Chavez v. Martinez

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Chavez v. Martinez
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 4, 2002
Decided May 27, 2003
Full case nameBen Chavez v. Oliverio Martinez
Citations538 U.S. 760 ( more )
123 S. Ct. 1994; 155 L. Ed. 2d 984
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
PluralityThomas, joined by Rehnquist (in full); O'Connor (Parts I and II-A); Scalia (Parts I and II)
PluralitySouter, joined by Breyer (Part I and II); Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg (Part II)
ConcurrenceScalia (in judgment)
Concur/dissentStevens
Concur/dissentKennedy, joined by Stevens (in full); Ginsburg (in part)
Concur/dissentGinsburg

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which held that a police officer does not deprive a suspect of constitutional rights by failing to issue a Miranda warning. However, the court held open the possibility that the right to substantive due process could be violated in certain egregious circumstances and remanded the case to the lower court to decide this issue on the case's facts.

Contents

A complex series of concurrences and dissents were filed, many partially joined by various justices. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the court, finding that no constitutional rights were violated. However, the only opinion to gain the votes of a majority of the court was Part II of Souter's concurrence, which consisted of a direction to the lower court to consider the substantive due process claims on remand.

Background

In 1997, during an altercation with the police in Oxnard, California, the respondent Martinez was shot five times. He was very seriously injured. The police officer's supervisor—the petitioner, Chavez—arrived at the scene around the same time as the paramedics. He rode in the ambulance with Martinez and accompanied him into the hospital. Throughout this time, Martinez was often conscious but in great distress, repeatedly stating that he was dying and requesting treatment. Without informing Martinez of his Miranda rights, Chavez sporadically interviewed Martinez about the incident over a period of 45 minutes. Martinez survived the incident, but was partially paralyzed and left blind. [1] He was never charged with a crime and his answers were never used against him in any criminal prosecution. [2]

Martinez sued Chavez in a §1983 action alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated. The district court found that Chavez had violated at least two of Martinez's clearly established rights: the 5th Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself and his 14th Amendment right not to be subjected to coercive questioning. Because of this violation, the district court held that Chavez was not entitled to qualified immunity. The 9th Circuit affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

Opinion

Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion.

Fifth Amendment

Thomas opinion

The Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” We fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. [3]

Although Martinez contends that the meaning of “criminal case” should encompass the entire criminal investigatory process, including police interrogations, we disagree. In our view, a “criminal case” at the very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings. We need not decide today the precise moment when a “criminal case” commences; it is enough to say that police questioning does not constitute a “case” any more than a private investigator’s precomplaint activities constitute a “civil case.” Statements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs. [3]

Here, Martinez was never made to be a “witness” against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case. Nor was he ever placed under oath and exposed to “`the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.'” The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the Ninth Circuit’s view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the Constitution. [3]

Although our cases have permitted the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in noncriminal cases, that does not alter our conclusion that a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. [3]

Related Research Articles

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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restricts prosecutors from using a person's statements made in response to interrogation in police custody as evidence at their trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them.

The right to silence is a legal principle which guarantees any individual the right to refuse to answer questions from law enforcement officers or court officials. It is a legal right recognized, explicitly or by convention, in many of the world's legal systems.

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Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that law enforcement officers and other public employees have the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. It gave birth to the Garrity warning, which is administered by investigators to suspects in internal and administrative investigations in a similar manner as the Miranda warning is administered to suspects in criminal investigations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating due process rights

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Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. Until Schmerber, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police officers must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. Likewise, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood evidence taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution.

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Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court considered the position of a suspect who understands their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona and is aware that they have the right to remain silent, but does not explicitly invoke or waive the right.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a lineup held after indictment.

Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution's Sixth Amendment barred the admission, in a joint trial, of a non-testifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant, even if the defendant's own confession was admitted against him.

McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court determined that Kansas' Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) served a vital penological purpose and determined that allowing minimal incentives to take part in the SATP does not equal compelled self-incrimination as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. There were three main points to the case that were used to determine the SATPs were constitutional as summarized by the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA). These included the distinct findings that, “[t]he SATP in Kansas is supported by the legitimate penological objective of rehabilitation”, that, “the fact that Kansas does not offer immunity or privilege in response to statements made by participants does not render the SATP invalid under the [fifth] amendment”, and that the, “consequences that follow for nonparticipation, do not, under the Kansas plan, combine to create compulsion, thereby infringing upon the participant’s [fifth] amendment right”. Due to the plurality of the case, no singular decision was held as a majority.

References

  1. "permanently blinded and paralyzed from the waist down" Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764 (2003)
  2. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764 (2003)
  3. 1 2 3 4 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 766, 767 (2003)