Begay v. United States | |
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Argued January 15, 2008 Decided April 16, 2008 | |
Full case name | Larry Begay v. United States |
Docket no. | 06-11543 |
Citations | 553 U.S. 137 ( more ) 128 S. Ct. 1581; 170 L. Ed. 2d 490; 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3474; 76 U.S.L.W. 4228; 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 188; 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4462, 2008 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5389 |
Case history | |
Prior | Writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 470 F.3d 964. |
Holding | |
Felony driving while intoxicated is not a “violent felony” within meaning of section of the Armed Career Criminal Act imposing special mandatory 15-year prison term upon felons who unlawfully possess a firearm and who have three or more convictions for violent felonies. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Breyer, joined by Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg |
Concurrence | Scalia (in judgment) |
Dissent | Alito, joined by Souter, Thomas |
Laws applied | |
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) |
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that felony driving while intoxicated is not a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Larry Begay had multiple felony convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in New Mexico. He was found to be in possession of a firearm when he was arrested by the local police in a domestic incident. [1]
Under federal law it is illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. [2] Begay pleaded guilty in federal court to unlawful possession of a firearm. The pre-sentencing report showed that Begay had been convicted twelve times of DUI. Under New Mexico law, each DUI conviction after the first three was considered a felony. [3] [4]
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico concluded that DUI was a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, [5] thereby triggering that Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the decision to treat the DUIs as "violent felonies." [6]
In a 6–3 vote, the Court held that DUI was not a "violent felony" because the crime was too different from the violent felony examples provided by Congress in the Armed Career Criminal Act (such as burglary, arson and extortion). Therefore, Begay should not have been subject to the mandatory sentencing hike.
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion with Justice Scalia concurring. Justice Alito dissented, with Justices Thomas and Souter, joining. [7]
A felony is traditionally considered a crime of high seriousness, whereas a misdemeanour is regarded as less serious. The term "felony" originated from English common law to describe an offense that resulted in the confiscation of a convicted person's land and goods, to which additional punishments including capital punishment could be added; other crimes were called misdemeanors. Following conviction of a felony in a court of law, a person may be described as a felon or a convicted felon.
In the United States, habitual offender laws have been implemented since at least 1952, and are part of the United States Justice Department's Anti-Violence Strategy. These laws require a person who is convicted of an offense and who has one or two other previous serious convictions to serve a mandatory life sentence in prison, with or without parole depending on the jurisdiction. The purpose of the laws is to drastically increase the punishment of those who continue to commit offenses after being convicted of one or two serious crimes.
Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it illegal to possess a gun for individuals previously "convicted in any court" of crimes for which they could have been sentenced to more than one year in prison. The Court ruled, in a five to three decision, that "any court" does not include those in foreign countries. This decision resolved a circuit split on the issue, and reversed the lower ruling of the Third Circuit that the law did apply to foreign convictions.
Mandatory sentencing requires that offenders serve a predefined term of imprisonment for certain crimes, commonly serious or violent offenses. Judges are bound by law; these sentences are produced through the legislature, not the judicial system. They are instituted to expedite the sentencing process and limit the possibility of irregularity of outcomes due to judicial discretion. Mandatory sentences are typically given to people who are convicted of certain serious and/or violent crimes, and require a prison sentence. Mandatory sentencing laws vary across nations; they are more prevalent in common law jurisdictions because civil law jurisdictions usually prescribe minimum and maximum sentences for every type of crime in explicit laws.
Project Exile is a federal program started in Richmond, Virginia, in 1997. Project Exile shifted the prosecution of illegal technical gun possession offenses to federal court, where they carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in federal prison under the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, rather than in state court. Note that federal law provides for a penalty of ten years in federal prison for being a "prohibited person", i.e., a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, as well as for falsifying information in order to obtain one, or furnishing a gun to a convicted felon.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), is one of two cases upholding a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law against a challenge that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As in its prior decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court could not agree on the precise reasoning to uphold the sentence. But, with the decision in Ewing and the companion case Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court effectively foreclosed criminal defendants from arguing that their non-capital sentences were disproportional to the crime they had committed.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision that filled in an important gap in the federal criminal law of sentencing. The federal criminal code does not contain a definition of many crimes, including burglary, the crime at issue in this case. Yet sentencing enhancements applicable to federal crimes allow for the enhancement of a defendant's sentence if he has been convicted of prior felonies. The Court addressed in this case how "burglary" should be defined for purposes of such sentencing enhancements when the federal criminal code contained no definition of "burglary." The approach the Court adopted in this case has guided the lower federal courts in interpreting other provisions of the criminal code that also refer to generic crimes not otherwise defined in federal law.
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that attempted burglary could serve as a predicate felony under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which provided that a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm with three prior convictions for either serious drug offenses or violent felonies must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum 15-year prison term.
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the 6–3 majority, ruled that although the elements of a crime may not be considered "serious," sentence enhancements related to a defendant's prior record will bear on how the determination is made.
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) is a United States federal law that provides sentence enhancements for felons who commit crimes with firearms if they are convicted of certain crimes three or more times. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter was a key proponent for the legislation.
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that failing to report for incarceration does not qualify as a "violent felony" for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Loss of rights due to criminal conviction refers to the practice in some countries of reducing the rights of individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offence. The restrictions are in addition to other penalties such as incarceration or fines. In addition to restrictions imposed directly upon conviction, there can also be collateral civil consequences resulting from a criminal conviction, but which are not imposed directly by the courts as a result of the conviction.
Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that addressed the mandatory sentencing increase under federal law for the possession or use of a deadly weapon in drug trafficking and violent crimes. In an 8–0 decision, the Court ruled that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which required a minimum five-year prison sentence, was to be imposed in addition to any other mandatory sentence given for another crime, including the underlying drug-related or violent offense. The only exception to the five-year addition applied only when another provision required a longer mandatory term for conduct violating §924(c) specifically, rather than a mandatory sentence for another crime as the defendants had unsuccessfully argued.
Daniels v. United States, 531 U.S. 374 (2001), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court ruled, in a 5–4 decision, that a defendant sentenced under that Act could not challenge previous convictions on appeal that were used to increase his new sentence.
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled the Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague and in violation of due process.
Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the decision in Johnson v. United States announced a substantive rule change and is therefore retroactive.
Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that state robbery offenses that involve overcoming victim resistance count as "violent felonies" under the definition of that term under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, even when only 'slight force' is required. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, defendants with three or more violent felonies can face higher sentences when subsequently convicted of a federal firearms-related offense. This case upheld a ruling by the 11th Circuit.
Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), is an opinion of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, the definition of “serious drug offense” only requires that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute. Unlike other provisions of the ACCA, it does not require that state courts develop “generic” version of a crime, which describe the elements of the offense as they are commonly understood, and then compare the crime being charged to that generic version to determine whether the crime qualifies under the ACCA for purposes of penalty enhancement. The decision states that offenses defined under the ACCA are "unlikely names for generic offenses," and are therefore unambiguous. This renders the rule of lenity inapplicable.
Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the classification of prior convictions for "violent felony" in application of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); the ACCA provides for enhanced sentencing for convicted criminals with three or more such felonies in their history. In a 5–4 decision in June 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that crimes resulting from reckless conduct should not be considered as a "violent felony" for the purposes of the ACCA.
Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. ___ (2022), was a Supreme Court of the United States case dealing with the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In a unanimous decision, the court ruled that multiple criminal offenses that a person commits during a single criminal episode do not count as separate convictions when considering the number of prior convictions a criminal has under the ACCA.