This article possibly contains original research .(August 2023) |
The term red lines has seen use in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and is a veiled threat of engagement that is intended to warn an opponent or observer not to interfere or undertake in an action or behaviour that would "cross the red line."
On 21 April 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a speech in which he repeatedly warned the West of red lines that Russia would not accept. The warnings were repeated on many occasions up to the date of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. [1]
To some experts, the number of red lines that have been crossed reveal the inability for belligerents involved in the war to project power internationally. [2]
The mention of red lines have been in common use since the very start of the renewed conflict in Ukraine to justify the war. In February of 2022, President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation stated that the United States and its Western partners had crossed a red line with regard to Ukraine, which resulted in the consequence of Russia having to undertake its "Special Military Operation" against Ukraine due of the threat imposed from Ukraine to the very existence of the Russian Federation. [3]
Crossing a red line to the Russian Federation is often identified as being an action that damages Russian national interests. Such actions may include the imposition of sanctions, the freezing of Russian or affiliated nation funds, and the donation of military goods to its perceived adversaries or other.
While commonly used by the Russian Federation in international politics, Russia has simultaneously used the red line phrase in shaping narratives aimed at domestic audiences.
In June 2023 President Putin said that Russia would keep responding to breaches of its red lines. [4] President Putin has been consistent with regard to the threat of nuclear action being used solely in the event of crossing the red line of an existential threat to the state. [5]
In 2023 Russia made 15 official "red line" statements, compared to 24 in 2022. [6]
Russia has used the phrase "red line" often, and because some of these lines have been crossed without major repercussions, some believe that Russia has devalued the impact of their threats, with the threats appearing more as bluffs. [7]
There may be an actual red line that Russian and the Kremlin really have, but it is largely unclear what exactly it consists of. [7]
Some of the red line threats from Russia may in fact be bluffs solely to slow the supply of resources to Ukraine, making the West consider their options and delaying action. [8]
Others may be used just to show an element of escalation has taken place once a line is crossed. Red lines are nearly always soft, variable and adjustable rather than hard-line positions that are immutable. [9]
In diplomacy, both Russia and Ukraine have mentioned red lines when referring to acceptable peace terms. One such example of a diplomatic Russian red line leaves Russia keeping Crimea, and another Ukrainian red line sees all Russian forces leave territory that belonged to Ukraine on 31 December 1991. [10] [11] These red lines appear incompatible.
As time has progressed in the war, a set of tacit rules has emerged which fit between current operations and red lines and affect the rule creator. [12] [8]
Examples of such tacit rules include:
Under these stated rules, Russia would cross a red line if they attacked a NATO country, and NATO would cross a self-imposed red line if they sent troops into Ukraine. The above aim to limit an expansion of the war; however, it is not all one-sided, as other tacit rules are:
Date notified | Red line | Date broken | Consequences | Ref. |
---|---|---|---|---|
2014 | Crimea | 23 Aug 2023 | [19] [20] | |
September 2021 | Ukraine not joining NATO | not broken | [21] [20] [22] | |
September 2021 | NATO military infrastructure not to be deployed in Ukraine | not broken | [21] [20] [22] | |
September 2021 | No deployment of soldiers to Ukraine | 12 April 2023 | [23] [22] | |
December 2021 | No weapons to Ukraine | February 2022 | Threats over non disguised intervention by NATO | [23] [26] [27] |
24 February 2022 | “Interference” in Ukraine by outside powers | 24 February 2022 | Reduction in gas supply to the west | [20] |
February 2022 | NATO troops and missiles to be withdrawn from Russia's western border | February 2022 | [28] | |
February 2022 | NATO to stop eastward expansion and reverses back to position in 1997 | February 2022 | [28] | |
March 2022 | No introducing a “no-fly” zone | not broken | [29] | |
March 2022 | No more western arms to Ukraine | March 2022 | Convoys will be considered legitimate targets | [30] [20] |
March 2022 | No MiG-29 fighter jets | March 2023 | Supplied MiG's will be destroyed | [8] |
April 2022 | No foreign intervention in war | not broken | [31] [20] | |
June 2022 | No long-range missiles | June 2022 | New targets hit by Russian missiles | [32] [20] |
June 2022 | No Western made missiles to be fired into Russia | Dec 2023 | [33] | |
August 2022 | No supplying old Soviet tanks to Ukraine | August 2022 | [36] | |
September 2022 | Germany's supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine crosses a red line | September 2022 | [37] | |
September 2022 | Russian setbacks on battlefield will result in nuclear holocaust | September 2022 | [38] | |
September 2022 | Not to threaten the territorial integrity of Russia (as its borders were prior to 2014) | 22 May 2023 | [38] | |
September 2022 | Not to supply longer range battlefield missiles (greater than HIMARS's current 80 kilometres (50 mi)) | May 2023 | Red line pulled back | [41] [42] |
November 2022 | Not to supply Patriot Missile system | April 2023 | [43] | |
January 2023 | No modern western tanks to be supplied to Ukraine | January 2023 | Comments about it being an "extremely dangerous" action | [44] [42] |
May 2023 | No F-16 fighter jets | pending | Comments about it being a "colossal risk" | [45] |
June 2023 | No HIMARS or Storm Shadow missiles to attack Russian territory (as its borders were prior to 2014) | not broken | [6] | |
September 2023 | No US ATACM longer range missiles to attack Russian territory | October 2023 | Putin said in October, US deliveries of the long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) to Ukraine was "another mistake" | [46] [47] [48] |
Current red lines
Date notified | Red line | Date broken | Consequences | Ref. |
---|---|---|---|---|
Through 2021 | Russia not to invade Ukraine | February 2022 | Immediate sanctions | [49] |
February 2022 | Threats against a NATO country | several times against Poland and Baltic countries | [50] | |
February 2022 | Not to surrender the independent right of any country to apply to join NATO | not broken | [51] | |
March 2022 | No chemical weapons | broken [52] | [53] | |
International law | Murder and abduction of children | 2022-2023 | International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova | [54] |
NATO rules | Interfering with civilian ships belonging to NATO countries in the Black Sea Russian warships stop and board NATO member civilian ship (Turkish) in international waters | August 2023 | NATO warships from Romania and Bulgaria patrol and sweep Ukrainian grain corridor for mines | [55] |
Red lines come in differing levels of severity. Some of these are bluffs, with parties to the conflict having given many red lines that were transcended without issue during the last decade. To counter red line policies, a number of tactics have been employed by the belligerents and non-belligerents alike. Such counter-measures aim to allow the crossing of red lines with significantly fewer or no consequences. [8] [56] [57] [ original research? ]
Red lines set by Russia have had an effect. The United Kingdom, apart from refusing to have British soldiers participate, have supplied most pieces of equipment and undertaken training missions that they are in a position to do, however many other countries have shown timidity and concern over the red lines, resulting in a lack of, or delay in, providing assistance to Ukraine. [66]
Russia appears to generally abide by the Western red lines, although certain chemical weapons deployed are pushing the boundaries, [67] as is the treatment of civilians, especially Ukrainian children.
Many countries outside of the direct belligerents active in the Russo-Ukrainian war have interests within it. As a result, this has caused foreign parties such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and the People's Republic of China to establish their own so-called red lines.
When the international community refers to the crossing of "red lines" it tends to be limited to the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the supply of other lethal weapons. Below, a small list of such red lines has been provided.
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This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 12 November 2022, following the conclusion of Ukraine's Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives, to 7 June 2023, the day before the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive began. Russia continued its strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure while the Battle of Bakhmut escalated.