Franks v. Delaware

Last updated

Franks v. Delaware
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued February 27, 1978
Decided June 26, 1978
Full case nameJerome Franks v. Delaware
Citations438 U.S. 154 ( more )
98 S. Ct. 2674; 57 L. Ed. 2d 667
Case history
PriorFranks v. State, 373 A.2d 578 (Del. 1977)
SubsequentFranks v. State, 398 A.2d 783 (Del. 1979)
Holding
Where a warrant affidavit contains a statement, necessary to the finding of probable cause, that is demonstrated to be both false and included by an affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, the warrant is not valid.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist  · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityBlackmun, joined by Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens
DissentRehnquist, joined by Burger
Laws applied
4th Amendment of the US Constitution

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court case dealing with defendants' rights to challenge evidence collected on the basis of a warrant granted on the basis of a false statement. The court held that where a warrant affidavit contains a statement, necessary to the finding of probable cause, that is demonstrated to be both false and included by an affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, the warrant is not valid.

Contents

Facts

On Friday, March 5, 1976, Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police in Dover, Delaware, that she had been confronted in her home earlier that morning by a man with a knife, and that he had sexually assaulted her. She described her assailant's age, race, height, build, and facial hair, and gave a detailed description of his clothing as consisting of a white thermal undershirt, black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather three-quarter-length coat, and a dark knit cap that he wore pulled down around his eyes.

That same day, petitioner Jerome Franks coincidentally was taken into custody for an assault involving a 15-year-old girl, Brenda, six days earlier. After his formal arrest, and while awaiting a bail hearing in Family Court, petitioner allegedly stated to Robert McClements, the youth officer accompanying him, that he was surprised the bail hearing was "about Brenda B. I know her. I thought you said Bailey. I don't know her." [1]

Detective Brooks and Detective Larry D. Gray then submitted a sworn affidavit to a Justice of the Peace in Dover, in support of a warrant to search petitioner's apartment. In paragraph 8 of the affidavit's "probable cause page," mention was made of petitioner's statement to McClements. In paragraph 10, it was noted that the description of the assailant given to the police by Mrs. Bailey included the above-mentioned clothing. Finally, the affidavit also described the attempt made by police to confirm that petitioner's typical outfit matched that of the assailant. Paragraph 15 recited: "On Tuesday, 3/9/76, your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams and Mr. Wesley Lucas of the Delaware Youth Center where Jerome Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both these people." [1]

Paragraphs 16 and 17 respectively stated: "Mr. James Williams revealed to your affiant that the normal dress of Jerome Franks does consist of a white knit thermal undershirt and a brown leather jacket," and "Mr. Wesley Lucas revealed to your affiant that in addition to the thermal undershirt and jacket, Jerome Franks often wears a dark green knit hat." [1]

A warrant was then issued on the basis of this affidavit. Pursuant to the warrant, police searched Frank's apartment and found a white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark pants, and a leather jacket, and, on petitioner's kitchen table, a single-blade knife. All these ultimately were introduced in evidence at trial.

Prior to the trial, however, Frank's counsel filed a written motion to suppress the clothing and the knife found in the search; this motion alleged that the warrant, on its face, did not show probable cause, and that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel orally amended the challenge to include an attack on the veracity of the warrant affidavit; he also specifically requested the right to call as witnesses Detective Brooks, Wesley Lucas of the Youth Center, and James D. Morrison, formerly of the Youth Center.Counsel asserted that Lucas and Morrison would testify that neither had been personally interviewed by the warrant affiants, and that, although they might have talked to another police officer, any information given by them to that officer was "somewhat different" from what was recited in the affidavit. Defense counsel charged that the misstatements were included in the affidavit not inadvertently, but in "bad faith." Counsel also sought permission to call Officer McClements and petitioner as witnesses, to seek to establish that petitioner's courthouse statement to police had been obtained in violation of petitioner's Miranda rights, and that the search warrant was thereby tainted as the fruit of an illegally obtained confession. Id. at 17, 27. [1]

In rebuttal, the State's attorney argued in detail, App. 124, (a) that Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 2306, 2307 (1974), contemplated that any challenge to a search warrant was to be limited to questions of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit; (b) that, purportedly, a majority of the States whose practice was not dictated by statute observed such a rule; and (c) that federal cases on the issue were to be distinguished because of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e). He also noted that the Supreme Court of the United States had reserved the general issue of subfacial challenge to veracity in Rendorf v. United States, when it disposed of that case on the ground that, even if a veracity challenge were permitted, the alleged factual inaccuracies in that case's affidavit "were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to the integrity of the affidavit." [2] The State objected to petitioner's "going behind [the warrant affidavit] in any way," and argued that the court must decide petitioner's motion "on the four corners" of the affidavit. [1]

The trial court sustained the State's objection to petitioner's proposed evidence. The motion to suppress was denied, and the clothing and knife were admitted as evidence at the ensuing trial. Tr.192–196. Petitioner was convicted. In a written motion for judgment of acquittal and/or new trial, Franks repeated his objection to the admission of the evidence, stating that he "should have been allowed to impeach the Affidavit used in the Search Warrant to show purposeful misrepresentation of information contained therein.", and affirmed Franks' conviction. The motion was denied, and Franks was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years each and an additional consecutive life sentence.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, [3] but its decision was reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court in the here entitled case. [1] After remanding the case back to the Delaware Supreme Court, the latter then reevaluated the legitimacy of the warrant and considered the ramifications of the false statements contained therein. It concluded that, "[e]xcised of the alleged false paragraphs[,] the warrant affidavit contains sufficient uncontested allegations to establish probable cause", and therefore affirmed Franks' conviction. [4]

As of 2018, Franks is still serving his sentence at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center. [5]

Opinion

The Supreme Court of the United States held that "Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. The trial court here therefore erred in refusing to examine the adequacy of petitioner's proffer of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit." [1]

See also

Related Research Articles

In a legal dispute, one party has the burden of proof to show that they are correct, while the other party has no such burden and is presumed to be correct. The burden of proof requires a party to produce evidence to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of the dispute.

An arrest warrant is a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate on behalf of the state which authorizes the arrest and detention of an individual or the search and seizure of an individual's property.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

False arrest, unlawful arrest or wrongful arrest is a common law tort, where a plaintiff alleges they were held in custody without probable cause, or without an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Although it is possible to sue law enforcement officials for false arrest, the usual defendants in such cases are private security firms.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court established the "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), is a Fourth Amendment case. Gates overruled Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, thereby replacing the Aguilar–Spinelli test for probable cause with the "totality of the circumstances" test.

In United States law, the Aguilar–Spinelli test was a judicial guideline set down by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating the validity of a search warrant or a warrantless arrest based on information provided by a confidential informant or an anonymous tip. The Supreme Court abandoned the AguilarSpinelli test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in favor of a rule that evaluates the reliability of the information under the "totality of the circumstances." However, Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, Oregon, and Washington have retained the Aguilar–Spinelli test, based on their own state constitutions.

<i>United States v. Grubbs</i> 2006 United States Supreme Court case

United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the constitutionality of "anticipatory" search warrants under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court ruled that such warrants, which are issued in advance of a "triggering condition" that makes them executable, are constitutional and do not need to describe that condition on their face.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing police dog during a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, even if the initial infraction is unrelated to drug offenses.

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), held that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have probable cause to seize items in plain view.

Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that one could not lawfully be arrested in one's home by officers breaking in without first giving one notice of their authority and purpose.

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), is a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that the traditional, common-law-derived "knock and announce" rule for executing search warrants must be incorporated into the "reasonableness" analysis of whether the actual execution of the warrant is/was justified under the 4th Amendment. The high court thus ruled that the old "knock and announce" rule while not a hard requirement, was also not a dead letter.

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that "[a]lthough an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information and some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was credible or his information reliable." Along with Spinelli v. United States (1969), Aguilar established the Aguilar–Spinelli test, a judicial guideline for evaluating the validity of a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant or an anonymous tip. The test developed in this case was subsequently rejected and replaced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), is a United States Supreme Court decision excluding the presentation of verbal evidence and recovered narcotics where they were both fruits of an illegal entry. Narcotics agents unlawfully entered Toy's laundry at which point Toy indicated that Jonny was selling narcotics. The drug agents then went to Jonny and found the narcotics. Jonny made a deal to give up his supplier, Wong Sun. The agents then arrested Wong Sun. All were arraigned and released on their own recognizance. Several days later, Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the police station to make a statement, during the process of which he confessed.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Model Crime Investigations</span>

Started in 2008, Model Crime Investigations is a student-associated international conference. Model Crime Investigations is held annually in South Korea so it is usually known as KMCI. MCI is an extracurricular activity where students gather to learn about how a police department operates, as well as about how the broader criminal justice system functions. In the actual conference of simulation, participants will debate upon civil or criminal cases to find culprits among virtual suspects in committees. Unlike scientific investigation, in Model Crime Investigation participants usually interrogate suspects in oral arguments, and gather verbal evidence. Issues that can be discussed will vary from minor cases such as robbery to major crimes such as international terrorism. During the sessions, students who charge the investigation will have to work on affidavit by summarizing the points given by the suspects and witnesses, for the purpose of exterminating crimes by means such as arrest and/or complaint; and prosecute suspects. Along with Model United Nations, Moot Court, Mock Trial, or Model Congress, Model Crime Investigations aims to build students' global perspective.

<i>Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts</i> 2009 United States Supreme Court case

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test. While the court ruled that the then-common practice of submitting these reports without testimony was unconstitutional, it also held that so called "notice-and-demand" statutes are constitutional. A state would not violate the Constitution through a "notice-and-demand" statute by both putting the defendant on notice that the prosecution would submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the scientist and also giving the defendant sufficient time to raise an objection.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."

<i>Florida v. Jardines</i> 2013 United States Supreme Court case

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case which resulted in the decision that police use of a trained detection dog to sniff for narcotics on the front porch of a private home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore, without consent, requires both probable cause and a search warrant.

<i>Florida v. Harris</i> 2013 United States Supreme Court case

Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court addressed the reliability of a dog sniff by a detection dog trained to identify narcotics, under the specific context of whether law enforcement's assertions that the dog is trained or certified is sufficient to establish probable cause for a search of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Harris was the first Supreme Court case to challenge the dog's reliability, backed by data that asserts that on average, up to 80% of a dog's alerts are wrong. Twenty-four U.S. States, the federal government, and two U.S. territories filed briefs in support of Florida as amici curiae.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2014 term per curiam opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States</span>

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down eight per curiam opinions during its 2014 term, which began October 6, 2014 and concluded October 4, 2015.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). PD-icon.svg This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain .
  2. Rendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).
  3. Franks v. State, 373A.2d578 (Del.1977).
  4. Franks v. State, 398A.2d783 (Del.1979).
  5. "Department of Correction".