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In economics,a network effect is the phenomenon by which the value or utility a user derives from a good or service depends on the number of users of compatible products. Network effects are typically positive feedback systems,resulting in users deriving more and more value from a product as more users join the same network. The adoption of a product by an additional user can be broken into two effects:an increase in the value to all other users and also the enhancement of other non-users' motivation for using the product.
An auction is usually a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bids,taking bids,and then selling the item to the highest bidder or buying the item from the lowest bidder. Some exceptions to this definition exist and are described in the section about different types. The branch of economic theory dealing with auction types and participants' behavior in auctions is called auction theory.
A Dutch auction is one of several similar types of auctions for buying or selling goods. Most commonly,it means an auction in which the auctioneer begins with a high asking price in the case of selling,and lowers it until some participant accepts the price,or it reaches a predetermined reserve price. This type of price auction is most commonly used for goods that are required to be sold quickly such as flowers,fresh produce,or tobacco. A Dutch auction has also been called a clock auction or open-outcry descending-price auction. This type of auction shows the advantage of speed since a sale never requires more than one bid. It is strategically similar to a first-price sealed-bid auction.
An online auction is an auction held over the internet and accessed by internet connected devices. Similar to in-person auctions,online auctions come in a variety of types,with different bidding and selling rules.
Wanda J. Orlikowski is a US-based organizational theorist and Information Systems researcher,and the Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Information Technologies and Organization Studies at the MIT Sloan School of Management,Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Bid rigging is a fraudulent scheme in a procurement action which enables companies to submit non-competitive bids. It can be performed by corrupt officials,by firms in an orchestrated act of collusion,or by officials and firms acting together. This form of collusion is illegal in most countries. It is a form of price fixing and market allocation,often practiced where contracts are determined by a call for bids,for example in the case of government construction contracts. The typical objective of bid rigging is to enable the "winning" party to obtain contracts at uncompetitive prices. The other parties are compensated in various ways,for example,by cash payments,or by being designated to be the "winning" bidder on other contracts,or by an arrangement where some parts of the successful bidder's contract will be subcontracted to them. In this way,they "share the spoils" among themselves. Bid rigging almost always results in economic harm to the agency which is seeking the bids,and to the public,who ultimately bear the costs as taxpayers or consumers.
Auction theory is a branch of applied economics that deals with how bidders act in auctions and researches how the features of auctions incentivise predictable outcomes. Auction theory is a tool used to inform the design of real-world auctions. Sellers use auction theory to raise higher revenues while allowing buyers to procure at a lower cost. The confluence of the price between the buyer and seller is an economic equilibrium. Auction theorists design rules for auctions to address issues that can lead to market failure. The design of these rulesets encourages optimal bidding strategies in a variety of informational settings. The 2020 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson "for improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats."
A multiunit auction is an auction in which several homogeneous items are sold. The units can be sold each at the same price or at different prices.
A combinatorial auction is a type of smart market in which participants can place bids on combinations of discrete heterogeneous items,or “packages”,rather than individual items or continuous quantities. These packages can be also called lots and the whole auction a multi-lot auction. Combinatorial auctions are applicable when bidders have non-additive valuations on bundles of items,that is,they value combinations of items more or less than the sum of the valuations of individual elements of the combination.
A reverse auction is a type of auction in which the traditional roles of buyer and seller are reversed. Thus,there is one buyer and many potential sellers. In an ordinary auction also known as a forward auction,buyers compete to obtain goods or services by offering increasingly higher prices. In contrast,in a reverse auction,the sellers compete to obtain business from the buyer and prices will typically decrease as the sellers underbid each other.
Anindya Ghose is an Indian-born American academic,and the Heinz Riehl Chair Professor of Business at New York University's Stern School of Business and the director of the Masters of Business Analytics &AI program at NYU Stern. He is the author of TAP:Unlocking The Mobile Economy which is a double winner in the 2018 Axiom Business Book Awards and has been translated into five languages. He is a Leonard Stern Faculty Scholar with an MBA scholarship named after him. He has been a visiting professor at the Wharton School of Business. In 2014 he was named by the blog Poets and Quants as one of the "Top 40 Professors Under 40 Worldwide" and by Analytics Week as one of the "Top 200 Thought Leaders in Big Data and Business Analytics". In 2017 he was recognized by Thinkers50 as one of the Top 30 Management Thinkers globally most likely to shape the future of how organizations are managed and led in the next generation. Thinkers50 also bestowed the Distinguished Achievement Award Nomination for 'Digital Thinking' in 2017. In 2019,he was recognized by Web of Science citation Index in the top 1% of researchers selected for their significant influence in their fields over a 10-year period (2008-2018). He is a recipient of the prestigious INFORMS ISS Distinguished Fellow Award,given to recognize individuals who (i) have made outstanding intellectual contributions to the discipline with publications that have made a significant impact on theory,research,and practice and (ii) intellectual stewardship of the field as reflected in the mentoring of doctoral students and young researchers. His rise from assistant to full professor in 8.5 years at NYU Stern is widely regarded as one of the fastest in the history of the entire Information Systems,operations and Marketing academic disciplines in business schools globally.
John Leslie King is a W.W. Bishop Professor at the University of Michigan School of Information. His main works deal with computerization in the public sector and municipalities,as well as other organizations. He has also worked on privacy issues and some of the primary computerization projects such as project SAGE. He is the author of Information systems:the state of the field,published by Wiley in 2006,which,according to WorldCat,is held in 126 libraries. He is a former editor-in-chief of Information Systems Research.
An ‘‘‘electronic bidding system ‘‘‘is an electronic bidding event according to defined negotiation rules (eAgreement). A buyer and two or more suppliers take part in this online event.
Business management tools are all the systems,applications,controls,calculating solutions,methodologies,etc. used by organizations to be able to cope with changing markets,ensure a competitive position in them and improve business performance.
The economics of digitization is the field of economics that studies how digitization,digitalisation and digital transformation affects markets and how digital data can be used to study economics. Digitization is the process by which technology lowers the costs of storing,sharing,and analyzing data. This has changed how consumers behave,how industrial activity is organized,and how governments operate. The economics of digitization exists as a distinct field of economics for three reasons:it studies a world that is digital,exponential and combinatorial. First,new economic models are needed because digital goods have very low or even zero marginal costs unlike most traditional goods,thus many traditional assumptions no longer hold in a digitized world. Second,the rate of improvement of computers,networks and other engines of digitization,is exponential,as reflected by Moore's Law. Third,digital goods can easily be combined and recombined,increasing their value not only via networks and platforms,but also novel combinations. Each of these effects is important individually,but together they have synergies and constitute a distinct economic landscape.
Maria Gini is an Italian and American Computer Scientist in artificial intelligence and robotics. She has considerable service to the computer science artificial intelligence community and for broadening participation in computing. She was Chair of the ACM Special Interest Group in Artificial Intelligence SIGAI from 2003 to 2010. She is currently a member of the CRA-W board.
A user review is a review conducted by any person who has access to the internet and publishes their experience to a review site or social media platform following product testing or the evaluation of a service. User reviews are commonly provided by consumers who volunteer to write the review,rather than professionals who are paid to evaluate the product or service. User reviews might be compared to professional nonprofit reviews from a consumer organization,or to promotional reviews from an advertiser or company marketing a product. Growth of social media platforms has enabled the facilitation of interaction between consumers after a review has been placed on online communities such as blogs,internet forums or other popular platforms.
Wolfgang Ketter is Chaired Professor of Information Systems for a Sustainable Society at the University of Cologne. and a prominent scientist in the application of artificial intelligence,machine learning and intelligent agents in the design of smart markets,including demand response mechanisms and in particular automated auctions. He is a co-founder of the open energy system platform Power TAC,an automated retail electricity trading platform that simulates the performance of retail markets in an increasingly prosumer- and renewable-energy-influenced electricity landscape.
Ann Majchrzak is an American academic. She is a Professor of Digital Innovation in the Department of Data Sciences and Operations within the USC Marshall School of Business. Majchrzak holds the USC Associates Chair in Business Administration.
Ravi Bapna is an Indian-born American data scientist,digital transformationalist,business academic,executive educator and speaker. He is the Curtis L. Carlson Chair in Business Analytics and Information Systems,the Associate Dean for Executive Education and the Academic Director of the Carlson Analytics Lab and the Analytics for Good Institute at the University of Minnesota’s Carlson School of Management.
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- ↑ Granados, Nelson; Gupta, Alok; Kauffman, Robert (March 2006). "The Impact of IT on Market Information and Transparency: A Unified Theoretical Framework". Journal of the Association for Information Systems. 7 (3): 148–178. doi:10.17705/1jais.00083.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bichler, Martin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang (December 2010). "Research Commentary —Designing Smart Markets". Information Systems Research. 21 (4): 688–699. doi:10.1287/isre.1100.0316. hdl: 1765/32046 .[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Gupta, Alok; Jukic, Boris; Stahl, Dale O.; Whinston, Andrew B. (June 2011). "An Analysis of Incentives for Network Infrastructure Investment Under Different Pricing Strategies". Information Systems Research. 22 (2): 215–232. doi:10.1287/isre.1090.0253.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Zhang, Jingjing; Adomavicius, Gediminas; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang (March 2020). "Consumption and Performance: Understanding Longitudinal Dynamics of Recommender Systems via an Agent-Based Simulation Framework" (PDF). Information Systems Research. 31 (1): 76–101. doi:10.1287/isre.2019.0876.[ non-primary source needed ]
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- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok (January 2003). "Analysis and Design of Business-to-Consumer Online Auctions". Management Science. 49 (1): 85–101. doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.1.85.12754.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok; Karuga, Gilbert (September 2002). "Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytical, Empirical, and Computational Insights*". Decision Sciences. 33 (4): 557–578. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.2002.tb01656.x.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Adomavicius, Gediminas; Gupta, Alok; Zhdanov, Dmitry (December 2009). "Designing Intelligent Software Agents for Auctions with Limited Information Feedback". Information Systems Research. 20 (4): 507–526. doi:10.1287/isre.1080.0172.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok; Karuga, Gilbert (August 2008). "Predicting Bidders' Willingness to Pay in Online Multiunit Ascending Auctions: Analytical and Empirical Insights". INFORMS Journal on Computing. 20 (3): 345–355. doi:10.1287/ijoc.1070.0247.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ "A Data-Driven Exploration of Bidder Strategies in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions".[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok (2000). "A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions". Information Technology and Management. 1: 1–23. doi:10.1023/A:1019100419867.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok (December 2001). "Comparative analysis of multi-item online auctions: evidence from the laboratory". Decision Support Systems. 32 (2): 135–153. doi:10.1016/S0167-9236(01)00107-5.[ non-primary source needed ]
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- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok (September 2003). "Replicating Online Yankee Auctions to Analyze Auctioneers' and Bidders' Strategies". Information Systems Research. 14 (3): 244–268. doi:10.1287/isre.14.3.244.16562.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Adomavicius, Gediminas; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab (January 2008). ""Design and Evaluation of Feedback Schemes for Multiattribute Procureme" by Gediminas Adomavicius, Alok Gupta et al". Icis 2008 Proceedings.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Chang, Seokjoo Andrew; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok (2009). "Overlapping Online Auctions: Empirical Characterization of Bidder Strategies and Auction Prices". MIS Quarterly. 33 (4): 763–783. doi:10.2307/20650326. JSTOR 20650326.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Adomavicius, Gediminas; Curley, Shawn P.; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab (September 2013). "User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms: Role of information feedback". Journal of Operations Management. 31 (6): 489–503. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2013.07.015.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Adomavicius, Gediminas; Gupta, Alok (June 2005). "Toward Comprehensive Real-Time Bidder Support in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions". Information Systems Research. 16 (2): 169–185. doi:10.1287/isre.1050.0052.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Adomavicius, Gediminas; Curley, Shawn P.; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab (2013). "Impact of Information Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Study of Economic Performance". MIS Quarterly. 37 (1): 55–76. doi:10.25300/MISQ/2013/37.1.03. JSTOR 43825937.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Adomavicius, Gediminas; Curley, Shawn P.; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab (April 2012). "Effect of Information Feedback on Bidder Behavior in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions". Management Science. 58 (4): 811–830. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1443.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heck, Eric (2016). "Exploring Bidder Heterogeneity in Multichannel Sequential B2B Auctions". MIS Quarterly. 40 (3): 645–662. doi:10.25300/MISQ/2016/40.3.06. JSTOR 26629031.
- ↑ Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heck, Eric (August 2019). "Dynamic Decision Making in Sequential Business-to-Business Auctions: A Structural Econometric Approach". Management Science. 65 (8): 3853–3876. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3118.
- ↑ Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heck, Eric (10 April 2017). Information Transparency in B2B Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure (Report). hdl:1765/98970. SSRN 2949785.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heck, Eric (28 February 2022). "Designing Hybrid Mechanisms to Overcome Congestion in Sequential Dutch Auctions". MIS Quarterly. 46 (1): 457–490. doi:10.25300/MISQ/2022/16472.[ non-primary source needed ]
- ↑ Bapna, Ravi; Goes, Paulo; Gupta, Alok; Jin, Yiwei (2004). "User Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Electronic Auction Market Design: An Empirical Exploration". MIS Quarterly. 28 (1): 21–43. doi:10.2307/25148623. JSTOR 25148623.
- ↑ Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heck, Eric (10 April 2017). Information Transparency in B2B Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure (Report). hdl:1765/98970. SSRN 2949785.
- ↑ "The Design Science Award – INFORMS".
- ↑ "Information Systems Society President's Service Award".
- ↑ "ISS Practical Impacts Award – INFORMS".
