Dallas v. Stanglin

Last updated
City of Dallas v. Stanglin
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 1, 1989
Decided April 3, 1989
Full case nameDallas v. Stanglin
Citations490 U.S. 19 ( more )
109 S. Ct. 1591; 104 L. Ed. 2d 18
Case history
PriorStanglin v. City of Dallas, 744 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App. 1987), writ denied (Mar. 2, 1988); cert. granted, 488 U.S. 815(1988)
Holding
An ordinance imposing age limits on a teen dance hall does not infringe the First Amendment right of association.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
ConcurrenceStevens (in judgment), joined by Blackmun
Laws applied
U.S. Const. Amend. I

City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court decision considering the First Amendment associational rights of teenagers at a dance hall. The Court upheld an ordinance imposing age limits on teen dance halls, ruling that gathering for recreational dancing is not an "expressive association" under the First Amendment. [1]

Contents

Background

In 1985, the City of Dallas passed an ordinance allowing licensed businesses to open dance halls for teenagers. The ordinance created a new category of dance halls ("Class E" dance halls) where only youths age 14 to 18 could dance. The Twilight Skating Rink, operated by Charles M. Stanglin, opened a Class E dance hall. Stanglin divided the floor of the skating rink into two sections: a dance floor for youths ages 14 to 18, and a roller skating rink open to all ages.

Stanglin wished to broaden the clientele of his dance floor by opening it to all ages. He brought a lawsuit against the City of Dallas claiming that the age restriction violated the association rights of minors under the First Amendment. The Texas Court of Appeals sided with Stanglin, striking down the age limit. [2]

Opinion of the Court

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Texas Court of Appeals and upheld the age restrictions. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion.

The Court analyzed the case under the framework of Roberts v. United States Jaycees . [3] In Jaycees, the Court had identified two types of associations that receive constitutional protection: "intimate associations" and "expressive associations." Stanglin argued that the dance hall patrons came together to form an expressive association.

The Court rejected this, writing that the dance hall patrons are "not members of any organized association"; indeed, "most are strangers to one another," and there is "no suggestion that these patrons take positions on public questions." [4] In addition, the Court ruled that recreational dancing is not inherently expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. While gathering together to dance does contain a "kernel of expression," "such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection the First Amendment." [5]

Because the Dallas ordinance impinges on "no constitutionally protected right," the only question is whether the age classification passes rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. [5] The Court held that the City's interest in separating minors from the potential "corrupting influences" of "alcohol, illegal drugs, and promiscuous sex" justified imposing limits on dance-hall contacts between juveniles and adults. [6]

Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He would have evaluated the case under the framework of substantive due process rather than the First Amendment, writing, "the opportunity to make friends and enjoy the company of other people — in a dance hall or elsewhere — is an aspect of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." [7] Nonetheless, Stevens agreed the ordinance was constitutional.

See also

Related Research Articles

Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court, decided on June 28, 2000, that held that the constitutional right to freedom of association allowed the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) to exclude a homosexual person from membership in spite of a state law requiring equal treatment of homosexuals in public accommodations. More generally, the court ruled that a private organization such as the BSA may exclude a person from membership when "the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints". In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that opposition to homosexuality is part of BSA's "expressive message" and that allowing homosexuals as adult leaders would interfere with that message.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), is a case of the United States Supreme Court that unanimously struck down St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance and reversed the conviction of a teenager, referred to in court documents only as R.A.V., for burning a cross on the lawn of an African-American family since the ordinance was held to violate the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that burning the Flag of the United States was protected speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as doing so counts as symbolic speech and political speech.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that an ordinance passed in Hialeah, Florida, forbidding the "unnecessar[y]" killing of "an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption", was unconstitutional.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), was a U.S. Supreme Court case involving discrimination against the intellectually disabled.

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), is a United States Supreme Court case. This case was remarkable in its discussion of the requirement of persons to seek government sanction to distribute religious material. In this particular case, the Supreme Court ruled it was not constitutional for a city to require such sanction.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that states cannot impose qualifications for prospective members of the U.S. Congress stricter than those the Constitution specifies. The decision invalidated 23 states' Congressional term limit provisions. The parties to the case were U.S. Term Limits, a nonprofit advocacy group, and Arkansas politician Ray Thornton, among others.

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a city ordinance of Detroit, Michigan requiring dispersal of adult businesses throughout the city.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the First Amendment and the ability of the government to outlaw certain forms of expressive conduct. It ruled that the state has the constitutional authority to ban public nudity, even as part of expressive conduct such as dancing, because it furthers a substantial government interest in protecting the morality and order of society. This case is perhaps best summarized by a sentence in Justice Souter's concurring opinion, which is often paraphrased as "Nudity itself is not inherently expressive conduct."

Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case finding a requirement mandating a permit to speak on religious issues in public was unconstitutional. It was argued October 17, 1950, and decided January 15, 1951, 8–1. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion for the Court. Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result only. Justice Jackson dissented.

Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding nude dancing as free speech. The court held that an ordinance banning public nudity did not violate the operator of a totally nude entertainment establishment's constitutional right to free speech.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States overturning the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's application of a Minnesota antidiscrimination law. The case established what was at the time the prevailing framework for analyzing claims of associative freedom, holding that the Minneapolis branch of the United States Jaycees could not bar women from becoming voting members.

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a law cannot be so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence can not figure out what is innocent activity and what is illegal.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that an East Cleveland, Ohio zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with her grandchild was unconstitutional. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. ruled that the East Cleveland zoning ordinance violated substantive due process because it intruded too far upon the "sanctity of the family." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional, but he based his conclusion upon the theory that the ordinance intruded too far upon the Moore's ability to use her property "as she sees fit." Scholars have recognized Moore as one of several Supreme Court decisions that established "a constitutional right to family integrity."

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a local city ordinance that made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and "annoy" any passersby was unconstitutionally vague. Dennis Coates participated in a protest along with four other unnamed students, all of whom were convicted of violating the city ordinance. Coates appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which upheld the conviction. However, this conviction was overturned in the divided United States Supreme Court decision. The Court found that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amendment freedom of assembly.

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the ordinance by the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, preventing protest outside of a residential home. In a 6–3 decision, the Court ruled that the First Amendment rights to freedom of assembly and speech was not facially violated. The majority opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concluded that the ordinance was constitutionally valid because it was narrowly tailored to meet a "substantial and justifiable" interest in the state; left open "ample alternative channels of communication"; and was content-neutral.

Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), was a United States Supreme Court case on the controversial issue of adult bookstore zoning in the city of Los Angeles. Zoning laws dictated that no adult bookstores could be within five hundred feet of a public park, or religious establishment, or within 1000 feet of another adult establishment. However, Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc. were two adult stores that operated under one roof. They sued Los Angeles, stating the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The district court concurred with the stores, stating that the 1977 study stating there was a higher crime rate in areas with adult stores, which the law was based upon, did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its restrictions on adult stores. The Court of Appeals upheld this verdict, and found that even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city. This reversed the decision of the lower court. This case was argued on December 4, 2001; certiorari was granted on March 5, 2001. "City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 00-799, didn't involve the kind of adult material that can be regulated by the government, but rather the extent to which cities can ban "one-stop shopping" sex-related businesses."

Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court overturned the disorderly conduct charges against Dick Gregory and others for peaceful demonstrations in Chicago.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when municipalities may impose content-based restrictions on signage. The case also clarified the level of constitutional scrutiny that should be applied to content-based restrictions on speech. In 2005, Gilbert, Arizona adopted a municipal sign ordinance that regulated the manner in which signs could be displayed in public areas. The ordinance imposed stricter limitations on signs advertising religious services than signs that displayed "political" or "ideological" messages. When the town's Sign Code compliance manager cited a local church for violating the ordinance, the church filed a lawsuit in which they argued the town's sign regulations violated its First Amendment right to the freedom of speech.

Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, or Times v. City of Chicago is the name of two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1957 and 1961. Both involved the issue of limits on freedom of expression in connection with motion pictures. In both cases the court affirmed the right of local governments to engage in some form of censorship.

References

  1. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
  2. Stanglin v. City of Dallas, 744S.W.2d165 ( Tex. App. 1987).
  3. Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
  4. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24–25.
  5. 1 2 Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
  6. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 26-27.
  7. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring).