Xavier Vives

Last updated
Xavier Vives
Born (1955-01-23) 23 January 1955 (age 68)
Barcelona, Spain
Academic career
Institution IESE Business School (2006 –) [1]
FieldIndustrial Organization
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Banking and Finance
Alma mater UC Berkeley Ph.D. (1983)
Doctoral
advisor		 Gérard Debreu
Information at IDEAS / RePEc
Website blog.iese.edu/xvives

Xavier Vives is a Spanish economist regarded as one of the main figures in the field of industrial organization and, more broadly, microeconomics. [2] He is currently Chaired Professor of Regulation, Competition and Public Policies, and academic director of the Public-Private Sector Research Center at IESE Business School in Barcelona.

Contents

Biography

A native of Barcelona, after obtaining his bachelor's degree from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), received a doctorate from UC Berkeley under the supervision of Gérard Debreu, and moved to the University of Pennsylvania as an Assistant Professor. In 1987 moved back to Spain and headed for ten years the Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) in the decade of the 1990s. In 2001 he moved to the business school INSEAD in Paris and in 2005 went back to Barcelona with a research professorship at ICREA-UPF (Pompeu Fabra University). He also taught at UAB and held visiting positions at Harvard University, the University of California at Berkeley and New York University. He served as Director of the Industrial Organization Program of the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in 1991–1997. He was editor of the International Journal of Industrial Organization in 1993–1997, editor-in-chief of the European Economic Review (1998–2002), of the Journal of the European Economic Association (2003–2008) [3] and editor of the Journal of Economic Theory in 2013-2020. Currently he is co-editor of the Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. Member of the Identification Committee of the European Research Council in 2014–2019. He has participated extensively in the policy debate in Europe with contributions to a substantial number of reports published by CEPR and CESifo networks as well as columns in Project Syndicate, The Financial Times , The Wall Street Journal and the Spanish press (La Vanguardia, Expansión, El País). From 2011 to 2014 he was Special Advisor to the Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Competition, J. Almunia.

Research contributions

Vives' research concentrates on microeconomics and ranges from industrial organization, information economics, and game theory to banking and finance. [4] His contributions started with seminal research in oligopoly theory and the study of price and quantity competition providing canonical models and results on price formation and competitiveness. [5] [6] [7] The research extended to the interaction between private information and strategic behavior with the early study of information sharing among firms. [8] [9] This research has served as a basis for extensive theoretical and applied developments in industrial organization and international trade among other fields, as well as having implications for competition policy. A path breaking contribution was the pioneer application of lattice-theoretic methods to analyze games of strategic complementarities (or supermodular games), and in general complementarities, in economics. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] His contribution opened the gates to numerous applications in a wide range of fields including macroeconomics and finance. Further work has studied incomplete information economies and the mechanisms of information aggregation and transmission in markets and learning by traders formalizing the ideas of Hayek. This work provides a bridge between the rational expectations and the herding literatures. [15] [16] [11] [17] [18] [19] [20] and has been applied to study the dynamics of asset prices. [11] [21] [22] Vives has contributed to the study of competition and regulation in banking and of financial stability with research that has policy implications for the financial crisis and European financial integration. [23] [24] [25] [11] [26] [27] More recently, he has examined the implications for competition, innovation and the macroeconomy of the rise of common ownership. [28] [29]

Books

Awards and honors

Vives is a Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1992, [30] of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts since 2002, [31] of the European Economic Association since 2004, [32] of the Spanish Economic Association since 2010, [33] of the Institute of Catalan Studies since 2011 [34] and of the Academia Europaea since 2012. He has received several research prizes in Spain, among them the Premio Nacional de Investigación Pascual Madoz 2020, the Premio Rey Jaime I de Economía in 2013. [35] In 2009 and 2018 he was awarded a European Research Council Advanced Grant, [36] and in 2015 a Wim Duisenberg Fellowship from the European Central Bank. President of EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics) for the period 2016–2018 and current Vicepresident of the European Finance Association. Distinguished Fellow of the Luohan Academy since 2020.

Related Research Articles

A duopoly is a type of oligopoly where two firms have dominant or exclusive control over a market, and most of the competition within that market occurs directly between them.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Microeconomics</span> Behavior of individuals and firms

Microeconomics is a branch of economics that studies the behavior of individuals and firms in making decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources and the interactions among these individuals and firms. Microeconomics focuses on the study of individual markets, sectors, or industries as opposed to the national economy as a whole, which is studied in macroeconomics.

An oligopoly is a market in which control over an industry lies in the hands of a few large sellers who own a dominant share of the market. Oligopolistic markets have homogenous products, few market participants, and inelastic demand for the products in those industries. As a result of their significant market power, firms in oligopolistic markets can influence prices through manipulating the supply function. Firms in an oligopoly are also mutually interdependent, as any action by one firm is expected to affect other firms in the market and evoke a reaction or consequential action. As a result, firms in oligopolistic markets often resort to collusion as means of maximising profits.

In economics, industrial organization is a field that builds on the theory of the firm by examining the structure of firms and markets. Industrial organization adds real-world complications to the perfectly competitive model, complications such as transaction costs, limited information, and barriers to entry of new firms that may be associated with imperfect competition. It analyzes determinants of firm and market organization and behavior on a continuum between competition and monopoly, including from government actions.

This aims to be a complete article list of economics topics:

In economics and commerce, the Bertrand paradox — named after its creator, Joseph Bertrand — describes a situation in which two players (firms) reach a state of Nash equilibrium where both firms charge a price equal to marginal cost ("MC"). The paradox is that in models such as Cournot competition, an increase in the number of firms is associated with a convergence of prices to marginal costs. In these alternative models of oligopoly, a small number of firms earn positive profits by charging prices above cost. Suppose two firms, A and B, sell a homogeneous commodity, each with the same cost of production and distribution, so that customers choose the product solely on the basis of price. It follows that demand is infinitely price-elastic. Neither A nor B will set a higher price than the other because doing so would yield the entire market to their rival. If they set the same price, the companies will share both the market and profits.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Antoine Augustin Cournot</span> French economist and mathematician

Antoine Augustin Cournot was a French philosopher and mathematician who also contributed to the development of economics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Paul Milgrom</span> Economist and winner of the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics

Paul Robert Milgrom is an American economist. He is the Shirley and Leonard Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences at the Stanford University School of Humanities and Sciences, a position he has held since 1987. He is a professor in the Stanford School of Engineering as well and a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Research. Milgrom is an expert in game theory, specifically auction theory and pricing strategies. He is the winner of the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, together with Robert B. Wilson, "for improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats".

Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics, named after Joseph Louis François Bertrand (1822–1900). It describes interactions among firms (sellers) that set prices and their customers (buyers) that choose quantities at the prices set. The model was formulated in 1883 by Bertrand in a review of Antoine Augustin Cournot's book Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses (1838) in which Cournot had put forward the Cournot model. Cournot's model argued that each firm should maximise its profit by selecting a quantity level and then adjusting price level to sell that quantity. The outcome of the model equilibrium involved firms pricing above marginal cost; hence, the competitive price. In his review, Bertrand argued that each firm should instead maximise its profits by selecting a price level that undercuts its competitors' prices, when their prices exceed marginal cost. The model was not formalized by Bertrand; however, the idea was developed into a mathematical model by Francis Ysidro Edgeworth in 1889.

Cournot competition is an economic model used to describe an industry structure in which companies compete on the amount of output they will produce, which they decide on independently of each other and at the same time. It is named after Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801–1877) who was inspired by observing competition in a spring water duopoly. It has the following features:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Market structure</span> Differentiation of firms by goods and operations

Market structure, in economics, depicts how firms are differentiated and categorised based on the types of goods they sell (homogeneous/heterogeneous) and how their operations are affected by external factors and elements. Market structure makes it easier to understand the characteristics of diverse markets.

Merger simulation is a commonly used technique when analyzing potential welfare costs and benefits of mergers between firms. Merger simulation models differ with respect to assumed form of competition that best describes the market as well as the structure of the chosen demand system

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jean Tirole</span> French professor of economics

Jean Tirole is a French economist who is currently a professor of economics at Toulouse 1 Capitole University. He focuses on industrial organization, game theory, banking and finance, and psychology. In particular, he focuses on the regulation of economic activity in a way that does not hinder innovation while maintaining fair rules.

Stephen W. Salant is an economist who has done extensive research in applied microeconomics. His 1975 model of speculative attacks in the gold market was adapted by Paul Krugman and others to explain speculative attacks in foreign exchange markets. Hundreds of journal articles and books on financial speculative attacks followed.

In economics and game theory, global games are games of incomplete information where players receive possibly-correlated signals of the underlying state of the world. Global games were originally defined by Carlsson and van Damme (1993).

In economics and game theory, the decisions of two or more players are called strategic complements if they mutually reinforce one another, and they are called strategic substitutes if they mutually offset one another. These terms were originally coined by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).

Paul David Klemperer FBA is an economist and the Edgeworth Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Oxford University. He is a member of the Klemperer family. He works on industrial economics, competition policy, auction theory, and climate change economics and policy.

In oligopoly theory, conjectural variation is the belief that one firm has an idea about the way its competitors may react if it varies its output or price. The firm forms a conjecture about the variation in the other firm's output that will accompany any change in its own output. For example, in the classic Cournot model of oligopoly, it is assumed that each firm treats the output of the other firms as given when it chooses its output. This is sometimes called the "Nash conjecture," as it underlies the standard Nash equilibrium concept. However, alternative assumptions can be made. Suppose you have two firms producing the same good, so that the industry price is determined by the combined output of the two firms. Now suppose that each firm has what is called the "Bertrand Conjecture" of −1. This means that if firm A increases its output, it conjectures that firm B will reduce its output to exactly offset firm A's increase, so that total output and hence price remains unchanged. With the Bertrand Conjecture, the firms act as if they believe that the market price is unaffected by their own output, because each firm believes that the other firm will adjust its output so that total output will be constant. At the other extreme is the Joint-Profit maximizing conjecture of +1. In this case, each firm believes that the other will imitate exactly any change in output it makes, which leads to the firms behaving like a single monopoly supplier.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Huw Dixon</span> British economist

Huw David Dixon, born 1958, is a British economist. He has been a professor at Cardiff Business School since 2006, having previously been Head of Economics at the University of York (2003–2006) after being a professor of economics there (1992–2003), and the University of Swansea (1991–1992), a Reader at Essex University (1987–1991) and a lecturer at Birkbeck College 1983–1987.

In microeconomics, the Bertrand–Edgeworth model of price-setting oligopoly looks at what happens when there is a homogeneous product where there is a limit to the output of firms which are willing and able to sell at a particular price. This differs from the Bertrand competition model where it is assumed that firms are willing and able to meet all demand. The limit to output can be considered as a physical capacity constraint which is the same at all prices, or to vary with price under other assumptions.

References

  1. ↑ "Xavier Vives - Faculty Search" . Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  2. ↑ "Xavier Vives is one of the outstanding scholars of his generation in oligopoly and industrial organization theory"; "Xavier Vives has been one of the leading contributors to the modern theory of oligopoly", Quotations, respectively, by James W. Friedman and Eric Maskin from back cover of the book "Oligopoly pricing"
  3. ↑ "Report for the editors of JEEA for 2008" (PDF). Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  4. ↑ IESE Business School. “Xavier Vives | Economics & Financial Management.” IESE, https://www.iese.edu/faculty-research/faculty/xavier-vives/.
  5. ↑ Singh, Nirvikar; Vives, Xavier (1984). "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly". The RAND Journal of Economics. 15 (4): 546–554. doi:10.2307/2555525. JSTOR   2555525.
  6. ↑ Vives, Xavier (1985). "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentation". Journal of Economic Theory. 36: 166–175. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90086-9.
  7. ↑ Thisse, Jacques-Francois; Vives, Xavier (1988). "On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy". The American Economic Review. 78 (1): 122–137. JSTOR   1814702.
  8. ↑ Vives, Xavier (1984). "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand". Journal of Economic Theory. 34: 71–94. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5.
  9. ↑ “Information Sharing Among Firms”, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008
  10. ↑ Vives, Xavier (1990). "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities". Journal of Mathematical Economics. 19 (3): 305–321. doi:10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T.
  11. 1 2 3 4 Vives, Xavier (2002). "Private Information, Strategic Behavior, and Efficiency in Cournot Markets". The RAND Journal of Economics. 33 (3): 361–376. doi:10.2307/3087462. JSTOR   3087462.
  12. ↑ Vives, Xavier (2005). "Complementarities and Games: New Developments". Journal of Economic Literature. 43 (2): 437–479. doi:10.1257/0022051054661558. S2CID   7261986.
  13. ↑ “Supermodularity and Supermodular Games”, en Game Theory, S. Durlauf y R. Blume (eds.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010
  14. ↑ Van Zandt, Timothy; Vives, Xavier (2007). "Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities". Journal of Economic Theory. 134: 339–360. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.009. S2CID   14493629.
  15. ↑ Vives, Xavier (1988). "Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets". Econometrica. 56 (4): 851–876. doi:10.2307/1912702. JSTOR   1912702.
  16. ↑ Vives, Xavier (1993). "How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?". The Review of Economic Studies. 60 (2): 329–347. doi:10.2307/2298060. JSTOR   2298060.
  17. ↑ Vives, Xavier (2011). "Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information" (PDF). Econometrica. 79 (6): 1919–1966. doi:10.3982/ECTA8126.
  18. ↑ Vives, Xavier (2014). "On the Possibility of Informationally Efficient Markets" (PDF). Journal of the European Economic Association. 12 (5): 1200–1239. doi:10.1111/jeea.12107.
  19. ↑ Vives, Xavier (2017). "Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games". The Review of Economic Studies. 84 (2): 935–963. doi:10.1093/res/rdw062.
  20. ↑ Cespa, Giovanni; Vives, Xavier (2015). "The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading" (PDF). The Journal of Finance. 70 (5): 2099–2154. doi:10.1111/jofi.12279.
  21. ↑ Cespa, G.; Vives, X. (2012). "Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek". The Review of Economic Studies. 79 (2): 539–580. doi:10.1093/restud/rdr040. hdl: 10419/30693 .
  22. ↑ Cespa, Giovanni; Vives, Xavier (2015). "The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading" (PDF). The Journal of Finance. 70 (5): 2099–2154. doi:10.1111/jofi.12279.
  23. ↑ Postlewaite, Andrew; Vives, Xavier (1987). "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon". Journal of Political Economy. 95 (3): 485–491. doi:10.1086/261468. JSTOR   1831974. S2CID   153779397.
  24. ↑ Matutes, Carmen; Vives, Xavier (1996). "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance". Journal of Financial Intermediation. 5 (2): 184–216. doi:10.1006/jfin.1996.0010.
  25. ↑ Matutes, Carmen; Vives, Xavier (2000). "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking". European Economic Review. 44: 1–34. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00057-9.
  26. ↑ Rochet, Jean-Charles; Vives, Xavier (2004). "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?". Journal of the European Economic Association. 2 (6): 1116–1147. doi:10.1162/1542476042813850. hdl: 10419/19346 . JSTOR   40004888. S2CID   15382834.
  27. ↑ Vives, Xavier (2014). "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation". Review of Financial Studies. 27 (12): 3547–3592. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu064. hdl: 10419/49495 .
  28. ↑ López, Ángel L.; Vives, Xavier (2019). "Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy". Journal of Political Economy. 127 (5): 2394–2437. doi: 10.1086/701811 . hdl: 10171/66824 . S2CID   222445257.
  29. ↑ Azar, José; Vives, Xavier (2021). "General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership Structure". Econometrica. 89 (3): 999–1048. doi: 10.3982/ECTA17906 . hdl: 10171/62080 .
  30. ↑ "Fellows of the Econometric Society as of September 2012". Archived from the original on December 10, 2008. Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  31. ↑ "European Academy of Sciences and Arts Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea" . Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  32. ↑ "Fellows of the European Economics Association, FEEA" . Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  33. ↑ "Fellows AEE". Archived from the original on October 16, 2012. Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  34. ↑ "Membres numeraris i emèrits" . Retrieved November 25, 2012.
  35. ↑ "Premio Rey Jaime I de Economía". Archived from the original on June 13, 2013.
  36. ↑ "ERC Advanced Grant 2008" (PDF). Retrieved November 25, 2012.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.