Knowles v. Iowa

Last updated
Knowles v. Iowa
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 3, 1998
Decided December 8, 1998
Full case namePatrick Knowles, Petitioner v. Iowa
Citations525 U.S. 113 ( more )
119 S. Ct. 484; 142 L. Ed. 2d 492; 1998 U.S. LEXIS 8068; 67 U.S.L.W. 4027; 98 Daily Journal DAR 12417; 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6164
Case history
PriorConviction affirmed, State v. Knowles, 569 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1997); cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1019(1998).
Holding
A law enforcement officer may not search a person's vehicle without their consent when they are not in custody once they have been cited without violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Case opinion
MajorityRehnquist, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
Iowa Code §321.485(1)(a); U.S. Const. amend. IV

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from further searching a vehicle which was stopped for a minor traffic offense once the officer has written a citation for the offense. [1]

Contents

Background

Patrick Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, driving 43  mph (69  km/h ) in a 25 mph (40 km/h) zone. The police officer ticketed Knowles rather than arresting him, as was permitted under Iowa law. The officer then searched the car, finding marijuana and a "pot pipe." Knowles was then arrested and charged with violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances.

Before trial, Knowles argued the search was not applicable to the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Robinson , [2] because he had not been placed under arrest. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer conceded that he had neither Knowles' consent nor probable cause to conduct the search. He relied on Iowa law dealing with such searches.

Because Iowa Code § 321.485(1)(a) permits either an arrest or a citation when making a traffic stop, the Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as providing authority to officers to conduct a full-blown search of an automobile and driver in those cases where police elect not to make a custodial arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the defendant was convicted.

A divided Iowa Supreme Court upheld the search and the conviction. [3]

Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the search was unlawful.

Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.

Because, given the type of stop, there were no grounds for the officer to believe that his safety was in jeopardy, and thus had no probable cause to perform a search without consent of the driver. Also, since Knowles was not "in custody", there was no custodial exception to permit a search either. Thus the search was ruled illegal.

The Supreme Court reversed the case and remanded it for redetermination.

See also

Further reading

Related Research Articles

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Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), was a 1983 case before the US Supreme Court determining that a warrantless arrest violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Therefore, Belton extended the so-called "Chimel rule" of searches incident to a lawful arrest, established in Chimel v. California (1969), to vehicles. The Supreme Court sought to establish bright line rules to govern vehicle search incident to eliminate some confusion in the cases.

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Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."

Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a murder conviction notwithstanding a challenge that the evidence upon which guilt was based was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court held that in view of the station-house detention upon probable cause, the very limited intrusion of scraping the defendant's fingernails for blood and other material, undertaken to preserve highly evanescent evidence, did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that appellate courts should review probable cause determinations for warrantless searches de novo.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that decided that a warrantless arrest in public and consenting to a vehicle search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court decision dealing with warrantless arrests and the Fourth Amendment. The Court ruled that even if an officer wrongly arrests a suspect for one crime, the arrest may still be "reasonable" if there is objectively probable cause to believe that the suspect is involved in a different crime.

References

  1. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113(1998)PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  2. United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
  3. State v. Knowles, 569N.W.2d601 (Iowa1997).