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Aerial warfare in the Russian invasion of Ukraine began at dawn of 24 February 2022, [1] with infantry divisions and armored and air support in Eastern Ukraine, and dozens of missile attacks across Ukraine. [2] [3] The first fighting took place in Luhansk Oblast near the village of Milove on the border with Russia at 3:40 am Kyiv time. [4] The main infantry and tank attacks were launched in four spearhead incursions, creating a northern front launched towards Kyiv, a southern front originating in Crimea, a south-eastern front launched at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas, and an eastern front. [5] [6] Dozens of missile strikes across Ukraine also reached as far west as Lviv. [7] [8] Drones have also been a critical part of the invasion, particularly in regards to combined arms warfare. [9] [10] Drones have additionally been employed by Russia in striking Ukrainian critical infrastructure, [11] [12] and have been used by Ukraine to strike military infrastructure in Russian territory. [13] [14]
The Ukrainian Air Force, led by Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, [15] is the aerial branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Prior to the invasion, Ukraine had 43 MiG-29s, 12 Su-24s, 17 Su-25s, and 26 Su-27s in active service in 2021 according to data from Flight Global. [16] In May 2023, the United States indicated support for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighters and for allies to transfer the aircraft to Ukraine. [17] After this, multiple countries, including the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, pledged F-16s to Ukraine. [18]
After the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014, the development of air defense capabilities was a goal of the Ukrainian government. This consisted of ensuring that the radio engineering troops, responsible for providing warning from air attacks, could detect targets in a 300–400 kilometres (190–250 mi) range. In addition, Ukraine tried to modernize and increase the lifespans of its man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which played a significant role in Ukraine's air defense capabilities. Also after 2014, Ukraine attempted to modernize its air force fleet, which, at the time of the invasion, had around 50 Mig-29 fighters, 32 Su-27 fighters, and Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft. However, the Ukrainian Air Force was still at a technical disadvantage to the Russian Air Force at the beginning of the invasion. [19]
The Russian Aerospace Forces, which consists of the Russian Air Force, the Air and Missile Defense Forces, and the Russian Space Forces, is currently led by Viktor Afzalov. [20] The Russian Aerospace Forces, formed in August 2015, [21] were previously headed by Sergey Surovikin, who was sacked from his position in August 2023 in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion. [22] As of 2021, Russia had 4,173 active aircraft, comprising 8% of the world share, according to data from Flight Global. [23]
According to Mikhail Khodaryonok, Russians expecting a quick Russian victory in Ukraine falsely believed that: Russia could overwhelm Ukrainian defense with a powerful "first strike", which overlooked Russia's limited number of Kalibr cruise missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskander missiles, and Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles; and that Russia achieving air dominance would be the decisive factor in obtaining a fast victory, which disregarded previous conflicts (such as the Soviet-Afghan War and the Chechen Wars) in which achieving air dominance did not obtain a fast victory. [24]
Russian forces were unable to achieve air dominance over Ukraine in the early days of the war, which contributed to the Russian army failing to achieve its initial strategic objectives. Justin Bronk, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, attributed the failure to establish air superiority to a lack of early warning, coordination capacity and sufficient planning time. In addition, the Russian use of small jet formations and the U.S's fast delivery of anti-aircraft FIM-92 Stingers to Ukraine were also factors in Russia not achieving air superiority. [25] In addition, Ukraine successfully used anti-air systems against Russia, which meant that Russian aircraft could not freely operate over most of Ukrainian-controlled territory. [26] Due to the Russians having limited numbers of air resources for bombing, as well as Russian aircraft losses, Russian forces began to rely on missiles, which were often less accurate, instead of planes and helicopters. [27] During the first three months of the war, the Russians took an estimated 200 aircraft losses. [28]
At the opening stages of the war, Russia aimed to pin down Ukrainian air defenses by conducting ballistic and cruise missile strikes, and strike Ukrainian military infrastructure, arms, shipments from the West, fuel facilities, and bridges. During the first 21 days of the war, Russia launched over 1,100 missiles, and 2,125 over the first 68 days. [26] On the first day of the invasion alone, Russia launched 100 short-range ballistic missiles. [29] Russia faced problems in this campaign due to a lack of air supremacy, as well as logistics problems (such as running low on long range, precision guided missiles). [26] In addition, Ukraine was able to move most of their planes before Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian airfields began on February 24. [30]
The first major battle of the invasion, the Battle of Antonov Airport, began on 24 February. The Russians aimed to use the airport to land a paratrooper force near Kyiv. The attack began with Russian KA52 attack helicopters and MI8 transport helicopters, with paratroopers on board. While Russian forces managed to take Antonov Airport, the Ukrainians contested the area for multiple more days. [31] The Russians' failure to achieve air superiority also significantly hampered their efforts to take the airport. [32] The resistance of Ukraine at Antnonov Airport, and the failure of Russian paratroopers to take another airport in Vasylkiv a few days later, were significant reasons why the Battle of Kyiv failed. [33] Russian forces took heavy paratrooper losses during the Battle of Kyiv. [34] Later during the Battle of Kyiv, on 28 February, Russian forces sent a 15,000 strong convoy from Belarus into Ukraine, in order to help encirclement efforts of Kyiv. Ukraine employed Bayraktar TB2 drones to breach Russian anti-air systems included in the convoy. [35] During the Odesa offensive in late march, Russia used cruise missiles to strike port infrastructure and the military airport in Odesa. [36]
In the first month of the war, multiple countries provided air components to Ukraine: the U.S. provided 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems, 5,500 Javelin anti-tank missile systems, and 16 Mi-17 helicopters; Britain gave 10,000 short-range missiles and 10,000 anti-tank missiles; France gave MILAN anti-tank guided missile systems; and Germany gave 500 Stingers. [37]
In April, after Russia abandoned the Kyiv Offensive, Russia refocused its missile attacks from Ukraine's military air fields and air defenses to economic and logistical targets. To that end, Russia targeted Ukraine's petroleum industry and oil refineries, which likely contributed to a temporary shortage of gasoline for Ukraine in the spring and summer of 2022. In addition, Russia struck Ukraine's bridge and rail infrastructure in an effort to slow the transfer of Western supplied weapons to Ukraine. However, neither of these efforts had a lasting impact on the war. [38]
During this period in the Battle of Donbas, fighting became increasingly dominated by the use of artillery. As this increased, the importance of target acquisition also increased. To help with target acquisition, both sides used a wide range of drones. In a study by the Royal United Services Institute covering the period of the war up to July 2022, it was assessed that around 90% of drones used by Ukraine during this time period were destroyed. [39]
From the last week of march to the end of April, Ukraine initiated helicopter raids to rescue members of the Azov Regiment during the Siege of Mariupol. These raids consistend of sixteen Mi-8 helicopters and resulted in the loss of three helicopters. [40]
On 14 April, Ukraine sunk the Moskva cruiser with the use of Neptune missiles and a drone. [41] The loss of the Moskva, which was the only Black Sea Fleet ship to have the S-300 missile system, left the other Black Sea Fleet ships with insufficient anti-air capabilities. [42] This led the other Black Sea Fleet ships to relocate to the Sevastopol harbor, where there were ground based anti-air defences. [41]
By the summer of 2022, Russian attacks against civilians and the Ukrainian agricultural sector using long-range missiles had increased. The increase in civilian attacks happened at the same time that there were reports that Russia was running low on higher-end precision-guided missiles, such as the Kh-101, and was instead using missiles not suited for land attacks, such as anti-ship missiles like the Kh-22 and S-300 anti-air missiles. It is likely that this increase in civilian attacks came in part intentionally, and in part due to inaccurate Russian missiles and bad targeting information. [43]
On 28 June, Oleksii Reznikov, the defence minister of Ukraine, said that Ukraine had been given fifty Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones since the start of the invasion. [44]
On 9 August, Ukraine struck Saky airbase in Novofedorivka, Crimea, leading to the destruction of four Su-30M jets and seven Su-24 jets. [45]
After Ukraine attacked the Kerch Straight Bridge on 8 October, Russia began a campaign to degrade Ukraine's electrical infrastructure through the use of missile and drone strikes. In the first week after having started these attacks, Russia struck about 30% of the power stations in Ukraine. While this campaign led to significant damage of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, Ukraine was able to avoid a complete collapse of its electrical grid. [46]
During the Battle of Avdiivka, according to the ISW, Russian forces gained temporary and localized air superiority, likely for the first time during the war. [47] During the battle, Russian forces increased their use of glide bombs. [48]
On 24 February, Russian forces attacked the Chuhuiv air base, [49] which housed Bayraktar TB2 drones. The attack caused damage to fuel storage areas and infrastructure. [50] The next day, Ukrainian forces attacked the Millerovo air base. [7] [8] On 27 February, Russia reportedly fired 9K720 Iskander missiles from Belarus at the civilian Zhytomyr Airport. [51] [52] Many Ukrainian air defense facilities were destroyed or damaged in the first days of the invasion by Russian air strikes. [53] In the opening days of the conflict, Russia fired many cruise and ballistic missiles at the principal Ukrainian ground-based early warning radars, thereby blinding the Ukrainian Air Force to their air activity. Craters in the operating surfaces at the major Ukrainian air bases hindered Ukrainian aircraft movements, and several Ukrainian long-range S-300P surface-to-air missile batteries were destroyed. [54]
On 1 March, Russia and the US established a deconfliction line to avoid any misunderstanding that could cause an unintentional escalation. [55] Russia lost at least ten aircraft on 5 March. [56] On 6 March, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that 88 Russian aircraft had been destroyed since the war began. [57] However, an anonymous senior US defense official told Reuters on 7 March that Russia still had the "vast majority" of its fighter jets and helicopters that had been amassed near Ukraine available to fly. [58] After the first month of the invasion, Justin Bronk, a British military observer, counted the Russian aircraft losses at 15 fixed-wing aircraft and 35 helicopters, but noted that the true total was certainly higher. [59] In contrast, according to the United States, 49 Ukrainian fighter aircraft were lost by 18 March. [60]
On 11 March, US officials said that Russian aircraft launched up to 200 sorties a day, most not entering Ukrainian airspace, instead staying in Russian airspace. [61] On 13 March, Russian forces conducted multiple cruise missile attacks on a military training facility in Yavoriv, Lviv Oblast, close to the Polish border. Local governor Maksym Kozytskyy reported that at least 35 people had been killed in the attacks. [62] [63] The poor performance of the Russian Air Force has been attributed by The Economist to Russia's inability to suppress Ukraine's medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries and Russia's lack of precision-guided bombs. Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites force planes to fly low, making them vulnerable to Stinger and other shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, and lack of training and flight hours for Russian pilots renders them inexperienced for the type of close ground support missions typical of modern air forces. [64] On 5 May, Forbes magazine reported that Russians had continued air attacks and "continue to send Su-24 and Su-25 attack planes on treetop-level bombing runs targeting Ukrainian positions." [65]
On 14 March, Russian forces conducted multiple cruise missile attacks on a military training facility in Yavoriv, Lviv Oblast, close to the Polish border. Local governor Maksym Kozytskyy reported that at least 35 people had been killed. [66] [67] On 18 March, Russia expanded the attack to Lviv, with Ukrainian military officials saying initial information suggested that the missiles which hit Lviv were likely air-launched cruise missiles originating from warplanes flying over the Black Sea. [68] On 16 May, US defense officials say that in the previous 24 hours Russians fired long-range missiles targeting military training facility near Lviv. [69]
By June 2022, Russia had not achieved air superiority, having lost around 165 of its combat aircraft over Ukraine which amounted to approximately 10% of its frontline combat strength. Western commentators noted the qualitative and quantitative advantages the Russian Air Force had over its Ukrainian counterpart, but attributed the poor performance of Russian aviation to the extensive ground-based anti-aircraft capabilities of the Ukrainians. [70]
An attack on Dnipro proper was carried out by Russian armed forces [71] on 15 July 2022. As a result, 4 people died and 16 were injured. [72] The main target was the largest space plant of Ukraine located within the city. [73] [74] The city was struck by Kh-101 missiles launched from Tu-95 aircraft in the northern part of the Caspian Sea. [75] According to preliminary data, eight missiles were launched, of which four were shot down by the Ukrainian Air Defence Forces. [76] Each missile costs 13 million dollars [77] (8 missiles cost Russia more than 100 million dollars). [78]
Part of the rockets hit the "Pivdenmash" enterprise. [79] As a result of the impact, the city's water supply was damaged, and part of the city's residents were left without water supply. [79] More than ten cars were damaged, doors and windows were destroyed in residential buildings. [80] Four people were killed. [81] One of the victims was a city bus driver. [71] On the first day, 15 wounded were reported, and the next day their number increased to 16. [71]
In August the USAF was able to integrate AGM-88 HARM missiles into the Ukrainian Su-27s and MiG-29s. This effort has taken "some months" to achieve. This does not give the Ukrainian air force the same "capabilities that it would on an F-16." However, US Air Force General James B. Hecker said: "Even though you don't get a kinetic kill … you can get local air superiority for a period of time where you can do what you need to do." [82]
On 19 September, US Air Force General James B. Hecker said that 55 Russian military aircraft had been shot down by Ukrainian air defenses since the start of the invasion. He credited this success to the Ukrainian use of SA-11 and SA-10 air defense systems. As the US does not have these systems, getting new missiles from European allies is a "big ask" from Kyiv. Russian airplanes increased their operations in response to the 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive. The tally of downed aircraft increased to 55 when the UK MoD stated that it believed that some four Russian jets had been downed by Ukraine over the previous 10 days. These losses were due to changing front lines (Russia's loss of controlled territory) and other factors. Also, Russian aviation resources were under pressure to provide closer support to ground forces. As of 19 September, the Ukrainian Air Force was at "about 80%" of its pre-invasion strength after seven months of combat. [83] [84]
On 28 February 2023, the Ukrainian military attacked the port of Tuapse with two uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) causing a large fire at the Rosneft oil terminal. It was reported by Naval News that the reach of Ukrainian forces across the Black Sea was growing with this long-range air attack over 430 km (270 mi) away from Ukrainian-controlled territory. [85]
During the invasion, there have been several airspace violations of noncombatant countries, such as in Poland, [86] Moldova, [87] and Romania. [88] On 10 March 2022, an unmanned drone crashed in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, after flying through Hungarian and Romanian airspace. [89] On 15 November 2022, a stray Ukrainian air defense missile landed in Przewodów, Poland, killing two people. [90] [91]
Russia launched about 85 to 100 missiles at a number of Ukrainian cities. The recent strategic bombing campaign has caused severe shortages of electricity and water in multiple cities. [92] [93] [94] According to Ukraine's Operational Command South, Ukrainian rocket and artillery units attacked Russian positions on the left bank of the Dnipro River and in the area of the Kinburn Spit. [95] [96]
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, 77 of 96 Russian missiles were shot down. A Pentagon official claims the Russian plan is to exhaust the Ukrainian air defenses. At one stage some 50 missiles were in combat "within minutes" near the Polish border. [97] [98] Ukrainian officials report that electricity has already been restored to "nearly 100%" of Ukraine. [99] [100] President Zelenskyy said that about half of the Ukrainian electricity infrastructure has been hit and some 10 million people are still without power. [101]
Ukraine was first reportedly supplied with U.K. made Storm Shadow missiles on 11 May 2023. [102] Since that time that have been used in a number of attacks by the Ukrainian Air Force on strategic targets as a part of the war effort. Key targets have been ammunition depots and transit hubs, as well as bridges, notably the Chonhar bridge which has been attacked by Storm Shadow missiles on two confirmed occasions, 22 June 2023 and 6 August 2023. [103] The aircraft commonly cited as being used to carry and fire Storm Shadow missiles is the Ukrainian Su-24M. [104] [105] [106]
Initial Ukrainian sources claimed that, on 25 February 2022, the Su-27 of Ukrainian Colonel Oleksandr Oksanchenko was shot down by an S-400 over Kyiv. [107]
On 14 April 2022, the Russian Defence Ministry claimed that a Ukrainian Mi-8 was shot down by a S-400 near Horodnia, Chernihiv Oblast on its way to an air base following an attack on Russian territory near Klimovo, Bryansk Oblast. [108] [109]
In August 2022, Ukraine claimed that a 92N6E radar used in the S-400 SAM system was destroyed in Kherson region. [110]
On 15 October 2022, a S-400 missile crashed or was shot down in the Grayvoronsky District of Belgorod Oblast, Russia. [111]
On 23 August 2023, GRU released a video of two alleged elements of an S-400 battery being destroyed in Olenivka, Crimea, 120 km (75 mi) south of Kherson, by a barrage of Ukrainian missiles. [112] [113] [114] Ukrainian forces, according to Ukrainian media, used a R-360 Neptune and a drone to destroy the missile's radar. [115] [116]
On 14 September 2023, Ukraine claimed to have destroyed a Russian S-400's radar near Yevpatoria, Crimea. [117] On 4 October 2023, Ukrainian kamikaze drone destroyed one radar and a missile launcher of S-400 system in Belgorod region. [118]
During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both Russia and Ukraine have heavily used drones in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, combined arms, air strikes, and electronic warfare. [119] [120] [121]
During the winter and fall of 2022-2023, Russia engaged in a campaign of striking Ukrainian infrastructure, which included a widespread use of drones, [122] [123] [124] [125] [126] resulting in significant damage to Ukraine's electrical grid. [127] [128] This campaign was initiated in large part in an attempt to demoralize the Ukrainian population, an initiative that has been deemed to have failed. [129] [130] [131] Additionally, Russia has struck Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure with missiles and drones since its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, [132] [133] causing an estimated loss of 280,000 metric tons of grain. [134]
According to US officials, Iran has supplied Russia with Shahed-136 drones [135] [9] and has assisted Russia in building a drone production facility in Yelabuga, [136] leading the US to impose sanctions on Iranian officials involved in the production of drones. [137] [138] Shahed-136 drones, which are hard for air defenses to intercept due to a flight path at low altitudes, have mostly been used by Russia to strike targets deep inside Ukrainian territory. [10] [139]
Ukraine has used drones in strikes against Russian military infrastructure, [140] [141] [142] such as in the ongoing strikes against Crimea, [143] and has been accused by Russia of being responsible for the Kremlin drone attack and the 30 May 2023 Moscow drone strikes, but has denied responsibility in both cases. [144] [145]
In October 2023, The Economist reported that electronic warfare was in widespread use on frontlines to impair small battlefield UAV activity, with Russia installing video feedback and control jammers on high-value equipment like tanks and artillery. [146]
In January 2024, Ukrainian drone operators told Reuters and the BBC that many small first-person view (FPV) drones were cheaply assembled by volunteers at home encouraged by the government, using different controllers and settings, with a lack of quality and reliability that hindered in their use. The most common problem being video or control link failure. Each new drone needed testing before combat use. Ukrainian FPV drone pilots receive 14 hours of training to qualify. [147] [148]
December 26, 2023, reportedly using air-launched cruise missiles, Ukraine's Air Force attacked the Novocherkassk, a major Russian landing craft docked in Feodosia, southern Crimea. Ukraine said the ship had launched cruise missiles against Ukrainian cities. The attack resulted in multiple explosions and fires. Ukraine said munitions aboard were detonated by the attack, and the ship was destroyed -- unlikely to return to service. Russian authorities and media confirmed the attack, but did not confirm the ship's loss, adding that two attacking aircraft were shot down. Independent analysts said the ship's loss would substantially impede future Russian attacks on Ukraine's coast. [149] [150] [151]
The Ukrainian Air Force is the air force of Ukraine and one of the seven branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Its current form was created in 2004 by merging the Ukrainian Air Defence Forces into the Air Force.
The Black Sea Fleet is the fleet of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea Fleet, along with other Russian ground and air forces on the Crimean Peninsula, are subordinate to the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces. The fleet traces its history to its founding by Prince Potemkin on 13 May 1783 as part of the Imperial Russian Navy. The Russian SFSR inherited the fleet in 1918; with the founding of the Soviet Union in 1922, it became part of the Soviet Navy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Black Sea Fleet was partitioned between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 1997, with Russia receiving title to 82% of the vessels.
On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in an escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War that started in 2014. The invasion became the largest attack on a European country since World War II. It is estimated to have caused tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties and hundreds of thousands of military casualties. By June 2022, Russian troops occupied about 20% of Ukrainian territory. From a population of 41 million in January 2022, about 8 million Ukrainians had been internally displaced and more than 8.2 million had fled the country by April 2023, creating Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. Extensive environmental damage caused by the war, widely described as an ecocide, contributed to food crises worldwide.
There have been attacks in mainland Russia as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022. The main targets have been the military, the arms industry and the oil industry. Many of the attacks have been drone strikes, firebombing, and rail sabotage. The Ukrainian intelligence services have acknowledged carrying out some of these attacks. Others have been carried out by anti-war activists in Russia. There has also been cross-border shelling, missile strikes and ground raids from Ukraine, mainly in the Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk oblasts. Several times, Russian anti-Kremlin paramilitaries have launched incursions from Ukraine into Russia, captured border villages and battled the Russian military. While Ukraine has supported these ground incursions, it has denied direct involvement.
The battle of Huliaipole is an ongoing military conflict between the Armed Forces of Russia and the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the city of Huliaipole, in central Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces have launched several missile attacks over the city of Dnipro in Ukraine. These have led to dozens of fatalities and over a hundred injuries among the civilian population.
The HESA Shahed 136, also known by its Russian designation Geran-2, is an Iranian-designed loitering munition, also referred to as a kamikaze drone or suicide drone, in the form of an autonomous pusher-propelled drone. It is designed and manufactured by the Iranian state-owned corporation HESA in association with Shahed Aviation Industries.
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine, to 7 April 2022 when fighting focused away from the north and towards the south and east of Ukraine.
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 29 August 2022, when Ukraine's Kherson counteroffensive started, to 11 November 2022 when Ukrainian troops retook Kherson. In between, Ukraine launched a successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast. Starting in October, Russia began a campaign of massive strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure.
Beginning in July 2022, a series of explosions and fires occurred on the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula from where the Russian Army had launched its offensive on Southern Ukraine during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Occupied since 2014, Crimea was a base for the subsequent Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast and Russian occupation of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The Ukrainian government has not accepted responsibility for all of the attacks.
During the autumn and winter of 2022–2023, Russia launched waves of missile and drone strikes against energy in Ukraine as part of its invasion. The strikes targeted civilian areas beyond the battlefield, particularly critical power infrastructure, which is considered a war crime. By the end of 2023, Russian forces launched about 7,400 missiles and 3,900 Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine according to Ukrainian military officials.
The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to the Russo-Ukrainian War:
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 12 November 2022, following the conclusion of Ukraine's Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives, to 7 June 2023, the day before the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive began. Russia continued its strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure while the Battle of Bakhmut escalated.
Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine with around 2,950,000 residents, has been frequently targeted by the Russian Armed Forces during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 8 June 2023, when the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive began, to 31 August 2023.
Naval warfare in the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, when the Russian Armed Forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. Media reporting of and focus on the invasion has largely been on the terrestrial and aerial aspects – however, maritime engagements have been consequential during the conflict. Disputes over Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea have also played a significant role.
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 1 September to 30 November 2023 during the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 1 December 2023 to 31 March 2024.
This timeline of the Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 1 April 2024 to the present day.
The Ukrainian army is already attacking positions around the Kinburn Spit on the left bank of the Dnipro river.