Acree v. Republic of Iraq | |
---|---|
Court | Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia |
Full case name | Clifford Acree, Colonel, et al., Appellees v. Republic of Iraq, et al., United States of America, Appellant |
Decided | June 4, 2004 |
Citations | Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (2004) |
Case history | |
Prior actions | default judgment, Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, motion to intervene denied, Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 276 F. Supp. 2d 95 |
Subsequent actions | cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1010 (2005) |
Related actions | Acree v. Snow, 276 F. Supp. 2d 31 |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Harry T. Edwards, David S. Tatel, John Roberts |
Case opinions | |
Decision by | Harry T. Edwards |
Concurrence | John Roberts |
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004), [1] was a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. U.S. military personnel who had been tortured by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War sued for damages, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) made state sponsors of terror liable. Iraq never contested the lawsuit, but the U.S. federal government intervened. [2] [3] The Court of Appeals ultimately decided against the plaintiffs, saying that the FSIA did not create new causes of action against foreign states. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the plaintiffs' appeal.
The plaintiffs in this case were 17 U.S. military personnel (some former, some currently serving at the time of the lawsuit) who had been tortured while they had been held as POWs during the 1991 Iraq war, who were joined in the lawsuit by 37 family members. The torture included "starvation, []mock executions, []mock castrations, chemical injections and severe beatings," [4] and included inflicting, "mental anguish by falsely reporting that they had killed Americans, including a pilot's wingman, other American POWs, and the President of the United States." [5]
They filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in April 2002 against the Republic of Iraq, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and Saddam Hussein for compensatory and punitive damages. The causes of action listed in the complain included common law torts, and while normally, the FSIA granted foreign states immunity from lawsuits in U.S. courts, there had been a "terrorism exception" (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)) passed in 1996, which took away sovereign immunity from state sponsors of terror. [6] Iraq had been designated a state sponsor of terror in 1990 after it had invaded Kuwait, so the complaint argued that it was liable. [2]
The Republic of Iraq was served notice through a Polish embassy in Baghdad, but never made any response to the suit, and a default was entered against them in September 2002. [5] The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs on their interpretation of the FSIA, and awarded them a default judgment that totaled $959 million. [2]
Having won a judgment, the plaintiffs tried to secure the monetary judgment by attaching funds in seized Iraqi bank accounts. However, in April 2003, Congress had enacted the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (EWSAA), which contained a provision that allowed the president to "make inapplicable with respect to Iraq . . . any other provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism." [7] President George W. Bush did so on May 7, and he stated publicly that he believed this applied to (among other things) the terrorism exception to the FSIA. [1] This resulted in a separate lawsuit titled Acree v. Snow, where the U.S. opposed the plaintiff's attempt to attach the funds. Acree v. Snow depended on a different law, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"), and the District Court ruled that the May 7 declaration made the TRIA inapplicable, and plaintiffs could not use it. [1] [8]
In July 2003, two weeks after the judgment was issued in Acree v. Republic of Iraq, the U.S. government filed motions to intervene in the case and vacate the judgment. [2] The invasion of Iraq had just finished, thus beginning the occupation of Iraq, and the government asserted an interest in "ensur[ing] the successful establishment of a democratic government in Iraq," as well as protecting the assets it had seized from the now-defeated Hussein regime. [7]
The U.S.'s argument for vacating, moreover, was that the May 7 presidential declaration removed the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Just as the TRIA no longer applied to Iraq, it argued, neither did the FSIA's terrorism exception apply.
The court rejected both of these motions, first on the grounds of timeliness—there was no question the government had been aware of the case for months, and it had even been two months since the president's May 7 declaration—and second on the grounds that the U.S. had no cognizable interest that had been impaired, as required for an intervention motion. The assets, it said, were not relevant to the lawsuit, nor had it been shown how the judgment would have any impact on the establishment of a democratic government. [7] The U.S. appealed.
In an opinion by judge Harry T. Edwards, the Court of Appeals sided with the U.S. government, but it did so based on its own reasoning. First, regarding the timeliness of the motion to intervene, it said that "the District Court failed to consider adequately the unique circumstances of this case." [1] On one hand, the "weighty interests" of foreign policy were enough to justify the government's delay, and on the other, the plaintiffs had not shown that they were prejudiced in any way by the government's intervention.
Second, on the question of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the government. Calling it "an exceedingly close question," it said the EWSAA was aimed at making it easier to assist a new Iraqi government, not changing the course of lawsuits in the U.S. [1] In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on an examination of the legislative history and context of the FSIA and the EWSAA.
In spite of this, they overturned the District Court and vacated the judgment, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had never had a proper cause of action to begin with (an argument the government had never made). [2] Just a few months earlier, in Cicippio-Puleov. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), the same court had ruled that "neither § 1605(a) (7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered together, supplies a cause of action against foreign states," and the court simply applied that rule to Acree. [2]
Unlike in Cicippio, however, the court did not remand the case to give plaintiffs a chance to fix their cause-of-action problem. [6] Instead, the case was simply dismissed. This seems to have been motivated by the policy arguments the U.S. had raised in its motion to intervene. The court wrote,
The circumstances of this case are even more extraordinary when one considers the stakes: Appellees have obtained a nearly billion dollar default judgment against a foreign government whose present and future stability has become a central preoccupation of the United States' foreign policy. In these circumstances, it would be utterly unseemly for this court to ignore the clear implications of our holding in Cicippio. We therefore find it appropriate to exercise our discretion to determine whether appellees' case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
— Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (2004) (Harry T. Edwards, writing for the majority)
Judge John Roberts (later Chief Justice of the United States) wrote a concurring opinion that agreed with the courts' decision, but supported the government's argument against subject matter jurisdiction, rather than the majority's reasoning about causes of action. [1] Taking a more textualist approach than the rest of the court, he wrote,
I appreciate that my view of Congress's purpose . . . is necessarily speculative — but then so is the majority's more limited view of Congress's purpose . . . In such circumstances I prefer to rest on the firmer foundation of the statutory language itself. Give me English words over Latin maxims.
— Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (2004), (John Roberts, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
The plaintiffs tried to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but their petition for certiorari was denied.
The Alien Tort Statute, also called the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), is a section in the United States Code that gives federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits filed by foreign nationals for torts committed in violation of international law. It was first introduced by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and is one of the oldest federal laws still in effect in the U.S.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) is a United States law, codified at Title 28, §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602–1611 of the United States Code, that established criteria as to whether a foreign sovereign state is immune from the jurisdiction of the United States' federal or state courts. The Act also establishes specific procedures for service of process, attachment of property and execution of judgment in proceedings against a foreign state. The FSIA provides the exclusive basis and means to bring a civil suit against a foreign sovereign in the United States. It was signed into law by United States President Gerald Ford on October 21, 1976.
Alperin v. Vatican Bank was an unsuccessful class action suit by Holocaust survivors brought against the Vatican Bank and the Franciscan Order filed in San Francisco, California, on November 15, 1999. The case was initially dismissed as a political question by the District Court for the Northern District of California in 2003, but was reinstated in part by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2005. That ruling attracted attention as a precedent at the intersection of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (1956), was a case heard before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on Montgomery and Alabama state bus segregation laws. The panel consisted of Middle District of Alabama Judge Frank Minis Johnson, Northern District of Alabama Judge Seybourn Harris Lynne, and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Rives. The main plaintiffs in the case were Aurelia Browder, Claudette Colvin, Susie McDonald, and Mary Louise Smith. Jeanetta Reese had originally been a plaintiff in the case, but intimidation by segregationists caused her to withdraw in February. She falsely claimed she had not agreed to the lawsuit, which led to an unsuccessful attempt to disbar Fred Gray for supposedly improperly representing her.
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, was a landmark case in United States and international law. It set the precedent for United States federal courts to punish non-American citizens for tortious acts committed outside the United States that were in violation of public international law or any treaties to which the United States is a party. It thus extends the jurisdiction of United States courts to tortious acts committed around the world. The case was decided by a panel of judges from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit consisting of judges Wilfred Feinberg, Irving Kaufman, and Amalya Lyle Kearse.
American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, 493 F.3d 644, is a case decided July 6, 2007, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs in the case did not have standing to bring the suit against the National Security Agency (NSA), because they could not present evidence that they were the targets of the so-called "Terrorist Surveillance Program" (TSP).
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the pleading standard for retaliatory prosecution claims against government officials. After a successful lobbying attempt by the CEO of a manufacturing company against competing devices that the US Postal Service supported, the CEO found himself the target of an investigation by US postal inspectors and a criminal prosecution that was dismissed for lack of evidence. The CEO then filed suit against the inspectors and other government officials for seeking to prosecute him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights to criticize postal policy. The Court ruled 5-2 that to prove that the prosecution was caused by a retaliatory motive, the plaintiff bringing such a claim must allege and prove that the criminal charges were brought without probable cause.
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court considered the term "based upon a commercial activity" within the meaning of the first clause of 1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, Ruhal Ahmed, and Jamal Al-Harith, four former Guantánamo Bay detainees, filed suit in 2004 in the United States District Court in Washington, DC against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. They charged that illegal interrogation tactics were permitted to be used against them by Secretary Rumsfeld and the military chain of command. The plaintiffs each sought seek compensatory damages for torture and arbitrary detention while being held at Guantánamo.
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 is a US statute that allows for the filing of civil suits in the United States against individuals who, acting in an official capacity for any foreign nation, committed torture and/or extrajudicial killing. The statute requires a plaintiff to show exhaustion of local remedies in the location of the crime, to the extent that such remedies are "adequate and available." Plaintiffs may be U.S. citizens or non-U.S. citizens.
Saleh v. Bush, 848 F.3d 880, was a class action lawsuit filed in 2013 against high-ranking members of the George W. Bush administration for their alleged involvement in premeditating and carrying out the Iraq War. In December 2014, the district court hearing the case ordered it dismissed with prejudice. The dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014), is a U.S. Supreme Court opinion regarding foreign sovereign immunity. After defaulting on its debt and losing a federal collection action, Argentina claimed that its foreign assets were immune from discovery. The Court found that no such immunity existed.
Doe ex. rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia, 489 F.3d 376, is a unanimous decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, written by Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh, in which the Court upheld a 2003 District of Columbia statute that stated the conditions for authorizing a non-emergency surgical procedure on a mentally incompetent person. This case developed out of an appeal to a district court decision that was brought on behalf of a mentally incompetent patient who was subjected to an abortion without her consent and another patient who was subjected to an eye surgery without the patient's consent. Under the appellate court's interpretation of the statute, a court located in the District of Columbia must apply the "best interest of the patient" standard to a person who was never competent, and the court must apply the "known wishes of the patient" standard to a person who was once competent. The appellate decision was remanded to the District Court.
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case that found that a law which only applied to a specific case, identified by docket number, and eliminated all of the defenses one party had raised does not violate the separation of powers in the United States Constitution between the legislative (Congress) and judicial branches of government. The plaintiffs, in the case had initially obtained judgments against Iran for its role in supporting state-sponsored terrorism, particularly the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings and 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, and sought execution against a bank account in New York held, through European intermediaries, on behalf of Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The plaintiffs obtained court orders preventing the transfer of funds from the account in 2008 and initiated their lawsuit in 2010. Bank Markazi raised several defenses, including that the account was not an asset of the bank, but rather an asset of its European intermediary, under both New York state property law and §201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. In response to concerns that existing laws were insufficient for the account to be used to settle the judgments, Congress added an amendment to a 2012 bill, codified after enactment as 22 U.S.C. § 8772, that identified the pending lawsuit by docket number, applied only to the assets in the identified case, and effectively abrogated every legal basis available to Bank Markazi to prevent the plaintiffs from executing their claims against the account. Bank Markazi then argued that § 8772 was an unconstitutional breach of the separation of power between the legislative and judicial branches of government, because it effectively directed a particular result in a single case without changing the generally applicable law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit both upheld the constitutionality of § 8772 and cleared the way for the plaintiffs to execute their judgments against the account, which held about $1.75 billion in cash.
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. ___ (2017), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that Federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review a denial of class certification after plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice.
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case from the October 2018 term. The Court held that civil service of a lawsuit against the government of Sudan was invalid because the civil complaints and summons had been sent to the Embassy of Sudan in Washington, D.C. rather than to the Sudanese Foreign Minister in Khartoum.
Jam v. International Finance Corp., 586 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case from the October 2018 term. The Supreme Court ruled that international organizations, such as the World Bank Group's financing arm, the International Finance Corporation, can be sued in US federal courts for conduct arising from their commercial activities. It specifically held that international organizations shared the same sovereign immunity as foreign governments. This was a reversal from existing jurisprudence, which held that international organizations had near-absolute immunity from lawsuits under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the International Organizations Immunities Act.
Kim Dong-shik was a Korean-American Protestant minister who went missing in China in January 2000. His missionary and humanitarian work in China had involved aiding North Korean defectors there, and evidence eventually emerged that the North Korean regime was responsible for his disappearance. In 2015, a U.S. federal court awarded damages to his family after determining that Kim had likely died in a North Korean prison camp after being abducted from China by North Korean operatives who regarded Kim's activities as a threat to the regime.
Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act with its 2008 amendments, whether plaintiffs in federal lawsuits against foreign countries may seek punitive damages for cause of actions prior to enactment of the amended law, with the specific case dealing with victims and their families from the 1998 United States embassy bombings. The Court ruled unanimously in May 2020 that punitive damages can be sought from foreign nations in such cases for preenactment conduct.
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran was a 2004 case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit related to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The DC Circuit Court ruled that while 1996 amendments in FSIA made exceptions from sovereign immunity for states known for supporting state-sponsored terrorism, as listed by the State Department, foreign nations were still immune from private cause of action, preventing lawsuits from private individuals levied at the state based on such terrorism. As a result of this ruling, Congress significantly amended FSIA in 2008 to greatly expand the exceptions from sovereign immunity for state-sponsored terrorism and specifically allowing for causes of actions against foreign countries.