In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "the father of Miranda."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that law enforcement in the United States must warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, or else the person's statements cannot be used as evidence at their trial. Specifically, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government cannot use a person's statements made in response to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.
The right to silence is a legal principle which guarantees any individual the right to refuse to answer questions from law enforcement officers or court officials. It is a legal right recognized, explicitly or by convention, in many of the world's legal systems.
Ernesto Arturo Miranda was an American laborer whose criminal conviction on kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery charges based on his confession under police interrogation was set aside in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, which ruled that criminal suspects must be informed of their right against self-incrimination and their right to consult with an attorney before being questioned by police. This warning is known as a Miranda warning.
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that struck down the police practice of first obtaining an inadmissible confession without giving Miranda warnings, then issuing the warnings, and then obtaining a second confession. Justice David Souter announced the judgment of the Court and wrote for a plurality of four justices that the second confession was admissible only if the intermediate Miranda warnings were "effective enough to accomplish their object." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in a concurring opinion that the second confession should be inadmissible only if "the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning."
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that law enforcement officers and other public employees have the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. It gave birth to the Garrity warning, which is administered by investigators to suspects in internal and administrative investigations in a similar manner as the Miranda warning is administered to suspects in criminal investigations.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates several constitutional rights, limiting governmental powers focusing on criminal procedures. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court that ruled that a person in police custody following a misdemeanor traffic offense was entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment pursuant to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Previously, some courts had been applying Miranda only to serious offenses.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that police may re-open questioning of a suspect who has asked for counsel if there has been a 14-day or more break in Miranda custody. The ruling distinguished Edwards, which had not specified a limit.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court considered the position of a suspect who understands their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona and is aware that they have the right to remain silent, but does not explicitly invoke or waive the right.
In United States criminal law, a custodial interrogation is a situation in which the suspect's freedom of movement is restrained, even if they are not under arrest.
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court declined to overturn a state court's conclusion that a minor was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his police interview. Michael Alvarado helped his friend Paul Soto steal a truck in Santa Fe Springs, California. The truck owner was killed by Soto during the robbery and Alvarado was convicted of second-degree murder for his role in the crime. The evidence for Alvarado's conviction was primarily based on statements given by Alvarado during a two-hour police interrogation that occurred when Alvarado's parents brought him to the police station. Alvarado was 17 years old and was not read his Miranda rights before questioning. During Alvarado's murder trial in a state court, motions to suppress the statements given by Alvarado were denied on the ground that Alvarado was not in police custody at the time of the interrogation and thus did not have to be read his Miranda rights. Alvarado appealed his conviction, claiming that the determination that he was not in custody was incorrect because the courts did not take his age into account.
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply in custody rulings for Miranda.
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court considered whether a police officer's subjective and undisclosed opinion whether a person who had been questioned was a suspect was relevant in determining whether that person had been in custody and thus entitled to the Miranda warnings. In a 9–0 ruling, the Court reversed and remanded the case. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that "an officer's subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment [of] whether the person is in custody."
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined that it is not necessary to provide full Miranda warnings to a person called to testify before a grand jury; and that false statements given during that testimony may not be suppressed in a subsequent prosecution for perjury.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 US 582 (1990), is a U.S. Supreme Court case involving the Self-incrimination Clause of the 5th Amendment and the meaning of “testimonial” under the 5th Amendment. A drunk-driving suspect, Muniz, made several incriminating statements while in police custody, and the Supreme Court held that only one of these statements was inadmissible because it was incriminating and testimonial. This testimonial statement was the suspect’s confused response when the police officer asked him for the date when he turned six years old. The other statements were admissible because they either counted as physical evidence for 5th Amendment purposes or fell under the routine booking exception to Miranda v. Arizona.
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that held that undercover police agents did not need to give Miranda warnings when talking to suspects in jail. Miranda warnings, named after the 1966 Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, are generally required when police interrogate suspects in custody in order to protect the right not to self-incriminate and the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. However, the Court ruled that potential coercion must be evaluated from the suspect's point of view, and if they are unaware that they are speaking to police, they are not under the coercive pressure of a normal interrogation.
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012), was a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that an interrogation of a prisoner was not a custodial interrogation per se, and certainly it was not "clearly established federal law" that it was custodial, as would be required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Instead, the Court said, whether the interrogation was custodial depended on the specific circumstances, and moreover, in the particular circumstances of this case, it was not custodial. This decision overturned the rule of the Sixth Circuit, and denied the prisoner's habeas corpus petition.
Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. ___ (2022), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held, 6–3, that an officer's failure to read Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody does not alone provide basis for a claim of civil liability under Section 1983 of United States Code. In the case, the Court reviewed its previous holding of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) to determine whether respondent Carlos Vega violated plaintiff Terence Tekoh's constitutional rights by failing to read Tekoh his Miranda rights prior to interrogation. Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the six-justice majority that Tekoh's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, as Miranda rights are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution."
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the language requirements for Miranda warnings. In the case, a suspect was advised of his right to consult with an attorney before questioning, as well as his right to consult with an attorney at any time during questioning. However, he was not advised of his right to the physical presence of an attorney during questioning.
