only. [6] [5]
Section 1157 explicitly states the following:
The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title shall not be applicable to any alien seeking admission to the United States under this subsection, and the Attorney General may waive any other provision of [section 1182] ... with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest . [48] [17] [12]
Section 1159 states the following:
The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) ... shall not be applicable to any alien seeking adjustment of status under this section , and the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may waive any other provision of [section 1182] ... with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest. [49] [17] [12]
The above legal finding "is consistent with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." [26] Those admitted as refugees under section 1157 may also apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 1182(h), [2] but doing such is totally optional and not required by any law. [50]
Aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA have
There are several circumstances under which illegal entrants and immigration violators may apply for a Waiver of Inadmissibility:
Applicants may download Form I-601 ("Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility") from the USCIS website. [10] Depending on whether an applicant is applying for an immigrant visa or adjustment of status, Form I-601 may be filed at the consular office, USCIS office, or in the immigration court considering the immigrant visa or adjustment of status application. [10] It may also be filed with the BIA. [67] The filing fee for Form I-601 is currently $930. A person who has been removed from the United States at any time in the past may use Form I-212 ("Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States After Deportation or Removal"). [13]
Imprisonment in law is the specific state of being physically incarcerated or confined in an institutional setting such as a prison. When it comes to issues involving a so-called indeterminate sentence, the specific amount of days or months that had to be served in prison make up the official term of imprisonment. In other words, the months or years of "street time" ordered by the trial court do not constitute imprisonment.
A green card, known officially as a permanent resident card, is an identity document which shows that a person has permanent residency in the United States. Green card holders are formally known as lawful permanent residents (LPRs). As of 2019, there are an estimated 13.9 million green card holders of whom 9.1 million are eligible to become United States citizens. Approximately 65,000 of them serve in the U.S. Armed Forces.
Permanent residency is a person's legal resident status in a country or territory of which such person is not a citizen but where they have the right to reside on a permanent basis. This is usually for a permanent period; a person with such legal status is known as a permanent resident. In the United States, such a person is referred to as a green card holder but more formally as a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR).
In law, an alien is any person who is not a citizen or a national of a specific country, although definitions and terminology differ to some degree depending upon the continent or region of Earth. More generally, however, the term "alien" is perceived as synonymous with foreign national.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L. 104–208 (text)(pdf), 110 Stat. 3009-546, enacted September 30, 1996, made major changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which the bill's proponents argued was mainly to counter the rapidly-growing undocumented immigrant population, and also to protect the legal immigrants and citizens of the United States. "These IIRIRA changes became effective on April 1, 1997."
The Oath of Allegiance of the United States is the official oath of allegiance that must be taken and subscribed by every lawful permanent resident (LPR) who wishes to become a national of the United States (American). The only LPR who cannot take this oath of allegiance is one who is "removable" from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Deportation of Cambodian immigrants from the United States violates the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) and other laws, unless it is done rationally and in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This deportation process has long been put in place to forcefully expel, return or extradite to Cambodia failed asylum seekers and certain Cambodian immigrants convicted of a common crime in the United States. Some of these individuals in removal proceedings were originally admitted as children with their stateless refugee family members after they had escaped from totalitarianism, genocide, torture, persecution, etc., and have continuously spent decades in the United States as legal immigrants and potential U.S. nationals (Americans).
Parole, in the immigration laws of the United States, generally refers to official permission to enter and remain temporarily in the United States, under the supervision of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), without formal admission, and while remaining an applicant for admission.
The USA PATRIOT Act was passed by the United States Congress in 2001 as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. It has ten titles, each containing numerous sections. Title IV: Protecting the Border aims to prevent terrorism in the USA through immigration regulations. The provisions of the title generally increase the difficulty of entering the country for those known to have, or suspected of having, terrorist intent.
A foreign national is any person who is not a national of a specific country. For example, in the US a foreign national is something or someone who is neither a citizen nor a national of the United States. The same applies in Canada.
Adjustment of status in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States refers to the legal process of conferring permanent residency upon any alien who is a refugee, asylum seeker, nonpermanent resident, conditional entrant, parolee, and so forth.
Cancellation of removal is a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States that allows some aliens who are in removal proceedings, who have lived in the United States for a long period of time and meet certain other conditions, to apply to remain in the United States and have the removal proceedings terminated. Cancellation of removal was crafted by the U.S. Congress to replace "suspension of deportation," a similar form of relief available prior to April 1, 1997.
Moral turpitude is a legal concept in the United States and prior to 1976, Canada, that refers to "an act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment or accepted standard of the community". This term appears in U.S. immigration law beginning in the 19th century.
The term aggravated felony was created by the United States Congress as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to define a category of serious criminal offenses. It basically covers documented convictions from anywhere on Earth for which imposition of one year or longer of imprisonment was possible under the controlling law of a country or locality. The INA says that for asylum in the United States, any alien "convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime." Every legal immigrant or non-citizen U.S. national that has been convicted of any aggravated felony is ineligible for citizenship of the United States, and other than a refugee under INA section 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157, every alien who has been convicted of any aggravated felony is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States, if his or her "term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), is a United States Supreme Court case involving habeas corpus and INA § 212(c) relief for deportable aliens.
Tolling is a legal doctrine that allows for the pausing or delaying of the running of the period of time set forth by a statute of limitations, such that a case may be reopened or a lawsuit filed even after the statute of limitations has run out. Statutory filing deadlines are generally treated as nonjurisdictional procedural rules, which means they can be waived or the time to file a document can be tolled. The only time this is not permitted is when the legislature has expressly indicated its intent in the statute. Although grounds for tolling the statute of limitations vary by jurisdiction, common grounds include:
Reinstatement of removal in the United States refers to an immigration enforcement procedure in which a previously deported foreign national can again be removed for subsequent illegal reentry with no required judicial review except in very limited exceptional circumstances. In such a situation, the original "order of removal" gets resurrected and is reviewed by a U.S. court of appeals under the well-known gross miscarriage of justice standard. Other legal issues may also be raised in the petition for review, including a United States nationality determination, or a request for asylum, withholding of removal or deferral of removal. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a foreign national is an alien and not an American. "Only 'aliens' are subject to removal under the INA."
Deportation of Afghan immigrants from the United States violates the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) and other laws, unless it is done rationally and in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This deportation process has long been put in place to forcefully expel, return or extradite to Afghanistan failed asylum seekers and certain Afghan immigrants convicted of a common crime in the United States. Some of these individuals in removal proceedings were originally admitted as children with their stateless refugee family members after they had escaped from totalitarianism, genocide, torture, persecution, etc., and have continuously spent decades in the United States as legal immigrants and potential U.S. nationals (Americans).
Deportation of Americans from the United States violates the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) and other laws. It refers to the forceful expulsion, return or extradition of Americans to other countries after getting convicted of a common crime in the United States. These individuals in removal proceedings include Americans by birth and legal immigrants that were naturalized under 8 U.S.C. § 1427 or admitted as nationals of the United States under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000. As such, they can return to the United States at any time, even if it includes crossing the U.S. border like done in the 1987 American comedy film Born in East L.A.
Particularly serious crime in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States is a predecessor of the current aggravated felony. The term "particularly serious crime" was coined for the first time when the U.S. Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980. As of September 30, 1996, an aggravated felony conviction with at least 1 year of imprisonment that was actually imposed by a court of law could qualify as a particularly serious crime in certain cases. This requires a case-by-case analysis. An offense that involves murder or torture is considered a particularly serious crime even if the possible term of imprisonment is 2 years or less.
This article is based on latest statutory and published case law.
The umbrella statutory term for being inadmissible or deportable is 'removable.'
A person who enters the United States as a refugee and later adjusts in the United States to lawful permanent resident status is not precluded from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2018), based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, because he or she has not 'previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence' under that provision.
An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction.
An alien who has not previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), despite his conviction for an aggravated felony.
Mr. Obregon next claims that even if he is removable, he should nevertheless have been afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under controlling precedent from our court and the BIA's recent decision in Matter of J-H-J- he is correct.
In 2006, Sambare was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. In the years following his admission to the United States, Sambare was convicted of various crimes, including credit card theft and forgery.... In October 2013, however, an Immigration Court granted Sambare's application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and thus restored his status as a lawful permanent resident.
Accordingly, while Salmoran is removable, he may still file an application for cancellation of removal.
That the INA addresses termination of refugee status in only one provision— —might suggest, as Mr. Romanishyn argues, that refugee status persists indefinitely unless it is terminated pursuant to that provision.(emphasis added)
Congress granted the President and Attorney General wide discretion in determining the admission of refugees to the United States.
Section 101(a)(42) of the Act provides in pertinent part: The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
The INA generally defines the words 'admission' and 'admitted' as 'the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.'
With regard to refugees, the language of both the Act and the regulations states that they are 'admitted' to the United States.
Section 209(c) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may waive certain criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Act 'with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.'
Pursuant to section 209 of the Act, an alien admitted into the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), may have his or her status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. In making such a determination, it is clear from the statute that the Attorney General has the power to grant a waiver of inadmissibility to an alien who may be inadmissible.(emphases added)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.
BIA decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.
The [Supreme] Court has also emphasized that the Chevron principle of deference must be applied to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, even where a court has previously issued a contrary decision and believes that its construction is the better one, provided that the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
[T]he 90-day time bar (and restriction to file only one motion) will be waived for motions to reopen that (1) apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation that are (2) based on changed country conditions and (3) supported by material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing.
We have held that these regulations also apply to claims under the Convention Against Torture.
Having determined that we may review Charleswell's attempt to collaterally challenge the 1991 Deportation order, we next address whether he is able to meet the Mendoza-Lopez requirements.
The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command.(internal quotation marks omitted)
And when the same Rule uses both 'may' and 'shall,' the normal inference is that each is used in its usual sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.
[T]he word 'shall' imposes a mandatory requirement.
[W]e conclude that the departure bar does not apply in the context of sua sponte reopening.
An individual who has already been removed can satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement by raising a direct challenge to the removal order.
The statutory history and precedent, as well as the legislative history, thus support the conclusion that the statutory term 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to established facts.
For an alien challenging his removal, that path begins with a petition for review of his removal order, not a habeas petition.
We exercise plenary review over [Petitioner]'s due process claim and questions of law.
Nationality and citizenship are not entirely synonymous; one can be a national of the United States and yet not a citizen.
Citizenship and nationality are not synonymous.
The term 'or' is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings.(quotation marks omitted)
The amendments made by this title shall take effect 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to individuals who satisfy the requirements of section 320 or 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date.(emphases added)
Currently, adoptees who were over the age of 18 on February 27, 2001, do not automatically acquire citizenship.(emphasis added)
The Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, revised the manner in which children of non-citizens born outside the United States are eligible to become U.S. citizens.
A child acquires derivative citizenship by operation of law, not by adjudication.
As the District Court recognized, 'such' means 'of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied.'
As I see it, the language could be construed to allow coverage of individuals who had reached the age of 18 years before the CCA's effective date.
[T]he derivative citizenship statute as amended by the CCA promotes 'Congress's remedial purposes' of 'keep[ing] families intact.'
While Ahmadi argues that, under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, he has derivative citizenship because his father naturalized after Ahmadi turned eighteen, we have previously held that the Act does not apply retroactively to people who turned eighteen before Congress passed the Act.
Your Honors, this is a case that shocks the conscience. It is about an illegal deportation of a non-violent person from the State of Pennsylvania who was: 1) admitted to this country as an 11-year-old refugee from a totalitarian state pursuant to ; 2) became a lawful permanent resident, LPR, of the United States pursuant to § 1159(a)(2); 3) rightfully and successfully became a recipient of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, CAT, relief on September 26, 2000; and 4) was naturalized or admitted as a national of the United States under the Child Citizenship Act, CCA, of 2000.
A person who claims to have derived United States citizenship by naturalization of a parent may apply to the Attorney General for a certificate, but a certificate is not required.
Accordingly, in my view, 'as in effect on the effective date' clearly refers to the conditions that 'have been fulfilled' and exist now. No matter whether these conditions were met previously, or what the individual's status was previously, these are the rules that determine the person's citizenship status as of the February 27, 2001, effective date, i.e., now.
It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.(quotation marks omitted)
The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.
It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, rather than to emasculate an entire section, as the Government's interpretation requires.(citation and quotation marks omitted)
The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same.
A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that courts should avoid interpreting a statute in ways that would render certain language superfluous.
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that courts should interpret a law to avoid absurd or bizarre results.
[I]f the biological child is able to qualify for U.S. citizenship subsequent to birth, the conferral of U.S. citizenship is not retroactive to birth but occurs as of the date he or she fills the statutory qualifications of Section 320, 321, or 322 of the INA.
Although the INS appears to have taken the position that the act is not retroactive, the language of the CCA's and Congress' intent have not yet been universally determined, and there may still be room for individuals to continue arguing in favor of its retroactive application....
The Constitution protects both citizens and non-citizens.
The Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings... because the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.(citations and quotation marks omitted)
In other words, petitioners must receive 'a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf, and a decision on the merits of their claim by a 'neutral and impartial arbiter.'(citations omitted)
Afghanistan is a totalitarian state under the control of the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], which is kept in power by the Soviet Union.
We further find, however, that the past persecution suffered by the applicant was so severe that his asylum application should be granted notwithstanding the change of circumstances.
No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
CAT prohibits removal of a noncitizen to a country where the noncitizen likely would be tortured.
The three other reservations, also crafted with the help and approval of the Bush administration, did the following: Limited the definition of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading' treatment to cruel and unusual punishment as defined under the Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the Constitution....
Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials....
Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U. S. C. §242.
Section 241 proscribes conspiracies that seek to 'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person' in connection with exercising or enjoying constitutional rights.
Deprivation of [nationality]—particularly American [nationality], which is one of the most valuable rights in the world today—has grave practical consequences.(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.
[A]n applicant for naturalization has the burden of proving 'by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization.'
When an alien faces removal under the [INA], one potential defense is that the alien is not an alien at all but is actually a national of the United States.
The sole such statutory provision that presently confers United States nationality upon non-citizens is 8 U.S.C. § 1408.
The [INA] defines naturalization as 'conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.'
An alien seeking 'admission' to the United States is subject to various requirements, see, e.g., § 1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed 'inadmissible' on any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration statutes, see § 1182.
The whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead to swift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law.
Because Zivkovic's aggravated felony convictions were more than a decade old before the 1988 statute took effect, they cannot be used as a ground for removal (although they can be used for many other purposes under the statute).
Ledezma-Galicia is not removable by reason of being an aggravated felon, because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to convictions, like Ledezma-Galicia's, that occurred prior to November 18, 1988.
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that courts must consider both a crime's statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is 'punishable' by a certain term of imprisonment.
None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.
The panel held that the Washington offense of theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree was not 'punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year' when the statutory maximum sentence exceeded one year but the maximum sentence allowed under the State's mandatory sentencing guidelines did not. Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that the defendant committed a Grade B supervised release violation.
We reverse, concluding that Mr. Hisey has overcome the procedural default by showing actual innocence. He did not commit the underlying offense (unlawfully possessing firearms after a felony conviction) because he had no prior conviction punishable by more than a year in prison.