Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.

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Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 12, 1985
Decided February 25, 1986
Full case nameCity of Renton et al. v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., et al.
Citations475 U.S. 41 ( more )
106 S. Ct. 925; 89 L. Ed. 2d 29; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 2
Case history
PriorReversed and remanded, 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
Holding
The restriction imposed by Renton's ordinance was a permissible, content-neutral time/place/manner regulation.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr.  · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by Burger, White, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor
ConcurrenceBlackmun
DissentBrennan, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I

Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that localities may impose regulations prohibiting adult theaters from operating within certain areas, finding that the regulation in question was a content-neutral time/place/manner restriction. [1] The specific restriction at issue was established by Renton, Washington, and prohibited adult theaters within 1,000 feet from any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. [2]

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References

  1. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
  2. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.