This article needs to be updated.(May 2018) |
The term aggravated felony was used in the United States immigration law to refer to a broad category of criminal offenses that carry certain severe consequences for aliens seeking asylum, legal permanent resident status, citizenship, or avoidance of deportation proceedings. Anyone convicted of an aggravated felony and removed from the United States "must remain outside of the United States for twenty consecutive years from the deportation date before he or she is eligible to re-enter the United States." [1] The supreme court ruled 5-4 in Sessions v. Dimaya that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague limiting the term. [2]
When the category of "aggravated felonies" was first added to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1988, as a response to heightened concerns about drug abuse, it encompassed only murder and trafficking in drugs or firearms. [3] The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) both tremendously expanded the category. AEDPA added crimes related to gambling and passport fraud; IIRIRA added a great many more crimes, including certain crimes of a sentence of at least a year regardless of whether the sentence had been suspended.
The following chart lists all past aggravated felonies (as of 2018, not updated with information from Sessions v. Dimaya):
Letter Grade | 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) |
---|---|
(A) | murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; |
(B) | illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18); |
(C) | illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title); |
(D) | an offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000; |
(E) | an offense described in — (i) section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials offenses); (ii) section 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18 (relating to firearms offenses); or (iii) section 5861 of title 26 (relating to firearms offenses); |
(F) | a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; |
(G) | a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; |
(H) | an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom); |
(I) | an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography); |
(J) | an offense described in section 1962 of title 18 (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed; |
(K) | an offense that — (i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business; (ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18 (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or (iii) is described in any of sections 1581–1585 or 1588–1591 of title 18 (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); |
(L) | an offense described in — (i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18; (ii) section 421 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or (iii)section 421 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents); |
(M) | an offense that — (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000; |
(N) | an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter; |
(O) | an offense described in section 1325(a) or 1326 of this title committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph; |
(P) | an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of title 18 or is described in section 1546(a) of such title (relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter; |
(Q) | an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more; |
(R) | an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; |
(S) | an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; |
(T) | an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed; and |
(U) | an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph. |
The definition of aggravated felony has significantly expanded since its inception in 1988. A series of amendments have expanded its reach to the point that an aggravated felony need not be aggravated, nor a felony, to trigger the consequences of such a conviction. In United States of America v. Winston C. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3rd Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the respondent's 1990 petit larceny, a Class A misdemeanor with a maximum of one year imprisonment under New York law, constitutes an aggravated felony. [4]
This case requires us to determine whether a misdemeanor can be an "aggravated felony" under a provision of federal law even if it is not, technically speaking, a felony at all. The particular question before us is whether petit larceny, a class A misdemeanor under New York law that carries a maximum sentence of one year, can subject a federal defendant to the extreme sanctions imposed by the "aggravated felon" classification. Despite our misgivings that, in pursuit of a clearly defined legislative goal (to severely punish unlawful reentry into this country), a carelessly drafted piece of legislation has improvidently, if not inadvertently, broken the historic line of division between felonies and misdemeanors, we conclude that Congress was sufficiently clear in its intent to include certain crimes with one-year sentences in the definition of "aggravated felony"... [5]
— Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
In Lopez v. Gonzales , 549 U.S. 47 (2006), the Supreme Court ruled that because immigration law is under the control of the federal government, the definitions of any terms on the aggravated felony list comes from federal law, not state law. This holding calls into question the result in Graham because under federal law a crime must be punishable by imprisonment for a term "exceeding" one year in order to be considered an aggravated felony, otherwise it is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), Congress explains that the term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year does not include ... any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less."
In Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U.S. 1 (2004), the Court ruled that driving under the influence is not an aggravated felony if the DUI statute that defines the offense does not contain a mens rea element or otherwise allows a conviction for merely negligent conduct.
In Popal v. Gonzales , 416 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania simple assault does not constitute crime of violence under 18 USC § 16(a) and is therefore not an aggravate felony. [6]
In Sessions v. Dimaya , The Supreme Court struck down the "residual clause", which classified every felony that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk" of "physical force against the person or property" as an aggravated felony
An alien convicted of an aggravated felony may not:
At the same time, any alien convicted of an aggravated felony is automatically subject to expedited removal intended to ensure that the deportation occurs as soon as the alien is released from prison after serving the sentence imposed for the underlying crime. These deportation orders are not subject to review by the federal courts, although federal courts have ruled that they may determine which crime constitutes an aggravated felony.
IIRIRA required that any alien convicted of an aggravated felony must be detained while awaiting removal, resulting in the detention of far more aliens than before the Act took effect. In Demore v. Kim , 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court ruled that the mandatory detention provision of IIRIRA was constitutional.
A related use of the term "aggravated felony" comes in the context of the definition of the crime of illegal reentry into the United States following deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the corresponding sentencing enhancement provided by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It is a crime for an alien to illegally enter or without be found without permission in the United States after that alien has been deported. The maximum sentence for this crime is 2 years; however, if that deportation follows a conviction for an aggravated felony, the maximum sentence increases to 20 years.
Furthermore, the guideline that corresponds to this crime typically doubles or triples the sentence the alien would otherwise have received if the deportation follows conviction for an aggravated felony. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court held that this increased maximum sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
The consequences of making a crime an aggravated felony are far reaching. One major consequence is that, unlike the deportability ground for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), aggravated felonies do not have to be committed within five years after admission into the U.S. to give rise to deportability. (E.g. a Lawful Permanent Resident who was admitted into the U.S. as a small child and who commits an aggravated felony at age 60 becomes deportable).
Some aggravated felonies make a person deportable without regard to the actual or potential sentence attached to the conviction. For details, see list of aggravated felonies in the chart at the top.
A felony is traditionally considered a crime of high seriousness, whereas a misdemeanor is regarded as less serious. The term "felony" originated from English common law to describe an offense that resulted in the confiscation of a convicted person's land and goods, to which additional punishments, including capital punishment, could be added; other crimes were called misdemeanors. Following conviction of a felony in a court of law, a person may be described as a felon or a convicted felon.
A misdemeanor is any "lesser" criminal act in some common law legal systems. Misdemeanors are generally punished less severely than more serious felonies, but theoretically more so than administrative infractions and regulatory offences. Typically, misdemeanors are punished with prison time of no longer than one year, monetary fines, or community service.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, made major changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). IIRAIRA's changes became effective on April 1, 1997.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court written by Justice Stephen Breyer which confirmed that a sentencing enhancement for a prior felony conviction was not subject to the Sixth Amendment requirement for a jury to determine the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), held that aliens may not be deported after being convicted of DUI if the DUI statute that defines the offense does not contain a mens rea element or otherwise allows a conviction for merely negligent conduct.
Cancellation of removal is a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States that allows some aliens who are in removal proceedings, who have lived in the United States for a long period of time and meet certain other conditions, to apply to remain in the United States and have the removal proceedings terminated. Cancellation of removal was crafted by the U.S. Congress to replace "suspension of deportation," a similar form of relief available prior to April 1, 1997.
At law, criminal deportation is where a person is ordered deported or physically removed from a country by reason of such alien's criminal conduct.
Moral turpitude is a legal concept in the United States, and until 1976 in Canada, that refers to "an act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment or accepted standard of the community". This term appears in U.S. immigration law beginning in the 19th century. Moral turpitude laws typically deal with legal, judicial, and business related transgressions. Moral turpitude laws should not be confused with laws regarding social morality, violations of which are more commonly called public order, morality, decency, and/or vice crimes.
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), held that an "aggravated felony" includes only conduct punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act, regardless of whether state law classifies such conduct as a felony or a misdemeanor. Under federal law, there are two main consequences of having a prior conviction for an "aggravated felony." One is that, if the convicted person is an alien, he will be deported. The other is that, with respect to certain federal crimes, a prior conviction for an aggravated felony provides a sentencing enhancement. In this case, Lopez had been convicted of conduct that was a felony under South Dakota law but was a misdemeanor under federal law. Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this conviction could not serve as a basis for deporting him.
California criminal law generally follows the law of the United States. However, there are both substantive and procedural differences between how the United States federal government and California prosecute alleged violations of criminal law. This article focuses exclusively on California criminal law.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), is a United States Supreme Court case involving habeas corpus and INA § 212(c) relief for deportable aliens.
In the United States, removal proceedings are administrative proceedings to determine an individual's removability under federal immigration law. Removal proceedings are typically conducted in Immigration Court by an immigration judge (IJ).
The Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–416, 108 Stat. 4305, enacted October 25, 1994, was an act by the United States Congress "to amend title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act to make changes in the laws relating to nationality and naturalization." Introduced by Romano Mazzoli, the act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act by allowing the acquisition of United States citizenship from either parent for persons born abroad to parents, only one of whom is a United States citizen.
Charles Hopel Brown, is a US Army veteran and computer engineer. After leaving Robert Lightbourne High School, where he was a member of the cadet corp, he then became a police cadet and later enlisted in the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF).
Expedited removal is a process related to immigration enforcement in the United States where an alien is denied entry to and/or physically removed from the country, without going through the normal removal proceedings. The legal authority for expedited removal allows for its use against most unauthorized entrants who have been in the United States for less than two years. Its rollout so far has been restricted to people seeking admission and those who have been in the United States for 14 days or less, and excludes first-time violators from Mexico and Canada.
Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the decision in Johnson v. United States announced a substantive rule change and is therefore retroactive.
Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. 452 (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided the interpretation of section 1101(a)(43) of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which includes "aggravated felony" as a possible reason for deporting a non-citizen. The INA specifies certain offenses described in the federal criminal code as qualifying as an aggravated felony. The question before the court was if the plaintiff Jorge Luna Torres, who had been convicted under a state arson statute mostly identical to the federal statute but lacking an interstate or foreign commerce element in the federal law, fell under this definition of aggravated felony. The Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit original decision: the difference was merely "jurisdictional", and Torres still qualified for the accelerated deportation process described under the INA.
Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), a statute defining certain "aggravated felonies" for immigration purposes, is unconstitutionally vague. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) classifies some categories of crimes as "aggravated felonies", and immigrants convicted of those crimes, including those legally present in the United States, are almost certain to be deported. Those categories include "crimes of violence", which are defined by the "elements clause" and the "residual clause". The Court struck down the "residual clause", which classified every felony that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk" of "physical force against the person or property" as an aggravated felony.
Rape laws vary across the United States jurisdictions. However, rape is federally defined for statistical purposes as:
Penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim.
United States v. Palomar-Santiago, No. 20-437, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the three requirements under which a deportation order may be dismissed, as listed in 8 USC § 1326(d). The question brought before the Court was whether Palomar-Santiago may be excused from meeting all three requirements, given that the offense he was initially deported for was subsequently found no longer deportable. The Court held that all three requirements must be met in order to dismiss a deportation order.