Ashe v. Swenson

Last updated

Ashe v. Swenson
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 13, 1969
Decided April 6, 1970
Full case nameBob Fred Ashe, Petitioner v. Harold R. Swenson, Warden
Citations397 U.S. 436 ( more )
90 S. Ct. 1189; 25 L. Ed. 2d 469; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 54
Holding
The Double Jeopardy Clause embodies collateral estoppel as a constitutional requirement. Where a jury bases a judgment of acquittal on a finding that the defendant did not participate in the offense charged, this issue may not be relitigated in another trial.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II  · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall
Case opinions
MajorityStewart, joined by Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, White, Marshall
ConcurrenceBlack
ConcurrenceHarlan
ConcurrenceBrennan, joined by Douglas, Marshall
DissentBurger
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958)

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a state from relitigating a question already decided in favor of a defendant at a previous trial. Here, the guarantee against double jeopardy enforceable through the Fifth Amendment provided that where the defendant was acquitted of robbing one victim, the government could not prosecute the criminal defendant in a second trial for a different victim in the same robbery.

Contents

Background

After a group of masked robbers committed armed robbery of a poker game in Lee's Summit, Missouri, Bob Fred Ashe was indicted on six separate counts of committing an armed robbery of one of the six players. At trial, a jury returned a general verdict of not guilty "due to insufficient evidence". Six weeks later, Ashe was brought to trial for the robbery of another of the poker players. This time, a prosecution witness who did not confidently identify Ashe as a robber was not called, and several witnesses expressed greater confidence that Ashe was the robber. [1] At the conclusion of the trial, Ashe was found guilty and sentenced to thirty-five years.

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding no former jeopardy violation. After the federal district court denied habeas corpus relief, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Supreme Court

Ashe petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, which was granted. [2] His case before the Supreme Court was presented pro bono by noted Washington attorney and former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford. The state's case was argued by Gene E. Voigts, First Assistant Attorney General of Missouri. [3]

The Supreme Court concluded from the record of the prior trial that the "single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether [Ashe] had been one of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not. The federal rule of law, therefore, would make a second prosecution for the robbery . . . wholly impermissible."

Because the first jury, by its verdict, had rejected the claim that Ashe was one of the robbers, the Supreme Court held that the State could not "constitutionally hail him before a new jury to litigate that issue again."

See also

Further reading

Related Research Articles

In jurisprudence, double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prevents an accused person from being tried again on the same charges following an acquittal or conviction and in rare cases prosecutorial and/or judge misconduct in the same jurisdiction. Double jeopardy is a common concept in criminal law - in civil law, a similar concept is that of res judicata. The double jeopardy protection in criminal prosecutions only bars an identical prosecution for the same offence, however, a different offence may be charged on identical evidence at a second trial. Res judicata protection is stronger - it precludes any causes of action or claims that arise from a previously litigated subject matter.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating rights related to criminal prosecutions

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied all but one of this amendment's protections to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, also called judgmentnon obstante veredicto, or JNOV, is a type of judgment as a matter of law that is sometimes rendered at the conclusion of a jury trial.

Collateral estoppel (CE), known in modern terminology as issue preclusion, is a common law estoppel doctrine that prevents a person from relitigating an issue. One summary is that, "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision ... preclude[s] relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case". The rationale behind issue preclusion is the prevention of legal harassment and the prevention of overuse or abuse of judicial resources.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Acquittal</span> The legal result of a verdict of not guilty

In common law jurisdictions, an acquittal means that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge presented. It certifies that the accused is free from the charge of an offense, as far as criminal law is concerned. The finality of an acquittal is dependent on the jurisdiction. In some countries, such as the United States, an acquittal prohibits the retrial of the accused for the same offense, even if new evidence surfaces that further implicates the accused. The effect of an acquittal on criminal proceedings is the same whether it results from a jury verdict or results from the operation of some other rule that discharges the accused. In other countries, like Australia and the UK, the prosecuting authority may appeal an acquittal similar to how a defendant may appeal a conviction — but usually only if new and compelling evidence comes to light or the accused has interfered with or intimidated a juror or witness.

Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962), was a Supreme Court ruling that upheld the protection from double jeopardy by the federal government. While the protection from double jeopardy did not get incorporated to apply to the state governments until 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prevented the Federal Government from bringing a defendant to trial twice for the same charge. In this case, the court ruled that despite the error of the District Judge, the 5th Amendment protected the defendants from facing a second trial for the same charge.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating due process rights

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates several constitutional rights, limiting governmental powers focusing on criminal procedures. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that, because of the doctrine of "dual sovereignty", the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit one state from prosecuting and punishing somebody for an act of which they had already been convicted of and sentenced for in another state.

United States criminal procedure derives from several sources of law: the baseline protections of the United States Constitution; federal and state statutes; federal and state rules of criminal procedure ; and state and federal case law. Criminal procedures are distinct from civil procedures in the US.

United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that "a[n]…offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes." The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's reversal of Felix's conviction, finding that the Court of Appeals read the holding in Grady v. Corbin (1990) too broadly.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." The four essential protections included are prohibitions against, for the same offense:

Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from successive prosecutions by states and municipalities for offenses based on the same criminal conduct.

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not entitle a defendant in a criminal trial to refuse to provide details of his alibi witnesses to the prosecution, and that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to have 12 members.

Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Massachusetts two-tier court system did not deprive Ludwig of his U.S. Const., Amend. XIV right to a jury trial and did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Const., Amend. V.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States constitutional criminal procedure</span> United States constitutional criminal procedure

The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.

Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. 5 (2016), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States clarified the application of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause to cases in which a jury returns irreconcilable verdicts that convict a defendant on one count and acquit a defendant on another count when both counts rely upon the same ultimate fact.

Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified the limits of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of counts that a jury had previously unanimously voted to acquit on, when a mistrial is declared after the jury deadlocked on a lesser included offense.

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court decision that clarified both the scope of the protection against double jeopardy provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the limits of an appellate court's discretion to fashion a remedy under section 2106 of Title 28 to the United States Code. It established the constitutional rule that where an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause shields the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense. Notwithstanding the power that appellate courts have under section 2106 to "remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances," a court that reverses a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence may not allow the lower court a choice on remand between acquitting the defendant and ordering a new trial. The "only 'just' remedy" in this situation, the Court held, is to order an acquittal.

Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646, 587 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case about the separate sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which allows both federal and state prosecution of the same crime as the governments are "separate sovereigns". Terance Martez Gamble was prosecuted under both state and then federal laws for possessing a gun while being a felon. His argument that doing so was double jeopardy was found unpersuasive due to the exception. In June 2019, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision 7–2, with the majority opinion stating that there was not sufficient cause for overturning the dual sovereignty doctrine.


Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U. S. 356 (1972), was a court case in the U.S. Supreme Court involving the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Louisiana law that allowed less-than unanimous jury verdicts to convict persons charged with a felony, does not violate the Due Process clause. This case was argued on a similar basis as Apodaca v. Oregon.

References

  1. Edmiston, Robert Ruyle (1971). "Ashe v. Swenson: A New Look at Double Jeopardy". Tulsa Law Review. 7 (1): 68–73.
  2. Ashe v. Swenson,393U.S.1115(1969).
  3. Ashe v. Swenson, 397U.S.436 , 437(1970).