Abram Shulsky

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Abram Shulsky
Personal details
Born (1942-08-15) August 15, 1942 (age 82)
Education Cornell University (BA)
University of Chicago (MA, PhD)

Abram Shulsky (born August 15, 1942) is a neoconservative scholar who has worked for the U.S. government, RAND Corporation, and the Hudson Institute. Shulsky served as Director of the Office of Special Plans, a unit whose function has been compared to the 1970s Team B exercise. In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Shulsky approved OSP memos with talking points about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Shulsky is critical of the traditional intelligence analysis, which is based upon the social-scientific method, and of independent intelligence agencies. Shulsky favors a military intelligence model which can be used to support policy as, in Shulsky's words, "truth is not the goal" of intelligence operations, but "victory". Shulsky signed a letter to the Clinton White House on Iraq. [1] [2]

Contents

Education and career

Shulsky received his B.A. in mathematics from Cornell University and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in political science from the University of Chicago. [3] At Cornell and Chicago, he roomed with Paul Wolfowitz, whom he met during their time as members and residents of the Cornell Branch of the Telluride Association. [4] [5] Shulsky earned his doctorate under political philosopher Leo Strauss. [6] He is a neoconservative scholar [7] [8] and Straussian. [9]

Shulsky served as staff for the Senate Intelligence Committee in the early 1980s. [10] He worked under Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle during the Reagan Administration and later worked for the RAND Corporation. [10] He worked as a consultant for the Office of Net Assessment, a Pentagon think-tank. [5] In the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Shulsky was the Director of the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which served as a source of intelligence. [10] He was hired and overseen by Douglas Feith and William Luti, [5] but Shulsky's "real boss" may have been higher up than Feith. [11] Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz advocated the creation of the pro-war OSP as he "was impatient with the C.I.A." [8] Gordon R. Mitchell, writing in the Quarterly Journal of Speech , stated,

Shulsky’s cell stovepiped dubious intelligence purchased from Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress to senior administration officials, fundamentally distorting policy-making on topics ranging from the threat of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program to the cost of postwar reconstruction in Iraq. [12]

After the OSP took control of providing "intelligence" to justify the invasion of Iraq, many veteran intelligence officers were forced into retirement or transferred to other positions despite years of service. Shulsky developed the "intelligence" received by the White House. According to Lt. Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski, Shulsky ran the OSP with a clear agenda, to support the efforts of his fellow neoconservatives. [13] In his position at OSP, Shulsky "directed the writing of Iraq, WMD, and terrorism memos according to strictly supervised talking points" [14] and granted them approval. [11] Insider Karen Kwiatkowski characterized the talking points in depth:

These internal talking points seemed to be a mélange crafted from obvious past observation and intelligence bits and pieces of dubious origin. They were propagandistic in style, and all desk officers were ordered to use them verbatim in the preparation of any material prepared for higher-ups and people outside the Pentagon. The talking points included statements about Saddam Hussein's proclivity for using chemical weapons against his own citizens and neighbors, his existing relations with terrorists based on a member of al-Qaida reportedly receiving medical care in Baghdad, his widely publicized aid to the Palestinians, and general indications of an aggressive viability in Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program and his ongoing efforts to use them against his neighbors or give them to al-Qaida style groups. The talking points said he was threatening his neighbors and was a serious threat to the U.S., too... The talking points were a series of bulleted statements, written persuasively and in a convincing way, and superficially they seemed reasonable and rational. Saddam Hussein had gassed his neighbors, abused his people, and was continuing in that mode, becoming an imminently dangerous threat to his neighbors and to us—except that none of his neighbors or Israel felt this was the case. Saddam Hussein had harbored al-Qaida operatives and offered and probably provided them with training facilities—without mentioning that the suspected facilities were in the U.S./Kurdish-controlled part of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was pursuing and had WMD of the type that could be used by him, in conjunction with al-Qaida and other terrorists, to attack and damage American interests, Americans and America—except the intelligence didn't really say that. Saddam Hussein had not been seriously weakened by war and sanctions and weekly bombings over the past 12 years, and in fact was plotting to hurt America and support anti-American activities, in part through his carrying on with terrorists—although here the intelligence said the opposite. His support for the Palestinians and Arafat proved his terrorist connections, and basically, the time to act was now. [11]

George Packer, [15] Franklin Foer of The New Republic , [16] and Mitchell all compare the OSP failures to the problems in the mid-1970s Team B competitive intelligence analysis, with Mitchell noting Shulsky "worked on the staff of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that reviewed the original Team B exercise during the Cold War." [12]

In 2006, Shulsky was working in the Pentagon at the Iran desk as "senior advisor to the undersecretary of defense for policy, focusing on the Mideast and terrorism." [17] Mary Louise Kelly of NPR noted some concern from C.I.A. officials that he was in this position. [17] Paul Krugman of The New York Times asked "Why would the Pentagon put someone who got everything wrong on Iraq in charge of intelligence on Iran?" [18]

In 2010, Shulsky was working as a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. [19]

Worldview

Shulsky, a Straussian, argues that Leo Strauss would have attacked the dominant method of U.S. intelligence analysis "known as the "social-scientific method," an approach advanced by Sherman Kent, a former Yale History professor and member of the WWII-era Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor to the C.I.A.)". [20] Shulsky critiques the social-scientific method for its potential to err by mirror-imaging. [20] In Silent Warfare Shulsky and Schmitt write, "social science can provide the facts ... but policy makers have a monopoly on choosing the values to be pursued". [21]

Shulsky favors the military intelligence model, "in which the intelligence officer works for the commander rather than an independent intelligence agency". [22] "He can scour the intelligence agencies for information his commander needs and represent the commander's priorities with respect to the collection and dissemination of intelligence", write Shulsky and Schmitt in Silent Warfare. [22] Additionally, "In a supportive role, intelligence must concentrate its efforts on finding and analyzing information relevant to implementing the policy" as "truth is not the goal" of intelligence operations, but "victory". [22] By contrast, in a paragraph discussing Shulsky's views, Dr. Michael Warner of C.I.A.'s History Staff states "the goal of intelligence is truth" but concurs with Shulsky's idea that secrecy is endemic to intelligence. [23]

In a 1999 paper, "Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (By Which We Do Not Mean Nous)," also co-authored by Schmitt, Shulsky writes that "Strauss's view certainly alerts one to the possibility that political life may be closely linked to deception. Indeed, it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope, to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the exception." [20]

Publications

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References

  1. ↑ The American Way of War: Guided Missiles, Misguided Men, and a Republic in Peril, Eugene Jarecki, Free Press, 2008
  2. ↑ [usurped] PNAC, Rebuilding America's Defenses, 2000
  3. ↑ Dr. Abram Shulsky Archived 13 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine Bio. Accessed 9 August 2010.
  4. ↑ Hirst, Aggie (2013). Leo Strauss and the Invasion of Iraq: Encountering the Abyss. Routledge. p. 59. ISBN   978-1135043698.
  5. 1 2 3 George Packer (2005). The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 105. ISBN   0374299633.
  6. ↑ William Pfaff (25 May 2003). "Lies keep elite in power". Charleston Gazette-Mail . p. 2.C.
  7. ↑ Eric Schmitt (5 June 2003). "After the War: Prewar Intelligence; Aide Denies Shaping Data to Justify War". The New York Times .
  8. 1 2 "Dissect the Iraq Data". Los Angeles Times . 28 May 2003. p. B.12.
  9. ↑ "Q. & A.; War and Intelligence; Seymour M. Hersh talks about government intelligence and covering war". The New Yorker . 12 May 2003.
  10. 1 2 3 Seymour M. Hersh (12 May 2003). "Selective Intelligence – Donald Rumsfeld has his own special sources. Are they reliable?". The New Yorker .
  11. 1 2 3 Karen Kwiatkowski (10 March 2004). "The new Pentagon papers – A high-ranking military officer reveals how Defense Department extremists suppressed information and twisted the truth to drive the country to war" (RTF). Salon.com .
  12. 1 2 Gordon R. Mitchell (2006). "Team B Intelligence Coups" (PDF). Quarterly Journal of Speech . 92 (2). Taylor & Francis: 144–173. doi:10.1080/00335630600817993. S2CID   143554450.
  13. ↑ Dreyfuss, Robert and Vest, Jason (26 January 2004). "The Lie Factory". Global Exchange.
  14. ↑ Packer, p. 108.
  15. ↑ Packer, p. 106.
  16. ↑ Franklin Foer (21 November 2005). "Intelligence Design". The New Republic . Vol. 233, no. 21. p. 6.
  17. 1 2 Mary Louise Kelly (20 September 2006). "Pentagon Iran Office Mimics Former Iraq Office". NPR .
  18. ↑ Paul Krugman (12 February 2007). "Scary Movie 2". The New York Times .
  19. ↑ Douglas J. Feith; Abram N. Shulsky (20 May 2010). "The Dangerous Illusion of 'Nuclear Zero' – Why even speculate about a nuclear posture that would require world peace as a precondition?". The Wall Street Journal .
  20. 1 2 3 4 Laura Rozen (October 2003). "Con tract – The theory behind neocon self deception". The Washington Monthly . 35 (10): 11–13. Archived from the original on 24 June 2011.
  21. ↑ Peter Gill; Stephen Marrin; Mark Phythian, eds. (2008). Intelligence theory: key questions and debates. New York: Routledge. p. 141. ISBN   978-0203892992.
  22. 1 2 3 Martha Ezzard (24 June 2003). "As intelligence devolves, truth changes shape". The Atlanta Journal-Constitution . p. A.13.
  23. ↑ Michael Warner (27 June 2008). "Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence"". Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on 28 May 2010. Retrieved 20 August 2010.
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