Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries
The Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), also called the trade bazooka,[1] is a regulation of the European Union proposed in December 2021,[2] adopted in November 2023, and entering into force on 27 December 2023.[3][4] It aims to protect the EU and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries and provides a framework for EU action, including examination, engagement, and the adoption of countermeasures.[4]
Combining security policy and trade policy, it is a defence and deterrence tool designed to prevent coercion by creating penalties for whichever country is performing the coercion.[5] Analytically, one conference proceeding from 2025 introduces the term "geo-legality" to describe how the EU deploys its legal-normative authority, including the ACI, as leverage to counter external (economic) pressure.[a][6]:138,142–143
Among the coercive measures against which it could be used are boycotts and trade restrictions.[7] An earlier version of the ACI contained proposed mechanisms for compensation to affected Member States; yet, the final Instrument instead provides a framework for seeking reparation from the coercing country.[2]
The ACI was designed in part to address the requirement for unanimous consent among EU member states when adopting certain trade-restrictive measures. Under the Instrument, the veto power is removed for these cases, and trade restrictions in response to coercion are now adopted through two qualified majority votes.[5][2] Episodes of pressure on the EU and its member states, such as United States sanctions against companies involved in constructing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline around 2019[2][10] and the implementation of steel and aluminum tariffs in 2018,[7] also informed debate on the Instrument. Another important driver was China's use of trade restrictions against countries such as Lithuania and Norway.[2][9]
As early as in 2021, notably, Lithuania permitted Taiwan to open the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, after which China responded with wide-ranging trade measures; this situation has been discussed as a paradigmatic prototype-case for utilizing the ACI.[6]
Under the regulation, "economic coercion" refers to a situation in which a third country seeks to pressure the European Union or a Member State into making a particular policy choice by applying, or threatening to apply, measures affecting trade or investment.[4] The procedure is activated when the European Commission examines a potential case of coercion, either on its own initiative or following a substantiated request, and then submits a proposal to the Council of the European Union to determine whether economic coercion exists.[4][9] If the Council, acting by qualified majority, confirms that coercion is taking place, the Commission engages with the third country to seek a resolution, including through negotiations, mediation, or adjudication.[4] If those efforts fail, the EU may adopt "response measures" such as tariffs, restrictions on trade in goods and services, limits on access to public programmes and financial markets, or measures affecting intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment.[4][9] These restrictions can be targeted at states, companies, or individuals, thereby deploying EU legal authority as leverage. Through a "geo-legal" lens, then, this pattern of legal responses situates the ACI within a broader EU toolkit of counter-coercive instruments.[6]:136,Table 3
Notes
↑Drawing on a Delphi consultation with twenty-three EU institutional officials, including participants from the European Commission’s Legal Service and Directorate-General for Trade.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
